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ABSTRACT
GUIDED BY GOD: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND POLITICAL 
LEGITIMACY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Steven B. Shirley 
Old Dominion University, 2003 
Director: Dr. Qiu Jin
The developing world is witnessing a growing (some may say disturbing) 
trend towards "de-secularization" of national governments. This trend has been 
understudied and misunderstood over the past decade. Government experts and scholars 
alike too often view this trend through the lens of "threat" analysis and in so doing 
miss key cultural, historical, and political factors at work. This study attempts to redress 
this problem. By looking at political legitimacy and the role religious organizations such 
as the Catholic Church may play, a new understanding of how religious institutions can 
shape and mold governments and policies emerges.
This study focuses specifically on the Republic o f the Philippines and the Catholic 
Church. The rationale is that Philippines is one o f the most interesting and intriguing 
nation-states in which to study the dynamics between the Church and State. In no other 
Southeast Asian nation-state can one find a relationship with both the historical and 
cultural gravitas that exists between the Philippine Catholic Church and secular 
government. It is a relationship that spans almost five hundred years. Indeed, 
understanding how the Church uses its power to legitimize and make illegitimate 
politicians and regimes is a study in power, politics, and religion, all couched in the 
context of a Southeast Asian nation with its own unique cultural attributes.
Through the use o f historical analysis and contemporary case studies this study 
details for the reader the evolution o f Church power and influence and its effects on the
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legitimacy of Philippine governments. Built on the foundation of Weberian legitimacy 
and the Eastonian idea of support, the study includes a look at the personalities behind 
the Church’s power, the methods that led to two People Power revolutions, and the 
consequences o f the de-secularization on the Philippines.
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This work is dedicated to the people o f the Philippines and of Asia, whose culture 
and arts I have studied for so many years.
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On January 20, 2001, television sets across Manila beamed images o f hundreds of 
thousands of protestors converging in and around Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) 
in metropolitan Manila. Those protestors gathered in the shadow of the EDSA shrine— a 
statue o f the Virgin Mary located at the intersection of EDSA that had come to represent 
the power of democracy and the victory over the totalitarianism o f Ferdinand E. Marcos 
in the first People Power Revolution of 1986. Yet this was not 1986 and Marcos had 
long since passed into history. On this day the Church had a new target: the allegedly 
corrupt President Joseph “Erap” Estrada.
At 3:30 p.m. the Archbishop of Manila and de facto head of the Philippine 
Catholic Church, Jaime Cardinal Sin, announced through a loudspeaker and the Church- 
owned radio station Veritas that several top government officials who had in previous 
days supported Estrada had defected. Sin, a familiar face o f the opposition both against 
martial law and Marcos, once again came to the defense o f political morality in the 
Philippines and called for Estrada’s resignation. Sin and the thousands gathered at EDSA 
knew that Estrada’s own departure was imminent. It was a poignant scene, the hierarchy 
of the Catholic Church leading the protests and joined in hand with secular personalities. 
Both were being supported and cheered by the masses assembled at the feet o f the Virgin 
Mary. Sin and the others came to worship, to pray, and to depose a constitutionally 
elected president.
In the days leading up to the mass protests at EDSA, threats o f nonviolent action 
made politicians apprehensive. Word came to their offices that the average citizen and 
organized political groups were rallying their forces against the president. Included in
This thesis follows the style and format of A Manual for Writers o f  Term Papers, Theses, 
and Dissertations by Kate Turabian.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2
these groups were the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilino (Kompil), the Bagong 
Alyansang Makabayan, the Estrada Resign Movement, and most importantly, the 
Philippine Catholic Church. The Church’s history in toppling regimes and the fact that its 
membership was spread throughout each of the other anti-Estrada organizations made it 
particularly relevant and an authentic threat to Estrada.1
The Catholic Church flexed its political muscle when its leadership called on the 
faithful to come to the EDSA shrine in a show of solidarity, and hundreds o f thousands 
poured into the streets in response. Once there, they were treated to speeches and 
pronouncements made by the Church hierarchy, including Cardinal Sin, that were 
intended to encourage and prepare the crowds for a long vigil. That vigil would not end 
until Estrada was convicted by the Philippine Senate and ejected from office; or he 
voluntarily agreed to step down and hand power to the Church’s hand-picked successor, 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
If Estrada was unwilling or the Philippine Senate did not have the courage to 
convict Estrada on the impeachment charges brought against him, then the Church was 
prepared for action. These preparations included calls for mass protests at EDSA, 
coupled with efforts to build coalitions between business leaders, Church officials, and 
politicians sympathetic to their cause. Plans were made to ensure that both Estrada and 
his regime would be rendered illegitimate and that the protestors assembled would be 
protected from possible military reprisals ordered by Estrada, who prior to January 20, 
2001, still held the Philippine military’s loyalty.
Estrada had powerful political allies and there was little hope that the Senate 
would convict him. The fear o f a rigged trial in the Senate prompted the Catholic 
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) to call for “a miracle” and “prayer” in
1 Norman Boradador and Pablo Carlito, “Anti-Erap Groups Plan for People Power 
II,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 16, 
2001; accessed 1 September2001).
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hopes of influencing the Senator-judges to abandon their political allegiances and vote 
Estrada out. In the past the CBCP, organized in 1945 to give voice to catholic concerns, 
had played a role in furthering national unity, coordinating and organizing Filipino 
Catholics in education, promoting social welfare, and initiating political action.
Orlando Quevedo, Archbishop o f Nueva Segovia and member of the CBCP, 
summed up the concerns about Estrada’s likely impeachment: “God’s grace works 
quietly in the depths of conscience. Still, the door of conscience must be open to God’s 
grace."2 The Church left no doubt that in their minds that Estrada had lost the moral 
basis to govern and the legitimacy he once enjoyed. Estrada may have cowed the Senate, 
but the Church held the street. The Church’s leaders promised to fight his corrupt 
presidency with more than prayers if  he was allowed to stay. They were prepared to use 
extended and massive “extralegal. . .  civil disobedience."3
In the end the Senate did not convict, failing by one vote to move forward with 
the impeachment charges. The Church made good on its warning.4 The crowds at the 
EDSA shrine swelled and became so massive they spilled into surrounding areas, filling 
up nearby Ortigas Avenue, the parking lots o f the SM Megamall, and places as far away 
as Camp Aguinaldo. Those individuals who answered the Church’s call represented a 
cross-section of Philippine society and industry, from labor to the federal bureaucracy, 
militant groups, religious organizations, and even university students who walked out of 
their classes to make their voices heard. Those voices were not just heard in Manila.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4On the twenty-third day of the impeachment trial, the Senate voted on whether or 
not to open second envelope, which purportedly held concrete evidence o f Estrada’s 
crimes. By a margin o f only one vote, the senators supporting Estrada successfully 
blocked the opening o f the documents. The 11-10 margin was decried in the press, and in 
the Senate, Estrada’s victory was short lived. In just more than 48 hours he was forced 
from office.
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Throughout the Philippines, from Zamboanga in the south to Cebu in the Yisayas, tens of 
thousands of demonstrators engaged in anti-Estrada rallies.
Many military and police personnel were overwhelmed and unprepared for the 
number of protestors. At first they tried to control the crowds and maintain the 
barricades, but in a matter o f days they too were overcome by the spirit o f the movement. 
Media on the scene captured images o f the military and police sent to contain the rallies 
extending their hands in solidarity with the protestors.
Efforts by the Church to build a visible coalition paid off. Powerful and 
charismatic politicians united themselves with the Church. Former president Corazon 
Aquino, a longtime supporter and beneficiary o f the first People Power revolution whose 
story and connection to the Church is told in chapters 4 and 5, stood with her longtime 
friend and advisor Cardinal Sin. Fidel Ramos, a Protestant, former president, one-time 
antagonist o f the Catholic Church, and target o f EDSA rallies in the past, was also in 
attendance. All o f them were there to show the world the power and solidarity o f the 
Philippine people who refused to tolerate corruption in their midst.
The Church’s coalition also spanned political and religious lines, winning the 
support o f business and industry both in Manila and throughout the Philippines. These 
businesses allowed their workers to take the days off and answer the Catholic Church’s 
call for a People Power II. Many businesses also supplied food and water to the 
thousands who were at EDSA.
Viewing the masses assembled against him, Estrada and his few remaining allies 
realized that salvaging his presidency was politically hopeless. The crowd at EDSA 
signified outrage and shame directed toward his administration. The protestors 
represented a society that was fed up with corruption and tired of turning a blind eye to 
the president’s peccadilloes. Estrada was out o f time and out o f options.
On Saturday, January 20,2001, Estrada left Malacanang, the home of the 
president, by boat. That same day, the Supreme Court o f the Philippines declared the
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presidency vacant. Through the force o f People Power II, the Philippine Catholic Church 
proved to the world that it remained a political force to be reckoned with.
The first days o f the new century witnessed the end of the brief Estrada 
presidency and the emergence of the Philippine Catholic Church’s potent political power. 
People Power II, recounted in further detail in chapter 6, was a potent and concrete 
example of how the Catholic Church remained a force o f political change. As it had done 
on many occasions in the past, the Church challenged the legitimacy o f a constitutionally 
elected government and was successful in enforcing its political will.
The Philippine Catholic Church remains today one of the few institutions with the 
organization, the leadership, and the moral substance to launch a crusade against a 
corrupt president. It is the only institution in the Philippines with the power to declare a 
president legitimate or illegitimate and do so through peaceful means. The Church 
certainly did not act alone, but it succeeded where the Senate failed and politicians were 
powerless. Even when public opinion was running against the Catholic Church’s 
pressure, it proved invaluable and influential in forcing the removal o f President Estrada 
and the coronation o f his successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
People Power II and the Church’s work in bringing down Estrada are the latest in 
a series o f events that illustrate the role the Church historically played in the Philippines 
as a force of governmental legitimacy. It is a role overlooked in traditional international 
relations literature, comparative political studies, and writings on legitimacy. This study 
is one step in helping highlight the Church’s role, not merely as a social or political force, 
but as one of the key mediating factors in legitimating governments in the Philippines.
Studying governmental legitimacy is important because legitimacy shapes the 
effectiveness o f governance, the scope, pace, and method o f political change, and the 
international conduct o f the state. By maximizing political obligation, legitimacy greatly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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enhances the viability o f rulership.5 The Church, playing the key role in this legitimacy, 
is therefore an important unit o f study with consequences that stem well beyond simple 
unit level analysis.
If substantial studies existed recounting the happenings o f People Power II and 
the influence of the Church within this movement, then the need for this study would be 
less urgent. The same would be true if  current legitimacy theory dealt adequately with 
religious organizations like the Church. If less developed countries were utilized as case 
studies when Church-State issues were researched, then this study o f the Philippine 
Catholic Church and its role as the force o f legitimacy would be less intriguing.
Unfortunately, these studies do not exist. No current research examines the 
specific role o f the Catholic Church as a legitimizing force in the Philippines, and no 
literature addresses the corollary between legitimacy and the Catholic Church in the 
context of People Power II. All of this makes this particular study timely, relevant, and 
important to international relations literature.
This study also has two great advantages over previous studies. For one, it serves 
as an excellent source of information on the role o f the Church in the Philippines. No 
single study has ever highlighted the dynamic relationship that exists between the Church 
and State in the Philippines, nor looked at it with a historian’s eye and a political 
scientist’s analysis. It is at the same time applicable to the larger trends such as de­
secularization taking place in world politics today. Indeed, throughout Southeast Asia, 
the Middle East, and other areas, governments are coming to grips with new political 
realities, among them the fresh injection o f religion into the political dialogue and affairs 
of secular governments.
Politicians and citizens around the world are waking everyday to the reality that 
religious-based governments such as the Taliban are not the political anathema that one
5Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for  
Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3-4.
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might think, and in fact such diverse locations as the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey, 
Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Egypt, and a host o f others, secular 
governments are clashing head to head with the religious hard liners in their own 
countries.
In some countries they are able to deal with them and work together relatively 
peacefully, but in each o f these examples there have been times when violence ruled the 
day, and it was a violence often precipitated by the religious leadership. By examining 
the Philippines, and the Catholic Church’s role in political legitimacy, a model is given 
through which the role o f other religious institutions can be dissected, laid open, studied, 
and understood within the context o f political legitimacy. It is the author’s hope that the 
study can be a guide for others who wish to take up the understanding o f religious groups 
in other less studied areas o f the world, and in the process add to the greater 
understanding o f the world in which we all share.
To begin a study o f this nature, one must have a basis from which to understand 
how the Church can “fit” into a society like the Philippines. Simply stating that the 
Church is influential is not sufficient. An intellectual framework or theory is needed so 
that the correlation and causation between the variables can be determined. Until now, 
studies o f legitimacy and legitimacy theory have not offered sufficient explanations of the 
substantive role for an organization like the Catholic Church. Moreover, few 
contemporary studies address the role o f religion in the legitimacy of lesser-developed 
nation-states, and classical studies o f state legitimacy do not adequately address the 
theoretical contemporary role religious organizations like the Church play in twenty-first- 
century politics.
The absence of this material creates a sizable gap in the intellectual framework of 
comparative politics, Philippine studies, international relations, and especially legitimacy 
studies. This is an unacceptable situation, because understanding legitimacy as a 
dependent variable requires understanding the independent variables that impact it.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Evidence uncovered in this study will testify to the role of the Catholic Church as a 
legitimizing force in the Philippines. Whether it is the main independent variable or 
merely a mediating factor will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
This study begins by posing and attempting to answer several important questions 
and challenges to current legitimacy theory: (1) What is legitimacy and how, if  at all, 
does it deal with the role o f a social institution such as the Catholic Church? (2) What do 
the major theoretical texts in legitimacy theory have to say about how legitimacy is 
established, and what, if  any, intellectual space do they set aside for a body such as the 
Catholic Church to operate within? (3) Is legitimacy theory incomplete and 
consequently, can it allow for a religious institution like the Catholic Church to be an 
important variable in legitimacy? (4) Is a rethinking of the legitimacy paradigm needed?
(5) Can the function of the Catholic Church in legitimacy transcend a singular theory?
(6) Historically, how did the Catholic Church become the force o f legitimacy in the 
Philippines? (5) What do the events o f People Power II tell us about the Church’s 
responsibility in legitimating today’s Philippine government and its continued role in the 
future?
We must first address the ways scholars from a variety o f fields, including 
political science, international relations, cultural anthropology, and sociology, have all 
contributed to the development o f legitimacy theory. Those scholars’ differing 
intellectual backgrounds have not resulted in radically different ideas about legitimacy. In 
fact, from the works o f classical philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau to modem 
theorists like Seymour Martin Lipset, the elements of legitimacy remain relatively 
constant. Variety is found in the ways these elements are operationalized and the 
language used to define them, not in the essence o f their meaning.
As a theory, legitimacy is unlike the Realist, Marxist, or Dependency schools of 
thought in which the boundaries, variables, and causational pathways are clearly marked. 
The independent variables in legitimacy can be many things, depending on the author’s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
worldview. A few things are constant, such as all definitions including nods to power 
and authority, but the ways these variables are constituted is subject to debate. For 
example, Rodney Barker offers this concise definition of legitimacy: “The belief in the 
rightfulness o f a state in its authority to issue commands so that the command be obeyed 
not simply out of fear or self interest, but because they are believed to have moral 
authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey.”6
Barker’s definition of legitimacy is well delineated, but it does not explain how 
the state issuing the commands received the mandate to do so, nor does it identify the 
actions the state takes to remain legitimate. Where does this “moral authority” come 
from? How does any individual, regime, or government in Barker’s definition gain and 
keep its power and authority? The answer to these questions is contentious and subject to 
debate among scholars, and no common agreement exists across all schools o f thought.
A more common source, such as Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 
says simply that legitimacy is “the quality or state o f being legitimate . . .  in accordance 
with law or with established legal forms or requirements . . .  conforming to recognized 
principles or accepted rules and standards . . .  .”7 Again, like Barker, this definition 
clearly identifies what a legitimate authority might look like, but not how the authority 
gains its legitimate status. Moreover, what individual or group sets the “accepted rules 
and standards”?
A graphic visualization of the legitimacy process may help simplify the variety of 
definitions. Fortunately, in the majority of studies the conceptualization o f legitimacy is 
simplified into an easily discemable binary model: Legitimacy (dependent variable or 
Yi) and Forces Imparting Legitimacy (independent variable or Xi). This idea is 
graphically illustrated in figure 1.
6Rodney S. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 11.
n
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1969), s.v. “legitimacy.”
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What complicates the issue is determining what Xi may be, and it is on this point 
that the disagreement among scholars arises. While these same scholars work to identify 
the ways and means by which governments become legitimate, none of them give 
adequate attention to social organizations such as the Catholic Church. Therein lies the 
incongruence and incompleteness of legitimacy studies.
Fig. 1. Graphical Representation of Legitimacy: Legitimacy (Dependent Variable or Yi) 
and Forces Imparting Legitimacy (Independent Variable or Xi).
Using a standard quantitative model to illustrate the causal pathway for legitimacy 
is not part of this study. Analyzing the Church-State relationship in legitimacy is not a 
mathematical undertaking. Quite the contrary, it is a qualitative relationship that requires 
qualitative types o f research. The closest this study comes to using quantitative methods 
is drawing on public opinion data to show the level and strength of support for certain 
institutions and individuals in Philippine political and social culture. However, in this 
instance and later in the chapter, use of the quantitative-type graphical model to visualize 
the relationship between variables is ideal for helping illustrate legitimacy in nation­
Xi
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states. It is particularly helpful in explaining how the Catholic Church influences the 
process.
In addition to lacking definitional succinctness, the concept o f the Church’s role 
in legitimacy has been understudied and lacks a substantial amount o f case studies to 
guide current research. This is particularly evident in relation to emerging nation-states 
such as the Philippines, a fact made clear in Muthia Alagappa’s 1995 pivotal work, 
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority. Alagappa’s study 
highlights two reasons why this may be the case. The first is a lack of interest from Third 
World specialists in the state-society relationship, which includes the role o f a religious 
institution such as the Catholic Church. Instead, these specialists, most often from one of 
three dominant theoretical fields (Marxist, Political Development, and Dependency 
Theory), are concerned with other areas in their intellectual inquiry.8
Marxists view the state as an instrument o f class rule, a guarantor of production 
relations, or an arena for class struggle. They advocate the overthrow of the sociopolitical 
order and its replacement with more egalitarian socialist systems. Social relationships, 
particularly those that include cultural variables in developing nations, are o f little 
importance to Marxist theorists in their paradigmatic view. Because of this, Marxism is 
less concerned with the social dynamics behind why non-Marxist governments remain 
legitimate. Ideally, a Marxist government is legitimate because it exists at the behest of 
the proletariat—who serve as both the citizenry and the government—and on the orthodox 
Marxist ideology that seeks to neither exploit nor depress the masses. In simplified terms, 
legitimacy in Marxism has two independent variables at play, Xi and X2 (see figure 2).
To Marxists, there is simply no general need to study the social dynamics unique 
to the culture of a nation-state, because the principles of Marxism will emerge supreme in 
the end no matter which culture one is from. Moreover, any role a social-spiritual
g
Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, 4-5.
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organization such as the Catholic Church may play is irrelevant. As a representative of 
the “opiate o f the masses,” the Church and all it represents will pass with the rise of the 
state.
Xi -Proletariat X2 -Ideology
Fig. 2. Graphical Representation o f Marxist Legitimacy
Political Development theorists tend to be concerned with the goals o f economic 
growth and distribution, as well as the preconditions and transitions o f democracy, 
political order, and stability. If a religious organization can be used to further the cause 
of economic growth and distribution it is an added bonus, but the organization itself is 
still of little consequence. They also posit a linear model in which traditional societies 
develop into modem ones with no deviation. Economic growth is the primary means of  
achieving modernization and democracy, but until the model is mature, proponents 
advocate a strong autonomous center with domination based on power.
Modeling Political Development for legitimacy is simple, because Political 
Development theorists really only have one independent variable: economic growth (see 
figure 3). Within that variable itself there are many fine points, such as equity of 
distribution, sustainability, and other factors. However, those factors are less pertinent to 
a legitimacy model. It seems that if economic growth can be sustained, then a 
government has a high probability of maintaining its legitimacy.




Fie. 3. Political Development’s Legitimacy
Evidence of this approach is seen in studies o f East Asian nations, such as Japan’s 
strong state-controlled industrial sector, South Korea’s planned economy, and the neo- 
Marxist-capitalist blend emerging out o f the People’s Republic o f China. Each case 
represents a strong autonomous government moving towards a Western style of 
government. Japan has matured and reached the end of the linear spectrum. South Korea 
has progressed more recently with its new democratic constitution in 1988 and the 
election of Kim Dae-Jung in 1998. China has just begun this transition following the 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s.
Interaction between the dominant power base and social institutions is not 
highlighted or emphasized. It seems a church or group can help move the traditional 
society along its path to modernity, but just how that would happen and what effects it 
would have on modernization remains unclear. Based on the case studies used to prove 
political development hypotheses, it appears that what is important is not religious 
institutions, but secular state controls o f economies and unified cultures. The Church 
may be able to find a role in this theory, but it would be minimal at best.
The Dependency schools try to combine Marxism and nationalism, emphasizing 
the dependent character of lesser-developed countries’ economies and the need to break
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bonds with the capitalist order. According to Alagappa, the Dependency school believes 
the solution to the social ills created by capitalism requires the overthrow and 
replacement o f capitalism by socialism and breaking the bonds o f internationalism.9
Illustrating the Dependency view o f legitimacy requires at least three independent 
variables: unified nationalism, socialist economy, and internal focus (see figure 4). If a 
government can help foster or achieve all three—or at least appear to endorse all three- 
then it is likely to be legitimate in the eyes of a Dependency theorist. Consequently, 
Dependency-based studies of nation-states such as the Philippines would overlook 
inherent cultural variables and social institutions like the Catholic Church and their role 
in legitimacy, discounting their importance in favor of finding a nationalist trend within 
the political milieu. That environment favors the rejection o f internationalism and any 
extraterritorial forces meddling in the internal affairs of the state.
Xu-Internal FocusXi-Nationalism
Fig. 4. The Dependency School’s View of Legitimacy
Arguing for the inclusion rather than against the omission o f the Catholic Church 
in these disciplines begins by addressing the universality of the statements found in 
Marxism, Political Development, and Dependency Theory. The same could be done for 
any of the major theories that overlook the role o f religious institutions in legitimacy.
9Ibid., 5.
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Logically, a universal statement may be invalidated if one example can be produced 
contradicting the contention’s universality. Furthermore, just because it is difficult to 
establish a cause and effect relationship does not mean that these relationships do not 
exist. Issues should not be abandoned and considered useless because o f difficulty. 
Legitimacy studies that include a Church-State relationship should not be sacrificed on 
the altar o f parsimony.
The second reason Alagappa suggests for the Church’s omission from legitimacy 
studies is the belief among social scientists that legitimacy itself is a weak social science 
concept.10 The weakness stems from legitimacy’s perceived limited explanatory power 
as a concept and the difficulty of operationalizing the term. Alagappa highlights the 
Marxist, Political Development, and Dependency schools, all o f which look for other 
ways of explaining the state’s legitimacy while shying away from religious variables, for 
which it may be difficult to find evidence of cause and effect relationships.11 However, 
further examination of legitimacy shows that it is no less valuable as a concept than 
others, and indeed may offer certain inherent strengths to help understand nation-states.
Even legitimacy’s harshest critics admit that “while legitimacy [theories] cannot 
predict precisely when a regime change will occur, [they are] nevertheless useful in 
drawing attention to trends in the degree o f support enjoyed by particular governments 
and regimes.”12 Legitimacy may be complex and difficult to grasp, but such is the case 
with most o f social science. Even calling the study of societies a “science” can lead to 
trouble, given that science is an exact discipline. Including a variable such as the 
Catholic Church in these studies can only give the researcher another tool and another 
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Social science’s inexact nature also supports the supposition that to fully 
understand legitimacy requires space for social or religious institutions like the Catholic 
Church. The definitional fluidity and intellectual openness makes these types of 
legitimacy studies exciting and engaging. Indeed, this is why studies like this 
examination of the Philippine Catholic Church’s role can take on wider significance. 
These studies are relevant not only as legitimacy studies, but also as illustrations o f the 
growing political power o f religious groups, charismatic leadership, and the reemergence 
of old institutions in the new realities o f power politics.
Before we examine the new realities o f power politics, we need to look at how the 
idea of governmental legitimacy developed. One of the first times the modem question 
of legitimacy was critically addressed was in the Hobbesian doctrine o f liberalism, or 
more precisely, with the reconciliation of the problem of state power and individual 
rights.13 Although Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) did not coin the word “legitimacy,” nor 
was he the first to delve into how humanity can create a sovereign governmental regime 
with the power to command and be obeyed, his theoretical concern for how a government 
or “leviathan” could be created by popular consent was vital to Western political thought 
and the notion o f a mling regime needing the consent o f the governed.
In Western political theory the individual, tribe, or clan gives up a certain level o f 
personal freedom to a larger governmental order in exchange for security. This exchange 
of personal freedom for group sovereignty is seen as a small price to pay for a measure of 
personal security that would not otherwise be possible in the state o f nature. Just as Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau’s stag hunt analogy illustrated, members of a group working together 
are more likely to achieve a substantive goal than individuals working alone.14
13Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1965), passim.
14Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, trans. Maurice Cranston 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1984), passim.
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Hobbes’s leviathan represents the government; of a nation-state that is invested 
with a level o f authority and thus power from the members of the leviathan’s group. As 
such, it acts according to the leviathan’s mandates but also has the freedom to dictate 
behaviors circumscribed by the group and authorized to it through voluntary acquisition 
by its members.
The Eastern tradition of legitimacy is quite different. Acting on a more 
supernatural basis, Asian societies tend to view man’s natural state in different terms. 
Man is not inherently bad, his life is not necessarily brutish or short, and he does not have 
inherent freedoms fully enjoyed in the state of nature. Man instead operates in a 
hierarchical world, whether he submits to this order or not. The doctrines of Confucius, 
Mencius, Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, and others point to this phenomenon. The ruler is invested 
with power and legitimacy, not from the people, but from “heaven” or some other 
intangible origin that he may answer to directly. He is given a mandate. If he is a just 
ruler, then he retains the mandate. If he is an unjust ruler, then he is in danger of losing 
this mandate.
In Southeast Asia, rulers went a step further in identifying themselves and even 
their governmental structures with the supernatural world. In the ancient Khmer Empire, 
entire cities were built to represent Hindu cosmology.15 By constructing these structures, 
the ruler himself gained legitimacy from inhabiting its corridors and being God’s 
representative on earth. People obeyed the leader and his government as any human 
would obey a god.
15Angkor Thom and Angkor Wat, both in Cambodia, are prime examples. Both 
the city and the temple complex were built to represent the Hindu view of the universe. 
By building such monumental architecture, the Khmer kings hoped to foster a belief that 
they and the gods they sought to honor were one and the same. They were seen as god- 
kings, and their legitimacy was realized in this fact and in the very buildings they 
constructed.
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By the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the traditional elements of 
legitimacy found in East and Southeast Asian societies began to fall into disuse, replaced 
by the more Western idea of the social contract. For example, by 1911, the last emperor 
o f China abdicated and the “mandate o f heaven” was replaced by a modem republic. Yet 
not all elements of the supernatural have been eliminated in every sector. Chinese 
thought may still revolve around the idea of a “mandate,” even in its communist-based 
society. South Korea is still very much a Confucian society, Japan retains ascetic 
elements that continue the code o f bushido, and in societies such as the Philippines, 
charismatic leaders and organizations still hold considerable influence over the 
populations. Moreover, although the vote may decide the ruler today instead o f a “god” 
or any other source, the religious organizations operating within these societies have a 
direct impact on the voting behavior o f a sizable segment o f the population.
In contrast to these Asian ideas, Hobbes’s strength rested in how he clearly raised 
the idea o f the necessity of a government to have consent, active or passive, if  it was to 
work at all. Hobbes, however, did not address the question of governmental effectiveness, 
or whether the particular government was effective in delivering on promises it made to 
the people. Moreover, he did not effectively address the role of social institutions like the 
Catholic Church in helping to form or maintain the Leviathan. In the modem world, 
with its ever-expanding layers o f government, institutions play an increasing role as 
power brokers between the people and their governments.
While Hobbes had the idea in theory, Charles Maurice Talleyrand (1754-1838) 
was one of the first people to use and define legitimacy in practice. His use and 
definition of the word centered on the description o f the political situation o f European 
nation-states in relation to one another in the post-Napoleonic world, providing a clear 
demarcation as to what types o f governments were considered legally legitimate and what 
types were not acceptable. Talleyrand himself was an ordained priest, becoming bishop 
of Autun in 1789 before rising to secular political power in nineteenth-century France.
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For much of his career, Talleyrand exemplified the marriage between the Church and the 
State. With such a religious pedigree, could Talleyrand ignore the Church in legitimizing 
governments? Yes, he could and he did.
Talleyrand’s ideas o f legitimacy, at least those he espoused while he was France’s 
foreign minister, left little place for the role o f the Catholic Church in government.
While he himself enjoyed the power of his position due in large part to the opportunities 
afforded by his involvement in a very political Catholic Church, he did not extend these 
powers when he was in a position to do so.16 Instead, Talleyrand believed legitimate 
states included those with elected and parliamentary governments, such as Great Britain 
and the hereditary governments of Spain, Austria, and Russia. Those states that were not 
legitimate in Talleyrand’s eyes included the Napoleonic regime, which gained its political 
power through violence, aggression, and subversion, rather than from legal, popular 
consent or through descent, lineage, or tradition.17
Consideration for the role o f the Church was miniscule. It was still powerful, 
particularly among the monarchy of Spain, but the religious ceremony and the trappings 
of a kingly coronation were all that really remained in most European states. Real power 
now rested in the hands o f the strongest military, the greatest navy, the ability to keep the 
treasury full, and a standard of living for the population that prevented the sorts of 
revolutions that Europe witnessed in France and in its American colonies. Indeed, this
16 Philip G. Dwyer, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, 1754-1838: A Bibliography 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), passim; J. F. Bernard, Talleyrand: A Biography 
(New York: Putnam, 1973); Louis S. Greenbaum, Talleyrand, Statesman-Priest: The 
Agent-General o f  the Clergy and the Church o f France at the End o f the Old Regime 
(Washington: Catholic University o f America Press, 1970), passim.
17Joseph Bensman, “Max Weber’s Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation,” in 
Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy o f Modern Governments, ed. Arthur J. 
Vidich and Ronald M. Glassman (London: Sage Publications, 1979), 18.
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time period may be the beginning of the myopic view held by Western intellectuals that 
the Church no longer mattered.
Writing a century earlier and most certainly influencing Talleyrand was French 
deistic philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who combined the ideas of the social contract 
with the need for other elements to legitimize the regime it formed.18 His thoughts, while 
deep and substantive, are responsible for the simplified modeling of legitimacy.
At the core of Rousseau’s belief was that legitimacy is nation-bound and 
parochially circumscribed.19 This did not initially preclude involvement of religious 
institutions, but it did limit the kinds of organizations that may play a role in Rousseau’s 
society. Moreover, the validity o f this belief poses a particularly interesting set of 
questions for those who study legitimacy as a part of the anarchical nation-state system or 
have hope of building an effective international government, for how can anything 
international be parochial?
Rousseau’s ideas did contain flaws as they relate to the Catholic Church. Just as 
Hobbes had done before him and Talleyrand would do later, Rousseau neglected and did 
not provide a role for extra-territorial institutions such as the Church, institutions that 
exist both within the nation-state’s borders and without as part of a larger global 
organization. His idea of parochialism notwithstanding, Rousseau did offer intriguing 
views on what constitutes legitimacy. Rousseau’s two distinct bases for legitimacy 
consisted of “procedural rightness” and the “general will.”20 Both serve as independent 
variables in the formation of legitimacy (see figure 5).
18Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. 
Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950), passim; John H. Mason, ed., The Indispensable 
Rousseau (New YorkiHorizon Press, 1979), passim.
19F. M. Barnard, Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder 
(Oxford: Calredon Press, 1988), 20.
20Ibid., 67; J. G. Merquior, Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory o f  
Legitimacy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), passim.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
Xi-Procedural Rightness
Fig. 5. Rousseau’s Legitimacy Variables
Procedural rightness refers not to the substantive content o f a particular decision, 
but to the manner in which it was arrived at as part o f a process in which the public 
participates. The public’s participation in any decision imbues it with validity. This 
statement clearly opens the door for Church involvement. The general will is something 
prior to and independent o f processes o f political mediation. The general will may be 
thought of as society’s boundaries, the limits it sets for itself and how far it is willing to 
go to accomplish a task or policy. In order to have a general will, there needs to be a 
general consensus across society and class. This consensus can come only from the 
culture of the people. Culture is shaped by mutually shared experiences, powerful elites, 
and social institutions, again opening up an area where the Church may be involved.
Rousseau’s writings make it clear that both the general will and the procedural 
rightness include a religious element, but here Rousseau’s idea of religion should not be 
confused with the supernatural aspect that is most commonly thought o f when religion is 
mentioned. Although Rousseau rejected involvement o f an organized religion claiming 
to represent a system of beliefs stemming from supernatural origins, such as the Catholic 
Church, he did believe that his brand of legitimacy and its procedural mechanism
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required a foundation o f intrinsic rightness that can come only from what he termed a 
“civil religion.”21
Rousseau’s civil religion was a collection o f secular ideas, norms, values, and 
ceremonies that grew out o f the general will. It was also a fusion of both utility and 
justice. Theoretically, civil religion was to act as the glue to ensure that societal norms
99remained constant and were not subject to persistent debate. Some people argue that 
Rousseau’s civil religion is the only way to create the degree of “creedal consensus” 
necessary for a general acceptance of moral standards and for “the injection o f civic 
virtue into social life.”23
Rousseau’s concepts o f civil religion were not unique. Others, such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville, believed in much the same thing and saw evidence of it taking shape in early 
America. Tilo Shabert points out that de Tocqueville believed in two sources of 
legitimacy: majority rule and moeurs and les croyance communes.24 Loosely translated, 
these are the general habits and civil virtues stemming from the common political culture, 
a different way of expressing Rousseau’s general will and civil religion. Both are the 
generally accepted principles and attitudes.
21 Barnard, Self-Direction, 83-96.
99 The United States can be said to have a civil religion. One aspect is found in the 
rituals surrounding the fostering o f patriotism from a very early age. Both the Pledge of 
Allegiance and the National Anthem are aspects o f this religion o f the American state. 
Very few o f the 270 million Americans disagree or somehow object to these ceremonies 
being repeated and practiced in public and private life, and the act forms a common bond 
between a citizenry that might otherwise not share much in common.
90
Barnard, Self-Direction, 83-96; Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy: A 
Critical Exposition o f Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and 
Hegel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), passim.
24Tilo Shabert, “Power, Legitimacy and Truth: Reflections on the Impossibility to 
Legitimise Legitimations o f Political Order,” in Legitimacy/Legitimite: Proceedings o f  
the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982, ed. Athanasios Moulakis (New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 101.
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One can immediately notice the correlation between de Tocqueville’s “accepted 
attitudes” and “virtues” and Rousseau’s “creedal consensus.” Rousseau and de 
Tocqueville realized that in legitimacy, what is right in society or politically right, in 
other words, cannot be divorced from what people acting together consider right and 
proper under particular circumstances of time and place.
Did this civil religion develop? The answer depends on how succinctly one 
interprets the evidence. Most, if  not all nation-states, particularly those that claim a 
separation o f Church and State, create the trappings of a civil religion to foster unity and 
a melting pot mentality that fuses their society. Yet an unexpected result o f this civil 
religion is that supernatural religions are protected and in some cases promoted under 
secular rule o f law, thus gaining greater influence over members of the society who are 
the authors o f the law. The United States is an obvious example of this phenomenon.
American society is a potent mix of almost every major culture and religion on 
earth, yet it operates under the common ideas of a civil religion that are embodied in its 
“holy” text, the U.S. Constitution. Coupled with the Constitution are other “canonical” 
works, including the Bill of Rights, Declaration of Independence, and Federalist Papers.
Lesser works have also been added over the years in the form of Supreme Court 
rulings and landmark legislation that have helped shape attitudes and the very nature of 
society. A few examples from American history include Brown v. Board o f Education 
(1954), which effectively ended the separate but equal statutes in many states and 
chipped away at the legality of segregation. Another would be Roe v. Wade (1972), 
which legally protected certain forms o f abortion by using the right o f privacy found in 
the U.S. Constitution.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act is another example of an attempt at implementing 
sweeping legislation to right previous injustices against the African American population 
through Affirmative Action, as well as racial quotas and fundamentally altered race 
relations in the United States. It proved a turning point for African Americans, offering
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
them access to the mainstream of American society that had previously been denied to 
them. Alongside these civil religious treatises is a tacit promotion o f the biblical Ten 
Commandments and other Judeo-Christian doctrines. Evidence of this is found in 
numerous places, from the mottos on U.S. currency to the writings etched in national 
monuments.
The writings o f Hobbes and Rousseau are well thought out treatises on 
government and legitimacy, and they are prime places to start if  one wishes to understand 
the current meanings and context o f legitimacy. However, both fail to give a complete 
picture. Likewise, case studies based purely on their writings cannot be fully delineated 
without a further maturing and evolution of legitimacy theory. Shoring up some o f the 
weaknesses and giving legitimacy one o f its best definitional treatments was the 
influential sociologist, political theorist, and historian Max Weber and the writings of 
twentieth century political scientist David Easton who investigates the connection 
between support and political systems.
Theoretically modem legitimacy studies are guided more or less by two important 
foundations. The first is the Weberian model of legitimacy and the second is the 
Eastonian model of political support. Both theories supply a credible framework in 
which the Philippine Catholic Church can be analyzed. Yet both theories are also lacking 
in their explanatory power, and must be supplemented by historical analysis to prove and 
validate the relationship between theory and practice.
Max Weber was a product of both his own religious upbringing and the humanist 
movements of the late nineteenth century. As a sociologist and political economist, he is 
best known for his writings on the “Protestant Ethic.” But Weber’s contributions to the 
social science field go well beyond his initial writings. Weber believed that a historical 
phenomenon was determined by the viewpoint o f the investigator rather than by any 
objective significance. This led him to develop the concept of “ideal types” as a tool for 
isolating sociological phenomena. These ideal types are particularly useful in legitimacy
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studies, where isolating independent variables to determine the dependent variable of 
legitimacy is difficult to do. Another strength o f Weber’s work was his promotion o f the 
idea of a plurality o f historical factors, meaning one should not focus exclusively on one 
phenomenon to determine all results.
Weber delineated legitimacy as concisely as anyone before or after him did. To 
begin with, his concept of legitimacy contained the idea of “authority.” To have true 
authority and for it to be valid and thus legitimate, it must be more than simply a standard 
of social conduct determined by custom or self-interest.25 Authority must be oriented 
around certain recognizable and practicable axioms. There are many types of axioms that 
can reinforce authority. The legitimacy of authority can be guaranteed on a purely 
affectual basis, derived from rational belief, originate in religious attitudes, or even be 
guaranteed by self-interests.26 However, two things must be present for legitimacy to 
function. There must be a belief (vorstellung) shared by those within the order that the
77order itself is valid (geltung).
Weber wrote in his landmark text, The Theory o f Social and Economic 
Organization, that this system of legitimate order is called a “convention.” Its validity is 
externally guaranteed by the probability that deviation from the convention from within a 
given social group will result in a general and significant negative reaction from others 
under the same convention.28 He termed such an order “law” when lack of conformity 
with it is met with physical or psychological sanctions aimed at compelling conformity
25Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans. H. P. Secher (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1962), 71.
26Ibid., 75.
27Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, trans. S. N. Esienstandt 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1968), 11.
28Max Weber, The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), 127.
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and punishing disobedience. Law is also a basis for one o f Weber’s ideal types of 
legitimacy.
In general, Weber’s simplest idea o f what legitimacy is and ought to be is 
contained in the following idea: Legitimacy is best understood as “the basis o f every 
system of authority, and corresponding o f every kind o f willingness to obey, is a belief, a 
belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.” Though 
simple, ideas such as “belief’ and “prestige” are general enough to be open to wide 
interpretation. Thus, the ideal types o f legitimacy need to be defined, as well the sort of 
conditions needed for an order to be considered legitimate.
According to Weber, legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those acting 
subject to it in several different ways. The first is by tradition or, in other words, a belief 
in the legitimacy of what has always existed. The second is by affectual attitudes, 
especially emotions, legitimating the validity o f what is newly revealed or a model to 
imitate. The third is by a rational belief in its absolution value (Wertrational), thus 
lending it the validity of an absolute and final commitment. The final way is because it 
has been established in a manner which is recognized to be legal. This legitimacy o f the 
legality is derived from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties or imposed on the 
basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority over the relevant person and a 
corresponding claim to their obedience.30
These ideas express, in general terms, the basis for legitimate order. Although 
Weber’s structure does not specifically account for a role of religious organizations, it 
nonetheless provides a valuable intellectual framework on which to build a legitimacy 
study that exposes the important role o f a religious institution like the Catholic Church in 
helping foster an order. It does so both at the level of the basis o f legitimate order, and
Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New 
York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 263.
30Weber, Theory o f  Social and Economic Organization, 130-131.
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also as Weber expanded and focused his idea on the “ideal” types o f legitimacy he 
believed existed in the real world. These ideal types, discussed next, provide a useful 
framework in understanding the role o f the Catholic Church in Philippine politics 
generally and the specific events and consequences of People Power II.
In Theory o f  Social and Economic Organization, Weber utilized ideal types of 
legitimacy in his quest to answer the basic question of how one can become a leader, 
issue commands, and have their actions carried out. In effect, he was trying to find out 
how an individual or regime can be legitimate. Weber attempted to show both the nature 
and constitution of legitimacy. His theory, by using a triad of categories, attempted to 
address the kinds of substantive issues Hobbes, Rousseau and others neglected to cover in 
their writings. Weber’s talent and his value to legitimacy studies lies in his simplification 
of legitimacy into three main types, which also serve as ideal independent variables: 
rational (legal)-Xl, traditional-X?, and charismatic-X? (see figure 6).
While Weber used the term “rational,” this particular type of legitimacy can best 
be described as legal. It rests on belief in the legality o f patterns o f normative rules and 
the rights o f those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. In the case 
of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It 
extends up to the person or regime exercising the authority of office only by virtue o f the 
formal legality of their commands and only within the scope o f the office’s authority.
The effectiveness o f legal authority rests, according to Weber, on accepting the 
validity o f a few mutually interdependent ideas. The first is that any given legal norm 
may be established by agreement or by imposition on grounds of expediency or rational 
values or both, with a claim to obedience made by at least some of the corporate group’s
31 •members. In the case of states, this usually includes all people living in that territory
31Ibid., 329.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
who stand in certain social relationships or carry out forms of social action that have been 
declared relevant in the order governing the group.
X2 -Traditional X3 - CharismaticXt -Rational Legal
Fig. 6. Weberian Model of Legitimacy
The second idea is that every body of law essentially consists o f a consistent
32system of abstract rules. These rules are typically established intentionally.
Furthermore, administration of law is held to consist o f the application of these rules to 
particular cases, and the administrative process in the rational pursuit of the interests 
specified in the order governing the corporate group. This is done within the limits laid 
down by legal precepts and following principles that are capable o f generalized 
formulation and are approved in the order governing the group, or at least not 
disapproved by it.33
The third idea is that the person in authority occupies a legally established office. 
In the actions associated with his status, including the commands he issues to others, he is 
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people in positions o f power, not only for the ones exercising legal authority as the 
elected president of the state.
The person who obeys this authority does so only in his capacity as a member of 
the group, and the authority he obeys is the law. He may also be part of an association, a 
territorial commune, or a church, or he may be a citizen o f a state. His submission is to 
the law, not to the person who occupies the office. Hence, it follows that there is an 
obligation to obey only within the sphere of the rationally delimited authority that, in 
terms of the order, has been conferred upon the officeholder. Obedience does not extend 
beyond the scope of the law.
Margherita Ciacci embraces Weber’s paradigm, arguing in her writings that 
legitimacy can be the outgrowth of a legality of patterns o f normative rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. The loyalty Ciacci 
described is the citizenry’s loyalty to the rule of law and the organizations the law 
establishes. It is not loyalty to personalities. The loyalty to both the law and the 
impersonal order that exists is extended to the person exercising the authority of the 
office under them. For example, citizens’ loyalty to the office o f president is extended to 
the individual who occupies that office, whether or not one has a favorable opinion o f or 
initially supported the person in the electoral process.
This rational-legal form of legitimacy Weber recognized might be a de facto 
agreement, but it is most often an assumptive consensus among the populace to elect a 
body of officials from their ranks and to abide by the rule of law. Indeed, as the 
discussion thus far has illustrated, there is near universal agreement that legitimacy itself 
is a social practice, an outcome of the interaction between the ruler and the ruled. Hence,
35 •Margherita Ciacci, “Legitimacy and the Problems of Governance,” in 
Legitimacy/Legitimite: Proceedings o f the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982, 
ed. Athanasios Moulakis (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 22.
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it must be framed in the sociopolitical and economic context o f a specific society at a 
specific time, taking into account actors within the society that play significant roles.
Supporting this statement are the earliest writings addressing legitimacy, 
including those of Hobbes, who laid bare the harsh realities of the leviathan and the need 
for people to give up certain individual rights and freedoms to enjoy the safety and 
stability o f a state monolith. They freely and voluntarily give their legitimacy in return 
for receiving a desired social and political situation that is acceptable to the majority, or 
at the very least the majority of the politically relevant within that particular body. This is 
true whether it is at the village level or nation-state level.
Earlier, more grandiose works such as Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia (1310) 
argued that humankind’s development o f intellect and culture could create a social 
contract resulting in a strong world government that would ensure peace and world 
stability. Indeed, his was the first call for legitimation of a world government, at least a 
government o f the known world.36 Others followed him, including Emeric Cruce in 
1623, Hugo Grotius in 1625, and Abbe de Saint-Pierre in 1712. Each illustrated in their 
own way how the legally based social contract between the populace and the prince could 
be made workable, legitimizing a regime meant to bring about the collective good of the 
known world.37
The ideas and concepts behind this legally based legitimacy have remained 
appealing for contemporary scholars as well. Peter T. Manicas expresses a similar line of 
thought, albeit more developed, in his book The Death o f the State. To Manicas, the idea
36  f  • • •Dante Alighieri, Monarchia, trans. Prue Shaw (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), passim.
37  •Emeric Cruce, The New Cineas, trans. C. Frederick Farrell Jr. and Edith R. 
Farrell (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), passim; James Bohman and Matthias 
Lutz-Bachmann, eds., Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), passim; J.R. Jacob and M.C. Jacob, eds., Peace 
Projects o f the Seventeenth Century (New York: Garland Publishers, 1972), passim.
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of a legitimate government rests on the supposition that in order to be legitimate, the 
government must be invested with the right to command and to act in the name of the 
governed. The laws conceived in this arrangement are considered “morally obligatory,”
10
and citizens have a duty to obey, whether they personally approve or not.
In the real world, of course, the system is not as “obligatory” as one might expect, 
and just how the citizens can get out of this arrangement is unclear. However, following 
the logic, personal approval, or disapproval of individual citizens is not enough to effect 
change. Instead, an organized effort and mass movement are required. How large the 
movement would need to be may be a function of the population or be based on the 
percentage o f those active in politics. In the United States, for example, it certainly does 
not take tens o f millions to affect policies or the makeup of the national government. 
Such effects can be brought about by a relatively few powerful interest groups and 
elites.39
If the world were neatly packaged under the rule o f law and officials were elected 
without the necessity of personal influence and charismatic appeal, then Weber’s first 
category would be sufficient to explain all forms of legitimate authority. However, the 
world is not that way. Weber realized as much and provided two other categories of 
legitimate authority, traditional and charismatic, to help explain these variations.
According to Weber, traditional legitimacy rests on the established belief in the 
sanctity o f immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status o f those exercising
38Peter T. Manicas, The Death o f the State (New York: Capricorn Books, 1974),
38.
39Another element that is tacit, although not explicitly mentioned, is the idea of 
fair play. If someone has received benefits under the standing body of laws and political 
organization then he has an obligation to bear the burdens of that organization as well, 
including an obligation to accept its political decisions, whether or not he has solicited 
these benefits or has in any more active way consented to the burdens o f the order.
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authority under them.40 In traditional authority, obedience is not owed to enacted rules or 
laws but to the person or the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of 
authority and who is bound by tradition. In this category the obligation of obedience is 
not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter of personal loyalty within the area of 
accustomed obligations.41
The commands of the traditionally legitimate government or individual are 
formulated in one of two ways. The first is in terms o f traditions, which themselves 
directly determine the content of the command and the objects and extent o f authority.42 
In so far as this is true, to overstep the traditional limitations would endanger the 
traditional status by undermining acceptance of the legitimacy. The second is a matter of 
the head o f state’s free personal decision, for there are no formal principles as there are 
under legal authority.
Examples o f the traditional type of legitimacy in a “pure” form are found in the 
feudal kingdoms of China, Egypt, and Africa, and later in the monarchies o f Europe. The 
danger of this sort o f authority is that it can be exercised arbitrarily. The office is held by 
virtue o f traditional status, by recruiting favorites, or by patrimony. Promotion is by the 
ruler’s arbitrary grace. A meritocracy does not usually exist and the best and brightest 
are not recruited to fill positions.
Obedience from the population is based on personal loyalty, and the traditional 
exercise o f authority is only limited by resistance aroused in the subjects or by a failure to 
act according to traditions. Natural societal evolution is retarded, and the development of 
capitalism is obstructed.43 Functions within the government are defined in terms of
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competition among the interests o f those seeking favors, income, and other advantages. 
Because fees and gifts are given to win the ruler’s favor, bribery and corruption are
44rampant.
Weber’s final category of legitimacy is charismatic authority. It is based on 
devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character o f an 
individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.45 
In the case o f charismatic authority, the charismatically qualified leader is obeyed by 
virtue o f personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism, or his exemplary qualities 
so far as they fall within the scope of the individuals’ belief in his charisma.
Ciacci’s writings on charisma again echo and support Weber’s on this point. 
According to Ciacci, charismatic legitimacy is built upon the devotion to a specific and 
exceptional character, to a person, and on the normative patterns revealed by that 
person.46 The leadership or leader seeks to maintain a sense o f self-confidence and 
legitimacy by continually trying to gain the support o f other individuals and groups 
wherever they may be found, inside or outside the territorial limits or the supposed 
consensus-oriented jurisdiction o f the nation-state.
Ciacci believes that the charismatic ideal o f legitimacy is almost always embodied 
in a single individual, but that individual is not necessarily the head of state. He or she 
may also be a religious leader, spiritual advisor, or trusted spokesman of the people, a 
role that will prove particularly relevant during the discussion o f the Philippine Catholic 
Church and its leadership.
44Ibid.
45Ibid., 328.
46Ciacci, “Legitimacy and the Problems o f Governance,” 22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
With the rational, traditional, and charismatic categories o f legitimacy, one has a 
large piece o f the legitimacy theory puzzle. However, there are still some pieces missing. 
Weber realized that his classifications were an ideal, not reality, and that his models were 
dynamic, meaning one form of legitimacy could change and morph into another and then 
even revert. No one form was capable of acting alone in the real world, and all needed to 
be propped up by elements of the others.47 Weber’s model may also be cyclical, with 
some classifications being more unstable than others and turning into hybrids.
Since it can be argued that the three categories Weber expounded do not include 
all possible types o f legitimacy and that the obligatory nature of the social contract does 
not exist in the real world, then something else must exist to fill the gap. There must be 
another piece o f the puzzle. The missing piece is not a radical departure from Weber or 
any other legitimacy theory, nor is it likely that Weber would disagree with including it 
alongside his three classifications. This is because in all three o f his legitimacy 
categories, power lies at the bottom of the relationship. While society’s dynamics have 
changed, power is still the most important component. The power has simply shifted in 
form and shape.
Twentieth-century economies produced populations geared towards materialism 
and the acquisition of an ever-increasing standard of living, the kind unknown to Weber, 
Hobbes, Rousseau, and de Tocqueville. Power now came from the ability to meet these 
needs. After World War II, populations looked to governments for more than just the 
bare necessities o f survival. Instead, they wanted material goods and services and 
assurances that they and their children would have increasing opportunity for success, 
safety, and prosperity.
The United States led the charge and the industrial nation-states o f Western 
Europe and Japan have followed in close order. Legitimacy o f their governments
47Weber, Theory o f  Social and Economic Organization, 329.
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expanded beyond charisma and traditional ties, and even beyond the rule of law. In this 
new world, governments provided utility for their populations in return for their support. 
This is a utilitarian form of legitimacy. This same form of legitimacy also dominates the 
twenty-first century.
Under utilitarian legitimacy, the apparatus of the state functions as a machine 
churning out goods and services wanted, needed, and desired by the population. The 
population in turn provides for the machine, keeping it in working order, and the fuel for 
its operation comes in the form of popular consent and legitimacy (see figure 7). This 
utilitarianism can manifest itself in a variety of ways, from the most grandiose to the 
simplest. A utilitarian-based social contract could be something as complex as national 
defense o f the population or as mundane as adequate sewers in a city.
Seymour Martin Lipset is one of the key supporters of utilitarian legitimacy. In 
some of his works, Lipset laid out the causational relationship between state capacity and 
legitimacy.48 His studies centered on empirical analyses of the state’s ability to produce 
economic results. Lipset believed that in the short term, a government can substitute 
economic growth for political legitimacy, and in the long run this same growth could 
generate legitimacy itself49 Lipset made state effectiveness his independent variable and 
legitimacy his dependent variable, thus producing a simple binary model o f legitimacy.
Lipset’s model has a positive correlation; as effectiveness goes up, so does the 
level o f legitimacy a government enjoys, as it decreases so too does the government’s 
legitimacy. Joseph Schumpter supports this contention, arguing that the fate o f modem 
regimes hinges on their ability to trade off the deliver/ of state services for political
48 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f  Politics (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); idem, Consensus and Conflict: Essays in 
Political Sociology (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), passim.
49Edward W. Lehman, The Viable Polity (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press, 1992), 4.
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support. Moreover, faith in the incumbent’s ability to deliver results does not necessarily 
mean a loss of faith in a system. As with other models, legitimacy can be withdrawn 
when governing elites are unable to deliver on specific claims.50 Easing the tensions 
created by the government’s failure to deliver on its part o f the utilitarian equation may 
be done by lowering citizen demands.
X j  Rational Legal X.?, Traditional Xj -Charismatic X4- Utilitarian Legitimacy
Fig. 7. Weber + Utilitarianism
Ciacci hints at a utilitarian desire expressed between the ruler and the ruled in 
her writings. Her idea of utilitarian legitimacy is based on personal loyalty within the 
area of obligations. These obligations are built, fostered, and sustained by an established 
belief in the certainty o f immemorial tradition and of the status o f those exercising 
authority.51 This tradition can be anything, from expectations that the government 
provide for the common defense, support the general welfare, and ensure equal protection
50Ibid.
51 Ciacci, “Legitimacy and the Problems of Governance,” 22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
under the law, or an expectation that the government simply maintain roads and bridges. 
The government in turn expects that the populace will respect its authority. The 
government possesses legitimacy when a population values the government and the work 
it undertakes. As such, individuals are willing to assume the disciplines and burdens that 
membership in this society entails. Legitimacy declines when this willingness flags or 
fails.
Procedural principles such as majority rule, unanimity, and theories o f consent 
prescribe adherence to this kind of rule. These principles also prescribe adherence to a 
decision rule. Along these lines is the work of Robert Nozick. In Nozick’s worldview, 
the only just state is the minimal state, and a person must never experience consequences 
that would violate his rights within the society. The state should provide, not prevent, a 
standard of living. Utilitarianism can be found in the state’s willingness to do “nothing” 
to prevent a citizen from being satisfied.
Delivering on the utilitarian aspect requires power, which is imparted to the 
government, regime, or individual by the people. Once in power, government’s use and 
control o f the power it is entrusted with will affect its legitimacy. There are two aspects 
to the proper use of power. The first, according to Alagappa, is that governments 
operating within the law or other tacitly accepted rules and procedures must be seen as 
properly using the power they are given. Governments that abuse or otherwise misuse 
their power risk alienating their own populations and losing their mandate.53 Future 
elections can mean the end of the government, but revolution can also result from abuse 
of governmental power in many parts o f the world. Failure to fulfill the utilitarian
52James S. Fishkin, Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique o f Political Theories 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), 5; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and 
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), passim.
53Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, 20.
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agreement between the ruler and the ruled is a failure of duty and a form of abuse of 
power.
The second aspect o f power, even more related to utility, is performance. 
Performance is defined as the power used to promote the collective interest o f the 
community.54 Classical definitions of legitimacy tend to exclude performance as a 
consideration. This is unfortunate, because effective governmental performance can be 
used to generate political, social, and moral authority.
Measuring performance is becoming more sophisticated in most o f the developed 
world. The Internet, tracking polls, and twenty-four-hour news and information networks 
allow politicians to test the public perception and acceptability of policies before they are 
ever implemented into law. Floating “trial balloons” is the norm. Thus, when laws are 
finally passed the people get what they want, further buttressing the government in 
power.
It is when these institutions or individuals seem not as appropriate that a problem 
with the government’s mandate of legitimacy may occur. Removal o f the mandate can 
occur if the government becomes unable or unwilling to meet the utilitarian responsibility 
that has come to be expected of it. It may then be replaced by a regime that promises to 
provide the utilitarian aspect the former government once did.
Currently, ideas o f utilitarian legitimacy are in vogue. They are perhaps the 
easiest to validate through statistical methods. In social sciences the use o f statistics is 
often seen as necessary if one’s study is to gain attention from peer-reviewed journals and 
publishing houses. However, it is difficult to mathematically model what lies in people’s 
hearts. One then must turn to expressions o f opinion, found in polls, which tell the 
researcher the level o f satisfaction with a particular regime or official and measure the 
mandate’s strength.
54Ibid., 22-23.
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Using public opinion polls alone to track how a society may feel about the 
government also has its pitfalls. Polls may be too one-dimensional and may lead to an 
analysis based on personal biases and opinions, because data can be manipulated in a 
variety o f ways. The best solution is to analyze the words of the actors involved, both in 
written sources and interviews.
Utilitarian legitimacy is the missing piece o f the legitimacy paradigm. Alongside 
rational, traditional, and charismatic authority, it provides a better picture o f how states 
and rulers can become legitimate and maintain that legitimacy. However, like the other 
concepts, it cannot stand alone. Utilitarianism is a valuable new way of looking at 
legitimacy, but it is no more powerful or convincing in its explanatory power than the 
more classical ideas expressed by Weber and others. Therefore, it finds its place 
alongside the other three pillars of legitimacy as a useful but not wholly independent 
form of legitimacy theory.
Within each category the reader may have noticed the implied existence of 
intellectual space for the development of norms and a moral order. In all three of 
Weber’s categories and in the utilitarian model, there is implied if  not directly stated the 
existence of a moral order. Indeed, it can be argued that the moral aspects, more 
appropriately described as normative, are an underlying requirement for both the 
traditional and the rational-legal categories.
If a set o f laws or a ruler is not backed by force o f arms, then its legitimacy must 
rest upon some element o f trust and expectation that both sides will fulfill their duties. 
This trust and expectation results from the shared norms of the parties involved, both the 
ruler and the ruled. Once established, legitimacy can reinforce and strengthen existing 
norms and become a norm itself. Norms and values are essentially belief systems or 
ideologies that specify how things ought to be.55 These shared norms and values
55Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, 15.
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determine the political system and structure o f domination within a nation-state and serve 
as a normative regulation on society. In figure 8, one can now see the four types of 
legitimacy highlighted in the literature, as well as the role of norms and political violence 
that are ever-present in all aspects of legitimacy.
Another way to look at norms is by focusing on their references to the grounds on 
which those wielding power claim obedience.56 Indeed, this normative ground may differ 
from state to state, and here again is where the role of social institutions like the Catholic 
Church comes into play. Left to its own devices, the moral aptitude o f the people may 
never quite stimulate the moral aptitude o f the government, and vice versa.57 Both the 
rulers and the ruled need molding, reinforcement, and validation from each other. The 
government gets these things from the citizenry through the power o f legitimacy, and the 
citizenry gets them by being ruled by a government that is respectful and responsive to 
societal norms and values.
The likelihood of either side getting this type o f feedback and political satisfaction 
from the other without a third party active in the political culture is small. The 
government would lack real legitimacy and the people would most likely suffer at the 
hands o f a less-responsive government. In fact, saying less-responsive is putting it 
mildly, because in most cases a government that does not have this moral authority from 
the people or organizations representing the people’s interests tends to not only become 
dictatorial, but authoritarian and totalitarian. Citizens do not just suffer politically, but 
they are often victims of state-sponsored persecution and violence.
56Paschalis Kitromilides, “Enlightenment and Legitimacy,” in 
Legitimacy/Legitimite: Proceedings o f the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982, 
ed. Anthanosios Moulakis (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 61.
57Frederick Rosen, “Legitimacy: A Utilitarian View,” in Legitimacy/Legitimite: 
Proceedings o f the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982, ed. Athanosios Moulakis 
(New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 73.
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N o rm s
X;-Charismatic 1 X 4- 1 lilitarian LegitimacyX| -Rational Legal X-> -Traditional
Fig. 8. The Inclusion o f “Norms”
Alagappa contends that the norms and values o f a society contribute to the 
establishment o f regimes in which rules for the acquisition of power are properly 
established.58 In other words, they are a part of every category of authority previously 
discussed and credited to Weber and the utilitarian model of legitimacy, as long as they 
foster societal norms and reinforce existing morality. Governments acquiring power 
through these channels are likely to be seen as legitimate.
History seems to support this contention. Just recently in the United States there 
was a crisis o f sorts surrounding the election of the president. In 2000, A1 Gore’s 
challenge to the results in Florida spawned a mini Constitutional crisis, as the lawyers 
from his and George W. Bush’s campaign sparred in front o f the partisan Florida 
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court over the constitutionality of 
“butterfly ballots,” recounts, and the electoral college system.
58Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, 20.
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On many occasions, members o f Gore’s campaign and the media hinted and 
blatantly questioned the legitimacy that either candidate would enjoy after the electoral 
mess. Gore made an effort to mention his popular vote victory and hinted at the 
illegitimacy of a Bush victory, no matter how lawful it may have been. Several members 
of the U.S. Senate were quoted as wanting to amend the Constitution in order to do away 
with the electoral college, which gave Bush the win.59
Interestingly, the poll numbers never swung dramatically either way. It seemed 
that the American public took a wait-and-see attitude. When the United States Supreme 
Court finally resolved the election and Gore conceded defeat, public opinion polls 
showed that the majority o f the electorate believed that Bush was the legitimate winner.
In essence, Bush had obeyed the rules. He had followed the norms and stuck to the 
electoral values that the country was founded upon, and no amount of partisan wrangling 
over the outcome and the intricacies of the vote changed the feeling o f legitimacy. In the 
end, both candidates conformed to the expected rules o f the game and were rewarded 
with the public’s trust and support. This moral-normative dimension of legitimacy that 
was at work during the 2000 election may cause problems for scholars who dislike 
studying normative values in a society and believe they are unscientific. But in any 
political inquiry into legitimacy, one must consider both empirical connotations and basic 
normative elements.
So far, the journey through the legitimacy literature leads to several conclusions. 
The first is that although the variety o f scholars creates variety in definition, the basic 
concept o f legitimacy remains a simple concept and an even simpler model, with 
dependent and independent variables. Where agreement breaks down is on what exactly 
should be an independent variable and the strength of the relationship between X and Y.
59After the 2000 election and the difficulties some Florida voters had in 
determining who they had voted for, the editorial pages o f major newspapers and most 
prominently Sen. Hillary Clinton called for a change, in Clinton’s case the elimination of 
the Electoral College system.
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Some of this confusion is natural, because mathematically modeling what is in the hearts 
and minds o f individuals and organizations is extremely difficult, leading to subjective 
studies using the qualitative approach to understand the relationship.
Some ideas, however, are more helpful at elucidating the causational relationships 
than others. There are strengths and weaknesses in all approaches, with some containing 
a good balance between theory and reality. For example, where Rousseau and others 
may be too specific in their attempts to pinpoint the independent variables in the 
legitimacy equation, Weber provides the right balance of generality and parsimony.
When Weber comes up lacking, the inclusion of a utilitarian category can help strengthen 
his model. Yet even Weber’s idea with the inclusion of the utilitarian model remains 
insufficient. Including norms across the independent variables is also not enough.
Until now, there has been no single study that can accurately and fully account for 
the role of a religious institution like the Catholic Church in the legitimacy of regimes. 
The author believes the key missing from the model, and from all the studies discussed 
thus far, is an emphasis on what can be termed a mediating variable. This variable, 
couched between X and Y, acts as a lens to focus, shift, and even redirect the legitimate 
authority vested by populations and coming from the independent variables. Use o f a 
mediating variable also fills the incompleteness of the conceptualization o f legitimacy, 
addresses the inadequacy of the models, and fulfills the potential o f the theory. The 
mediating variable becomes the Z component o f the legitimacy equation.
The mediating variable will generally act as a lens to focus the many forces and 
factors found in each of the independent variables and help clear up the causational 
relationship between the factors o f legitimacy and how they directly affect the legitimacy 
of a ruling regime. This does not mean, o f course, that the X variables cease to interact 
with one another, for as Weber demonstrated in his earlier models, no one pure form of 
legitimacy exists. They all influence one another in a variety of ways and levels of 
strength. What is different with the inclusion o f a mediating variable is that it can serve
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to filter, direct, and focus the political and social power emanating from the X variables. 
In turn, it adds its own influences back upon the independent variables and upon the 
dependent variable (legitimacy) as well.
In the real world, a mediating variable can be many things. It may be the military 
establishment, a particular powerful personality, the media, the entertainment industry, or 
a religious institution. Where there is a democracy, Z variables focus the people’s 
energies, their will, their anger, their desires, and their authority towards the government. 
In the Philippines, a host o f organizations, institutions, and even individuals serve as 
mediating variables. It can get complicated (see figure 9). Social, political, and even 
military organizations jockey for position to influence the vote and the nature and 
character of the ruling regime. They may even field candidates, campaign, and attempt 
coups, all in an effort to establish a ruling government favorable to their needs.
Including all of the possible mediating variables affecting legitimacy in the 
Philippines would lead to a web of arrows and boxes, creating a confusing labyrinth that 
may be difficult to decipher and not particularly useful for understanding the most 
important factor behind the legitimacy o f Philippine regimes. The military, business 
interests, universities, popular politicians, economics, and public policy think tanks all 
serve as mediating variables in determining the level o f the ruling regime’s legitimacy. 
Yet what is evident in figure 9 is the existence of one mediating variable that transcends 
every independent variable. What is evident in figure 9 is the one organization that can 
influence all variables.
In the Philippines, there is only one organization that has traditionally been and 
remains the most influential mediating variable for all four of the legitimacy categories.
It is the only institution that serves as a lens to focus the forces o f legitimacy. This 
organization is the Catholic Church. It is not an overstatement to say that all roads to 
legitimacy lead through the Catholic Church. How and why this is the case will be 
illustrated in subsequent chapters.
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Fig. 9. The Intricate Web of Variables
With the inclusion of utilitarianism and the mediating variable concept, the 
Weberian model has been adapted into a valuable tool for understanding the role o f the 
Church in the legitimacy of the Philippine government, and indeed although altered just a 
bit, it is the cornerstone in understanding legitimacy in the Philippines. Indeed, Weber’s 
ideas are one o f the most useful tools to the historian. In the mid-twentieth century 
another attempt to explain the interaction o f social and political forces was developed by 
David Easton, and Easton’s theory also allows for a mediating variable like the Church to 
influence the legitimacy o f governments.
Easton’s theory, while more in the genre o f political science, is still useful in 
understanding the historical dynamics of the Philippine Catholic Church in political 
legitimacy. To understand the Eastonian theory, one must first think o f politics outside of 
a cultural milieu. Unlike Weber, the cultural dynamics that bring personality and life to 
politics is left to the side. Easton makes no room for political culture and instead focuses 
on a sterile political environment that he calls a system. Easton defines his political
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system as “a set o f interactions abstracted from the totality of social behavior, through 
which values are authoritatively allocated for society.”60
Whereas Weber defines the state by its monopoly of physical force used 
legitimately, Easton’s is concerned more about the political system that includes the 
nation-state and the international community.61 In other words the political system 
represents a multitude o f interests. Moreover, Easton’s theory revolves around the 
determination o f relationships within a system. These relationships are self-regulating, 
and are never truly in equilibrium. Instead, forces are in constant competition, either 
directly or indirectly with one side gaining and losing the advantage over another.
A key to the Eastonian system is the idea of support. The government is made 
legitimate through support within the system. According to Easton there are two types of 
support: diffuse and specific.62 The actors in Easton’s theory are much the same as 
those found in Weber’s ideal types of legitimacy. In this particular study o f political 
legitimacy, the Philippine Catholic Church, the secular government, and individual 
politicians account for the actors in these relationships. The actors involved deal with a 
give and take reality. There are demands and there are supports, both of which are 
converted into decisions by the regime in power. The kind of decisions that are made 
really depends on the types and level o f the input.
Diffuse support is support developed over a long period o f time. It is formed at 
an early age and is not easily lost. Indeed, diffuse support is more like the traditional idea 
of legitimacy than any other. On the other hand, specific support is measured at any given
60 David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1965), 57.
61 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State o f  Political 
Science (New York: Knopf, 1953), 23.
62  *David Easton, A Systems Analysis o f Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 
1965); David Easton, “A Re-Assessment o f the Concept of Political Support,” British 
Journal o f  Political Science, no. 5 (1975: 435-57.
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time by public opinion data, and illustrates a persons or groups personal satisfaction with 
a regime or individual politician’s policies and actions. Along with being easily 
measurable it is also unstable. Policies and politicians can find themselves on a roller 
coaster ride o f popularity among their constituents. As the study goes forward the role of 
the Church in formulating diffuse and specific support will become clear. In the last 
chapter, the level and measurability of such support will also be outlined in relation to 
Easton’s theory.
Easton is mentioned here at the end of the Weberian discussion because Easton’s 
theory is not without problems for a legitimacy study. He succeeds more in laying out a 
study o f political systems rather than succeeding in producing a real general theory of 
legitimacy. Because his theory is removed from the real world, maybe a function o f his 
political science training as compared to Weber’s cultural sociology, Easton does not 
make room for the dynamics of economics, gender, race, nor in-depth cultural analysis.
In his theory there are also no real interest groups or mediating variables, making little 
room for institutions that have the size, scope, and power of the Catholic Church. 
Regardless of these limitations the theory has value.
In its weakness lies strength. In the Eastonian system, all politics is simply 
politics. There is no difference between national, local, or international. The truisms one 
may find at any level may also work at others. It stands to reason, therefore, that if the 
Church is found to be active in Weber’s ideal independent variables, as well as 
utilitarianism, and active in the cultivation o f diffuse and specific support then according 
to Easton its affects will be felt at both the domestic and international levels. Throughout 
this study, this particular assertion will be backed by history and concrete facts.
In chapter 2, the historic role of the Church will be examined, illustrating the 
establishment of the Church’s hold on the hearts, minds, and politics of the island. 
Chapter 2 will also explain the permeation of the Church into the very fabric of 
Philippine society, from the first mass in 1521 to the most recent People Power
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revolution. They ways the Church continues to change and adjust to new political 
realities are also covered in chapter 2, and the story blends seamlessly into chapters 3 and 
4, in which the Church’s relationship with Ferdinand Marcos, martial law, and the first 
People Power Revolution are discussed.
In chapter 5, the Church’s cooperative effort to rebuild the Philippine polity 
alongside their chosen president, Cory Aquino, is discussed. Finally, in chapters 6 and 7, 
the Church’s antagonism and political struggle against Joseph Estrada and his 
administration will be detailed, including the events leading to the culmination o f People 
Power II and Estrada’s downfall. No more fitting case study can be found to illustrate the 
powerful influence of the Church on the legitimacy o f Philippine governments.
Throughout this study, the reader should pay close attention to the Catholic 
Church’s resilience in its many political battles and its ability to influence elections, 
governments, politicians, and peasants. These are all a testament to the power o f the 
Church to affect legitimacy. No greater testament to the Church’s power can be found, 
other than the fact that it entered the twenty-first century more powerful than it had ever 
been since Spanish colonial times. The Church has proven its importance as a variable in 
legitimacy because among all organizations, it has been able to survive, sustain, and 
maintain its position as the premier force in Philippine politics.
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CHAPTER II
CONSTRUCTING FAITH & CREATING GOVERNMENT
The first chapter laid out an intellectual framework to explain the causes, creation, 
and foundation o f a legitimate government, in particular the government o f the 
Philippines. In the remaining chapters the point will be made again and again that in 
order for a government in the Philippines to be legitimate it must work with, through, or, 
to a lesser extent, around the Catholic Church. What is illustrated in figure 9 becomes 
clear as the story o f the Philippine Catholic Church and its role in legitimating Philippine 
governments is discussed at length. It is important to understand that although the other 
mediating variables in figure 9, such as the military, play a role, no other institution or 
organization in Philippine society has had such an important role for as long a time in 
influencing policy and practice as the Philippine Catholic Church.
Legitimacy, as explained by Rousseau, Weber, and by the author of this study, is 
an idea that revolves around community. This community involves many attributes, 
including common identities, norms, and laws all o f which create a unique political 
culture. The political culture in this community sets the rules and procedures for 
investing a government or institution with the power to govern or the power to represent 
the political will of the membership—the legitimacy or illegitimacy o f a government. It 
is this community that also gives both a voice and power to organizations like the 
Catholic Church.
In the Philippines, to understand how the Catholic Church behaves in the political 
culture unique to the community and most importantly its role in determining the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy o f a government first requires an understanding o f how it 
helped form and shape the very underlying foundation of Philippine political and social 
identity. This requires an examination o f the Church’s history in the Philippines.
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Through this window into the past one can better understand the present and, with a little 
luck, forecast the future.
A common national identity, the kind necessary to legitimacy studies, did not 
exist in the Philippines prior to the arrival o f organized religion. Indeed, the idea o f what 
it meant to be “Filipino” did not exist prior to the Spanish arrival in 1521 and the 
introduction of Catholicism. Based on the anthropological and cultural studies focused 
on the pre-Spanish Philippines, it is believed that there was no singular “nation” in the 
Philippines, and no concept o f being “Filipino.” This situation existed in part due to the 
geographical layout o f the archipelago, and it also resulted from the lack o f commonality 
in laws, norms, and values among the various tribal groups that were themselves the 
result o f centuries o f human migrational waves into the islands.
Situated in the South China Sea, the Philippines are an archipelago o f more than 
7,000 islands covering roughly 300,000 square kilometers. The three main island groups 
are Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. Luzon comprises the northern portion o f the 
archipelago, the Visayas the middle region, and Mindanao the south. The sheer number 
of islands meant the creation of a strong central authority was difficult and the islands 
were left politically fragmented. The disparate origins of each successive wave and the 
inability o f any one group to absorb and dominate others meant that no singular power 
developed around which a strong national identity could coalesce.
The first and oldest remains of human culture date back to a pre-Mongoloid homo 
sapien, who scientists believe lived around 250,000 years ago in the Palawan region. The 
next to arrive were the Negritos (Aetos).1 Successive waves of Malaysian, Indonesian-
1 These Neolithic hunter-gatherers are believed to be part o f a wave of humans 
migrating from East Africa around 30,000 B.C. These groups share a common ethnicity 
with Austrolnesians in the Andaman Islands and Aborigines o f Australia and are some o f 
the most primitive peoples on earth, only recently emerging out o f a Neolithic existence. 
Today, the Negritos number only in the thousands but can still be found only in the most 
remote jungles o f the Philippines. At one time they were the dominant human presence 
on the islands.
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2
Malay, and Chinese settlers pushed the Negritos out of their dominant position. The
descendents o f waves of aboriginal, Malay, Indo-Malay, and Indo-Chinese settlers lived
-2
in scattered coastal and riverside villages or further inland in the mountains. There were 
small-scale contacts with Chinese, Indian, and Arab traders particularly in the Visayas 
and Mindanao.
Possessing animist beliefs and practicing primitive forms o f ancestor worship, the 
islands’ early inhabitants had very basic conceptions o f religion. As Hinduism trickled 
into the islands from the Southeast Asian mainland and the maritime empire o f Sri Vijaya 
early in the first millennium A.D., it mixed and mingled with other native beliefs. 
Unfortunately, little if  any o f this early Indie influence remained by the time the more 
organized religions o f Islam and Christianity arrived, and the ideational elements o f these 
early Indie faiths were not strong enough to imbue the Filipino with a common religion, 
language, or culture.
Pre-Spanish populations, possessing the most rudimentary political organization, 
identified with the tribal group. They lived in settlements called barangays. The 
Tagalog word barangay comes from the Malay word balangay, the small boat used for 
inter-island transport, fishing, and war. As the unit o f government, a barangay consisted 
of 30 to 100 families. At its head was the chieftain, known as the datu, and more often 
than not each barangay was independent from other groups. Usually, several barangays 
settled near each other to help in case o f war or emergency. The datu passed his authority 
to his eldest son or, if  he had no sons, to the eldest daughter. Later, any member of the 
barangay could be chieftain based on his talent and ability.
2William Henry Scott, Prehispanic Source Materials for the Study o f the 
Philippines History, rev. ed. (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984).
James B. Goodno, The Philippines: Land o f Broken Promises (New Jersey: Zed 
Books Ltd., 1991), 19.
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The barangay datu had the usual responsibilities of leading and protecting the 
members o f his barangay. In turn, members o f the tribe were expected to pay tribute to 
the datu, help him till the land, and help him fight in case of war. Traditionally, a council 
of elders advised a datu. Laws were agreed upon by the council and announced to the 
entire barangay. Early barangay society was loosely based on four classes: the ruling 
class {datu), the freemen and people of skill (maharlika), the commoners {timawa), and 
the dependents and slaves {alipiri). The alipin were o f two kinds, the aliping namamahay, 
who were household servants, and the aliping saguiguilid, who were slave workers.
Small-scale domestic trade existed among the barangays and between the dozens, 
sometimes hundreds, o f small tribes that shared an island or group o f islands. Traces exist 
of sporadic foreign trade with Ming China, Tokugawa Japan, Siam, Borneo, the Sri 
Vijaya and Majapahit of Java and Sumatra, the Khmer of Cambodia, and the populations 
o f Champa and Malaysia. The barter system was most likely used in business transactions 
since there was no currency. Trade was neither heavy nor complex, and most often 
consisted of small contacts between barangay traders and middlemen who occasionally 
ventured to the islands from the more advanced mercantile societies of Indonesia and 
coastal Vietnam.
Although ethnically similar, the familial or kinship group found in a barangay 
was the largest community an individual would usually recognize. It was not uncommon 
for tribes on the same island to be political foes and no closer in ties than tribes from one 
end of the archipelago and the other. The fractured nature o f the geography and the 
fractured beliefs adopted by the scattered groups led to deep and lasting divisions within 
the Philippines. Even today there are several different ethnic groups and dozens of 
cultural minorities in the Philippines, many that speak their own dialects or languages. 
Among the most well-known ethnic groups are the Tagalog, the Ilocano, the 
Pangasinanian, the Pampangueno, the Bicolano, the Cebuano, the Ilongo, and the Waray- 
Waray. Chinese and other groups also live in the Philippines. The Chinese currently
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comprise 1.5 percent of the population and are active in business, controlling a large 
segment o f the business capital in the Philippines.
Religion played a miniscule role in identity and community formation, and most 
likely little if  any role in legitimating whatever proto-governmental structure would have 
existed in the pre-Spanish era. Only the arrival o f a unifying religion—Islam—with its 
monotheistic doctrine and strong tendency to organize society around a moralistic body 
of laws, began to change this. Tradition says that in 1380 an Arab teacher by the name of 
Mukdum arrived in Sulu from the Malay peninsula to preach Islam to the locals. He built 
the first mosque in Sulu. Around 1390, Raja Baginda, a minor ruler o f Menangkabaw, 
Sumatra, followed him. In 1450 Abu Bakr, a Muslim scholar, came to Sulu and married 
Paramisuli, the daughter of Raja Baginda, and after Baginda’s death, he established a 
sultanate form o f government with himself as sultan. Islam then spread rapidly to all parts 
of Sulu.
Serif Kabungsuan is credited with spreading Islam in Mindanao. He led a force 
that conquered the natives in what is now Cotabato and converted them to Islam. He also 
married into an influential family and founded the first sultanate of Mindanao. At the 
same time, Muslim Malay traders from Borneo were spreading Islam to natives as far 
north as Luzon. When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines during the first half o f the 
sixteenth century, many parts o f Luzon, including several large kingdoms of Manila and 
Tondo, had already been nominally Islamized. By the year 1515, Islam had gained a 
permanent foothold in Mindanao, a foothold that almost 500 years o f Christian influence 
and open warfare were unable to eradicate.
The arrival o f Islam is important and illustrative to this study for several reasons. 
First, it shows how an organized and vigorous religion bent on proselytizing can have a 
profound affect on a pre-modem tribal society that was essentially a tabula rasa. Second, 
it illustrates how a religion can go beyond taking care of the spiritual needs o f a people 
and help organize an identity beyond the tribal community. Islam gave the small,
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fragmented tribal communities throughout the Philippines their first conception of 
“organized” civilization, coupled with a communal identity that went further than the 
local barangay.
In Mindanao, the Muslim rulers espoused a common law, a common belief in a 
single god, and gave the populations where Islamic influence was strong a sense o f 
identity greater than that o f the tribe. After the introduction o f Islam one was still a 
member o f a kinship group, but as followers o f Allah and Quranic law, one shared a 
common bond with neighboring tribes and answered to a common chieftain or sultan in 
matters o f social justice, warfare, trade, and moral issues.
Islam made great strides in organizing the populations where it was introduced. 
Even today in the southern Philippines the Moros, or descendents, o f these first Muslim 
converts retain a strong sense of pride and identity with the past, their religion, and their 
fellow Muslims. This causes the majority of the Christian population a great deal of 
consternation in efforts at national unity and cohesion.
Islam deserves credit for what it was able to accomplish in the century after its 
introduction. Indeed, had the Spanish not arrived it is very likely that the Philippines 
would have become an Islamic nation much like neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia.
But the true development of Philippine identity was shouldered by the Catholic Church, 
which arrived in the Philippines as a result o f the Spanish push to find spices and 
converts early in the sixteenth century. The Church, represented by the Spanish friars 
and the conquistadors, was about to land on the shores o f the Cebu and change the history 
of the Philippines forever.
The Spanish arrived in 1521, led by Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan. 
The Spanish did not set out to discover these islands, but were instead looking for new 
trading routes to Asia via circumnavigation o f the globe. However, upon discovering 
these islands the opportunity for conquest and conversion of its souls was too rich to pass
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up. Magellan planted a cross and the Spanish flag, and the first Catholic Mass was 
celebrated on Limasawa on March 31, 1521.5
After landing in the Visayas, Magellan wasted little time in becoming involved in 
local politics. He impressed himself upon the local datus (kings) on the island of Cebu 
and formed alliances with several o f the local chiefdoms. These alliances were followed, 
in due course, by the conversion o f local datus and their followers to Catholicism. 
Emboldened by his successes, Magellan tried to impress the Catholic faith and Spanish 
rule upon the other surrounding datus. Some accepted but others, like datu Lapu-Lapu of 
Mactan, resisted. Magellan set out on a punitive expedition against Lapu-Lapu. 
Unfortunately for Magellan, he was outnumbered and outfought, and he and fifteen o f his 
men died after horrendous hand-to-hand combat. Only one ship of the original five made 
it back to Spain, and only 35 o f the original 265 men were left alive.6
Magellan’s defeat did not mean the end of Spanish designs, and it was only the 
beginning. Soon more Spanish ships would return, better equipped and better armed. 
Both friars and soldiers filled the Spanish ships with the dual purpose of subduing the 
islands for Spain and converting as many inhabitants as possible to Christianity. By 
1565, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi officially claimed the archipelago for Spain and the 
conquista of the Philippines then began in earnest. By 1571, Manila was established and
5Gegoria F. Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines (Manila: University o f Santo 
Thomas Press, 1937), 14.
6Today on Mactan Island one can visit the site of Magellan’s defeat. Nearby there 
are two statues, one o f Magellan and the other o f Lapu-Lapu. It seems strange to one 
unfamiliar with the Filipino nature to honor both the slayer and the slain. On one end of  
the promenade stands the native chieftain, who viscously resisted the foreign invaders 
armed with a sword and shield, and on the other is a statue honoring a man who made it 
possible for the islands to be subdued by conquest. One answer to this confusing duality 
lies in religion, for while it is true Magellan brought colonization to the islands, he also 
brought Christianity. It was subsequently embraced by more than 80 percent o f the 
population.
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the islands were under Spanish authority. Only the Muslim south remained a thorn in the 
Spanish side.
While Spain used military and economic power to dominate the country
n
physically, to establish cultural and political hegemony it turned to the Catholic Church. 
At the outset, the Spaniards placed a heavy emphasis on Christianization as the most 
effective means of incorporating the Filipinos into Spanish culture and colonial 
government. This emphasis on Catholicism is a unique and striking feature of Spanish 
imperialism, as was the inseparable union of the Church and the State— two institutions 
inextricably interdependent.
In the early stages o f Spanish colonial rule, legitimacy did not extend from the 
Church to the government, nor did the Church receive a popular mandate from the people 
or act as an agent on their behalf. Quite the contrary, in the initial stages o f Spanish 
colonization the Church and the government were the same. Legitimacy was inherent 
because the government did not require Church’s the backing. The government was the 
Church. When graphically illustrated (see figure 10) the reader will notice how the 
Church not only acts as a mediating variable but also cuts across the government itself.
The very claim of the Philippines by the Spanish was based on pontifical Law 29, 
Title XXVII o f Partida III, which gave them a legal right over any newly discovered land 
they inhabited first. However, little was said about the legality of this claim if there were 
indigenous people already inhabiting the land. This led to a dispute between Castilian 
monarchists and Spanish friars in the Philippines. Initially, some in the Catholic Church 
resisted Spanish conquest and subjugation of the islands even if  it meant new Christian
7Goodno, The Philippines: Land o f Broken Promises, 20.
g
John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization o f  the Philippines: Spanish Aims and 
Filipino Response 1565-1700 (Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1959), 6.
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lands under Papal authority and the Spanish crown.9 Their argument was that Spain 
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Fig. 10. Legitimacy Model o f Philippines during the Spanish Colonial Era
Traditionally, Spain could acquire sovereignly over new territories in four ways: 
heredity, voluntary choice o f the inhabitants, marriage to an heiress o f the realm, or 
pontifical or imperial grant.10 It was obvious that Spain could not meet the requirements 
of the first and third items. The second and fourth justifications were more readily open 
to manipulation, because the Catholic Church was used to help ensure that the native
9Ibid„ 7.
10J. Gayo Aragon, O.P, “The Controversy over Justification of Spanish Rule in the 
Philippines,” in Studies in Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 3.
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Filipinos made a “voluntary” choice. The Pope, as the de facto “ruler” of all the world’s 
domains, could then grant them the right to the Philippines.
Out o f this controversy came more power for the Church, for as the religious 
debated with the secular authorities they were at the same time positioning themselves as 
the power o f legitimacy for colonial rule. They did so through an elaborate but curiously 
Catholic logic. A case in point is declaration of Monsignor Domingo de Salazar, the first 
bishop o f the Philippines, who argued that the secular authority had no power except that 
granted by Christ. Therefore, Spain could not claim siny legal right to the Philippines 
except that part which was a consequence o f steady Christian conversion.11 From the very 
beginning, the Church positioned itself to be needed by the crown. Indeed, it argued that 
no soldiers or administrators were required unless converts were made, because the 
Church first had to produce a population of Christians before Spanish soldiers, Spanish 
law, and Spanish government were necessary or legally justified.
The king o f Spain, Philip II, supported the Church’s position that preaching the 
gospel had to be assured first. Once conversions were made they, had to be protected, 
organized, and governed. Philip II, a staunch Catholic, made a habit of intently listening 
and studying the writings and arguments of the Catholic bishops in his realm. He rarely 
acted without their consent and never did so without their advice. Even after decades of 
Spanish control, he called upon the authorities o f the islands, including all the clergy, to 
ask for voluntary submission of the indigenous population to the Spanish crown. The 
results, thanks to the hard work of the Spanish friars, were positive. Most indigenous 
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Producing a population of “converts” is itself an interesting story about Church 
power and influence. It was not enough for the friars to get a verbal commitment o f  
conversion from the Filipinos. Instead, conversion required acts o f faith and participation 
in the sacraments. One o f the most important of these sacraments was baptism. The 
proper administration of baptism was the sin quo non of taking part in the new Christian 
communities. Baptism was carried out only after the convert had at least a rudimentary 
understanding o f Catholic doctrine.
Instruction in Catholic doctrine to prepare the Filipino for the sacraments and for 
baptism also meant that the rudiments of a common identity were being constructed 
among otherwise disparate groups. The progress towards this identity construction was 
real, because few were forced to accept the baptism rite if  they were not cognizant of 
what they were doing.
It was through baptism that the indigenous Filipinos became subjects o f another 
independent and sovereign state, one that was spiritual in character and came under the 
authority o f the Pope in Rome.13 At the same time, the friars allowed the Filipinos to 
keep their kinship ties and loyalty to their rulers, who were also allowed to keep their 
positions of authority and their lands once they too converted. It was explained that the 
Pope delegated his authority to the friars and to the converted datus, who pledged to 
promulgate the laws necessary for the protection and the rights o f new Christians. In 
theory, running parallel with Papal authority was the authority of the secular Spanish, 
whose duty it was to administer temporal protection, laws, and government in areas 
where Papal and spiritual matters had no jurisdiction. In reality, the Catholic Church’s 
jurisdiction was omnipresent, leaving the Spanish colonial authorities to work with and 
around the Church as best it could.
13Ibid., 11.
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The first few decades o f Catholic presence in the Philippines were a tremendous 
success. What the priests were able to accomplish in the first few years with limited 
numbers is quite astounding. By the 1590s the number o f friars was only 267, yet they 
were able to baptize around 200,000 Filipinos.14 Many of those baptized in the 
Philippines were youths and young children. This was no coincidence, because the friars 
realized that the future of Catholic and Spanish authority lay with the children.15 
Representing a foreign faith and foreign ways meant that acceptance amongst the elders 
and the older datus was not readily forthcoming. However, through well-laid plans of 
evangelization the friars sought to overcome initial reservations. When a new mission 
was established, three buildings usually went up in quick succession: a church (parish), a 
convent, and a school. If the datus could not be converted, they could still be convinced 
to allow a few o f their children to receive an education at the friars’ schools.
The use o f such a small number of friars to administer such vast areas was not 
meant to be a permanent situation. Instead, the friars were to establish their missions and 
make initial conversions, then set about the work of training indigenous Filipinos to take 
over the positions o f clergy at the parishes. But the Spanish friars hesitated in this duty 
for reasons explained later in the chapter.
The Church’s refusal to ordain enough Filipino priests to fill positions meant that 
the Church and Spain had to rely on other methods o f converting and pacifying the large 
numbers o f Filipinos. Since the number of friars was sparse, much o f the initial work of 
preparing the way for conversion fell to the encomenderos. The encomenderos formed a 
system o f tributary labor. Developed as a means of securing an adequate and cheap labor
14John Leddy Phelan, “Prebaptismal Instruction and the Administration of 
Baptism in the Philippines During the Sixteenth Century,” in Studies in Philippine 
Church History, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 
36.
15Ibid„ 35.
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supply, the encomienda was first used in the conquered areas of Moorish Spain. 
Transplanted to the New World, it gave the conquistador control over the native 
populations by requiring them to pay tribute from lands, which were granted to deserving 
subjects of the Spanish crown. The indigenous populations often rendered personal 
services as well. In return, the grantee was obligated to protect his wards, to instruct them 
in the Christian faith, and to defend their right to use the land for their own subsistence.
The Spanish encomienda system filled the need to have both a Spanish presence 
and a Catholic presence in the colonies. As part of their agreement with the crown, those 
encomenderos in the Philippines had to personally undertake the spiritual education and 
baptism of the indigenous Filipinos in their wards. Moreover, out of their profits they 
were required to build a parish, supply it with the necessary ornaments and items for the
1 7mass, and build a house for and compensate the friar who came to reside in his ward.
For the friars and Church officials who were active in the Philippines, the political 
climate could not have been more accommodating.
The union of Church and State in the Spanish colonial empire was official 
colonial policy. The Recopilacion de las leyes de Indias (Recompilation o f the laws of 
the Indies) put the spiritual and cultural welfare of the nation first, not just economic and
•  •  ,  i o
political gain. The same Recopilacion used to guide Spanish actions in Central and 
South America became the guide for the management o f Spanish acquisitions in the 
Philippines. Adhering to the doctrines set forth in its religious cannon and the legal rights 
bequeathed to it under the Recopilacion, the Catholic Church never limited its role in the 
Philippines to spiritual matters.
17 • • » • «Phelan, “Prebaptismal Instruction and Administration,” 29-31.
18 •Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines, 55.
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The local parish priest was given duties beyond those o f caring for the spiritual 
life of his parishioners. The priest was a salaried government official.19 He was also 
entrusted with purely civil duties, such as organization of the tribute list, direction o f the 
local elementary school, supervision of the election o f local officials, management of 
town council meetings and the approval of local ordinances. Moreover, he oversaw the 
administration o f public works projects, including the maintenance of roads and bridges.
Leading the administration o f the Recopilacion in the Philippines was Manila’s 
first bishop, Fray Domingo de Salazar o f the Order o f Preachers. He arrived in 1581 and 
in 1598, Manila became an archbishopric. This was coupled with the establishment of 
suffragan in Cebu, Caceres, and Nueva Segovia. Under this system power emanated 
from the top down, and from the altar of the Church it remade the Philippines into a 
Catholic colonial territory. In return for the Church’s cooperation, the Spanish crown 
committed itself to the protection and compensation o f priests. The symbiotic 
relationship between the Church and the Spanish government was further underscored by 
the fact that in the early years o f the colony, the religious were continually consulted 
about governmental administrative matters.
The Hispanization o f the Philippines required the Church to do as much. Spain 
extending its government to include the Philippines naturally meant that its theocratic 
system also had to be adapted to the conditions o f the islands. Spanishness was equated 
with Catholicism. To be a good Spanish colony meant that the inhabitants should also be 
Catholic. The friars undertook the dual task of governing and evangelizing the colony, 
and in the process they helped construct the Filipino identity. Religious conversion was 
the path to it all.
19Horoacio De La Costa, S.J., “The Development of the Native Clergy in the 
Philippines,” in Studies o f Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald. H. Anderson (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 70.
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In order to convert the Filipinos, the friars had to first appeal to the indigenous 
populations. That meant a greater understanding o f their beliefs and practices. The first 
step was to learn the languages and customs, and here the friars were up to the task. One 
of the first things the friars did was learn and employ the local languages, a necessary 
burden given their formidable task of “conversion.” The first printed book in the 
Philippines, the Doctrina Christiana published in 1593, was a translation of prayers and 
Christian doctrines. Other books published after Doctrina were translations or 
adaptations of Biblical stories or explanations o f Christian doctrines.
In 1627 the first dictionary, Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala by Fray Pedro de 
San Buenaventura, was published. It was an important tool that helped the Spanish 
missionaries learn Tagalog. The earliest translations and publications were therefore 
directly related to religion. Knowing the indigenous dialects gave the friars power—the 
power to influence, convert, exploit, and subjugate. The naive element of the Filipino 
populace believed the Church was the be all and end all of civilization. The friars, by 
translating Catholic doctrine and Spanish law, fundamentally altered the makeup of the 
Philippines.
Aurora E. Batnag of the Philippine National Commission of Culture and Arts 
highlights this transformation of society through the friars’ translation efforts. 
“Translation in the Philippines started as part o f a religious undertaking . . .  missionaries 
used translation as a tool to spread Christianity among the natives, thus fulfilling a 
utilitarian role: to conquer mind and body.”20
The results of learning the dialects and the push for mass baptism allowed a small 
number of priests to baptize the majority of the Filipinos. Baptisms also allowed the 
friars to conduct a de facto census, thus gathering the population data necessary to carry 
20Aurora E. Batnag, Translation in the Philippines, 
[http://www.ncca.gov.ph/phil._culture/other_cultural info/language/language translation 
.htm] National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 2001 (accessed 29 September 
2001).
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out another policy o f the Church and crown—the policy of Ruduccion. Reduccion 
(literally translated as reduction), implemented by the Church with the help o f the 
Spanish military, aimed to gather together scattered tribal groups and resettle them under 
the watchful eye o f a parish priest. It not only meant that the friars held tighter control 
over the new converts, but it also made the administration o f laws and tax collection 
much easier. The Catholic Church and its authority extended to all o f those said to be 
living debajo de las campanos, or within the sound of the parish’s bells.
In a matter of decades, large chunks o f territory took on the characteristics of 
Castilian organization, leaving behind a Philippine society that had until that time been 
little more than Neolithic. Reduccion created new townships organized around the parish 
and Catholic authorities. This meant that it was now easier to instruct and train the 
indigenous population in Spanish law and Catholic doctrine.
The very infrastructure, government, and civic organization of the Philippines was 
created during this time and owed itself to the work of Catholic religious orders in the 
Reduccion. The founding of towns, cities, and principalities, which served to organize 
the centers o f government, learning, and welfare, were the direct result o f the work o f the 
Catholic Church and the religious orders. These orders also established numerous cities 
and townships. The Augustinians had the most, with more than 385 cities and towns 
established by their order. The Recollects were a distant second with 235, and the 
Franciscans established 233. The Jesuits, who were evicted from the Philippines in 1768 
but returned in 1859, were responsible for more than 93, and the Dominicans had 90.
Each order was also instrumental in developing agriculture, bridges, water works, and 
roads.21 Even today, the Philippines remain divided into provinces that owe their origins 
to this Church-based organization.
21Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines, 70.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
With Reduccion and baptism came new names, new rules, and new identities for 
the Filipino population. Tribal identities were discouraged, and identification with those 
living within the sound of the parish bells was furthered. As each successive generation 
joined the church through participation in the rituals, the Filipino identity became closely 
linked with being Catholic. The names o f those baptized were logged, and as these 
communities grew they fell under the jurisdiction o f the parishes whose responsibility it 
was to organize them politically and socially. Little by little, native Filipinos lost their 
pre-Spanish identities as they began to adopt the dress and the surnames o f the Spanish. 
Gone were names such as Lapu Lapu, replaced instead with De La Cruz, Mendoza, de 
Ocampo, and others.
Within the sound o f the parish bells daily life came to revolve almost entirely 
around the Church. The Church taught its communities how to read and introduced them 
to classical music, rudimentary healthcare, and basic forms o f government. Many o f the 
new Filipino artisans would ply their talents to create the ornate interiors o f the baroque 
parishes that still dot the Philippine landscape. Catholic doctrine also influenced rituals 
and festivals as various tribal traditions were melded within the new communities and 
injected with a dose o f Christianity. Dances, songs, and live plays were now performed 
with Christian themes. Characters were no longer spirits of the forest, but instead 
included Jesus and the Virgin Mary.
Religious holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, became joyous events for the 
villages. Today every Catholic town in the Philippines celebrates an annual barangay 
fiesta in honor of their patron Catholic saint. There are large processions and parades 
throughout the town with the saints, the mayordomo, or sponsor o f the fiesta, and school 
children marching through the settlement to music. In addition, families visit neighbors 
and relatives to share special home-cooked foods. Where else in the world can one 
celebrate Christmas for literally one full month?
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Thus, the Catholic Church did more than just encourage baptism, adoption o f a 
“Catholic” sounding name, or the wearing of Spanish clothes. The friars woke up the 
villagers each day, summoned them to Mass, and subjected them to religious 
indoctrination and catechismal instruction.22 The Church played a central role in the lives 
of the Filipino because it touched every aspect o f their existence, from the spiritual to the 
ordinary, from birth to marriage, and from adulthood to death.
23The Filipinos themselves responded enthusiastically to the new religion.
Luckily for the friars, they were able to convert and reorganize the Filipinos due in part to 
the absence of centralized, organized, and complex political structures. In areas where 
Spain and other Catholic countries like the Portuguese encountered powerful and 
organized civilizations-such as the Hindu kingdoms of India, the Buddhist kingdom of 
Siam, or the Islamic kingdoms of Java—they had little success.
The mass of conversions and the Reduccion around the parishes that followed the 
Spanish conquest gave the Filipinos, from Luzon to Mindanao, a common set of social, 
moral, and spiritual beliefs that had never before existed. It was the first step in a process 
that would see the Church become the central focus o f identity, stronger than any other 
symbol or political ideology during the Spanish period. Integration of religion into the 
social fabric of the Philippines was complete and thorough, as the Catholic Church 
reproduced the various institutions it had successfully established in Spanish America, 
including hospitals, colleges, orphanages, and houses o f refuge.24
29 ♦ • •Leslie E. Bauzon, "Influence of the Spanish Culture," in Encyclopedia o f  
Southeast Asia: Philippines, ed. Shizuo Suzuki and Shinzo Hayase (Kyoto: Dohosha, 
1991), 195-196.
99Phelan, Hispanization o f the Philippines , ix.
24Gerald H. Anderson, ed., Studies in Philippine Church History (Ithaca, N Y : 
Cornell University Press, 1969), 47.
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Beyond institutions, the Catholic Church injected itself into the lawmaking 
process in the Philippines. The governor-general shared his powers with high-ranking 
officials of the clergy. Friars virtually ran the country side, and with this absolute power 
came corruption. Both the friars and the secular authority used each other for gain. The 
colonial government used the friars to maintain control, and the friars became the 
authority for all matters of state. Government officials consulted the clergy before policy 
was made or implemented, and it was not uncommon for the friars to write laws for the 
Spanish colonial authority. In fact, the first Philippine civil code was penned by Father 
Juan de Plasencia in 1589.25
Education o f the masses was also part o f the Catholic Church’s agenda. The 
Church believed that to truly capture and hold the hearts and minds of the indigenous 
Filipino required more than mere submission under the threat of arms. Primary and 
secondary education was established to teach Spanish ways and Church doctrine, but the 
education was not complete. The goal was to educate while giving only enough 
knowledge to make the population governable. Too much knowledge meant a population 
that was hard to control. For those who were deemed worthy to study, usually the 
mestizos (those with a mix of Spanish and Filipino blood), a university education was 
possible either in Spain or at several friar-run institutions, the oldest being the University 
of Santo Thomas, which was established in 1611 in Manila.
Educational indoctrination was also part of constructing a common political and 
social identity. Educated Filipinos from across the vast archipelago could meet members 
of other tribes who only a century earlier may not have understood each other’s 
languages, customs, or religious beliefs or recognized different political authorities.
Now in the townships, local parishes, and Catholic universities they shared a common 
language, style of dress, set o f laws, government, and religion.
25  •Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines, 120.
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The policy of Reduccion gathered together the disparate tribal groups and laid the 
foundation of towns and cities. Translation and publication o f religious texts were 
coupled with conversions, all furthering the creation o f a common identity. Friar- 
controlled government and education gave rise to a number o f Filipino elite, and the 
Church’s efforts culminated in the creation of a common political culture around which 
the nation of the Philippines emerged. But the friars were more than spiritual teachers 
and government officials. In some cases they were called upon to defend the colony 
itself.
The Spanish fleet protected the colony externally. Periodic clashes with the 
Dutch, the English, and the Islamic tribes of Mindanao called upon the resources o f the 
Spanish military garrisons stationed there, but the Church also played a role in colonial 
defense. Indeed, the clergy were instrumental in helping defend the territorial and 
political integrity of the Philippines from foreign invasion.26 Priests organized and 
rallied the population against internal revolts, occasionally taking up arms against 
rebellious Chinese traders who lived in the islands, against the Muslims in the south, and 
externally against attacks by the Dutch and the British.27
The most prominent example of the Church’s role in colonial defense came 
during the brief British occupation. As part of the Seven Years War, the British sailed 
into Manila Bay and occupied the city. Their occupation lasted from October 6,1762, to 
June 11, 1764. It proved to be the only serious imposition of a foreign power on Spanish 
rule until 1898, when Spain would lose the Philippines to the United States. What is
26Anderson, Studies in Philippine Church History, 124.
27  • •Some of these incidences are well documented and include a raid in 1582 by a 
Japanese expeditionary force. The year 1603 saw the first large-scale Chinese revolt in 
Manila, in 1622 Chinese pirate Limahong occupied Corregidor Island, during 1636 a 
Dutch invader sacked and burned the churches of Cagsaw, Albay, and in 1647 the Dutch 
sieged Manila. During the period from 1762 to 1764, the British occupied Manila.
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important about the British occupation, however, is not what it meant for Spanish history 
but its illustration of another role the Church shouldered—defense o f the Philippines.
The religious orders did not simply verbally oppose British conquests, they 
actively opposed the British occupation. The occupation government, whether justified 
through war or not, was illegitimate in the eyes o f the friars. This meshed with the 
concept of the unity of the Church and state that was carried into the Philippines. When
98 > •one was attacked, the other was to defend. Recognizing that the Church and the 
government were one and the same, it is little surprise that the Spanish friars were as 
devoted to Spain as they were to their missionary work.
The British were unprepared to deal with the Church as a military threat.
Working with opposition forces, such as those headed by Don Simon Anda y Salazar, the 
Church proved an effective resistance. The British made a fatal error in judgment when 
they freely granted the right to religious assembly. What they did not realize was that 
these assemblies left undisturbed were covert meeting places for resistance fighters 
within the perimeter of occupation.29 The parishes were turned into planning rooms. It is 
not hard to imagine that after Mass the talk turned quickly to plans o f resistance. Indeed, 
Anda and the friars would not only appeal to anti-British sentiment but also justified their 
defense of the Philippines as a fight against anti-Catholic doctrines.30
«
Almost all o f the religious orders were hostile to the British. When Archbishop 
Manuel Antonio de Rojo y Vieyra, the Spanish governor-general, called for the religious 
orders to leave their cloisters and help defend the city, many friars filled the ranks o f the 
defenders. In most areas the friars were the best trained, most familiar, most fluent, and
9 8 Conrad Myrick, “Some Aspects of the British Occupation,” in Studies in 
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in the best position to organize a native resistance against the English. They knew the 
language, the customs, and the native Filipinos better than anyone. Among the orders 
called to arms, the Augustinians appeared to be the most active and effective instigators 
of resistance. They even riled fears among good Catholics that the British were heretics
•51
who brought only war and no peace.
Some o f the British did see problems with the Church. One officer, Captain 
Blackhouse, is credited with noting that the whole Philippines could be quickly subdued
T9if  the clergy were arrested and confined to Manila. The friars, who plotted to starve the 
British forces out o f Manila, victimized Blackhouse and others. Since the Church 
controlled the valuable supply lines leading to Manila, it was difficult for food and other 
materials to get to the British without the friars’ help. The Church also worked with 
Anda in helping melt parish bells in order to use the metal for casting guns. This forced 
the British to seize all parish bells within their area o f control, further angering both the 
friars and the Catholic Filipinos.
Throughout the ordeal, the Spanish clergy gave their support to Anda and others 
against the British, rallied the Filipinos, took up arms, and facilitated to a great extent the 
failure of British occupation in the Philippines. The military dimension of the Church, 
coupled with its role in the education and infrastructure building in the Philippines, was 
part o f the wide swath the Church cut politically in the country. Everything about the 
Spanish colonial regime’s legitimacy reinforced a pyramidal social structure created by 
the Church and that remained intact until the end of the nineteenth century. At the top of  
the pyramid were the Spanish officials, the peninsulares, and the friars. Its base 
consisted of the Filipino majority, and the middle was filled with a small bourgeois class
3'ibid., 123.
32Ibid., 124.
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of mestizos and criollos (Spanish bom and raised in the Philippines).33 Each level was 
interwoven socially and politically into the great fabric of society, and the thread that 
bound them all was the ever-present Catholic Church.
Since 1565 the Philippines, under the guidance of the Spanish friars, had 
witnessed steady development. Church policies helped create a new Filipino identity, 
religion, and political culture. But underneath the surface tensions begin to mount. The 
tension was the result o f several policies made by the friars. These included the friars’ 
refusal to give the Filipinos what they wanted: full access to the power that being full 
members o f the clergy allowed. Education was incomplete for most and religious 
training was in general never fully developed, obstructing the path for most Filipinos to 
rise to positions of power and influence within the Church. The Catholic Church had 
helped create the Filipino nation, but because the friars were unwilling to step aside and 
let the natural progression and maturation of the society to take place, they were directly 
responsible for the burgeoning sense of nationalism.
The Spanish friars enjoyed their roles as power brokers for the Spanish crown, 
and they resisted traditional efforts to ordain native priests. In so doing, they failed to 
acknowledge a universal maxim of the Church: The church can only be securely founded 
when it is assured o f a clergy sufficiently numerous to administer and develop its various 
works, and the church has no assurance as long as its personnel in any given territory are 
dependent for their recmitment on foreign lands.34
Traditionally, the Catholic Church established a mission and then set about 
training the indigenous population to become members of the clergy. The Church and its 
priests had followed this doctrine elsewhere in Asia, including China with the works of 
Matteo Ricci and Japan with Francis Xavier. However, this was not the case in the
'5-2
Maria Corona S. Romero and Julita R. Romana, Rizal and Philippine 
Nationalism (Manila: St. Anthony Book Service, 1969), 7.
34De La Costa, “The Development o f the Native Clergy in the Philippines,” 67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
Philippines. The doctrinal basis for this exclusion began with the first royal decrees 
made by Philip II, who wanted the parishes to remain in Spanish hands because he felt 
they were loyal subjects to the crown. It was also based on two councils, the Council o f  
Mexico in 1555 and the Third Council o f Mexico in 1585, which prohibited the 
admission o f indios to the religious orders. As Gerald H. Anderson writes, the 
retardation of the native clergy was the result of the “ecclesiastical legislation o f the New  
Spain, where the failure of a premature attempt to develop a native clergy resulted in a
i f
reaction unfavorable to the very idea o f a native clergy.”
The friars’ obstinacy was easily sustained through the structure o fpatronato, a 
policy that gave the king the right to appoint clergy and administration in return for his 
pledge to protect and compensate the Church. The entire structure o f patronato, through 
which the parishes in the colony were administered, contributed to the barring of 
indigenous Filipinos from entering the priesthood and achieving any meaningful role. 
Under the doctrine of patronato, the Spanish sovereign in his capacity as royal patron of 
the Church in the colonies defrayed the expenses o f the colonial churches. In exchange he 
acquired the exclusive right to presentation to all-important ecclesiastical posts. He then 
held wide power in the disposition o f personnel and the division o f ecclesiastical 
territory.
Finally, the Spanish cited the cultural level o f the Philippine missions as a reason 
they could not turn over control. In their minds, no suitable candidates existed.36 The 
Philippines, they argued, were just emerging out of a rudimentary human existence and 
had yet to organize into stable political communities. Whereas Japan, China, and India 
had all possessed great civilizations in the past, it was premature to expect that the
35Ibid., 103.
36Ibid„ 77.
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Filipinos would be priests. The Church wanted to “civilize” them first and ordain them 
later.
Most friars believed that the indigenous people lacked the temperament necessary 
for the job—a nice way to say they feared Filipinos did not possess the intellectual 
acumen to be priests and giving them such responsibilities would be a disaster. The 
Filipinos, the friars believed, were good only for labor and for assisting the “real” priests. 
It was shocking for anyone to suggest that having a native priest was something to be 
desired and most surely, such a priest would promote the downfall of his parish, his 
village, and all those in his wake. At the core was a fear that giving the Filipinos the kind 
of power that the priesthood allowed would mean the collapse o f Spanish authority.
The friars had opposed all efforts made by the Spanish crown to appoint men to 
the posts, even though according to the patronato doctrine the crown had every right to 
do so. The friars fiercely protected their territory from secular influence. They were 
successful in their defense based on a simple formula. The crown either left them alone or 
they threatened to quit the parishes and missions, leaving no Catholic presence, no 
Spanish presence, and thus no governmental presence in the vast majority of the 
Philippines.37
Spain’s colonial government initially backed the friars. The monarchists thought 
that keeping the religious in their parish posts was good for the colonial government.
The farther from Manila these posts were, the more important the residence o f a Spanish 
friar was to the secular government. The friars were not only zealous missionaries, but 
also honored and loyal subjects of the crown. Their presence in these remote regions 
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The friars “showed the flag” of Spain and were the eyes and ears of the secular 
authorities. Indeed, through the use o f the sacraments they were able to ensure stability 
and control over those in their townships. For example, as part o f the evangelization 
process the natives were expected to regularly participate in the sacramental life of the 
Church. Baptism, as mentioned earlier, initiated one into the Church and the State. 
Communion sealed the bond and the confessional was a necessary part o f the new 
spiritual life o f the Christian. As a result o f the enforced confessional, friars were able to 
hear the deepest thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the Filipino, including those who 
harbored ill will against the Spanish authorities.39
One may never know the actual number and frequency o f instances when a friar 
was privy to a plot being hatched against the Spanish and then turned over the 
intelligence to the appropriate authorities. However, it was frequent enough to gamer the 
attention of preeminent Filipino nationalists like Jose Rizal, who used such incidents as 
fodder in his anti-Spanish writings. Indeed, the Catholic religious in the doctrinas were 
given credit by governor Pedro Sarrio for having “contributed most to the pacification of 
the malcontents.”40
The Spanish friars exploited their power in the patronato system. They, as part o f  
the government, were usually the only visible source o f Spanish authority within the 
colony. However, even against this backdrop of resistance, a native clergy was slowly 
emerging in spite of their best efforts to suppress it. In 1702, some in the Church, but not 
the Spanish friars, even went so far as to propose that Manila become a regional seminary 
for East and Southeast Asian indios. It would be a place to train them in the ways and 
laws of the Church for service in their homelands. Al though the idea did not come to
39Rafael L. Vincente, Contracting Colonialism (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1993), 92-94.
40De La Costa, “The Development of the Native Clergy in the Philippines,” 73.
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fruition, it did spark the building of a few seminaries in and around Manila, including San 
Carlos in 1772, which was established by Archbishop Sancho de Santa Just y Rufina.41
By the mid-eighteenth century there were at least four educational establishments 
in Manila built to train native candidates for the priesthood. These priests were slowly 
forming a secular priesthood. It was secular in the sense that they were not bound to any 
particular religious order and were separate from the Spanish religious orders. It was rare 
that the friars would allow an indigenous Filipino to enter their order. This produced a 
split within the Church. On one side were the friars and on the other were members o f the 
developing Filipino secular clergy.
Racial prejudice embittered the rivalry between the friars and the seculars almost 
from the beginning. The problem only worsened as the number of Filipino clergy grew, 
because this gave the Archbishop the power to impose punishments on friars, a power 
that was unenforceable as long as their threat to abandon their parishes was valid. With 
the numbers o f Filipino clergy growing, friars who did not bend to the will o f the 
Archbishop or yield to the patronato could be replaced. At least that was the theory.
That theory was put to the test in 1773 when Archbishop Sancho expelled the 
Augustinians from the parishes in Pampanga and replaced them with indigenous priests. 
When the Jesuits were removed from their parishes, Filipino clergy also replaced them.
So great was his need to replace the arrogant and rebellious friars that Sancho hurriedly 
ordained Filipino priests, often before their training was complete. The results were 
disastrous, and many of these new Filipino clergy were incompetent. Their parishes fell 
into disrepair and stories o f cruelty and thievery perpetrated by indigenous clergy flooded 
into the Archbishop’s office.42 Sancho’s disastrous experiment resulted in the general 
acceptance by both civil and religious authorities that the Filipino was incapable of
4‘ibid., 85-86.
42Ibid., 95-96.
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accepting the responsibilities o f the priesthood.43 To the secular authorities incompetent 
Filipino priests were no better, nor were they an improvement over rebellious Spanish 
friars. At least the friars were Spanish and loyal subjects, while the Filipino clergy were 
often suspected and thought o f as enemies o f Spain 44
It was a no-win situation for the indigenous clergy. If they were incompetent, 
then they served only to justify and prove the negative view o f the incapability of 
Filipinos to assume responsibility for parishes in their own land and justified their 
continued subservient role to the Spanish friars. However, if  they proved intelligent and 
competent, then they were sure to be labeled as rebels with divided loyalties. Indeed, it 
seems that the best and brightest among the Filipino clergy did attract malcontents among 
the barangays, yet in hindsight this was not unusual. If a Filipino had the right 
combination o f acumen, intelligence, and luck, he could rise to a position of power within 
the Church. It is only natural that restless elements o f Filipino society sought assistance 
from one o f their own in a position o f power.
The Filipinos desired to be part of the clergy as much as the friars desired to keep 
them out. They realized that the Church offered a path to power and brought respect, 
lands, wealth, and influence to those within its structure. Yet the Filipinos were excluded 
from these opportunities. Catholic influence in the Philippine colonial government and 
among the populace did not translate into opportunities for the Filipinos who aspired to 
be priests or members o f the powerful Church hierarchy.
The Filipino clergy were excluded by the system itself on almost every front. The 
division of ecclesiastical territory in the Philippines among the missionary religious order 
decreed by Philip II left no room for a secular clergy. The arbitrary limitation o f the 
scope o f Filipino clergy necessarily lowered the standards of its formation. In other
43Ibid., 98.
44Ibid., 100.
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words, the Spanish friars had no need to fully educate and train the Filipinos because they 
were to serve only as subordinates to the friars.
The one attempt by Archbishop Santos to cripple the religious orders resulted in 
disaster, as poorly trained and half educated native clergy were unable to assume the 
responsibilities o f the parishes after the Spanish were removed. It proved to be a self- 
fulfilling prophecy. This purely political maneuver resulted in a deepening antagonism 
between the Spanish friars and the Filipino seculars, which rapidly degenerated in a 
national and racial enmity.45 This was followed by a growing uneasiness on both sides, 
as the Filipino clergy realized revolution was necessary to achieve their goals and the 
Spanish friars and secular authorities suspected Filipino clergy o f harboring revolutionary 
tendencies and believed that their loyalties did not lie with Spain.
The Church establishment’s rejection o f native Filipinos laid the foundation for 
revolution against Spanish rule in the nineteenth century. This revolution can be 
considered the first legitimacy crisis, when the Church, long a pillar o f governmental 
stability, used its resources and was used by others as a tool to fight against the decaying 
Spanish regime. The Filipino clergy were first to rise up against the friars, and thus the 
government. They were the most visible protagonists against Spanish authority, and their 
efforts were based on the early and repeated attempts to exclude them from assuming 
responsibility for the parishes.
Few understood as well as the Filipino clergy the power that came with control of 
the parishes and missions. Flaving this power meant being a part o f the government and 
the power structure and enjoying the full benefits the position entailed. It was not simply 
a desire to serve God or a desire to put a Filipino face in the parishes, but it was real 
power concerns that motivated these Filipinos. Nonetheless, the Spanish had laid a 
foundation that excluded Filipino participation.
45Ibid„ 104.
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An interesting dichotomy developed during this pre-Revolutionary period in and 
around the Catholic Church. The Church, which was the institution o f governmental 
stability and of continuity, became the early focus and breeding ground for Philippine 
nationalism.46 The Spanish friars, long the objects of scom among the nationalists, 
became targets, while at the same time Filipino priests took leadership roles and stirred 
up the fires o f nationalism. The Church was simultaneously equated with stability and 
revolution.
The catalysts that set the revolution in motion were a series o f political affronts to 
Filipino national pride, starting first in 1826 when all Filipino priests were removed from 
Philippine parishes and replaced by monastic friars from Spain. This religious expulsion 
was followed a few years later in 1837 by the political expulsion o f Philippine 
representation to the Spanish Cortes. As these insults to the Philippine people mounted, 
the common bonds of nationalism were fostered both in underground networks and 
through the communications o f the Filipino priests. The local parishes served as 
intellectual rallying points, as well as central meeting points for members of discontented 
groups. Soon, these groups would foment into a revolutionary movement, one that would 
challenge the legitimacy of the Spanish position and bring about a new era in the 
Philippines.
As early as 1870, Archbishop Gregoria Meliton Martinez warned that bitterness 
and resentment o f the Filipino priests could boil over into revolution should their 
treatment not improve 47 It was feared that the friends and families o f the priests would 
be the foot soldiers o f any revolution that might erupt. An interesting feature of this time 
period is the fact that much of the motivation for revolution was anti-Spanish friar and
46Goodno, The Philippines: Land o f Broken Promises, 27.
47Cesar Adib Majul, “Anticlericalism during the Reform Movement and the 
Philippine Revolution,” in Studies in Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald H. Anderson 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 153.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
the period’s literature was anti-Christian, cementing in many minds the permanent break 
from the Catholic Church by the Filipino elite. However, this is a misconception because 
although it was anti-friar, it was never anti-Christian.
The people never sought to break from religion, but merely desired a break from 
what they saw as a corrupt political institution operating under the guise o f faith. The 
ilustrados (a group of highly educated native-born Filipinos) also joined the movement. 
Educated, wealthy, and restless, the illustrados joined the secular priests and began to 
agitate peacefully for civil rights and the secularization of the parishes, unheard o f actions 
until that time.48
The revolution itself was not anti-Catholic but anti-Spanish friar. Even the most 
ardent o f revolutionaries who wanted to see the Spanish friars disappear did not want the 
parishes closed or the Catholic faith to be replaced with something else. Instead, they 
wanted the corrupt Spanish friars to be replaced with Filipinos, thus giving a boost to 
Catholic faith and the revolution at the same time. Anticlericalism during the Philippine 
revolution and legislative attempts to neutralize or minimize the traditional power of the 
Church represented the last phases o f a process that began earlier 49
The Spanish monarchists and the friars allied against the illustrados and the 
Filipino clergy. The turning point was the Cavite Mutiny of 1872. On January 20, 1872, 
200 Filipino soldiers mutinied due to harsh treatment and oppression by the Spanish. It 
was quelled in two days, but three Filipino priests were suspected o f instigating the 
mutiny. As a result, Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora were publicly 
executed. Other priests and illustrados were exiled and arrested.50 Their deaths 
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execution, an acronym developed from the names o f the martyrs, and GOMBURZA 
became the code word used to identify the underground members of the revolutionary 
Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan nang manga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest 
and Most Honorable Society of the Sons o f the Country), or Katipunan for short.
It was widely believed that the three priests were executed simply for being 
Filipino secular priests, but they became martyrs to the revolutionary cause. Two camps 
were now solidified in the same Church. The Spanish friars emerged as defenders o f the 
Spanish sovereignty of the colony, and the Filipino priests emerged as the organizers and 
instigators o f revolution against Spanish control. The positions were irreconcilable. Any 
demand made by one, if  met, would result in a loss o f power for the side that 
acquiesced.51 The chief demand from the revolutionists was that the Spanish hand over 
some 700 parishes to Filipino clergy. To do this would have meant an immense loss of 
revenue, territory, and political power for the Spanish government. The friars were the 
single largest and wealthiest group in the Philippines.52 Moreover, they were the most 
politically powerful.
Illustrados flocked to the cause under the banner of the martyred priests. 
Prominent men, including Jose Rizal, helped fan the fires of revolution by helping 
publish newspapers such as La Solidaridad (1889), which attacked the position of the 
friars in the Philippines. Rizal also wrote Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, both 
scathing satirical attacks on the hypocrisy and corrupt nature of Spanish friars.
The illustrados and other revolutionists were careful not to attack Catholicism in 
the process of attacking the friars. The sympathy for the Filipino secular priests was used 
to arouse nationalist sentiment against the Spanish friar, for it was the Filipino secular 
priests who were the first to fight Spanish abuses. Yet they remained ardent in their faith,
51Ibid., 158.
52Ibid., 159.
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reminding their followers that it was the Spanish who had corrupted Catholicism and the 
Catholic faith was not to blame. Furthermore, they reminded the revolutionaries that 
Catholicism was the great glue holding the islands together. The Filipino priests were 
comrades in arms against the Spanish. They became instigators, organizers, and martyrs.
Jesuit writer John Schumacher traced this story and the role o f the Filipino clergy 
as genitors and carriers of the nationalist consciousness in Revolutionary Clergy: The 
Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903. Schumacher noted that it was 
the Filipino priest who gave birth to nationalism, who nurtured it, and who continued to 
support it even when they were forced to yield its leadership to others who would later 
betray and abandon the Church in pursuit of their own power and alternate versions of the 
revolutionary cause.
Some in the revolution, including Amelio Aguilnaldo, made fatal errors in trying 
to separate the Church from the State. Apolinario Mabini did likewise. Mabini feared 
that any priest, if  left in the same position as a government worker, would be a threat to 
stability and start abusing power.54 He believed in the separation o f Church from the 
State, but others disagreed. One was Felipe Calderon, a prominent revolutionary who 
strongly propounded the unity of Church and State in the Revolutionary Congress of 
1898. Calderon was anti-friar but wanted to keep the Catholic religion as part of the 
state. The Filipino clergy were also represented at the Congress and demanded that any 
new Philippine society have the Catholic Church at its base and its foundation. The 
Church gave the Filipino a moral compass, norms, and “sense of identity.”55
53John N. Schumacher, Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the 
Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903 (Quezon City, Metro Manila: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 1981), 3.
54Majul, “Anticlericalism,” 171.
55Ibid., 168-169.
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When it came time to vote on an amendment to the provisional constitution that 
would have separated the Church from the State, there was a huge fight between those 
who favored keeping the Church as part o f the government and those who wanted a clean 
break. The first vote on the amendment ended in a tie. However, the chairman broke the 
tie and the amendment passed by a margin o f one vote.56 The Filipino clergy were 
outraged and felt the revolution’s leadership had betrayed them. The priests who 
supported the revolution to get rid of the Spanish friars never supported the goal of 
dissolving the established power and influence o f the Catholic Church. Many 
revolutionary delegates agreed. No one present at the vote needed to be reminded that 
there would have been no revolution had the Filipino priests not organized a stand against 
the Spanish friars and the Spanish crown.
The errors of Aguilnaldo and Mabini aside, most people were mindful o f the 
friars’ role in the revolutionary cause, including Rizal, who dedicated his second novel,
El Filibusterismo, to the martyred Filipino priests Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos, and 
Jacinto Zamora. Rizal’s actions, and those taken by Calderon and others, are poignant 
reminders that nationalism in the Philippines did not mean secularization o f the 
government but instead a “nationalizing” of the Catholic Church. By doing this it was 
believed the obstacles to education, progress, and freedom would be overcome while at 
the same time keeping the Philippines a Catholic nation. Unfortunately for the Church 
and the revolutionaries, those ideas were not fully realized.
In 1898 the Spanish-American War began, with grave consequences for the 
Philippines. Having defeated the Spanish in short order, the Americans became the new 
colonial masters of the Philippines, voiding the established Philippine Republic and 
igniting a new war against the Americans. The Catholic Church had few weapons to 
combat this new American colonialism, and would see its role diminish in importance as
56Ibid., 169.
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nationalism gave way to a partnership with the Americans. To be Filipino would Still 
mean to be part o f the Church, but now America would inject its own influences into the 
Philippine psyche, including ideas such as liberty, democracy, the Protestant work ethic, 
and the separation o f Church and State. For the first time in the history of the Philippine 
nation-state, the Catholic Church was not needed to legitimate the government.
The United States acquired the Philippines as the spoils from the war with Spain, 
and with them came the Catholic Church-based infrastructure. It was unlike any territory 
the United States had ever attained. Within American political circles there were those 
for and against this acquisition. Some saw the economic and military value o f the islands, 
including their undeniable value as a naval base for America’s emerging pacific fleet. 
Others objected to the United States playing the role o f an imperialist power. It was, in 
their view, unjustifiable in light of American political culture, which was founded on the 
principles o f free choice and rule o f law. To force the American government and 
institutions on a people who did not wish them was in itself un-American, yet President 
William McKinley and his advisors, mostly in the military, were able to look past any 
negatives associated with violating American principles and the tradition of anti­
imperialism and see the economic, political, and even religious benefits associated with 
the acquisition o f the Philippines.
Estimates o f public opinion toward the acquisition o f the Philippines after the war 
were varied. Businessmen viewed the Philippines as the gateway to Asiatic markets and 
a way for the United States to finally become competitive with what they believed would 
be the emerging markets in China.57 In American religious circles, there was almost 
uniform support for the acceptance of American responsibility for the islands and 
undertaking a “conquest for Christ.” The fact that more than 80 percent of Filipinos were 
Christian did not seem to damper the American spirit for Protestant proselytizing. Many
57Garel A. Grander and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United 
States (Norman, OK: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1951), 28-29.
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Americans who were aware o f American involvement in the Philippines viewed the
• » . ♦ . co
acquisition o f the islands as divinely inspired.
Divinely inspired or not, the American regime in the Philippines took power and 
remained in power throughout the colonial era because of its military might. The Church, 
long the center of politics in the Philippines, was marginalized. In figure 11 the drastic 
change in legitimacy is illustrated. The Church was detached from the government by the 
American desire to separate Church and State and was marginalized by other factors, 
such as the United States colonial economic sector and the United States military. 
Legitimacy did flow around the Church, but it was in large part inconsequential to the 
ruling regime.
Ignoring the Catholic Church was something the Americans did from the 
beginning. One of the rallying points for acquiring the Philippines initially as a 
protectorate was that a conquest o f arms must be followed by a conquest for Christ.59 
American Protestants simply ignored that more than 80 percent of the Philippine 
population was Catholic. The few anti-imperialists, such as Samuel Clemens, Andrew 
Carnegie, and Charles Francis Adams, who viewed what the United States was 
undertaking as being in direct opposition to the spirit of the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution o f the United States, were ignored. These gentlemen argued that the 
Filipino was no more eager for American rule than they were for Spanish misrule. The 
United States had unmistakably broken with its democratic traditions of equal rights and 
self-government.60 These men’s voices, like those o f the Catholic Church in the 
Philippines, were muted by the majority’s clamor to take over the islands.
CO
Kenton J. Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines, 1898-1916: An 
Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 
1986), 154.
59Anderson, Studies in Philippine Church History, 286.
60Grander and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 49.
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Fig. 11. Legitimacy Model o f the Philippines During the American Colonial Era
The final decision was McKinley’s, and given all the bluster about economics and 
empire, his description of his own decision lacked any mention o f empire building, a 
desired naval base, or an American counterweight to European expansion in Asia. What 
he says instead is that the United States had three undesirable alternatives. The islands 
could not be given back to the Spanish, they could not be turned over to a rival European 
power, and they could not be left to themselves, because the Filipinos were in his opinion 
unfit for self government. McKinley thus concluded that there was nothing left to do but 
to take them and “educate the Filipinos and uplift and Christianize them, and by God’s 
grace do the best we could for them as our fellow men for whom Christ also died.”61
American colonial authorities never saw themselves for what they were, the first 
major extension of the American imperialist arm. On the contrary, the official line o f the
61 Ibid., 37.
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United States was that it had come to the Philippines as a liberator, not as a colonizer, 
taking up the unenviable but necessary “white man’s burden.”62 Opinions about the 
Filipinos themselves were not flattering. Books written at the time described the 
Filipinos as “spoiled children,” “indignant,” and grateful for the surfeit o f American 
supplies.63 Indeed, the Filipinos were expected to be thankful that a “just” and “noble” 
imperial master was pacifying them, not a third-rate European power with antiquated 
politics and a friar-controlled bureaucracy.64
American intentions were not all bad. They planned to eventually give the 
Philippines independence, but in limited steps. There was still support for the policy of 
filling the Filipinos’ stomachs while keeping their heads empty. Yet there was more than 
pure philanthropy to the American conquest. Many Filipinos did not see the Americans 
as liberators, but as simply another occupying force, and they met the American army 
with a revolutionary army of their own.
Spain’s defeat by the Americans was in a real sense a defeat of the Catholic 
Church as well, and it made the Church’s cooperative position with the government 
uncertain. The Spanish friars were not ignorant o f the American political culture, but it is 
likely that the friars themselves did not have a clear idea of how they would be treated by 
the new American regime. Some probably felt their positions would be sustained against 
the Filipinos and the indigenous clergy, and others probably felt a mutual working 
relationship could be worked out between the parishes and the Americans. In either case, 
the Spanish friars planned on staying in the Philippines without being harassed by either 
Americans or Filipinos.
f\0 Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," McClure's Magazine 12 February
1899.
Nicholas Roosevelt, The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem (New York: J. 
H. Sears and Company, Inc., 1926), 4
64Ibid.
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In previous centuries the power of the friars was so great that the Spanish 
government rested upon the Church. The Americans had seldom dealt with a Church 
whose authority was indistinguishable from that o f the secular government, and one was 
always invoked to sustain the power o f the other.65 Garel A. Grunder and William E. 
Livezey summarized the friars’ power during the Spanish era quite well, stating that the 
friars were “supreme” in the life o f Filipinos.66 The priest exerted a determining influence 
in practically every branch of municipal government. He was president o f the boards of 
health, statistics, and prisons. He presided over taxation and the municipal budget and 
was a member o f the board of partition crown lands. At times, the friars were even in 
charge of the insular police. They closely supervised whatever public instruction was 
offered and naturally opposed any liberalizing tendencies or actions that might undermine 
their own privileged status or the power of Spain. In a very vital sense, these religious 
leaders were to the Filipinos the real representatives o f Spanish power.
The American administration approached the situation unsure of how to handle a 
Church that was also a government. The situation was complicated by the actions of 
some within the Church itself. As it had during the final years of Spanish rule, the 
Church tried to serve as a rallying point for opposition forces against the Americans.
Some elements within the Philippine Church refused to relinquish their dream of 
independence and did not shy away from violent conflict with the American forces. The 
most well-known of these clashes occurred on the island of Samar, where the bells o f the 
local parish were used as a signal to launch a brutal assault on Company C o f the United 
States Ninth Infantry. At the sound of the parish bells, Filipinos dressed as mourning 
women pulled out their bolos (large machete knives) and slaughtered fifty-four soldiers. 
Retribution from the Americans was swift, and included burning the church and seizing
65Charles Burke Elliot, The Philippines to the End o f the Commission 
Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 42.
66Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 123.
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the parish bells. The bells are still in American hands, kept as trophies at F. E. Warren 
Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. To this day, Wyoming veterans' groups resist 
giving them back.
The soldiers who had rallied around the Filipino clergy to overthrow the Spanish 
looked again to their parishes for guidance in matters o f war. They were fighting a 
juggernaut in the American military, but it did not stop them from trying. Discovering 
this, the Americans began to target the Church and the Filipino priests became a major 
focus o f “pacification.” To do this would require winning over the clergy, and if  they 
could not be won over they were to be “eliminated.”68
The exact number of priests targeted, won over, or eliminated is not known.
What can be surmised is that the pressure placed on the Catholic Church by the American 
occupying forces was successful. Gradually, the Church withdrew and was pushed out o f  
any revolutionary role. The revolution gradually transformed into something 
unrecognizable from the war with the Spanish. As the leadership, Aguilnaldo, Mabini, 
and others distanced themselves more and more from the Church and the revolution lost 
popular support and died out. Scholars readily acknowledge that the revolution became 
short-lived when the Church was removed from its center and there was nothing to 
replace it as the organizational and spiritual force.69 In many respects, the revolution 
failed because it abandoned its religious roots.
The centuries-old conflict between the Christian majority and the Muslim 
minority in the south was also very much alive during this time. Unlike the Spanish, the
67Edwin Kiester Jr. and Sally Valent Kiester, “Yankee Go Home and Take Me 
With You! Effect on Philippines o f U.S. Colonization,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Smithsonian (May 1, 1999; accessed 22 August 2001).
68Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the 
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), 114.
69Ibid., 97.
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Americans had little difficulty in subduing the moros. They were, through superior arms, 
more than a match for the fighters o f the moros, who were equipped with antiquated 
firearms and a keris. The Muslims ultimately accepted American rule with the signing of 
the Carpenter Agreement in 1915 between Sultan Jamalul Kiram and Frank Carpenter. 
They did this hoping that they would be granted a modicum of autonomy and not be 
forced to submit to the authority of the Christian Filipinos, whose power was centered in 
Manila.
The Americans, however, should not be viewed as benevolent imperialists who 
had no other choice but to take the Philippines under their exclusive wing and colonial 
protection. Elements in the Philippine revolution who had fought against the Spanish 
before the American victory had declared through their Malolos Constitution o f 1899 an 
independent Philippine state, and the Americans simply ignored this. The Americans did 
not plan to share their victory or the spoils of the Philippines with the Filipinos. After the 
dispatch of the Spanish, the United States made it known that the “insurgents” who had 
previously been Filipino freedom fighters must recognize the authority o f the United 
States.70
The American administration took the islands, but it also inherited the problems. 
Problems of education, infrastructure, land reform, and government all taxed the 
intellectual and material resources of the United States. An elite and educated body of 
Filipinos existed, but they were few in comparison with the overall population and were 
not o f great use in fostering the American administration.
Among the most important problems facing the new American administration was 
how to deal with the Church. The Americans had never seen or dealt with a Church-State 
apparatus that was so intimately intertwined. The indigenous Filipino clergy also had to 
be dealt with, along with the issue o f the Spanish friars. The questions and problems
70  •Grander and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 21-22.
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facing the Americans were daunting. They had to pacify a population, deal with the 
friars, keep the native clergy content, and honor their own American political traditions 
of separation of Church and State.
To deal with this issue, President McKinley tapped Jacob Gould Schurman, then 
president o f Cornell University, to head a commission to look into these difficulties. By 
the end o f 1899, the commission submitted a report stating that American stewardship 
was needed for an indefinite period until the Filipinos themselves were educated and 
responsible enough for self-government.71 It did, however, deal concretely with the 
Catholic Church issues. From the beginning of American rule in the Philippines, it was 
officially announced that the cardinal principle o f policy would be consonant with a 
fundamental rule of American life: Keep the separation between Church and State “real, 
entire, and absolute.”72 As a corollary, there was to be absolute religious freedom. This 
separation o f Church and State was an expression of the American political culture and 
ideals, not o f religious convictions.
A second commission was established under the authority o f William Howard 
Taft. President McKinley gave the Taft Commission legislative and executive authority 
to put in place the civilian government the Schurman Commission had recommended. In 
499 statutes issued between September 1900 and August 1902, the Taft Commission 
attempted sweep away more than three centuries of Spanish and Catholic rule and replace 
them with American-style law. In place o f a constitution, the United States passed the 
Organic Act of 1902, which among other things extended the protections o f the Bill of 
Rights to the Filipinos and imposed, for the first time in Philippine history, an official 
government mandate for the separation o f Church and State.
71Ibid., 59.
72  •Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule (New York: 
Shoe String Press, 1968), 96.
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Declaring the separation on paper did not make it reality. The Catholic Church, 
the friars, and the power they wielded were still issues that needed to be addressed, and 
Taft took it upon himself to give them his personal attention. Most o f the members o f his 
civilian government were clamoring for the expulsion of the friars from their land and 
from the Philippines because they had observed that the Spanish friars were the targets of 
much Filipino animosity. The friars were the reason for the revolution to begin with, and 
keeping them in their parishes could only hurt America’s effort in the Philippines. Yet at 
the same time, Article VII of the Treaty of Paris meant the Americans had to protect the 
friars and their lands.
The Church issue was made more complex by the fact that the Church owned vast 
estates throughout the Philippines and was also engaged extensively in banking and 
general businesses.73 Complicating matters was the Vatican’s handpicked representative, 
Archbishop Placido Chapelle of New Orleans, who was sent to the Philippines to oversee 
the transition from Spanish to American control. Archbishop Chapelle arrived on 
January 2, 1900. Paradoxically, he was the wrong man for the right job.
Once in the Philippines, Chapelle gave the illusion of representing both the 
Papacy o f Rome and the United States, but as a champion of the friars he failed to 
understand his role as an American representative. His aims for the Church clouded his 
judgment and ended up superseding any patriotic tendencies.74 Chapelle pressured the 
American administration to return the friars to their estates, in plain disregard for the 
inhibitions against the United States government or its agents being involved with 
ecclesiastical preferment.75 He also tried to get recognition for the Church’s exclusive
73Elliot, The Philippines to the End o f the Commission Government, 43.
74James E. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines: A History o f  the Conquest 
and First Years o f  Occupation with an Introductory Account o f  the Spanish Rule (New 
York: AMS Press, 1970), 296.
75Ibid„ 298.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
right to control property and charitable or educational works, which under Spanish rule 
had been mixed civil and ecclesiastical authority.76
Chapelle’s crusade to get exclusive rights to all Church-owned property and even 
that once held in joint custody by the Spanish secular authorities and the Church 
frightened many Filipinos, who feared an American-friar alliance. Fortunately for them, 
his requests were denied, and the fact that the insular government was legally contesting 
the right of the Church or friars to the property helped satisfy many Filipinos.77
The damage Chapelle did to the American efforts to resolve the friar issue was 
serious. He blatantly supported the friars’ interests, and to many Filipinos he seemed to 
represent the American view. Coinciding with Chapelle’s seemingly royal treatment by 
the American authorities was the imprisonment of Adriano Garces, a Filipino priest who 
was a chief opponent o f the Spanish friars. This action seen alongside the pomp and 
circumstance afforded friars by the Americans, including the military protection of some 
friars, led many to believe the Americans were getting too cozy with the friars.78 Indeed, 
it was not uncommon for Catholic dignitaries to be provided army wagons for pastoral 
tours and occasionally be granted a guard o f constabulary at their disposal. Even 
steamboats were available for the use o f the Church’s dignitaries.79 The Church even 
managed to pressure the Americans to appoint Catholics to the highest offices overseeing 
education in the Philippines.80
76Ibid., 303.
77 •Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 126.
78  •Elliot, The Philippines to the End o f the Commission Government, 38-40.
79Henry Parker Willis, Our Problem: A Study o f American Colonial Policy (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1905), 205.
80Ibid„ 234-235.
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There may have been more than one way to deal with the friar issue, but 
Chapelle’s methods were not one of them. Contrary to what Chapelle was purporting to 
be the American stance, the American authorities set two objectives. The first was the 
reduction o f the economic power o f the Catholic Church and the second was the 
expulsion of the religious orders (friars) from the islands.81 Together the main religious 
orders—the Dominicans, Augustinians, and Recollects—held almost half a million acres of 
the best lands and considerable business and political influence. Given that they were the 
targets o f Filipino animosity, they could not be allowed to stay in the same powerful 
positions. Taft’s commission concluded that the best way to deal with the issues was to 
purchase the friar lands and resell them to the Filipinos and others who wished to 
purchase them.
Directions from Washington were clear and echoed Taft’s findings. Secretary of  
War Elihu Root told Taft that separation of Church and State was one of the fundamental 
and imperative provisions o f American government and could not be compromised. 
Moreover, there was a need to adjust the relations o f these agencies in the Philippines 
from one of close union to one of complete independence.82
McKinley’s assassination on September 14, 1901, and his subsequent replacement 
by Theodore Roosevelt did not change America’s Philippine policy. At Roosevelt’s 
request, Taft proceeded to Rome in June 1902 to meet Pope Leo XIII to try to solve the 
friar problem. The deal Taft eventually struck was to purchase 410,000 acres for roughly 
$7.2 million in gold. Taft believed that unless serious efforts were made to get the Holy 
See to withdraw all friars, there would be no peace with the elite on whom the American
81Willis, Our Problem, 192.
82Grander and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 128.
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policy of conciliation depended.83 Taft’s work continued, and so did progress on the
• • • 84Cooper Bill, which authorized the purchase of friar lands.
Coupled with the Americans’ movement to buy the friar lands and rid the 
Philippines o f them for good were the schismatic movements within the Church itself. 
Gregorio Agliplay, an ordained priest of the Catholic Church, broke away from the 
Roman Church to establish his Independent Philippine Church (Inglesia Filipina 
Independiente). Also called the Aglipayan church, it grew out o f the Filipino clergy’s 
deep resentment against the Spanish government and the Catholic Church for failing to 
faithfully carry out the secularization of the church.85
The Aglipayan church was based on the Roman model and was essentially 
orthodox Catholicism with a nationalist bent, allowing full participation for the 
indigenous clergy who would join their ranks. Aglipay believed that those who joined 
his movement would also inherit the church buildings and property of the Catholic 
Church once the Americans had evicted the Spanish.86 It was this promise and the fact 
that those who joined his movement also brought ownership of their parishes that fueled 
the explosive growth o f the Aglipayan church.
As the Aglipayan movement built momentum, it began to gobble up the lands and 
parishes of the Catholic Church. It did so when a parish priest quit the Roman Church 
and joined the schismatics or when the congregation voted to do so. However, the 
purchase of the best friar estates posed difficulties, as did a legal challenge to the
John N. Schumacher, S. J., “Foreign Missionaries and the Political-Cultural 
Orientations of the Roman Catholic Church, 1910-1970,” Philippine Studies 38 (1990): 
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movement, which was heard before the Philippine Supreme Court on November 24,
1906. In the case of Barlin v. Ramires, the court held that the Catholic Church was the 
sole legal owner of all disputed churches and other parish properties.87 Deprived o f its 
main source o f inspiration-the takeover of property—the Aglipayan movement lost 
momentum and became politically irrelevant within a decade.
The Inglesia ni Cristo (INC) is quite a different story. Founded in 1914 by the 
charismatic Felix Manalo, the Iglesia ni Cristo (Tagalog for "Church of Christ") claimed 
to be the one true Church of Christ. Manalo heralded himself as God's last prophet. Since 
its founding, it has grown to boast more than 200 congregations in some sixty-seven 
countries outside the Philippines, including a large and expanding community in the 
United States. From its humble beginnings, membership grew and current estimates 
range from three million to ten million members worldwide.
At its onset, the INC poured large amounts o f resources and energies into 
condemning the Catholic Church. Like the Aglipayan movement, it offered dissatisfied 
Filipino Catholics an alternative to the friars’ legacy. However, unlike the Aglipayan 
church, it did not rely on the seizure o f Catholic property to make converts. Thus, when 
the Church won its legal battle the INC did not falter. It survived and grew and remains 
politically powerful today, a fact made clear in later chapters.
During this time the Catholic Church itself, made up of a few remaining foreign 
friars and loyal indigenous clergy, was being pressured on all sides. Schismatic 
movements such as Aglipay’s and the INC, initially drew both property and parishioners 
away from the Church, and the influx of hostile Protestant missionaries seemed to only 
exacerbate the problem. The hostility between the Catholic Church and the American 
Protestant missionaries was real. Many missionaries came to the island with the apparent
87 Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 104-105.
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notion that their first and most imperative duty was to fight the Catholics. But the 
Church was not going away without a fight, and it was prepared to do what was 
necessary to survive.
Though it is true that the Aglipayan schism, the INC, and the entrance of the 
American Protestant denominations shook the Church and caused a great deal of 
consternation, it survived weakened but basically intact. Under the Americans, the 
Church may not have been the force o f legitimacy it once was, but it retained the nominal 
adherence o f the immense majority o f Filipinos in the twentieth century and thus 
remained a major potential force in Philippine society and politics.89 The Church and its 
clergy were wise in the ways of political manipulation and realized that the American 
regime could be one of two things: the tool to break its hold on the people forever or the 
instrument allowing it to stay politically relevant and involved in the population’s 
everyday lives. Initially, it seemed a difficult task but later the Catholic cause would be 
helped along by the Americans themselves.
At the outset, American representatives were distinctly hostile to the Church and 
were inclined to treat it as if  it were identical to the discredited Spanish hierarchy.
Further experience in the Philippines brought the Americans to see the immense power 
the Church wielded. While the land negotiations were ongoing, there grew an American 
desire to make use of the Church’s power as a means of political 
control, rather than opposing it to keep it continuously against American rule.90 The idea 
of using the Church to further American aims had existed since Taft’s arrival. Taft and 
many o f his associates fully appreciated the fact that the Catholic Church had done much
88Willis, Our Problem, 222.
89 Schumacher, “Foreign Missionaries,” 151.
90Willis, Our Problem, 203.
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to civilize and stabilize the Philippines. Moreover, Taft believed that the Church’s great 
power and influence could still be used in advancing America’s agenda.91
Using the Church to further American aims was a delicate task, helped along by 
the Church’s willingness to find shelter in America’s shadow. The Americans had only 
to be careful not to appear to favor the friars. Moreover, the Americans had to ensure the 
absolute separation of Church and State and carefully avoid anything resembling 
concessions to the Church.92 It was a public policy keeping with the political traditions 
of the United States and also ensured the Filipino who had fought against the friars that 
the Americans were different and would not forsake their traditions or reinstall the friars 
to their positions of power.
At the same time, the vast majority o f the population still needed and held 
affection toward their Catholic faith. This affection was used to foster pro-Americanism, 
making the United States’ colonial occupation more tolerable to the Philippines. To 
accomplish both tasks meant a staunch and very public legal enunciation of the 
separation of Church and State, paralleling a much less public effort to buy friar lands, 
sell them to the natives, install American priests where the Spanish had once been, and 
support the native clergy who were pleasant towards American aims.
The United States was adroit at playing both sides of the card. The Filipinos, who 
were unable to throw off the yoke of American imperialism, benefited by ridding 
themselves of the corrupt friars, taking possession of their own lands, and maintaining the 
faith that had unified them politically, socially, and culturally for more than 300 years.
The Church also took steps to continue their internal reforms, structuring the Church to 
better fit the Philippine model. The Quae Mari Sinico issued in Rome on September 17, 
1902, increased the number of bishoprics, increased training for the indigenous priests,
91Elliot, The Philippines to the End o f the Commission Government, 45.
92Willis, Our Problem, 225.
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and elevated their role in Church affairs. Other reforms included replacing the Spanish
• Q -3
friar prelates with American bishops in 1903.
The Manila Council o f December 8-29,1904, took up these and other matters and 
marked a real turning point in the Church’s history in the Philippines. Since then, the 
Church’s political progress has been slow but steady.94 In the end, the Church had 
successfully rebuffed the Aglipayan schism, and after eighteen years of evangelical work 
the Protestants had converted only 124,575 Filipinos, or 1.3 percent of the population.95 
The failure by the Protestants or any o f the schismatics to make significant progress in 
the long run is yet another testament to how deep the Church’s roots ran in the 
Philippines.
Divorced from a direct role in political affairs, the Catholic Church attempted to 
remain relevant by having Filipino clergy attend to the needs o f their parishes and 
parishioners as best they could. Sacraments still needed performing, schools still needed 
to be run, health care needed to be doled out, and the Church could still dominate in all 
the places where American forces had yet to penetrate. The Church continued to run its 
schools and universities, including two universities that remained the premier institutions 
for Philippine elite. Those were the University of Santo Thomas, the royal and pontifical 
university o f the Philippines, and the Jesuit-established Ateneo de Manila University.
The Catholic Church had to share intellectual, political, and cultural space with 
the mass appeal o f all things American. Americanism itself became sort o f a religion, 
and Uncle Sam’s American way was a moral ideal to be emulated. Identification with 
things American sometimes became as powerful as any religious affiliation. Church 
leaders struggled to find ways to remain relevant. Understanding that the stiffest
93 Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 111-112.
94Ibid., 113.
95Ibid., 109.
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competition for the hearts and minds of the populace was not with any anti-clerical 
ideology but with Americanism, they decided to adopt some aspects o f the American 
way, such as the use of the rule of law to affect change and remain congruous to the 
everyday life o f the nation’s populace.
The Church also pushed parishioners to have a larger voice both in Church affairs 
and in social affairs. By doing this, it was hoped that Catholics would gamer greater 
political leverage through greater political activity. The logic was that the more the 
Church expanded parishioners’ involvement, the greater the Church’s influence would be 
in secular political institutions.96 It would take nearly three decades of constant effort, 
but eventually it yielded success.
Three decades after the Americans had established control, the Catholic Church 
managed to regain some political relevancy. The 1930s saw a rejuvenation of Church 
importance to politics, as Catholic scholars and the secular leadership were brought 
together in an exchange of ideas. This was the result o f the strong foundation and the 
kind of deeply rooted influence the Church enjoyed in the Philippines, along with the fact 
that the Catholics still held administrational power in the premier universities. The 
students they produced were still Catholic, and the majority of the scholars, politicians, 
and government workers were all still Catholic. It was reasonable, therefore, to assume 
that when the United States began to get serious about transitional control o f its colony to 
indigenous hands it would turn to the best and brightest of the nation, who just happened 
to be graduates of Catholic institutions who were influenced considerably by the Church.
In the legal arena, the push for independence was spearheaded by the efforts of 
Sergio Osmena and Manuel Roxas, who led a mission to the United States between 1931 
and 1933. The United States passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law, which provided 
granting the Philippines independence after a ten-year period. Due to some objectionable
96Ibid., 134.
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provisions, the Philippine Legislature rejected it, and in 1934 Manuel Quezon, himself a 
graduate o f the University o f Santo Thomas, led another mission to the United States to 
secure passage o f the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which provided, among other things, 
establishment o f the Philippine Commonwealth before granting independence.
The culmination of these efforts was the 1934 Commonwealth Constitution, the 
product of the finest Catholic minds assembled from the nation’s parishes and 
universities.97 From 1898 to 1934, the Catholic Church had been attacked, suppressed, 
and marginalized by the Americans. The Commonwealth Constitution was proof that the 
Church was back. It was again a force o f legitimacy in the Philippines. The 
Commonwealth Constitution is still called the first truly “Christian doctrine” o f national
98law. This document was to serve as the law of an independent Philippines.
Remarkably, the Catholic Church survived the ideological onslaught of American 
government, military, and Protestant denominations to reemerge in 1934 as the co-author 
the new constitution. It was positioned once again as a force of legitimacy in Philippine 
politics. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth government outlined in the constitution 
would never be truly tested. Japanese aggression was growing in East Asia and would 
spill over into Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Faced with a new enemy, the time for 
enlightened law in the Philippines had not come. Now was a time for war and national 
survival.
The price of being America’s ally in Asia was high for the Philippines. More than 
200,000 lives were lost fighting the Japanese, and the material destruction o f Manila and 
other important cities was almost complete. The fighting was costly, but as they had so 
many times in the past the Filipino people prevailed, their tenacity as fighters and their 
survival as a people unquestioned. Their reward was independence. The United States
97  •Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines, 202.
98Ibid., 210.
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kept its agreement to grant independence. On July 4, 1946, the Philippines declared 
independence and the third Philippine Republic was inaugurated.
To help the newly independent nation, the Americans offered the Philippines a 
“mini-Marshal Plan,” of $600 million per year." The amount was considerably less than 
the European nations were offered. And by the time the money was distributed, the 
amount was smaller than that offered to rebuild Japan. The miniscule help the United 
States offered to its former colony and its staunchest ally in Asia bordered on insulting, 
but the Americans added more salt to the Philippines’ wounds.
In 1946, before a single dollar was earmarked for the Philippines, the United 
States extracted a number o f preferential provisions from the nation through two major 
agreements. The first was the Rehabilitation Act (mini-Marshal Plan), and the second 
was the Trade Act (Bell Act). Both were implemented in 1946. Provisions in both bills 
required the Philippines to revise their constitution and civil, criminal, and trade laws so 
that American citizens and business interests were granted parity with their Philippine 
counterparts in economic matters.100 The latter was reaffirmed in the Laurel-Langley Act 
of 1956. The problems were made all the more intense by a weakened sense o f identity 
and national morale, weakened by the pre-war American occupation, the Japanese 
onslaught, and the diluted Catholic Church and its institutions. If the Philippines were to 
rebuild and if its poorest elements were to be lifted up, the nation would need a 
revitalized Church.
During the Spanish era, the Catholic Church had provided governance and 
guidance, and during the revolution it had provided leadership. However, the American 
colonial period had effectively weakened the Church-State cooperation that was endemic
99E. San Juan Jr., Allegories o f  Resistance: The Philippines at the Threshold o f  the 
Twenty-First Century (Manila: University of Philippines Press, 1994), 93.
100David Joel Steinber, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place, 2d ed. 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 20.
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in Philippine society. The brief Commonwealth period illustrated the Church’s 
resilience and its ability to reclaim its spot as a partner with the Philippine government.
It survived the Japanese onslaught and helped the Philippines become the first colony in 
Asia to gain independence. In so doing, it attracted the respect, admiration, and attention 
of leaders and revolutionary movements across the region.101
The next few decades would witness a reinvigoration of the Catholic Church 
worldwide. Vatican II, Liberation Theology, and the rise to power o f Ferdinand Marcos 
would all serve, in different ways, to push the Church’s activities to the forefront of 
Philippine politics. The culmination would be the Church’s role in the People Power 
revolution, which played a significant role in bringing down an authoritarian regime and 
bringing the Church back to the forefront o f Philippine politics.
101Ibid„ 46
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CHAPTER III 
FROM LIBERATION TO DESPOTISM
The Japanese occupation did more than destroy lives and property. It created a 
new threat and a new challenge to political stability in the post-war Philippine political 
landscape, particularly in central Luzon. This instability, greeted head on by the 
government and the Church, was the maturation of the peasant unrest that fomented 
nearly a decade earlier at the height of American colonial involvement.
Since the Spanish colonial era, much of the arable land in the Philippines had 
been owned by the Catholic Church or by a small number of elites. These landowners 
worked out what was in their minds a mutually beneficial relationship with peasants, who 
served as tenants on the land. The peasants and the landowners had a paternalistic 
relationship. The peasants cleared and cultivated the land and the landowner shared in the 
harvests and provided loans to the families when they needed extra funds. The landlords 
also sought cooperation with the Church to ensure the spiritual needs of the tenants were 
satisfied. The American colonial period resulted in a further disintegration o f this 
relationship.
In addition to the Church-State ties being weakened, the American presence 
brought a fundamental shift in the landlord-tenant relationship. Before the Americans’ 
arrival, these large haciendas had little support outside o f their local communities. The 
tenants and landowners needed each other, and this promoted a bond between landlords 
and peasants. The landlords extended protection and patronage to the peasants in return 
for their labor. But with the Americans pushing capitalism and demanding cash crops 
from every acre o f land, the large landowners now had an outside market for their goods, 
as well as an outside source o f income. For the landlords, doing it the American way was
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more profitable and any harm was passed on to the peasants. Indeed, the need to appease 
the peasants was less and less important.1
It was when the landowners stopped taking care of their peasant tenants that 
trouble began to brew. The landlords’ failure to take care of the peasants was seen by 
many as an affront to the tradition o f utang na loob. This concept is loosely translated as 
a feeling o f gratitude, obligation, or reciprocity for those who exchange services, or as 
one favor deserving another. In the past, landlords gave loans and looked after their 
workers. Now they increasingly ignored them and demanded a larger share o f the 
harvests while giving less and less in return. Faced with these increasingly harsh living 
and working conditions, the peasant tenants began to protest. Unfortunately, they had no 
legal recourse or outlet for their anger and frustration. Small, unorganized groups of 
peasants attacked landlords, burned crops, and sometimes refused to harvest the crops. 
Such acts had limited success. Landowners brought in strikebreakers or other peasants 
and used violence to compel their tenants to work.
Increasingly, peasants realized their shared predicament and common grievances. 
They learned that they had little power individually or in small groups. To have power, 
they needed to organize and band together.3 Several organizations sprang up during the 
1930s. Among the most prominent o f the peasant groups during that period was the 
KPMP (Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas), the National Society of 
Peasants in the Philippines, and the AMT (Aguman ding Maldin Talapagob), the General 
Workers’ Union, which was also affiliated with the Socialist Party. There was also the 
emergence in 1930 o f the PKP (Partido Komunista ng Philipina),, the Communist Party
'Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study o f Peasant Revolt in the 
Philippines (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 22-23.
2Ibid., 37.
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o f the Philippines. By working together, fears o f eviction, arrest, or reprisals were 
decreased.
Government fears of Communism germinated during this time period and 
accelerated in the aftermath o f World War II in what has since been termed a “red scare.” 
Fears o f Communism that would later dominate the decade following World War II 
would have their genesis during this time, but the reality was something quite different. 
Initially, the PKP lacked strong ties with the peasantry. Moreover, even after the 
consolidation of the Socialist Party and the PKP in 1938, the number of Communists in 
the peasant movement was relatively small. The Communists and the peasants shared 
common enemies, which made them allies. Their enemies included the landlords, the 
Philippine Constabulary, which was practically an army for landowners, and local 
politicians. The courts did not offer any recourse, as the judges were often members of 
the elite or appointed by them.4
The Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941 gave the peasants a new enemy 
to combat. Unfortunately for the peasants, the problems with the landlords and the 
Philippine government were merely compounded during the years o f Japanese 
occupation. How the movement would have progressed in the absence o f the Japanese 
threat is unknown. What is known is that after the Japanese invasion, the peasants’ 
resentment grew even more towards the government and landowners who colluded with 
the Japanese during the war.
The events o f World War II eroded whatever good faith may have previously 
existed between the peasants and the landlords.5 The Church, however, was never one of 
the peasants’ targets. Though the Church remained largely conservative, it was also anti- 
Japanese. Filipinos on the whole thought their God and morality were superior to those
4Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study o f Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, 55.
5Ibid., 66.
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o f the Japanese and their emperor.6 Any government., colonial or otherwise, that did not 
embrace the Christian faith was not legitimate, no matter how many Filipinos died or 
suffered under its control. However, the Church lacked the will and the resources to 
launch an effective counter-insurgency, and the clergy avoided taking up arms against the 
Japanese. Resistance, in Luzon at least, fell to peasant organizations.
As peasants watched the Japanese rape, pillage, and murder their way through 
Luzon, many turned to guerilla warfare as a way to resist. Resistance against the 
Japanese grew from previous peasant movements, with most of the anti-Japanese 
members coming from the KPMP and other peasant organizations. The new united front 
against the Japanese was called the Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon (People’s Anti- 
Japanese Army), also known as the Hukbalahaps or simply the Huks.7
During the war, the Huks’ main goals were to harass the Japanese and police the 
countryside in order to establish some semblance of law and order where none existed. 
This was a necessary function because the Philippine Constabulary and the landlords had 
switched loyalties and worked in concert with the Japanese. Banditry and crime went 
unchecked unless groups such as the Huks made an effort to police areas under their 
watch. Yet the Huks were not a police force. They were also not initially much o f a 
fighting force. They were poorly armed, poorly trained, and poorly organized, but they 
learned through experience and often obtained their weapons from the soldiers they 
killed. They gradually developed into an effective guerilla force. Luis Turac, a member 
of the Socialist and PKP parties, became the Huks’ overall commander.9 Turac
6Marel N. Francisco and Fe Maria C. Arriloa, The History o f the Burgis (Quezon 
City: GCF Books, 1987), 120.
Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven, 
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embodied the continuity between the peasant movement o f the 1930s and the Huks o f the 
1940s.
Throughout the war, the Huks put up a fierce resistance in areas they controlled. 
Attacking the Japanese in small groups, they then disappeared into the jungles. It was 
dangerous work, as the Japanese were fierce in their retaliation against suspected Huk 
villages. However, the Huks never gave up and even helped the Americans who returned 
in 1945 to push the Japanese from the Philippines. Fighting side-by-side with the 
Americans, the Huks thought that if they were valuable allies, they would be able to 
return to their normal lives after the war with a government that honored and respected 
their contribution to the Philippine nation. This was not the case.
After the war, the Huks were not honored. Quite the contrary, during the closing 
months o f the war the Americans and the Philippine authorities turned against the Huks. 
The Americans feared Communist subversion and wanted the Huks disarmed.9 Those 
who refused were arrested, persecuted, and attacked. The Americans, the Philippine 
government, and later even the Catholic Church issued propaganda that exaggerated the 
threat o f Communism in the Philippines. As the evidence showed, the PKP had little 
impact on the Huks’ political direction and ideology. Pushing for equanimity in harvests, 
enforcement of the constitutional bill o f rights, and fairness in elections hardly qualified 
as Marxist, but that was the thrust of Huk ideology in 1946.10
Still, the Huks were looking for a way to peacefully end their armed conflicts with 
the government. The events o f 1946 changed that. The Congressional elections held in 
1946 proved to be the watershed in Huk-Philippine government relations. Six candidates 
fielded by the Huks won seats in the new government, and for a time it seemed that the 
Huks would put down their weapons in favor o f a political settlement with the
9Ibid„ 34.
10Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study o f Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, 171.
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government. However, the government would not accept the election results. With little 
evidence, they accused the Huks of election violence and fraud. The new president, 
Manuel Roxas, prohibited the six Huk-sponsored candidates from taking their seats in the 
Congress.11 The Huks were outraged and returned to guerilla warfare, this time against a 
familiar enemy, the Philippine government.
The peak of Huk activity was between 1949 and 1951. Estimates o f Huk strength
• 12 during this time period range from eleven to fifteen thousand members. Yet the Huks’
efforts, both civilian and military, suffered from a chronic lack o f funding. There was
never enough food, clothing, ammunition, or other supplies. Moreover, by 1951 the
Catholic Church had entered as a third party into the fight against Huk insurgents in
Luzon. As their efforts helped that fight, the Huks rapidly declined.
The constant pressure on the Huks from the government, the Americans, and the 
Church took its toll. By 1951, the guerillas suffered from “battle fatigue” and were 
simply tired of fighting and wanted to return to their fields.13 The Philippine military, 
with the help o f the Americans, applied more and more pressure to Huk units by killing, 
capturing, and liquidating them in increasing numbers. United States assistance to the 
Philippines during the years from 1951 through 1956 totaled $500 million.14 American 
aid provided roughly half of the funds used to fight the Huks.
The Americans wanted the Huks suppressed to further their own interests, which 
were more geo-political than altruistic towards the Philippines. The United States wanted 
to make sure the Philippines did not fall to the ideological threat of Communism that
11 Ibid., 150.
12Ibid„ 210.
13 •Davis, Revolutionary Struggle in the Philippines, 41-42.
14 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study o f Peasant Revolt in the Philippines,
244.
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surfaced in Southeast Asia after the war. The colonial era was over, not just in the 
Philippines, but also in other parts o f Southeast Asia, where indigenous movements 
sought to break the chains o f colonial rule. The new anti-colonial movements were often 
spearheaded by ideologues who absorbed the teachings and tactics o f Marx, Lenin, and 
Mao.
Communism had claimed China. It was now threatening American interests in 
South Korea, and minor Communist tremors were being felt in Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. The United States did not want to lose the Philippines as China 
had been lost. For its part, the post-war government in Manila did not want to be toppled 
by Communist insurgents and sought help from all sectors, including the Catholic 
Church, to counter the threat.
Government reforms, although modest, created a feeling of progress among those 
Huks who were tired o f fighting. It seemed that the government, particularly o f President 
Ramon Magsaysay, wanted to reach out to the Huks and bring them back into the fold of 
normal Philippine society. He used a characteristic stick and carrot approach couched in 
frank language. He was quoted as saying to the Huks, “As guardians of our nation’s 
safety, it is our duty to hunt you down and kill you if  you do not surrender. But, as 
fellow Filipinos, we would rather help you return to a happy Filipino way o f life.”15 
However, the government’s work would have been less effective without the Catholic 
Church’s cooperation. Magsaysay and his government turned to the Church for help 
against the Huks and other groups that tried to destabilize the government.
l5Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1955), vi.
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Accepting the call to service against the Huks after 1946, the Catholic Church 
became a more aggressive pressure group that consolidated its conservative elements.16 
The Church, though largely left alone by the Huks, now became active in the drive to 
force Huk acquiescence to the government’s will. The partnership is not surprising, 
considering members o f the new Philippine leadership were products o f Catholic 
universities and strict religious education and saw the Church as the one organization that
i  n
could protect their “flock,” and thus their constituents, from the evils o f Communism.
In the fight against the Huks and Communism, the Church became politically 
active.18 Few organizations turned out to be as staunchly anti-Communist as the Catholic 
Church. It was willingly drawn into the hysteria of the “red scare” and did everything it 
could to promote the cause in the parishes and to ensure that “solid Catholics trembled
with holy indignation at the mere mention of Communism.”19 In the fight against the
00Huks and against Communism in many forms, the Church became politically active.
The Catholic Church made an effective and valuable ally for several important 
reasons. First, it was a grassroots level organization operating at the same societal level 
as the insurgents. Second, it was anti-Communist to the core. Marx’s godless ideology 
had no place and no support in the conservative Catholic Church of the mid-twentieth 
century. Furthermore, while it was true that the Americans trained and equipped the 
Philippine military and provided funds to the government, both actions helping counter
16Mary Rosario Battung, Liberato C. Bautista, Sophia Lizares-Bodegon, and Alic 
G. Guillermo, Religion and Society: Towards A Theology o f Struggle (Manila: 
Crossroads Publications, 1998), 101.
17 •Wilfredo Fabros, The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines 
1930-1972 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1988), 23.
18Francisco and Arriloa, The History o f  the Burgis, 178.
19Ibid„ 146.
20Ibid„ 78.
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insurgency, American influence could not penetrate the Communists’ grassroots level 
organization. Here is where the Church proved invaluable.
The Church was at its core a grassroots organization, and the best place to observe 
the actions and operations o f the Communist enemy. Their parishes dotted the landscape 
and their parishioners came from the same segments of society from which the 
Communists attempted to recruit their members. The Church had both the motivation 
and the ability to inform on the Communists.
One o f the first and most effective actions taken by the Church was the 
establishment of organizations that worked against the Huks’ base of support, including 
quite a few organizations that actively competed for members from the poorest segments 
of society. These were the same constituent groups the Huks targeted in their recruiting 
efforts. Among these organizations was the Church-established Catholic Welfare 
Organization (CWO), created in 1945. The CWO was meant to assist in all phases of 
relief work after the war. Later, it took on the role o f an anti-Huk political front.
In 1947, the Institute o f Social Order and the Young Christian Works Association 
were created by the Church along the same lines as the CWO, recruiting members from 
various segments o f society, including the poorer elements that the Huks also targeted. A 
few years later in June 1950, Fathers Walter Hogan and Juan Tan started the Federation 
of Free Workers (FFW), a democratic and specifically anti-Communist labor union. 
Jermias Monetymayor and Fernando Esguerra established the Federation o f Free Farmers 
(FFF) three years later along the same lines. Both the FFW and the FFF were staunchly 
anti-Huk, and the efforts o f both the FFW and the FFF helped stem the tide of peasants 
who were joining the Huks.21
With fewer peasants taking up arms against the government, their energies were 
now used to serve the Church-inspired aims, including rebuilding the Philippine nation­
21Fabros, The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines, 44.
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state and legitimating the ruling regime. It should be noted that the important aspect o f 
these and other Church-sponsored organizations is that they provided an alternative outlet 
for energies that might have otherwise been employed by the Huks. At the same time, 
these Church-inspired grassroots organizations served as effective intelligence-gathering 
arms for the Philippine government, which was militarily engaged against the Huks.
After two decades of helping the government counter the Huks and other leftist 
causes and helping stabilize the situation in the post-war Philippines, the Church 
possessed little in the way of political clout to show for it. Indeed, the Church’s 
leadership role against the Huks did not win them new political powers in Manila.
Instead, the Church leadership sat as politically weak as it was before the onset o f World 
War II.
The Philippine government, meanwhile, continued to strengthen its ties with 
Washington. At the same time, the traditional Church-State cooperation that 
characterized most o f Philippine history progressively deteriorated. A situation existed 
where the government was more than willing to use the Church and its resources to 
promote its own agenda, but it was unwilling to share power or influence either publicly 
or privately with the Church or its bishops.
The attitude displayed by the government’s leadership reflected the real nature of 
legitimacy in the Philippines. In the past, the government had enjoyed legitimacy 
because o f and through the Church. Now the Church’s role had declined to such an 
extent that the government did not seek, nor did it need, the Church’s direct support to 
remain in power. The Philippine government was now legitimate because o f the political 
relationship it enjoyed with the United States. Legally, it had an American-style 
constitution, its laws and policies mimicking those o f America.
Militarily, its forces were propped up by United States aid. The threat of 
Communism had been neutralized and the United State provided the arms, infrastructure, 
and money with which to build a new republic. The charisma of leaders such as Manuel
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Roxas, Elpidio Quirion, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia, and Diosdado Macapagal was 
also sufficient enough to carry elections and give each a mandate to govern. Under their 
leadership and with American dollars, the Filipino standard of living was raised, meeting 
the utilitarian standard of legitimacy. The Church was in no position to compete with 
American influence. If anything, the Church and its traditional institutions stood in the 
way o f “progress.”
The United States, with its military power and economic support, usurped more 
than the Weberian types o f legitimating functions once enjoyed by the Church. For more 
than 300 years the Catholic Church was the institution that provided the common 
ideational values and norms for the diverse Filipino population, even to the point of 
constructing identity. For the overwhelming majority, to be Filipino was to be Catholic. 
The situation was reversed as illustrated in figure 12. The American presence influenced 
norms and values, both indirect determinants of legitimacy. By the mid-1960s, America 
began to assume a pseudo-religious role as well, and not simply by supplying hundreds of 
American Protestant missionaries. American ideals, ideology, and pop culture flooded 
into the post-war Philippines. Everything from blue jeans to American flags on jeepneys 
crowded Manila’s streets.22 But Americanism had its limits.
Crowded streets, kids in blue jeans, and American dollars flooding Manila were 
not representative o f the Philippine experience in its totality. The rising towers of 
Makati, financed by foreign investment, were in stark contrast to the shantytowns found 
in Manila and in the rest o f the country. Elites may have enjoyed the post-war economic 
boom and the views from their American sedans, but most Filipinos were poor. They did 
not enjoy the luxury o f wearing American clothing and eating in fast food restaurants or
22 *The colorful and often gaudy jeepney is a staple of Philippine roads. Originally
constructed from surplus and leftover American JEEPS, the jeepney is the primary mass
transport vehicle across the archipelago. Although no longer constructed from surplus
American JEEPS, the jeepney still rolls off the assem bly line maintaining the trademark
characteristics of its forbearer.
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Fig. 12. Legitimacy Model o f the Philippines During Independence, 1945-1965
Most Filipinos barely lived at the subsistence level, and Americanism offered 
them little hope. No matter how much political support the United States offered 
Philippine administrations, it could not address the desperate needs o f the average 
Filipino who was trapped in poverty. America could not solve the problem of the 
Philippine poor. However, one institution was in a perfect position to do just that— the 
Catholic Church.
It was among the poorest elements o f Philippine society, by far the majority, that 
the Church found a new road to political relevance and a return to its place as the most 
prominent and important mediating variable in determining governmental legitimacy.
The impetus for this new direction was the Second Vatican Council, more commonly 
known as Vatican II, a landmark series of ecumenical meetings sponsored by the Catholic
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Church from 1963 to 1965 that would challenge Catholic leadership and laity across the 
world to refocus their efforts on capturing the hearts and minds o f their flocks. Political 
relevance for the Church might not have been one o f the main objectives o f Vatican II, 
but it was certainly one of the most important results for the Philippine Catholic Church.
The Second Vatican Council was called almost 100 years after the Church 
convened a similar council o f its hierarchy in the nineteenth century. It was termed 
Vatican II by the press, and the documents and changes to the Church that would emerge 
out of two years of meetings would fundamentally alter the Church in a variety of ways, 
including its role as a force for social action. Vatican II was the idea of Pope John XXIII, 
who announced to the world in January 1959 his ambitious plans to convene the council. 
It is said that the inspiration came to him during a time of prayer, a fitting beginning to 
the single most important event for the Catholic Church in the twentieth century. The 
first Vatican Council was held from 1869 to 1870, and many observers believed that this 
would be the final council the Church would convene because Pope Pius IX had 
promulgated the dogma of infallibility.23
Vatican II was convened on October 11, 1962, in Rome. It was for the Catholic 
Church an “opening of the windows” and a time for aggiornamento, or bringing the 
Church up to date.24 It has since been called the “greatest religious conference of all 
time,” a spectacle of 2,600 bishops, abbots, and heads of religious orders. The Pope 
welcomed input from all levels of the Church, encouraging the members to offer 
suggestions as to what sorts of ideas the council should tackle. It was a time to look
23 Robert McAfee Brown, Observer in Rome: A Protestant Report on The Vatican 
Council (London: T. H. Brickell & Son Ltd., 1964), 1.
24Ibid„ 2.
25 Paul Blanshard, Paul Blanshard on Vatican II (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 3.
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• • 26  •internally, and also to rejuvenate efforts to reach out to non-Catholics. The Council was
successful in many areas, even after the death of Pope John, because the spirit o f the 
Council was continued by his successor, Pope Paul VI.
Pope Paul VI carried Vatican II to fruition, and the thoughts and ideas coming out 
of the meetings would impact the Philippine Catholic Church on numerous fronts.
Vatican II was ecumenical, and its essential thrust was to address the Catholic Church’s 
declining relevancy worldwide. It also sought to update Church procedures, rites, and 
other aspects of Catholic doctrine that had remained relatively unchanged since the 
Council o f Nicea in A.D. 325. In many ways, Pope Paul was even more ambitious than 
John XXII. He not only made the legacy of John his own but also tackled the Roman 
Curia, the main source of the Pope’s power and authority within the Church.27
At the most basic level, Vatican II attempted to drag Catholic thought, liturgy, and 
the sacraments out o f the middle ages and into the twentieth century, making them more 
accessible and appealing to the masses and more relevant to the needs of the world’s 
poor. Vatican II was an attempt to stem the tide o f not only Protestant challenges, which 
were far more effective at winning converts with their use of charismatic movements, but 
also stop the increasing migration o f tens of thousands away from the Church and into the 
arms of the numerous Communist movements and their godless doctrine.
The two-year Vatican II conference brought many fundamental changes to the 
Church, including a renewed interest in helping the poor overcome poverty. It also
26Indeed, Pope John XXIII believed so strongly in this reunion of Christendom 
that he created the Secretariat for Christian Unity whose sole job was to, in an ecumenical 
fashion, reach out to Protestant denominations
77 The working power of the Church is the Roman Curia, made up of twelve 
Congregations, three Tribunals, and six offices and legitimized by Canons 242-264. Its 
membership at the time of Vatican II was predominately Italian. The Curia is described 
this way in Christus Dominus 9: “In exercising supreme, full, and immediate power in the 
universal Church, the Roman pontiff makes use o f the departments of the Roman Curia 
which, therefore, perform their duties in his name and with his authority for the good of 
the churches and in the service of the sacred pastors.”
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empowered traditional elements of society whose voices had been silenced by both 
poverty and authoritarianism.28 After Vatican II, the Church espoused particular 
economic policies that were nationalist and pro-worker.29 In many ways, it placed an 
authoritative stamp on embryonic Church-sponsored anti-poverty movements already 
active throughout the world, including a nascent movement in the Philippines.
The social involvement that grew out of Vatican II also emerged as the concept of 
liberation theology. Liberation theology is described by Vitaliona R. Gorospe as 
originating in Latin America as “a theological pastoral movement” that spread to other 
countries in the third world and in certain circles, in the first world. Liberation theology 
refers to a special concern for the poor and the victims of oppression, which in turn 
begets a commitment to justice. Moreover, it designates a theological reflection centered
TOon the biblical themes of liberation and freedom.
Ironically, liberation theology had much in common with the Marxist ideology the 
Catholic Church opposed. It shared a sense of empowerment for the poor and a desire to 
combat the problem of class exploitation, and its target was usually the ruling elite, who 
were seen as rich and out of touch. Also like Marxism, liberation theology had its birth in 
European humanist thought. Where it differed was its reexamination o f the mandate 
found in the Christian New Testament, a collection of books believed to be the doctrine 
given by Jesus to his apostles and his earthly church.
28  • • •For more detailed readings on Vatican II, see Michael A. Davies, Pope John’s
Council (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1977); George A. Lindbeck, The Future 
o f Roman Catholic Theology: Vatica 11-Catalyst for Change (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1970); Robert Kaiser, Inside the Council: The Story o f Vatican //(London: Bums 
& Oates, 1963); Anthony D. Lee, ed., Vatican II: The Theological Dimension 
(Washington: Thomist Press, 1963).
29Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies o f  Authoritarian Rule 
(Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
30  • • •Vitaliano R. Gorospe, S.J., “The Vatican Instmction and Liberation Theology in 
the Philippines,” Philippine Studies, vol. 33 (second quarter 1985): 153.
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Bom in European thought, liberation theology was nurtured in Latin America, 
where remnants o f the Spanish colonial empire had left the Catholic Church permeating
T i
all segments o f society, much as it did in the Philippines. In the twentieth century, 
however, the Catholic Church in Latin America found itself often aligned with leftist 
groups against authoritarian regimes and an emphasis was placed on the political 
dimension of their faith. Through liberation theology, the Catholic Church was now seen 
as an institution of social criticism, not simply a place to preach the gospel.
Liberation theology, including those ideas expressed by Gustavo Gutierrez, author 
of A Theology o f Liberation, contended that all theology was dynamic and was an 
ongoing exercise involving contemporary insights into knowledge, humanity, and history. 
The key is the ongoing nature of theology. The Church realized through liberation 
theology that the teachings of Jesus were not interpreted in a dogmatic way. Indeed, they 
could not be if they were to be responsive to the modem needs o f the poor. The Church 
recognized that the poor, though they may be promised to inherit the earth in the latter 
days, needed their situation addressed now. Jesus had shown special attention to the poor 
during his time on earth, and the Church as his temporal representative must do the same 
in theory and in practice.
Gutierrez argued in his writings that religion and theology were to not just to be 
learned but also practiced. This was not a novel idea in the Philippines, where the 
Catholic Church’s theology had steadily mixed with secular activities for centuries. 
Indeed, throughout the Spanish colonial period the Philippine Catholic Church had taken
31The literature on the theology o f liberation is vast. For more information, see 
Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology o f  Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, trans. 
Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973); David 
Lehmann, Democacy and Development in Latin America: Economics, Politics, and 
Religion in the Post-War Period (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990);
Rosemary R. Ruerther, Liberation Theology: Human Hope Confronts Christian History 
and American Power (New York: Paulist Press, 1972); Philip McManus and Gerald 
Schlabach, eds., Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America 
(Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1991).
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theology out of the pulpit and organized an entire nation-state around it. It certainly was 
not the idea shared by later liberation theologians, but it is difficult to argue that it did not 
try to make Christ’s doctrine manifest in the physical world. The post-Vatican II 
situation gave the Philippine Catholic Church another opportunity to “do” theology, both 
in the Philippines and across the world by organizing and lifting the poor and politically 
empowering them in the process.
Liberation theology quickly made the leap from its early incubation in Latin 
America to Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Given the shared Spanish and Catholic 
tradition between Latin America and the Philippines, it is not surprising that this theology 
appealed to the Philippine Catholic Church which, weakened politically after the war, 
needed an avenue to regain its relevance. The poor, whether in Latin America or the 
Philippines, were the beneficiaries of liberation theology. The enemies and targets o f this 
new theology were typically capitalists, as well as their cronies in the government who 
were seen as exploitive and greedy. Liberation theology seemed tailor-made to the 
Philippines, for there the poor were plentiful and so were capitalist targets.
The Church, traditionally a loyal ally to the government, worked hand-in-hand 
with many of these officials to help suppress Communist rebels like the Huks. However, 
they had not reaped any rewards for themselves or their parishioners. Moreover, since 
1934 the Catholic Church had remained active through the establishment of their social 
organizations and outreaches, as well as against the Huks. These and other efforts were 
essential in helping keep the Philippine nation-state together, a nation-state that 
throughout its history had a natural tendency to fragment.
The Church never abandoned the traditional role it had in identity formation and 
continued to remain and foster national unity in the remotest reaches of the Philippine 
archipelago. But in the political realm, secular politicians took advantage of the Church, 
and they had their influence on legitimacy curtailed. The Philippine government cared 
more about American military and financial help than the Church’s support. Much like
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their revolutionary predecessors, Philippine politicians took the Church’s support for 
granted.
Keeping the Church politically marginalized was not easy, and history illustrated 
that it was impossible to dampen its influence or maintain the political distance 
indefinitely. The Church itself was not about to sit idly by while its political fortunes 
grew progressively weaker. Vatican II was the proverbial nod from the hierarchy in 
Rome that the Philippine Church needed to move forward politically, and the theology of 
liberation served as a blueprint for the Church to reclaim some influence.
The new avenue of political power was quite different from the friar-based 
politics o f the Spanish, and it did not cater exclusively to the elites as it had done in the 
post-war years. As the rich got richer and the poor got poorer in the Philippines, the 
Church took advantage of this inequality. It did not promise an equality o f outcome 
because it was not in the business of economics, but it did appeal to the poor socially and 
politically in ways that other organizations could not. The Church, as the center of the 
community, rallied communal resources around the common goals o f economic 
development or something as simple as alleviating the hunger of the villagers. Doing 
these simple things allowed the Church to accomplish two complementary goals that 
were in line with the new Vatican doctrine. The first was helping the poor lift their 
standard o f living and in the process accomplishing the second, which was the 
reemergence o f the Church into a politically relevant and powerful social organization.
Liberation theology unfolded relatively quickly in the Philippines. The Church, 
for the most part at the parish level, began to change its tone. Mass was performed as it 
had been for centuries, but the message coming from the priests now reflected the new 
attitude o f liberation theology. The message emphasized that God was not passive, but 
was dynamically involved on behalf o f the poor and destitute. Likewise, the Church was 
there to help organize them, to give the poor a voice, and to ensure that the government 
would not and could not violate the social contract with the people that they were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
121
entrusted to protect. Indeed, the Philippine Catholic Church sought to preach, instruct, 
and act in accordance with the very foundation of liberation theology: "To know God is 
to do justice."32
The Philippine poor were receptive. Politicians were forced to follow the 
Church’s lead in addressing the issues important to the poor. This would have been 
impossible had the Church not motivated them to get out to vote and ensure their voices 
were heard. Even in contemporary Philippine politics, astute politicians realized that 
addressing the issues related to the poor was one of the surest ways to win an election. 
For example, in 1997 and 2000, public opinion polls conducted by the Social Weather 
Station (SWS) found that 82 percent o f the population felt that helping the poor was 
“very” important to any candidacy.33 In 2000, the SWS found that helping the poor rose 
in importance to 91 percent. The issue topped the list o f characteristics the people 
wanted in their politicians.34 As a related corollary, the surveys further found that 74 
percent believed a candidate should possess religion and the values associated with being 
a man or woman of God.
Public opinions polls consistently illustrate that issues related to the Philippine 
poor are at the top of the list o f concerns that politicians must address should they desire 
a mandate at the polls. These numbers can be credited in large part to the work of the 
Church, which during the 60s, 70s, and 80s brought the poor to political relevance. The 
Church made the poor a large block of votes through their investment of time, money, 
and manpower into organization and social programs. The work paid dividends in later
99Gutierrez, A Theology o f Liberation, 9.
33Pedro Laylo, ed. Filipino Voting Attitudes and Opinion: Selected Findings from  
SWS 1984-2001 National Surveys (Quezon City, Philippines: SWS, 2001), 32.
34Ibid„ 34.
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years when it was the poor who were called upon to rally for the election o f the Church’s 
own slate o f congressional delegates and presidential candidates.
Many factors may go into explaining the continued rise in the importance of  
issues related to the poor, but there is no doubt that since Vatican II the Catholic 
Church’s constant emphasis on the poor and empowering them at the polls is reflected in 
national surveys. As an astute political body, the Church and its representatives in the 
parishes, missions, and educational institutions capitalized on those issues and garnered 
political power at the polls. The Church realized that few national politicians canvassed 
the vast slum s o f the Philippines. Thus, the Church played a role as the mediating 
variable between the poorer masses and the candidates. The Church could either support 
or deny a candidate votes.
As Vatican II and the theology of liberation made the Philippine Catholic Church 
politically relevant again, there was a need among some more conservative elements o f  
the Church to balance this emerging power. Even from the Vatican, officials felt a need 
to strike a balance between affirmative policy measures and restraining clergy from being 
overly proactive in the political realm.
Simply put, the Vatican feared that there was too much activity on the part o f its 
priests. While it endorsed a struggle against tyrannical governments, the Vatican warned 
its clergy against direct involvement in politics and any efforts to inject Marxism into the 
Church’s work on behalf of the poor.35 The Vatican apprehension stopped short of 
condemning the efforts o f the Philippine Catholic Church, stating that civil disobedience 
campaigns like those that were to be employed against politicians and led by Catholic 
bishops in the Philippines were in keeping with the Church's doctrine and worldview.36
35 “Vatican Endorses Struggle by the Oppressed Against Tyranny: Clergy Warned 
Not to Enter Politics; Marxist Ideas Rejected for Work with Poor,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Dallas Morning News (April 6, 1986; accessed 23 October 2001).
36Ibid.
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Respecting the Vatican’s wishes and the tone it wanted set in Church-State 
relations, the Philippine Church nonetheless remained staunchly independent in regards 
to liberation theology, believing their mandate came from God, the spirit of Vatican II, 
and the Philippine people themselves. The Philippine Church believed that the 
conservative court o f the Pope, particularly the larger court of Pope John Paul II (1978- 
present), needed respect but not to the detriment of the Philippine parishioners’ welfare. 
The actions the Church set in motion in the Philippines in the wake o f Vatican II came 
years before Pope John Paul II took office in 1978.
Before and during the 50s and the early 1960s, the Catholic Church had retained 
much o f its colonial-era economic, political, and social power and remained a bulwark of
q*7
conservatism. This did not stop a small but growing progressive movement within the 
Church from making waves. Many o f these so-called progressives had “leftist” 
tendencies and were strengthened by the actions o f Vatican II. Part o f this strengthening 
was a push by the Philippine Catholic Church to establish five commissions at the local 
and national level to implement the various policies o f the Council.
Among these bodies was the Episcopal Commission on Social Action, with its 
own national secretariat, the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), created in
381966. The establishment of such apostolic social organizations drew attention from 
government leaders, especially with the Church’s expressed desire to combat any 
infringement on human rights and abuses by the government. This was an area where the 
incoming government o f Ferdinand E. Marcos, who ruled from 1965 to 1986, became 
notoriously prolific.
37 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 201.
38Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development 
and Political Repression in the Philippines (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
76.
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By 1969, 2,000 church-sponsored social action projects had been started, and
IQ
nearly 90 percent of all dioceses had a hand in some social action programs. Along 
with social organizations, the Philippine Catholic bishops became more vocal against 
government abuses. The use of the pastoral letter became commonplace as an effective 
way to issue statements on a wide range of issues, from the theological to the political. 
Pastoral letters usually shied away from direct confrontation and instead emphasized the 
Church’s mission in the temporal order, which meant that among other things the Church 
should safeguard human dignity against government abuse. Pastoral letters also called 
attention to the close relationship between social development and evangelization, 
bringing in Socialist and left-leaning rhetoric to address the issues of the poor. Coupled 
with that was the Church’s conscious decision to make extraordinary efforts to go to the 
barrios in order to sharpen their focus on social transformation.40
The establishment o f NASSA and the issuance of pastoral letters were 
preliminary steps, but the Catholic Church did not always act as a monolith in their social 
or political activities. Indeed, there were many different elements that worked beneath 
the umbrella o f the Philippine Catholic Church, and some were active in other more 
clandestine ways. Moreover, not all of these activities opposed the government. Social 
organization of the barrios was one thing, but strengthening the Church’s political clout 
while maintaining its commitment to the faith did not always mean publicly confronting 
the ruling regime.
A prime example o f this clandestine and “conservative” operation to gamer more 
political power was the penetration of the Philippines by an elite and secretive Catholic 
sect known simply as Opus Dei. Opus Dei had only a few objectives, and at the top of 
the list was the desire to permeate and influence all segments of elite society. Opus Dei’s
39Ibid., 77.
40James H. Kroeger, M.M., “Evangelization in the Philippine Church: 1965-85,” 
Philippine Studies, no. 35 (1987): 8.
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unique brand o f politics and social action harkened back to a more medieval time when 
the Catholic Church and the State were one. The situation in the Philippines was one 
where the Church’s connections to the State had steadily eroded since the American 
occupation. This was an unacceptable situation to some. Opus Dei’s activities were part 
of the solution to the problem. Their activities were another way to get the Church back 
to the level o f power and influence it once enjoyed, and it did so not through the power of 
the poorer masses but through recruitment of the elite.
Opus Dei itself was and remains a cult within a religion. It revolves around the 
personality of its late founder, Josemaria Escriva, who saw his creation as one institution 
that should be heavily invested in politics. In the beginning, Opus Dei’s membership was 
restricted to only those members of high society levels who were actively engaged in 
non-clerical work. Opus Dei members were integrated into the Catholic Church as 
whole. However, the leadership soon realized that to control the membership completely 
and to guard its own secrets from less-supportive elements within the Catholic Church 
required a priesthood exclusive to Opus Dei. Escriva successfully petitioned for and 
founded a priestly order exclusive to Opus Dei in 1943, dubbing it the “Society of Priests 
of the Holy Cross." Opus Dei was given swift pontifical approval in 1947, and later 
became a Personal Prelature in 1982.41 Both these things are a testament to the 
organization’s power and influence within the Church hierarchy.
Opus Dei tried to maintain a level o f secrecy unmatched in the Catholic Church. 
What is known from the internal documents is that Opus Dei’s raison d ’etat is that 
members are to “hallow and Christianize the institutions of peoples, o f science, culture,
41A Personal Prelature is defined as a jurisdictional and hierarchical structure by 
which the Catholic Church sets for itself special pastoral initiatives for the good o f all the 
“people of God.” It is entrusted to a prelate, has its own priests, and can incorporate into 
itself those lay persons who wish to contribute to the Prelature’s pastoral goals. The idea 
was conceived during Vatican II.
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civilizations, politics, the arts, and social relations.”42 To follow through with this 
mandate, members were required to work at all societal levels, from the poorest elements 
to the elite, including working to shape and form opinion among elites in academia, 
finance, and politics. Since its inception, Opus Dei had been active in formulating policy, 
both in Rome and internationally, in various nation-states where it had penetrated the 
foreign policy and domestic policy levels o f government bureaucracies. Indeed, Opus 
Dei had been called a religious “Fifth Column,” and it had never shied away from 
confrontation with elements in secular society, other religions such as Islam, or even the 
Catholic Church itself.43
As part of the Catholic Church’s push to regain power in the Philippines, Opus 
Dei was allowed to penetrate the Philippines in 1964, and since then it has steadily grown 
in influence. After its arrival, Opus Dei gave considerable attention to the Philippines as 
one of the “front line” countries.44 Within the Philippines, it enjoyed the full backing of 
the Philippine Catholic Church and influential Catholic leadership. Membership was 
kept small and elite, but despite its own efforts, membership rose to nearly 3,000 people 
in the Philippines. Although this may seem like a small number, it is comparable in size 
to the number of members found in much larger countries, such as the United States.
A quick look at the profile of Opus Dei membership gives one an insight into why 
the organization is so successful in its recruitment efforts and has such influence in 
government and society. In the Philippines, the membership is traditionally located in 
large urban areas like Manila and Cebu City, with smaller segments in Laguna, Iloilo, 
Bacolod, and Davao. More than 70 percent of Opus Dei members are married, and a
42Gordon Urguhart, Conservative Catholic Influence in Europe, Opus Dei: The 
Pope’s Right Arm in Europe (Washington, DC: Catholics for Free Choice, 1997), 1.
43Robert Hutchinson, Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World o f  Opus Dei 
(London: Corgi Books, 1997), 14.
44Ibid., 500-502.
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conscious effort has always been made to recruit members from a cross-section o f elite 
society. Opus Dei members are politicians, bankers, corporate managers, businessmen, 
lawyers, and other professionals, some o f whom are well known in public and others who 
remain power brokers behind the scene.45
Devising a term that describes what Opus Dei tried and continues to do in the 
Philippines is not easy, for Opus Dei is unique in the Catholic Church. It has both 
fundamentalist tendencies and secretiveness. Its work is best termed integralism, a word 
that harkens back to a time when Church and State were inseparable, a quixotic notion 
and worldview of a modem-middle age 46 The idea of integralism, which would seem 
impossible to accomplish for most religious groups, drove Opus Dei to begin work in the 
Philippines and no doubt continues its work there today. Regardless o f the pace of 
progress, the organization is undeterred, and for good reason. When compared to other 
religious groups, Opus Dei is “better organized, more unobtrusively hospitable, and more 
clearly thought through than are those o f any other organization, religious or secular . . .  
The Work, quite clearly, works.”47
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Philippines, where the Opus Dei agenda 
has been pushed at all levels of society since its introduction.48 One of Opus Dei’s first
45“Weekender: Q&A with Opus Dei’s Msgr. Joseph Duran,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (November 27,1998; accessed 3 
December 2001.
46Penny Lemoux, People o f  God: The Struggle for World Catholicism (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1989), 42.
47Robert Roya, “Opus Dei: Leadership and Vision in Today’s Catholic Church,” 
First Things, no. 83 (May 1998), 56.
4 8  *When describing its own efforts in the Philippines and elsewhere, Opus Dei 
favors the analogy of salt. Salt gives flavor but does not attract attention to its presence. 
Yet the analogy is filled with pitfalls, because if too much salt is present it will destroy 
the flavor. Moreover, in abundance it can poison both land and water.
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tangible successes in the Philippines was the construction and operation of the Center for 
Research and Communication, founded in 1967 by two Opus Dei members, Dr. Bernardo 
Villegas and Dr. Jesus Estanislao.49 The institution’s mission was simple, to produce the 
next generation of Catholic-trained leaders and elite to penetrate the government and run 
the Philippines.
Graduates of the Opus Dei institution were to be the best o f the best, and once in 
power they served the Church’s interests in any capacity they could. Opus Dei was also a 
permanent presence in other Catholic universities. Although the organization did not 
take over the administration o f the schools, it was there to help make sure that what was 
taught, be it economics or politics, was in line with the Catholic doctrine and that 
graduates would maintain their ties to the Catholic Church after obtaining positions of 
power.50
Financing Opus Dei’s efforts, including those at the Center for Research and 
Communication, which later became the University o f the Asia and Pacific, required the 
group to tap an extensive web o f international support. Its activities in the Philippines 
received major funding and support from other Opus Dei-affiliated organizations based in 
the United States and Europe, including the Hanns-Seidel Foundation of Germany, which 
itself is accredited by and receives funding from the European Union. Together with 
another Opus Dei affiliate, Limmat, the Hanns-Seidel Foundation helped fund Opus 
Dei’s extensive operation in the Philippines during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.51
Opus Dei’s early activities were largely clandestine and effective, but they were 
still only a small part of the Catholic Church’s activities in the Philippines. The Church’s
49W. J. West, Opus Dei: Exploding a Myth (Crows Nest, Australia: Little Hills 
Press, 1987), 138.
50Ibid., 143.
51Urguhart, Conservative Catholic Influence in Europe, 12.
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main thrust remained with the masses, and this activity was overt for all to see and 
evaluate. Its public nature also meant that its political enemies monitored its actions. By 
1969, the Church’s social participation gradually moved from small community and 
parish-based initiatives of development to cultivation of community-based 
organizations.52 Within a decade, the Church’s own mandate broadened from merely 
one of social welfare to include a demand for social justice, and from simply developing 
the poor to liberating them from the harsh conditions of tenancy to government’s human 
rights abuses.
The Church continued to push socially and politically, but political gains within 
the Philippines were initially slow and not up to par with the social progress the Church 
enjoyed in its effort to aid the poor. However, any sort o f political gain was a good thing 
considering the Church had been marginalized for decades. These gains, while marginal, 
would prove extremely valuable because they came at a time when great political change 
was about to grip the Philippines. During the 1960s, the Church was gaining momentum 
as a political and social force for change in the Philippines at a time when its more vocal 
and advocatory elements ran afoul o f the new govemment-a government and leadership 
that would prove more authoritarian than any since the Spanish occupation and more 
anti-Church than since the American’s arrival. This new government was the 
government o f Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Marcos came to power in the presidential election of 1965 by defeating incumbent 
President Diosdado Macapagal on a ticket that was one part nationalism, one part 
charismatic appeal, and one part typical Philippine politics—the bribing o f individual 
voters and the barrio leadership. Marcos appealed to the masses for several reasons, 
including his insistence on his glorious record as a soldier. He was never shy about 
touting his record as a war hero, which itself was fraudulent. As a candidate, he ran on a
Kroeger, “Evangelization in the Philippine Church,” 8-9.
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platform that promised governmental reform that would lift the Philippines out of the 
poverty of the Third World. During his tenure as president, he accomplished neither.
He did, however, bring a new level o f political oppression, violence, and social 
chaos to the Philippines. His one and a half terms as a constitutional and legal president 
were fraught with largesse at the expense of his own people. He had a Napoleonic 
complex of his own and a marriage of convenience with Imelda Romualdez that suited 
his political ambitions. Together they looted the Philippine treasury, ignored the 
suffering o f the people, and grew paranoid in their unquenchable thirst for complete 
authority over the Philippines. Those that got in his way, be they members o f the military, 
his friends, or political foes, did not endure. Organized resistance had a way of falling 
under the category of subversion and mass arrests, torture, and even murder were used as 
tools to squash dissent.
Some of his later political targets were the left-leaning progressives within the 
Catholic Church. In the end, getting at the Church and politically neutralizing it proved 
the ultimate challenge for Marcos. Targeting the Church politically was one thing, 
attacking it with the tools o f his policy state was another. In a country where the Catholic 
Church impacts more than 80 percent of voters, Marcos had to be careful about the type 
of action he took to silence any opposition to his regime that existed in the Church 
hierarchy.
In hindsight it is ironic that Marcos, who believed himself called by God to lead 
the Philippines, later turned the power of the State against God’s church and in the end 
was brought down by this same Church during the People Power revolution of 1986. But 
People Power was still thirteen years away, and the Philippines first had to suffer through 
years o f brutal authoritarian rule. The events of martial law and the People Power 
revolution are discussed later in the chapter, but to understand how he went from being a 
self-proclaimed ardent Catholic to the Church’s top political enemy requires some 
background analysis.
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Marcos’s political history was as checkered as any politician’s. His life, from a 
very early age, was filled with murder and intrigue and a sense o f destiny and divine 
intervention.53 Marcos knew how to manipulate his image and use those around him to 
gain votes. Those used for that purpose included his wife Imelda, who he chose for her 
beauty and talents and who he later nurtured into the ultimate socialite who could work a 
room with the best politicians. They were a true power couple. Marcos also used all 
means-money, influence, utang na loob, United States financial aid and support, and the 
Philippine military—to obtain and maintain power.
In the presidential election of 1965, Marcos wooed voters with money and the 
media with favors and overwhelmed his opposition in the public relations war.54 He 
played the dual role o f new blood and wise statesman. He played on pent-up frustrations 
and portrayed himself as a father figure wanting to take care o f his nation. He was a 
nationalist par excellence, vowing to make the Philippines great, alleviate poverty, and 
keep their soldiers out o f America’s Vietnam conflict.55 Marcos was assuming the roles 
of the wise leader, the statesman, and the father. One observer o f the Philippine political 
culture correctly noted this fact. Beth Day Romulo wrote that, “What Filipinos have 
always looked for. . .  is a datu: a father figure, a single leader who will take care of his
53As a youth in law school, Marcos was charged with murdering one o f his 
father’s political opponents. He was later jailed for one year while awaiting trial. He 
finished his law degree during this time and defended himself in court. Although the 
evidence showed that he pulled the trigger to avenge his father’s loss o f honor, the 
Philippine Supreme Court later acquitted him on all charges.
54William C. Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator: The Mind o f Marcos as Revealed 
in His Secret Diaries (Boston: Little Brown, 1993), 16-17.
55Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, 1988),
183.
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people. No one has understood this national yearning, and taken better advantage o f it, 
than Ferdinand Marcos.”56
The truth about Marcos is far more complex. He fancied himself a soldier, a 
military leader, a savior, and even a consolidator o f an empire, much like Napoleon.57 
But many things about Marcos were not what they seemed. For example, he was not the 
war hero he claimed to be. Much of his storied past existed only in his imagination. 
Moreover, buried in the government archives in Washington D.C. were documents that 
contested Marcos’s claims to heroism as well an arrest order issued by the United States 
military charging Marcos with wartime racketeering.58
Padding one’s war record for the benefit o f public office may not be ethical, but it 
is certainly easier to understand than Marcos’s quest to silence the Church against his 
regime, especially considering what he wrote in his personal diaries about his own 
relationship with God. Marcos himself claimed to be a staunchly religious figure and a 
“good” Catholic. It is ironic that he considered himself a devout Catholic but went above 
and beyond most Catholics in his claim that God spoke to him personally. It appears that 
Marcos did not need the benefit of a priest and was granted a special audience with the 
Creator himself.
Marcos believed that he was God’s personal political and social tool in the 
Philippines. Indeed, Marcos believed that his own hands did God’s work. His dreams 
were visions from God, his voice spoke God’s words, and even during the most 
tumultuous times o f his presidency he believed his solution, martial law, was all part of
56Beth Day Romulo, Inside the Palace: The Rise and Fall o f  Ferdinand & Imelda 
Marcos (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1987), 19.
57Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator, 163.
58  *James Hamilton-Paterson, America’s Boy: A. Century o f  Colonialism in the 
Philippines (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), 88-93.
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God’s plan.59 Being God’s personal servant meant that he was above the petty level of 
the Catholic Church. Indeed, he may have equated himself as an equal to the Vicar of 
Christ in Rome. One can only speculate about the level o f his delusion. However, one 
thing is certain. Marcos claimed that God was calling him to save the Philippines, to 
purge the subversive elements o f the Church, and to declare martial law.60
Believing as he did in his own special relationship with God, Marcos did not start 
as an enemy of the Church. He, like other presidents and politicians before him, 
embraced the unifying aspects o f the Catholic faith and understood, supported, and 
sought to utilize the conservative elements within it. In a way, the Marcos regime 
understood the value o f having the Church as an ally in efforts to win popular support for 
and even legitimacy o f his regime, much like the United States attempted to do during the 
early years o f their colonization of the Philippines. Just as it had been for the United 
States, Marcos believed the Church was best used as a mediating variable to temper the 
political feeling coming from all sectors o f society. The Church was best for Marcos 
when it was a tool to be exploited to further his political aims. Only when it began to 
interfere with his ambitions did the Church become an enemy.
After taking the oath of office and becoming the sixth president of the republic on 
December 30, 1965, Marcos let loose a political steamroller, dolling out pork barrel 
projects, reneging on campaign promises and consolidating his power.61 Marcos began to 
court the United States more openly as well, for military aid more than anything. The 
military was his favorite project, and he set out to make it bigger, better equipped, and
59Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator, 69.
60Ibid., 102.
61 One blatant political promise Marcos violated was his assurance during the 
campaign that he would not commit combat troops to Vietnam. After his election, he 
committed 2,000 Philippine soldiers to Vietnam.
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run under tighter control.62 Marcos’s increasing authoritarian tendencies were 
demonstrated by his step-by-step approach to increasing his own presidential powers 
during his first term. To be safe, potential political opponents such as the Catholic 
Church needed to make sure they stayed out o f his way. At first this was not difficult to 
do. At the time of Marcos’s first election, the Catholic Church was only beginning its 
activity at the barrio level o f society, socially organizing the peasants in a variety o f  
social and political elements.
The Marcos mystique was strong during his first two years and was tested at the 
polls during the 1967 midterm election. This election showed just how powerful his 
political machine was at the time. With one exception, his Nacionalista party won every 
senate race. A young senator from Tarlac, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, claimed the only
• • •  f tX •opposition victory. Ninoy Aquino was to become the bane o f Marcos’s political career 
almost from the beginning. In fact, it was during Marcos’s triumph in the election of 
1965 over Diosdado Macapagal when Aquino’s name first surfaced as a political force 
capable o f challenging Marcos. Aquino, working on behalf of Macapagal in his home 
province o f Tarlac, made sure that Marcos did not win that province.64 Marcos, who 
never forgot a political slight, made note o f this fact.
After the elections o f 1967, Marcos’s political honeymoon was over. Crime rates 
soared in Manila and the problems of hunger and poverty plagued the nation.65 Rumors 
of corruption were spreading. During this time, Marcos showed early signs o f what 
would later be his legendary corruption during his first administration. Once in the
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presidency, Marcos used his cronies and some members of his cabinet to muscle in on 
private businesses. Mrs. Marcos was doing the same thing.66 Critics were also worried 
about his seemingly singular focus on building up the military.
Marcos faced vocal opposition in the congress and on the street. He was accused 
among other things o f being a tuta (lap dog) o f the Americans.67 The attacks were more 
frequent and more personal as the 1969 presidential election loomed. However, Marcos 
was prepared for a fight. He had the money, his solid voter base in his home province of 
Ilocos Norte, and many Mends eager to help.68 He also had grandiose plans that included 
a movie about his life. It was to be called Maharlika, and though it was not finished in 
time to make a difference in the election, it was evidence of Marcos’s increasing self- 
importance and willingness to waste funds on himself rather than helping his own people.
For the 1969 election, Marcos had a war chest o f money unmatched by his 
opponents and an army at his disposal. He was willing and able to use the powers he had 
available against individuals or groups that caused him trouble, including the Catholic 
Church. Marcos was adamant about staying in power, and was willing to pay off barrio 
political bosses and individual voters and threaten political opposition. But in 1969, 
dissent was a non-factor, including opposition from those elements o f the Church who 
were despondent towards Marcos’s increasing authoritarianism. More than anything, this 
was the result o f the opposition’s choice for president, Sergio Osmena Jr. He lacked both 
charm and charisma, and his base of support did not extend beyond his home province of 
Cebu.
66Romulo, Inside the Palace, 170.
67Rempel, Delusions o f  a Dictator, 22.
68Ibid„ 23.
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Marcos won by a margin o f almost two million votes and soon after, accusations 
were hurled about election fraud.69 Indeed, it seemed that Marcos was not content to 
simply win the election in 1969, he wanted a landslide. So much money was spent on the 
election that it had a negative impact on the Philippine economy. The final tally was 
more than $50 million used to buy votes. If Marcos ran short on money, he simply 
ordered the central bank to print more pesos to pay off his political cronies and to buy 
votes on a massive scale. One victim of this spending orgy was the Philippine peso, 
which was devalued by 50 percent as a result o f the inflation caused by the amount of
» 70currency printed and given out by the Marcos campaign.
At Marcos’s second inauguration, he promised democracy instead of 
totalitarianism .71 Marcos delivered the reverse. His second term got off to a rough start 
due in large part to the ailing economy, something that Marcos himself was blamed for in 
the press. Things grew worse as students and leftists took to the streets to demand that 
Marcos either do something or step aside. His response was to unleash the riot police and 
tear gas the protestors.
There was a real fear among the dissenters that Marcos would try to stay longer 
than the constitutionally allowed two terms. This was a valid fear, because not long after 
his victory Marcos began making plans to hold a constitutional convention in hopes o f  
changing the constitution and the government to a parliamentary style o f government.
This constitutional convention called in 1971 gave Marcos virtually unlimited power.72 
His reasons for wanting this change became clear a few months later. For now, he had to 
contend with an increasing level of civilian violence directed towards his government.
69Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty, 218.
70Ibid., 219.
71Rempel, Delusions o f  a Dictator, 27.
77Hamilton-Paterson, America’s Boy, 57.
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It was also during the street protests of 1970 that the first hints o f Marcos’s anti- 
Church policy were revealed. His personal diary, found in 1986 a few months after his 
hasty flight from the presidential palace in the wake o f the People Power revolution, gave 
insight into how he grew wary of the Church as a political obstacle to his political plans. 
At the height o f the protests, as police were beating the students, the new session of 
congress was set to begin. As was customary, a priest was present to give the opening 
prayer.
Marcos bristled at this particular prayer. It was no ordinary invocation. Instead, 
it was a scathing attack on elements o f the Marcos government offered by Father Pacifico 
Ortiz, the Jesuit head o f Ateneo de Manila University. Ortiz used his prayer to pick at the 
conscience of all those present for their abuses o f power, students, and the conditions in 
the Philippines. Later that night, still fuming about the prayer, Marcos wrote his thoughts 
in his diary. He called the prayer “poor taste” and went on to blame extremists, the press, 
and even the priest’s prayer for helping instigate the riots in the streets.73 This delusional 
blame that Marcos placed on Father Ortiz was representative o f a pattern of blame for 
unrest in the Philippines. He would blame everyone, including Catholic priests, during 
the months ahead.
Marcos did not explain just how the opening prayers of one priest evoked riots in 
the streets, and he simply ignored the role his own policies and riot squads played in the 
violence. Ignoring responsibility, Marcos chose to overlook what history has since 
revealed. The reality o f the violence o f 1970 is something quite different than the official 
Marcos version. Using evidence from his diary, it is now clear that much o f the unrest 
and violence in the streets, including the Battle o f Mendiola, where several civilians were 
killed in a bombing, resulted from Marcos’s own political plans and intrigue. Further
73Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator., 32.
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evidence suggests that he personally approved the planting of government agents among 
the student protestors in order to instigate violence and unrest.74
Marcos did these things out o f fear o f what might happen should he lose power. 
He did not want his political career to come to an end. Moreover, he believed that he was 
the only man who could guide the Philippines on a course to prosperity. The students, 
the extremists, and the Catholic Church filled with men like Father Ortiz made Marcos 
extremely uncomfortable. Opinionated priests were the kind o f individuals who stood in 
the way o f his political plans.
Ortiz was indeed representative o f a movement coming out o f the Church. Still 
conservative, Vatican II’s theology o f liberation and the push for increased social action 
rippled into the mainstream Church. Men like Ortiz and later Jaime Cardinal Sin felt its 
affects. Slowly, the mainstream Church embraced more and more activist elements as 
the Marcos administration grew more authoritarian, eventually culminating in a clash of 
wills in the People Power revolution. But even in 1970, Marcos sensed the danger to his 
authoritarian designs. He feared that a growing number o f “Father Ortizes” in the Church 
might cause problems for his long-term plans to stay in power.75
Marcos had ample blame to pass around and plenty in reserve for the Church, 
which he blamed for increasing unrest. His vitriol knew no bounds. He even accused the 
Catholic Church of hiring thugs to force the poor to rise up in protest. To counter this 
perceived trend, he launched a secret investigation into the conduct of priests and leaked 
reports to the media that some in the Church were in league with the communists. Using 
the “red scare” to attack the Church was a common Marcos tactic, even though evidence 
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The Communist scare, the instigation o f protests, and the careful eye Marcos kept 
on the Church were part of his larger plan. He was positioning himself for a major power 
grab, an opportunity to suspend the writ o f habeas corpus and arrest and detain his 
political opponents. With opposition silenced, he could act with a free hand. But in 
1970, the time was not ripe for action.
Marcos’s political instincts were sharp and he saw that the Church posed a future 
threat to his position. As a result, he sought other means of legitimizing himself in the 
eyes of the Catholic faithful by circumventing the indigenous Catholic hierarchy. One 
idea was to invite Pope Paul VI to the Philippines. Marcos believed that a Papal visit 
would serve to dull any criticisms hurled at him by the Filipino clergy. What better way 
to show how “religious” and “Catholic” he was than to hop from photo opportunity to 
photo opportunity with the Vicar of Christ? It was in simple terms a stroke of political 
genius, at least in theory. His idea to use the Pope to further his political capital did not 
work as planned.
Marcos hoped to foster a warm relationship with the Pope, but reality was quite 
different. The Pope rebuffed the invitation to stay at the presidential palace, refused to 
ride in the presidential limousine with the first family, and showed little desire to attend 
the functions Marcos planned.78 This did not sit well with Marcos, who at every turn put 
his own positive spin on the situation. Even when Benjamin Mendoza attempted to 
assassinate the Pope on the tarmac o f Manila airport, Marcos took credit for saving the 
Pope’s life. The entire fiasco with the Pope is in some way indicative o f Marcos’s 
relationship to the official Church, for although in retrospect it seems he did little to save 
the Pope, Marcos credited his own “karate chop” with saving the Holy Father.79
78Hamilton-Paterson, America’s Boy, 69-70.
79Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator, 72.
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The chill that existed between the Catholic Church and the Marcos administration 
took a public turn in November 1970 when Pope Paul VI rebuffed Marcos’s and his 
wife’s efforts to join him on an official visit to the Philippines’ poorest areas.80 This 
action by the Pope was indicative of his treatment o f the administration for the extent of 
his visit. The Vatican and the Philippine Catholic Church worked to keep the Marcos 
administration out o f the official visits as much as possible, highlighting a demarcation of  
power and influence. The line ran between Marcos’s control o f the government and 
military and the Church coveting the poor masses.
To his chagrin, Marcos noticed the trend of the Church’s conscious efforts to 
increase their political capital among the poor segments o f society and the growing 
overall political power that would result should they succeed. Since the beginning o f the 
decade, Marcos had grown increasingly uneasy with the new power o f the Church and its 
role in promoting anti-Marcos sentiments throughout the country. His investigation into 
the “religious personalities actively engaged in various efforts to promote restlessness 
and disorder . . . ” turned up little useful political ammunition.81
Marcos’s efforts to suppress the Communists and quell student unrest had also 
been less successful, and nationalist unrest over the laigging economy was growing. 
Coupled with his economic woes was an obstructionist Congress that threw up political 
roadblocks to his domestic and foreign policy agenda. It was both unclear and uncertain 
whether, even with a corrupt political machine behind him, he could win the 1973 
presidential election. When the Catholic Church and its increased ability to mobilize the 
poor into a sizable voting block was factored in, Marcos understood that he did not stand 
much o f a chance in a free and fair election.
o n
Henry Kamm, “In Manila Shanty, Pope Kneels to Pray,” New York Times, 30 
November 1970, sec. 1, p. 5.
81Philip Shabecoff, “Filipino Church Under Broad Fire,” New York Times, 15 
March 1970, sec. 2, p. 11.
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Marcos may have overestimated the Church’s strength between 1970 and 1972, 
but he did not overestimate its potential. Church activities during this time were far less 
odious than he believed. By and large, the Church stayed out o f foreign policy and on the 
national scene it injected itself into only a few legal issues. One issue the Church did get 
involved in was in 1970, when the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines 
(CBCP) made a push for a Non-Partisan Constitutional Convention to be convened in 
1971. The Church’s hope was that such a conference, with its participation and 
oversight, would produce a document that would heal the opposition’s wounds, calm the 
student protests and be favorable towards the Church’s activities on the national level.
Alongside the push for a new constitution was the continued promotion o f moral, 
spiritual, economic, social, cultural, and political elements in society. By 1972, the 
Church was increasingly a champion of the disenfranchised. As such, it filled a huge 
vacuum as an advocate for traditionally oppressed groups. It was a de facto role for the 
Church because no other group could or would take on the responsibility.
The Church pressed forward, largely under Marcos’s political radar. However, as 
the 1973 presidential election loomed over the horizon, Marcos grew uneasy. He 
believed that if  the clamor of the opposition in congress, in the Church, or on the streets 
was an accurate indicator of the political climate, then it was unlikely that he could stay 
in power. On a legal basis, Marcos’s fears were moot. He had already been elected to a 
second term and the existing constitution forbade him to run for a third.
It is in this light that his push for a constitutional convention and the creation of a 
parliamentary government is understood. Marcos wanted the convention to convene and 
finish its work as soon as possible. He also wanted a parliamentary government, and as 
luck would have it, the student protestors in the street wanted the same thing. In 
Marcos’s mind, he was merely giving them what they wished.82 However, while they
Rempel, Delusions o f  a Dictator, 36.
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wanted a parliamentary form of government, the protestors did not want Marcos as their 
first prime minister.Marcos knew that creation o f a parliamentary government would 
ensure that he remained in power indefinitely. As president, he was limited to two terms. 
As prime minister, he could serve at the behest of the parliament. All he needed to do 
was win the seat of Ilocos Norte, and not a plurality o f the votes in a nationwide election. 
The Nacionalista party’s stronghold on any future parliament was its insurance policy. 
With a parliamentary system, his hold on power was guaranteed, but Marcos did not have 
the luxury of time in his quest for the constitutional change.
If he was going to act, he needed to act before 1973. Unfortunately for Marcos, it 
seemed unlikely that the convention could produce a document in time, and it was further 
unlikely that the delegates could or would ignore the protestors’ insistence that Marcos 
and his family be banned from holding office after his presidential term expired in 1973. 
Marcos was not about to let the protestors or the Church interfere with his goals. He 
devised an alternative plan, and he called it his “total solution.”83 This total solution was 
martial law.
83Ibid., 53.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CHURCH UNDER MARTIAL LAW
Marcos once mused in his diary that what was needed to enact his total solution 
was a little more violence and vandalism. He believed that following that violence and 
vandalism, he would be justified in doing anything to ensure order. Time was o f the 
essence, for he needed to invoke martial law as quickly as possible to seize his political 
opponents, silence his critics, and make sure that a new government was in place before 
any elections were held. He even hoped he could instigate an attack on his presidential 
palace, believing that would be enough to give him just cause to implement his total 
solution}
Marcos feared Communists, extremists, students, journalists, and the Church. He 
labeled them all as subversives and considered them all potential targets o f the total 
solution. Indeed, the Church stood out among the others as having a special role as a 
political enemy. Marcos believed that there existed a “Jesuit-fascist-CIA” united front 
specifically for the purpose o f deposing him and his government.3 No evidence of such a 
plot ever really existed. It was just something Marcos believed, and it was evidence of 
his paranoia about the Catholic Church.
The total solution needed to be implemented quickly. Yet in mid-1972, the 
violence was nowhere near the levels necessary to implement martial law. Marcos 
needed to devise a plan to change this situation. He called in his defense minister, Juan 
Ponce Enrile, to Malacanang to discuss the final event that would necessitate martial law. 
The two eventually settled on a staged ambush of Enrile’s motorcade. An attack on such 
a high-level official by “extremists” would necessitate a call for martial law.
'Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator, 56.
2Ibid., 61.
3Ibid., 54.
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Enrile agreed to go along with the ambush, which was set for Friday, September 
22,1972. Ironically, years later Enrile became one of the key players in Marcos’s 
downfall. However, his willingness to serve Marcos’s devious and violent designs 
clearly illustrate that he was not without blood on his hands. It was Enrile’s complicity in 
Marcos’s plans that allowed opposition leaders such as Ninoy Aquino to be arrested and 
take their first steps towards martyrdom. It was this “ambush” that allowed Marcos to 
take to the airwaves and declare martial law and name the Catholic Church as one o f its 
targets. How ironic that fourteen years later, Enrile would beg the same Church for its 
help to save his own life. But this was 1972 and not 1986, and the fake assassination 
attempt set in motion a series of events that threw the Philippines into its darkest hour 
since World War II.4
After martial law was declared, one of the first orders of business was to seize the 
media.5 Marcos signed an executive order during martial law that allowed the Philippine 
Ministry of Defense to take control of the mass media, including both the print and 
broadcast media that the state promptly seized. Violating the basic freedoms o f the press 
and free speech was another “necessary” step to retain control o f the government and 
keep the media out o f the hands of less desirable elements. The fear o f “Communists” 
was always invoked when Marcos did something that was both unjust and unpopular.
Under martial law, Marcos ordered the closing of all but one of Manila’s sixteen 
daily newspapers and seized all but one of the seven national television stations. Each 
new violation of the constitution was justified under the guise that the “Communists” had 
infiltrated the press. By the end of martial law in the early 1980s, the Catholic Church 
operated Radio Veritas, one of the few radio stations that survived Marcos’s media 
seizures.
4Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty, 244.
5Ibid., 246.
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One might ask why Veritas was not also shut down. It may have been because 
Veritas was, for the most part, apolitical. Its programming centered on the gospel of 
Jesus Christ and usually avoided political rhetoric. There was also another reason. While 
seizing newspapers and television stations was one thing, attacking the Catholic Church’s 
public affairs voice was quite another. Silencing Veritas would have been a very public 
attack on the Church, and one unparalleled under Marcos’s regime at that time.
The total solution also meant that Marcos set about to make quick work o f his 
political opponents. He had the loyalty of the military, the Philippine Constabulary, and 
the Nacionalista party. What he did not have was the legal basis to remain in power or to 
continue martial law indefinitely. But he had a plan to fix that situation. By the time his 
plans were implemented, the martial law regime he had established was a far cry from the 
forms o f legitimate governments the Philippines had possessed in the past.
Marcos’s first step after martial law was to call for a constitutional convention to 
be held in 1973. It was a continuation o f the process that began in 1970, although it was 
now hijacked by the Marcos martial law machine. His approach to the convention was to 
run it like a campaign, and that included bribery. Each delegate was given “messages” 
from the president in the form of crisp new pesos o f various denominations.6 Those he 
could not bribe were often jailed. Marcos’s money and the power intoxicated many, and 
in the end the constitutional convention went just the way Marcos wanted. He got his 
new parliamentary government. He also managed to have his term extended to six years 
and his election to the presidency ensured despite opposition protests, including those 
from the Church.7
6Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator., 142-143.
7In article VII, section II o f the 1973 Constitution, it reads in part, “The President 
shall be elected from among the members of the National Assembly by a majority vote of 
all its Members for a term of six years from the date he takes his oath o f office, which 
shall not be later than three days after the proclamation o f the National Assembly, nor in 
any case earlier than the expiration of the term of his predecessor.”
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By 1973, after implementation o f the total solution, the Catholic Church was fast 
becoming the focus of anti-Marcos energy. Francisco Claver, bishop o f Bontoc, clearly 
saw the connection between Marcos’s total solution and the Catholic Church when he 
noted, “The suspicion is in fact strong that one of the reasons for Martial Law was
o
precisely to put a stop to a process, helped along by [Church] efforts.”
The process Marcos wanted to stop was still in its embryonic stage. When the 
Church criticized him, he accused its members o f being Communists. And although 
Marcos had a tendency to label everything as “Communist,” there was some validity to 
his fears. Some Communist cells in the Philippines, particularly in Negros, relied on the 
Catholic Church to provide food, shelter, and protection.9 At times, the Church even 
offered financial and logistical support for the cadres.10 Yet even the most liberal views 
of the Church’s involvement in leftist organizations showed that at the time o f the 
declaration o f martial law, only a handful o f priests and laymen actually joined the 
Communist Party.11 As time went on more priests, nuns, and laymen belonged to the 
Communist insurgency, but never at the levels Marcos believed.
Church involvement in the anti-Marcos struggle took a variety of forms, and the 
conversion of priests and nuns from non-violent activists to armed revolutionaries 
occurred in two contrasting fashions. For some, accepting a Maoist “people’s war” was 
the result o f frustration over the conservative Catholic leadership’s inability to fully 
implement the goals of Vatican II.12 This included national Church leaders such as
o
Francisco Claver, “Prophecy or Accommodation: The Dilemma of a Discerning 
Church,” American 142 (April 1980): 354.
9Jones, Red Revolution, 92.
10Ibid., 94.
11 Joseph Lelyveld, “Church in Philippines Becoming a Focus of Opposition to 
Marcos,” New York Times, 27 February 1975, sec. I, p. 3.
12Jones, Red Revolution, 202.
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Archbishop Rufino Santos, who as bishop of Manila and the de facto leader of the entire 
Philippine Church had undertaken many good works during his career. But he was better 
known for his ability as comptroller o f the vast Church holdings than he was as a voice o f  
change. Indeed, Santos was a far cry from the kind o f reform-oriented, liberal-minded 
bishop needed to lead the Church against Marcos.13
Others in the Church never accepted a Maoist revolution or a “people’s war,” but 
they joined the movement to realize a mixture of two important ideological undercurrents 
in Philippine society, one old and one new. The old—nationalism and the new liberation 
theology—proved to be a potent mix.14 Out o f that mix came the establishment o f the 
Christians for National Liberation (CNL) on February 17,1972, on the 100th anniversary 
of the martyrdom of Fathers Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora. The 
CNL was the formal integration o f segments o f the Church and the Communist Party of 
the Philippines (CPP).
The integration o f some Church officials into organized leftist organizations 
seemed to prove Marcos’s earlier concerns that the Catholic Church would be the home 
of a revolution against his administration. But the CNL collaboration was not the only 
opposition. For example, Father Antoniio Y. Fortich, bishop of Bacolod, started social 
action programs among his parishioners to help curb the abuse of martial law. He also 
went above and beyond his Church duties to help organize labor. Moreover, he pushed 
his young Jesuit charges into taking stronger anti-government stances. He believed that 
Filipinos did not have the luxury of waiting for “messiahs,” but instead must push for 
social change on their own.15
13 Eduardo Lachica, Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt (Manila, 
Philippines: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), 254.
14Jones, Red Revolution, 202.
15Lelyveld, “Church in Philippines Becoming a Focus o f Opposition to Marcos,”
3.
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Marcos was aware of Fortich’s activities and those of others and issued stem 
warnings through his staff to cease and desist. Juan Ponce Enrile, whose own contrived 
assassination attempt brought the Philippines to martial law, issued warnings to the 
Catholic clergy not to “rock the boat.”16 Warnings were backed up by action. Marcos 
did not hesitate to issue arrest warrants against the Church.
By mid-1973, twenty-six priests and nuns had been formally arrested or detained 
by the government. The number of laymen arrested while working for Church causes is 
more difficult to determine.17 But in one incident that seems typical o f the martial law 
period, more than fifty youths were arrested while working with the Catholic Social 
Action Center and thirty-five were arrested while working for Jesuit priests. The 
activities for which they were arrested fell under the definition o f subversion, although 
the Church and government could never agree on exactly what constituted subversion.
Regardless o f the number arrested, the majority of Church’s members were still 
low key in their opposition to Marcos. Only a small number o f renegade priests joined 
leftist organizations, and the rest went about their daily lives with only the occasional 
pastoral letter protesting Marcos’s regime. This did not mean, o f course, that anti-Marcos 
sentiment was not strong within the mainstream Church, but the Church lacked a leader 
around whom to organize effective resistance. At the local parish level, many brave 
priests and nuns instilled courage in their followers to stand up against Marcos, even 
while they were being arrested and jailed. However, a national leader with the right mix 
of charisma, bravery, and audacity needed to combat martial law had not been found.
Throughout the formative years o f martial law, Cardinal Santos remained the 
leader, but he was not the kind of man to give in to revolutionary tendencies. His death 
in 1974 changed the situation. After the cardinal’s death, the door was open for a new
16Ibid.
17“Marcos Meets Moslem Rebels,” New York Times, 6 December 1973, sec. I, p.
7.
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priest to rise to that position o f power. The Church chose wisely. Replacing Santos, 
whose surname meant saint, was Jaime Sin, whose own last name is the source of 
numerous religious puns. Jaime Cardinal Sin was no stranger to protest. The cherubic 
son of Chinese mestizos, he was active in the Church for many years before rising to the 
leadership position. However, as the newly appointed bishop of Manila, he took over de 
facto leadership o f the Philippine Catholic Church. All eyes were on him.
It did not take long before Marcos tested the new Archbishop. The first test came 
when the administration issued an official government statement “thanking” the Church 
for its “cooperation” during a military raid on a Jesuit novitiate on August 26, 1974. 
Cardinal Sin, upon reading this outrageous statement, called privately for the government 
to issue a retraction.18 It did not.
Cardinal Sin went into action. It was the first test of his new position and o f his 
new power. His response took the form of a strongly worded pastoral letter that was read 
in parishes throughout the country, a tactic later used proficiently and profusely by 
Cardinal Sin and others during the embryonic stages o f the People Power movement of 
1986. Coupled with the letter was a call to the faithful to attend a prayer vigil at the 
Manila Cathedral. Marcos, acting through his own Church connections, urged Sin to call 
off the vigil. He did not.
The vigil started small but quickly grew to include more than 5.000 worshipers by 
September 1. The cardinal was moved by the response and so were the people. Those in 
attendance were a part of something special. They were hearing for the first time open 
criticism of the government from the highest-ranking member o f the Catholic Church. 
Almost overnight, the hopes and dreams o f a people yearning to be freed from the 
oppression o f martial law rested on the shoulders of one man, Jamie Cardinal Sin.
,8Joseph Lelyveld, “Marcos Mending Religious Fences,” New York Times, 18 
October 1974, sec. I, p. 5.
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During the vigil, Marcos invited Cardinal Sin to the palace not once, but twice.
He had the cardinal lead Mass, read homilies, and discuss issues with him. These 
attempts to woo Sin over to his side were fruitless. In the end, Marcos ordered his 
administration to issue a statement o f retraction asserting that the Church hierarchy did 
not in fact cooperate in the raid.19 In his first showdown with Marcos, Sin prevailed.
Under Cardinal Sin’s leadership, the Church was emboldened. It was 
emboldened to a degree that a vigil against injustice was not enough. It went further in 
calling for an end to Marcos’s total solution. The first official call to lift martial law 
came during the same month as the vigil. In a statement issued on September 3, 1974, 
the Catholic Bishops of the Philippines, led by Cardinal Sin, formally asked President 
Marcos to lift martial law and restore the civil liberties he had done away with two years 
earlier. The statement read in part, “On the occasion of the approaching holy year 1975, 
with its theme of renewal and reconciliation, we respectfully suggest that bold steps be 
taken to gradually lift martial law and thus pave the way for healing the wounds of the 
nation.”20
Marcos scoffed at the call to end his martial laiw. But one thing was certain under 
Cardinal Sin—the Church was reinvigorated. Part o f this reinvigoration included the call 
to end martial law, but it also included the revamping of previously underfunded and 
neglected social action groups, such as the National Secretariat for Social Action 
(NASS A). As noted earlier, the bishops created NASS A in 1966 to promote the active 
participation o f the Philippine Catholic Church in the transformation o f society. It 
remained committed to peace, justice, and the liberation of the Philippine people from all 
structures of oppression. Under Cardinal Sin’s leadership, it became important again.
19“Catholics Hold Vigil in Manila to Protest Raid on a Novitiate,” New York 
Times, 2 September 1974, sec. 1, p. 3.
20“Filipino Bishops Ask End of Curbs,” New York Times, 4 September 1974, sec.
I, p. 8.
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During martial law NASS A worked in, sponsored, and promoted programs that 
emphasized human development through “consceintization.” Among these works were 
establishment of Basic Christian Community-Community Organizations, or simply Basic 
Christian Communities (BCC).21 The BCCs were inspired in part by Vatican II’s 
injunction to greater lay participation in liturgical and sacramental functions. In remote 
areas where there were only one or two priests for thousands of parishioners, the BCCs
• 99enabled the Church to maintain its influence.
The Church’s work in general and the BCCs work in particular fundamentally 
changed the social and political empowerment level at the bottom strata o f Philippine 
society. In a way, the BCCs harkened back to the Spanish era, when the Catholic parish 
was the center o f the community, guiding and directing the community in matters of 
social and political concerns. Although the friars were long gone, the organization o f the 
BCC was centered on the Church, which was now headed by indigenous clergy and 
guided and encouraged participation in decisions that affected parishioners directly 
within both the Church and their communities. The BCC was a way to engage the 
masses in collective action to solve collective problems.
Revitalization of the Church did not mean an end to persecution. BCCs and 
Cardinal Sin’s leadership did much to bring the mainstream Church into social action, but 
also made it an easier target in some respects. Indeed, Sin’s actions heightened the 
profile o f many who had earlier remained off o f Marcos’s lists. The level o f persecution 
would vary from month to month, with some years being worse than others.
In an effort to put a stranglehold on Church involvement in peasant organizational 
activities and the inevitable linkages provided by the combined efforts of the Church and 
leftist groups, Marcos issued a decree in 1975 that required Church organizations to
21 Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church, 84.
22 Jones, Red Revolution, 208.
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obtain government approval before assisting in labor causes and banned foreign 
missionaries from trade-union activities. The decree served to reinforce the ban on 
strikes and lockouts imposed at the outset o f martial law. The Catholic Church reacted 
by charging that Marcos was preventing them from performing their “Christian and 
human duty to help the poor and suffering.”23 It also violated the Bill o f Rights, but since 
the Bill o f Rights had ceased to be relevant upon the imposition of martial law, it was a 
moot argument.
Failure to heed these decrees brought harsh government reprisals and threats. It 
was not uncommon for the government to “leak” threats against the Church. In February 
1975, one such government leak was o f an unsigned arrest warrant that contained the 
names o f 155 priests, nuns, and Catholic laymen. Included in this extensive list were four 
bishops who were, according to the warrant, to be charged with “rebellion and inciting to 
sedition.”24 The government leaked this and other warrants as a warning to the Church 
that its actions were being monitored. The leak struck fear in those whose names were on 
the list and prevented open confrontation with the Church.
The year 1976 saw continued arrests of clergy, deportations o f missionaries, and 
raids on Church property. Not only did the Marcos government arrest priests, but the 
military raided the offices o f Jesuit publications and seized Catholic-owned radio stations 
in Mindanao. Year after year, these sorts o f activities continued. In 1978, attacks 
against the Church were punctuated by the arrest of the Jesuit priest Father Romeo 
Intengan and the murder of his staff worker, T. Tantiado 26 Father Intengan was targeted
23 *“Manila Decree Draws Church Protest,” New York Times, 15 November 1975, 
sec. I, p. 3.
24Henry Kamm, “Church’s Ties with Manila Strained,” New York Times, 2 
February 1977, sec. I, p. 8.
25Ibid.
26Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church, 122.
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for being the founder o f the anti-authoritarian political party the Nagkakaisang Partido 
Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (United Democratic Socialist Party o f the 
Philippines). The Nacionalista party-controlled government feared the actions of 
Intengan’s party so much that they used terror and intimidation to try to silence its 
activities.
Even the most powerful members o f the Church leadership were not immune to 
Marcos’s harassment. Cardinal Sin had his activities watched closely by the Marcos 
administration. Sometimes he was unduly detained and kept from leaving the Philippines 
when he attempted to make official visits to the Vatican. This was an outrage to be sure, 
but it was a common occurrence in a country ruled by the singular power o f a corrupt 
man. Yet the Cardinal was quite lucky. Inconveniencing his travel plans was a minor 
thing compared to the list of options Marcos might have considered, which included 
arrest or assassination. Cardinal Sin realized that he could be targeted at any time.
Clergy and laymen suffered almost equally under Marcos’s tyrannical political 
policies. During martial law, more than 20,000 Philippine citizens were arrested for so- 
called political crimes. Among these were twenty-eight prominent and politically active 
Catholic priests and nuns.27 Some were even tortured after their detainment. Their crimes 
are unknown, probably because their crimes were little more than trumped-up charges 
created to give the government an excuse to arrest them. These men and women were 
little more than politically effective organizers, and for that reason they were targeted.
The way Marcos prosecuted his struggle with the Church was careful and 
cunning, and his tactics often remained unknown to the public. Still, there were no less 
than twenty-two major military raids on Church institutions during the remaining years o f  
martial law, and there is little doubt that far more were conducted on a lesser scale.28
27Kroeger, “Evangelization in the Philippine Church,” 10.
28Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church, 114.
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Through the use o f terror tactics, Marcos tried to restrict the clergy to merely preaching 
the gospel, and in so doing end any threat to his political fortunes. He failed to do both.
However, Marcos’s tactics were successful in slowing growth in Church activism. 
He did not, however, stop it. His political combat with the Church was indirect, and he 
avoided direct confrontation. Even Marcos realized that it was unwise to launch a direct 
frontal assault on the Church because it would certainly invite a backlash against his own 
administration. No matter how politically powerful the Church was or was not, it still 
had at least the nominal allegiance and respect of the vast majority o f the population. 
Marcos controlled the State and the power inherent in it, and by using this power he won 
the majority o f the battles. But in the end, the Church would win the war.
The marginalization and persecution o f the Church during the height of martial 
law had other consequences. As Marcos’s campaign had early success, he pulled away 
more and more from the Catholic Church as an institution of legitimacy for his own 
government. He had to fill in the huge vacuum created by the Church’s removal. How 
did Marcos then deal with creating at least a myth o f his own legitimacy? Marcos’s 
approach to the legitimacy of his martial law regime was a Faustian approach to Weber’s 
model of the legal, charismatic, and traditional aspects o f legitimacy mentioned in 
chapter one (see figure 13). On the charismatic side o f things, he fostered his own cult of 
personality, as demonstrated in the film about his life and the vast work o f Philippine 
history he commissioned in order to link himself with other great Filipino heroes, from 
Lapu Lapu to Jose Rizal.
Marcos used the military and his cronies to ensure complete power, and to cover 
up for his lack of legal authority he held of series o f referendums. These votes showed 
the world that his government enjoyed a mandate from the people. The referendums 
were a prime example o f how low he had fallen. During the days leading up to the third 
referendum held on February 27, 1975, Marcos campaigned even though he was the only
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candidate. The people were powerless, and again only the Church could organize a voice 
of opposition.
Martial Law Regime 
1972-1981
Z.3- Cromism Z.4- I,'.S. supportZ2-Military
Z5- Referendums! ZI -Catholic Church
>e
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Fig. 13. The Legitimacy Model Under Martial Law- Mediating variables that normally 
would not show up in such a model (cronyism) play prominent roles in stabilizing the 
regime. The military, this time the Philippine military, is also key in preventing dissent 
and stabilizing the government, as is the United States continued financial support. The 
Catholic Church still remains one of the variables, but its suppression by Marcos causes it 
to lose some prestige from the previous period. What is absent is “utilitarian” legitimacy. 
Marcos neither cared nor had to appeal to this form of legitimacy.
At first their numbers were small, numbering around 5,000 protesters, but it was a 
start and a daring one considering the amount of power the Marcos police state could 
bring to bear on the Church if it desired. But in 1975, it was not necessary for Marcos to 
act any harsher towards the Church than he already did. Through a combination o f voter
29“5,000 in Manila Join Protest March Against Regime,” New York Times, 22 
February 1975, sec. 1, p. 8.
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payoffs, harassment, and outright murder, Marcos made sure that he won every 
referendum on martial law. He was to be, in effect, the president for as long as he was 
alive, and should he die, Imelda Marcos was there to take over.
In reality, Marcos’s legal mandate and his legitimacy had long since gone out of 
the people’s hands. While he may have at one time enjoyed the benefits and moral 
certitude of legitimacy that came in the legal sense, it was now hollow. The constitution 
that gave him his power was written by him, and it was approved by men he had either 
bribed or threatened into acquiescence.
What Marcos had in abundance was traditional power. His administration was 
along the lines o f Weberian traditionalism. He used bribery, nepotism, and favoritism to 
install his people in positions o f power and had his opposition arrested. To gain power in 
the Marcos government meant pleasing Ferdinand or Imelda, and it had more to do with 
one’s own personal loyalty to Marcos than with any intellectual ability one possessed. It 
was a common saying under martial law that everything was “relative,” meaning you had 
to be related to the Marcos clan if  you wanted to succeed in the Philippines.
A prime example o f this was Herminio Disini, who was related to Mrs. Marcos 
by marriage. Because o f his family position, he went from being a menial worker in a 
tobacco company to having ownership of a conglomerate with assets exceeding $500 
million.30 Virtually all of the television stations and newspapers passed into the hands of 
Marcos relatives, and a mere 20 percent o f the population controlled 53 percent o f the 
nation’s wealth. Marcos padded his own pockets and those of his relatives, and yet he 
tried to put forth a face of “constitutional authoritarianism” for his government.
Utilitarian legitimacy was harder for Marcos to foster. As chapter one discussed, 
the utilitarian model o f legitimacy is based on the population granting the right to rule to 
a regime or government that in return takes care o f the population’s needs and desires.
on
Fox Butterfield, “5-Year Old Philippine Martial Law Builds Personal Power of 
Marcos,” New York Times, 9 January 1978, sec. 1, p. 8.
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Marcos and his administration were woefully inadequate to perform the task of taking 
care of the Philippine people. This was not because o f lack o f resources. Money poured 
into the State from the International Monetary Fund and other sources, but it never made 
it to the people. Instead, Marcos cared more about catering to his own excess than taking 
care o f his people.
Marcos’s brand of authoritarian stability actually brought some foreign 
investment, but much of the new cash flowed straight into the bank accounts o f Marcos
•  • •  3 1 *and his allies, and Marcos left the Philippines $26 billion in debt a decade later. His 
excesses were legendary and bordered on the preposterous. For instance, his government 
granted massive loans—out of the money given by the International Monetary Fund or the 
United States-to his cronies to build expensive five-star hotels in Manila while the poor 
went without adequate housing. On a smaller scale but just as outrageous was when 
much-needed money was diverted from the Typhoon Relief Fund to pay for Marcos’s 
daughter’s wedding dresses.32
Imelda Marcos was notorious for buying everything from precious stones to 
Manhattan real estate and charging it all to the Philippine government. Cardinal Sin was 
not above using biting social humor when discussing Mrs. Marcos’s disproportionate 
spending. He was once quoted as saying that Imelda was “into mining” as the source of 
her wealth, but he did not mean the kind of mining that brings forth precious metals from 
the ground. Instead, her mining was along the lines of “this is mine, and this is mine, and 
this is mine.”33 Indeed, by the time Marcos was chased from office by the People Power
31Youngblood, Militarization and the Churches, 29.
T9Romulo, Inside the Palace, 186.
33Ibid., 205.
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revolution it is estimated that his net worth was around $30 billion, more than enough to 
retire the national debt o f the Philippines.34
Marcos’s military kept him in power. Before 1972, the armed forces numbered 
55,000, and a mere five years later it had increased to 160,000.35 The military was 
staffed with Marcos cronies, and it represented a real threat o f violence to the opposition 
and more corruption in civil society, because many generals sat on the boards o f directors 
of top Philippine corporations.
The use o f the military to intimidate opponents was only one tactic Marcos used 
to stay in power. He heaped debt upon the citizenry, violated basic human rights, and 
persecuted opposition political and social establishments like the Church, all in an effort 
to remain on top. To Marcos, violence was necessary in martial law to bring about a 
“New Society” and a “New Republic.” The crackdowns against dissidents inside and 
outside o f the Church were justified for the elimination of subversion and the protection 
of national security.36
Marcos’s targeting the Church as part of the conspiracy to subvert his “New  
Society” coincided with the Church’s own attempt at remaining politically vigorous 
under the leadership of Cardinal Sin and the activities o f the CBCP and the BCCs. The 
Church still did not confront martial law directly, but its work continued at the grassroots 
level. Political patience gave way to empowerment o f the poor, gathering of allies in the 
middle class, and work in all sectors for possible unification as a single political voice 
under Church leadership.
The Marcos regime did not sit idly by while NASSA, the BCCs, and Cardinal Sin 
organized Church resources into politically relevant units capable o f challenging him at
34Ibid„ 251.
35Butterfield, “Martial Law Builds Personal Power,” 8.
36Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church, 65.
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the grassroots level. Besides arrests and violations o f human rights, Marcos took political 
action when he commissioned several top-level government committees within the 
Ministries of Labor and Defense to investigate the Church’s activities. As Robert 
Youngblood writes, “The Marcos regime’s uneasiness [with Catholic Activists] . . .  was 
underscored by two confidential government reports, one by the Ministry o f Labor in 
1975 and the other by the Ministry of National Defense in 1978.”37
Both reports outlined the danger o f the Catholic Church’s activities after Vatican 
II and its adoption o f liberation theology in the Philippines, including the paranoid belief 
that the Church was being manipulated by Communisit elements and even the Central 
Intelligence Agency. The reports recommended undercutting and thus weakening 
Church “activists.” The BCC movement was labeled “dangerous” because o f its potential 
as “an infrastructure of political power” on a national scale. Therefore, the report stated in 
general terms that the Church must be dealt with and countered.
These two reports blurred the line between what was considered radical and what 
was considered mainstream and thus acceptable within the Catholic Church. Both reports 
recognized that the Church’s influence in politics could not be completely curtailed. It 
could only be slowed. Later in 1983, the Crisis Papers were also critical o f the Catholic 
Church and recommended to the Marcos government more proactive steps to stem the 
tide o f Church influence. These steps included divide-and-conquer tactics, such as 
legislation guaranteeing the vital interests o f the Church, curtailing criticism of the 
Church in the state-run media, and downplaying ideological differences between the 
Church and State while using the state-controlled media to highlight even the smallest 
ideological schisms within the Church.
As the stranglehold o f the Marcos government tightened, the strength o f the 
Catholic Church’s opposition continued to expand. The commissions that Marcos had
37Ibid., 93.
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ordered to study the problem issued recommendations that were implemented neither 
fully nor successfully. Cardinal Sin, now president o f the CBCP, continued to strengthen 
the Church’s position through his own efforts. He was not only charismatic, but also 
politically astute, unflappable, and the right man for the job. Sin may have been the 
perfect adversary to Marcos.
Sin avoided direct confrontation with Marcos, preferring instead to use what 
became his modus operandi for political declarations, the pastoral letter. He issued a 
slew of them throughout the remaining years o f martial law. One of the first was entitled 
“Reconciliation Today.” This particular letter, read throughout the parishes o f the 
Philippines, proposed the National Reconciliation Council, which would bring elements 
of the Church together with business leaders and government officials to help bring the 
Philippines out o f the martial law period and reconcile the government with the people. 
The Marcos administration ignored this overture.
This did not deter Cardinal Sin and the Church from continuing to challenge, at 
least from the pulpit, the martial law regime. Indeed, calls to end martial law had come 
sporadically since Sin became bishop o f Manila in 1974. In 1979, the cardinal issued a 
firm and uncompromising pastoral letter calling for the end of martial law, stating 
unapologetically that martial law was destructive to the Philippines and had not brought 
progress but instead “killings” and “fear” to the people.38 He called for its immediate 
abandonment, stressing that the continuation of a failed policy was senseless. He further 
called for the release of Marcos’s chief political opponent, Ninoy Aquino, who had 
languished in prison since 1972.
Such pastoral letters alarmed some about the fears of blurring Church-State 
authority, but Sin still publicly stated he believed in the separation o f Church and State. 
He qualified his statement by reiterating that this did not mean that the Church should sit
TRHenry Kamm, “Philippine Cardinal Calls for End to Martial-Law Rule by 
Marcos,” New York Times, 15 September 1979, sec. I, p. 4.
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in isolation from temporal matters. For better or worse, the Catholic Church was married 
to the system. Catholics take marriage seriously and in a marriage o f any kind, whether 
literal or political, it is until death do they part.
In 1981, Cardinal Sin continued to blast the Marcos government for violating 
religious freedoms in the Philippines. In an address to the Catholic bishops in Baguio, Sin 
stated that the government was conducting “a deliberate, finely orchestrated campaign to
•IQ
throttle the freedom of the church to speak on matters of Catholic morality.” That 
statement came in the wake of fraudulent presidential elections held in June, yet another 
Marcos farce. Tempers were beginning to reach a boiling point and patience was running 
out. In the year ahead, Church anger spilled onto the streets as a group of 5,000 priests, 
nuns, and laymen rallied in the streets o f Cebu City in December 1982 to protest 
Marcos’s policies, as well as to bum him in effigy.40 Similar gatherings were also held 
that same year in Manila and Bacolod.
Though not fatally damaged by the Catholic Church’s attacks, Marcos realized 
that the Church had the potential to accrue political weight over time. To counter it, he 
reached back into his bag of tricks to pull out a tactic that he had used earlier. In his 
mind, it seemed like the best way to counter an attack by the Philippine Church was to 
embrace a higher authority, and since God had yet to appear by Marcos’s side, the Pope 
was certainly a good second choice. As he had before with the visit o f Pope Paul VI, 
Marcos wanted to use a visit by Pope John Paul II to his political advantage. Pope John
TO •“Manila Cleric Says Marcos Stifles Religious Freedom,” New York Times, 28 
June 1981, sec. I, p. 4.
40“An Effigy o f Marcos Is Burned at a Rally in the Philippines,” New York Times, 
13 December 1982, sec. I, p. 14.
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Paul II was an extremely popular pontiff and had he embraced Marcos, it would have 
been the best political anting-anting he could acheive.41
Both the Church and Marcos wanted a visit from the Pope. They had pushed for 
it for several years. The Pope’s final acceptance of an invitation and his subsequent visit 
did not have the effect Marcos had hoped. John Paul II did not embrace Marcos or grant 
him any special anointment, but it did bring an end to martial law. In a gesture o f good 
will, Marcos ordered the end of martial law on January 17,1981, a month before Pope 
John Paul II’s visit. It seemed just enough time to tidy the political landscape up while 
not risking any destabilization of his government. However, it did not curry any political 
favor with the Pontiff.
The end o f martial law did not mean the end of the problems between the Church 
and the Marcos government. Marcos’s “reelection” in 1981 only meant that the 
Philippines had another six years o f terror and in 1982, no less than a dozen clashes 
occurred between the Church and State, including raids on buildings and arrests o f those 
politically involved religious and lay workers 42 It seemed that Marcos was intent on 
keeping the Church out of politics, knowing full well the gravity o f his situation should 
the Church be able to effectively mobilize the voting power of the BCCs and other social 
organizations.
The Church, emboldened by its perceived victory of having martial law lifted, 
rebuffed Marcos’s efforts to keep it marginalized and away from temporal governmental 
matters. In 1983, the new CBCP president, Archbishop Antonio Mabutas, stated that the
41Part o f the folklore o f the Philippine people is the belief in the protective 
qualities o f certain magical talisman called anting anting. These anting anting can be 
anything from tattoos on the body to small metal discs worn around the neck. 
Antinganting are believed to be powerful enough to prevent death in battle or a loss in 
politics, or even promote something as mundane as making sure you have good luck on 
the job.
42Kroeger, “Evangelization in the Philippine Church,” 12.
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Church could not restrict its mission only to the religious field and disassociate itself 
from temporal problems. It was a challenge for the Church in the wake o f martial law to 
help build “not just a new society, but a new and just society . .  .”43
In 1984 the Church grew more vocal in its criticism of Marcos. It issued a mid­
year pastoral letter titled “Let There Be Life,” which confronted three specific national 
problems: the secret marshals, the economic crisis, and constitutional Amendment VI. 
The secret marshals had been the bane of both the Church and political opposition in the 
Philippines, responsible for the effectiveness o f the crackdown across the archipelago. 
The economic crisis was hurting the Philippines at all levels, from the business interests 
in Makati to the poorest segments o f Philippine society at the most basic level. Marcos, 
obsessed with remaining in power and enriching himself, did little to stimulate the 
economy.
The church’s opposition to Amendment VI was the most virulent. Amendment 
VI to the 1973 constitution, the result o f unprecedented bribery and heavy-handed tactics 
as discussed earlier, empowered President Marcos to exercise lawmaking powers 
alongside the Batasan Pambansa, the national legislative body. Considering the Batasan 
was nothing more than a rubber stamp on Marcos’s policies, the inclusion o f Amendment 
VI gave Marcos unlimited power to rule unopposed.
The Church never expected the protests to yield quick results, but the fight that 
had been waged since the 1960s at the grassroots level and at the national level since 
1974 was slowly cracking the Marcos regime. Already he had lifted martial law, and his 
total solution had created nothing more than total problems. The Church capitalized on 
it, not for its own enrichment, but for the sake o f its flock. The Church fully expected 
Marcos to refuse and fight its efforts at every turn, and that is what he did.
43Ibid„ 18-19.
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Since it was expected that Marcos would not voluntarily give up his presidency, 
the Church was prepared to take other action. It pushed hard and encouraged 
participation by its members in what it called a “parliament o f the streets.”44 In this mass 
protest activity the people, long victimized by the Marcos administration, finally let their 
voices be heard. But just as Marcos in 1972 lacked a proper level o f violence to justify 
his call for a total solution, the Church was missing a catalyst to bring out large numbers 
of people to apply adequate pressure on the administration. Martial law itself was not 
enough to motivate the masses, but the Church did not need artificial violence like the 
kind Marcos used as a catalyst for his total solution. It needed a tangible symbol on 
which to focus its rhetoric. This is what was missing in 1983.
Cardinal Sin, the CBCP, and the rest of the Catholic Church needed only the right 
opportunity or person around which to rally their forces and bring to bear the political 
power they had amassed since 1972. Few could have predicted what would make this a 
reality. Fewer still expected that the murder of one o f Marcos’s key political rivals and 
one of the Philippines’ most popular opposition leaders would provide the impetus 
needed for the Church to help bring the downfall o f Marcos’s government. It was not 
expected, but that is precisely what happened.
The role Ninoy Aquino played as Marcos’s chief political opponent and rival was 
discussed briefly before. From the very beginning of martial law he was an adamant 
opponent o f Marcos, but sitting in a government jail left him powerless to act. Ninoy was 
eventually released from jail and essentially exiled to the United States. Alongside Ninoy 
was his devoted wife Corazon “Cory” Aquino. Little did she know at the time that her 
own destiny would be intertwined with the Church’s work, Cardinal Sin’s leadership, a 
people’s revolution, and Marcos’s fate.
44Ibid., 13.
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Cory Aquino was bom Maria Corazon Conjuangco in 1933 to a family of upper 
class and staunchly Catholic Filipinos. Her family was both rich and politically powerful 
enough to have their daughter educated in finest Catholic institutions in the United States. 
Her education began at the all-Catholic Raven Hill Academy in Philadelphia, and later 
the Sister School o f Assumption Convent and Notre Dame convent school. Her primary 
education was accentuated by her life at the College of Mount Saint Vincent, a Catholic- 
run institution o f higher learning situated in the Bronx and administered by the Sisters of 
Charity.45 Throughout her college years, she was also active in several Catholic lay 
organizations. She was by birth and by training immersed in the Catholic faith, a fact that 
proved important during the struggles against Marcos when the Catholic Church anointed 
her to take up the fight.
After her Catholic education, she would eventually marry Ninoy Aquino in 1954. 
In what can only be seen as a bizarre twist of fate, Ninoy had at one time dated Imelda 
Ramuldez, the future Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos. After marriage, Cory assumed the duties 
of a mother and housewife, and Ninoy became a politically powerful figure from the 
province of Tarlac.
Ninoy was imprisoned for most o f the 1970s until Marcos, who feared his 
political power even in jail, had him exiled to the United States in 1979. Ninoy’s exile 
also allowed him to receive needed medical treatment for a chronic heart condition. In 
the United States, he at least had access to the best medical care, although he did not wish 
to leave the Philippines. Life in the United States was good for both Ninoy and Cory, but 
living in America meant that Ninoy was out of the mainstream of Philippine opposition. 
He was restless and wanted to return to the Philippines to serve as the conscience o f the 
anti-Marcos forces. In 1983, he and Cory decided to return. Ninoy chose to go alone
45Lucy Komisar, Corazon Aquino: The Story o f  Revolution (New York: George 
Braziller, Inc., 1987), 14.
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first and left the United States on August 13, 1983, on a return trip to his homeland. 
Eleven days later, Cory arrived in Manila to bury her husband.46
The events o f that day are now part of Philippine history. When Ninoy’s plane 
landed in Manila, he had no protection, not from the Church and not from the opposition. 
He was set up, a sitting duck for Marcos’s forces. As 30,000 supporters waited on him to 
emerge from the airport, Ninoy was escorted off the plane onto the tarmac where he was 
gunned down. Ninoy was assassinated in one of the most brutal ways imaginable, being 
shot in the back of the head by Philippine soldiers.47 Ninoy’s assassination profoundly 
affected the Philippines on all levels. Not only did it lead to political upheaval later, but 
it also it caused a flight in economic capital as the wealthy moved their money out o f the 
country to safer locations because they were unsure about the future. The peso was 
devalued 38 percent and the poverty level skyrocketed to 70 percent.48
It is said that Imelda Marcos warned Ninoy and others around him that if  he 
attempted to return to the Philippines he would be killed.49 The crime was never solved 
to the satisfaction o f Ninoy’s supporters. Moreover, President Marcos did little to 
investigate the murder. He did go through the motions o f establishing a commission led 
by his hand-picked Chief Justice Enrique Fernando as chairman, and he even offered 
Cardinal Sin a spot on the committee, something Sin promptly refused.50
Until this point, the Marcos-caused problems that existed in the Philippines, such 
as the peso devaluation and rising level of poverty, took time to notice. That was not so 




49Romulo, Inside the Palace, 174.
50Ibid., 195.
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funeral, the tens of thousands who showed up to pay their respects overwhelmed his 
widow, Cory. The funeral procession itself numbered two million people.51 It remains 
one o f the largest funeral processions ever.
The hundreds of thousands of mourners who turned out to pay their respects to 
Ninoy and to call for Marcos’s resignation crippled Makati, metro Manila’s main 
business district. The rallies continued even after Ninoy was buried. It was the catalyst 
the Church needed, and it gave birth to a new political movement. Businessmen, the poor, 
and the clergy united in a single cause to oppose Marcos. At the movement’s center 
would be Ninoy’s ill-prepared widow, Cory Aquino, who was buoyed by faith and 
guided by the Church.
The Church had, until Ninoy’s assassination, been engaged in what Cardinal Sin 
called a policy of “critical collaboration.”52 The collaboration kept the government and 
the Church from having a direct confrontation. This allowed the Church to slowly build 
its forces for an opposition push against Marcos and speak out through pastoral letters. 
The Aquino assassination accelerated the opposition’s momentum. Pressure mounted on 
Marcos as the “parliament o f the streets” grew in size. In August 1984, Sin again called 
for national unity and reconciliation between the opposition and the government, 
knowing full well that Marcos’s government would not respond favorably to his second 
call for reconciliation.
Marcos’s reaction was expected. The Church’s leadership was not surprised by 
the unresponsive nature of Marcos towards their overtures. Since the implementation of 
his total solution and his targeting the Church as an opposition movement, he had never
5'Robert H. Reid and Eileen Guerrero, Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire 
Revolution (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 21.
52Romulo, Inside the Palace, 58.
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taken a truly conciliatory stand towards the Church.53 Sin and the Church realized that 
the future lay not with Marcos’s appeasement, but with a leader they had yet to choose 
and in an opposition they could organize. Before Aquino’s assassination the identity of 
the leader was unclear, but the organization of the middle class and peasantry was well on 
track. In the wake of the tragedy, the Church called for unity between the groups—a 
united stand against the government on mutual concerns.54 Its leader had been found, and 
it was Cory Aquino.
There was little doubt among the opposition that Marcos was behind Ninoy’s 
murder, and this fact only galvanized support for Cory. Marcos’s guilt was evident in his 
government’s actions and the state-run media’s complete lack o f coverage o f the event. 
The few newspapers that dared print anything about the event had their doors shut, and 
daring journalists who challenged the official Marcos line were invited to “meet” the 
military.55 Radio Veritas was the only exception.
Aquino’s funeral drew millions o f mourners, but no official coverage from the 
state-controlled Philippine press was given to the event. One of the largest funerals in 
world history garnered no favorable press coverage in the Philippines. Veritas was the 
only notable media outlet covering the funeral.56 It clung tenaciously to the story, 
defying the martial law regime to shut its doors. Veritas did this because the Church 
bankrolled it, and its chairman was none other than the pugnacious Cardinal Sin.57
53Ibid., 57.
54Ibid., 58.
55Bryan Johnson, The Four Days o f  Courage: The Untold Story o f  the People 
Who Brought Marcos Down (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 173.
56Monina A. Mercado, ed. An Eyewitness History: People Power The Philippine 
Revolution o f 1986 (Manila, Philippines: James B. Reuter, S.J. Foundation, 1986), 10.
Jonhson, The Four Days o f  Courage, 174.
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The funeral was a backdrop to both mourning and anti-Marcos politics. Cardinal 
Sin officiated at the funeral and the world witnessed the Church shift its focus, 
aspirations, and hopes onto the shoulders o f the grieving widow, Cory. She was at first a 
reluctant recipient o f the Church’s mandate. Questions about how a humble housewife 
could be the secular head to depose the seemingly all-powerful Marcos were valid. Cory 
herself had to be talked into taking the political lead by Cardinal Sin. But Sin’s words, 
often described as having an “emphatic impact” on world leaders, were convincing.58
The Church had to do less to convince the public to embrace Cory. Nonetheless, it 
sought to endear her to the public by appealing to the Filipino affinity for the Christian 
pasyon. The pasyon was used to draw a parallel between what had happened to Ninoy 
Aquino and the suffering and death of Jesus Christ. The pasyon o f Christ was and 
remains a popular religious story that is both recounted and reenacted in the Philippines. 
The pasyon is the story found in the New Testament o f Christ’s suffering in the Garden 
of Gethsemani, his desire to have the Father lift his suffering and his fate, his betrayal by 
the apostles, his arrest and his execution by the corrupt Roman authorities. It is also the 
story o f victory over death and the resurrection, and it offered an understandable 
metaphor for the Philippine experience.
In the Philippine Catholic Church’s political take on the story, Ninoy Aquino was 
the fallen savior who wished his fate could be altered by God but realized it could not.
He had to see it through. His Galgoatha was the Manila airport and his cross was the 
tarmac where he, like Jesus, was betrayed by his own people and executed by their 
corrupt government. Cory was portrayed as the suffering Mary. Mary the mother and 
Mary Magdalene, who wept at the death of the fallen savior. In a country where every 
year hundreds literally have themselves crucified to reenact the suffering o f Jesus, such
c o
Roger Matthews, “Speaking Voice of the Church,” Financial Times, 28 March
1989.
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powerful imagery invoked sympathy and support for Cory, precisely as the Church hoped 
it would.
The pasyon allowed the Philippine population to have a connection with their past 
and their present. Christ’s suffering was transformed and personified in the modem era 
by leaders of nationalist movements, including Jose Rizal and Benigno Aquino. Cory 
was viewed in the same light as the suffering Mary, mourning the lost savior and 
speaking of Ninoy’s death as her country’s resurrection. It was an amazing combination 
o f images, the religious pasyon and the call for secular democracy in the fusion of 
Catholic imagery with secular politics.59
As Cory’s political capital began to rise, the pressure put on Marcos for reform 
increased throughout 1985. The Church played an integral role in applying that pressure.
It was largely due to this massive political pressure exerted by the Church that Marcos 
called snap presidential elections in 1986. He was not constitutionally required to do so, 
and it was a full year before his “constitutional” term expired. Marcos felt, as he had 
before the calling o f martial law that he could catch his political opponents off guard and 
unorganized by calling for snap elections in 1986 instead of 1987. He could then set his 
own political machine in motion, as he had during the previous referendums on martial 
law and elections, to prove to the world that he still held a mandate from the Filipino 
people.60 But this was not 1969, nor was it 1973, and the Catholic Church had the power- 
-a candidate and a platform to challenge Marcos as he had not been challenged since 
assuming office.
The election itself was a referendum on Marcos’s years in power, but with Marcos 
it would be impossible to have an honest vote. His political machine went into overdrive, 
blasting the Church, bribing officials, and doing whatever it took to win the election.
59Steinber, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place, 180.
60Romulo, Inside the Palace, 214.
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However, this time Marcos could not escape the watchful vigilance of the Catholic 
Church, an institution that in 1986 had reached its full political capacity and power, and 
was finally able to confront the Marcos government head-on.
The legitimacy of the Marcos regime had been fragile since his declaration of 
martial law. Hairline fractures developed throughout the 1970s within the various 
institutions and conventions that had fostered his regime. Marcos stood on very shaky 
legal ground, his charismatic legitimacy was equally fragile, and his appeal to 
utilitarianism was effectively nonexistent. The Church was headed toward a full 
reclamation o f its place as the primary mediating variable in Philippine legitimacy. It 
would be the one to help determine just who would lead the Philippines in 1986, and it 
would not be Ferdinand Marcos.
The methods used to organize the populace have been covered at some length so 
far. These included Radio Veritas, whose primary purpose was to spread the gospel but 
which was taking a more political turn in its broadcasts. The Church also had social 
organizations previously mentioned, the BCCs, pastoral letters, and something new—the 
National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Although formally 
organized in 1983, NAMFREL had its roots with the establishment o f the Operations 
Registration Committee (1957) and in the Citizens National Electoral Assembly (CNEA) 
formed in the 1960s. The Catholic Church helped develop, create, and organize 
NAMFREL. Its membership before the 1986 election read like a who’s who of the 
Catholic powerful, including Cardinal Sin. Even today, NAMFREL has several powerful 
Catholic clergy serving on its national board o f directors.61 At the time o f the 1986 
election, NAMFREL had the backing and full faith and support of the Church, 
businesses, labor, and civic groups.
61For a current list o f NAMFREL’s members and board o f directors visit
http://www.atenista.net/namfrelqc/about.htm.
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NAMFREL’s reach was extensive because it was based on the Church’s 
nationwide organization.62 With NAMFREL, the Church had the only organization that 
could compete with Marcos and his party. During the months leading up to the 1986 
election, NAMFREL fielded an estimated 500,000 volunteers strategically placed in 
nearly 90,000 polling places. Working through the organizational power of NAMFREL, 
the grassroots reach o f the BCCs, the oversight function of the priests, and the charisma 
brought by Cory and Cardinal Sin, the Catholic Church proved to be unstoppable. 
Marcos’s days were numbered.
Marcos must have been shocked. He and Imelda had underestimated the forces 
aligned against them. It seemed that his decade of persecution against politically active 
elements within the Church was fruitless, for he woke up in 1986 to a real juggernaut like 
he had never faced before. He was furious at the actions of the Church and Cardinal Sin, 
but he was unable to arrest or assassinate the popular leader, lest he bring about his own 
downfall. Instead, he blasted Sin’s efforts by publicly accusing him o f “destabilizing the
/ I
nation.” Marcos even went so far as to accuse Sin of being a Christian version o f the 
arguably insane Islamic revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini.64 Sin took these and other 
personal assaults in stride. He knew his power base was strong and his political influence 
was on the rise. There would be a new leader in the Philippines who would be granted a 
mandate of legitimacy by the people, and this legitimacy was to pass through the Catholic 
Church as it had for the majority o f Philippine history . It was enough to make anyone 
confident.
Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 94.
C 'i
Robert L. Youngblood, “The Corazon Aquino Miracle and the Philippine 
Churches,” Asian Survey 28, no. 12 (December 1987): 1,243.
64Battung et al., Religion and Society, 80.
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Cardinal Sin remained vigilant even as he helped Cory navigate potentially 
political pitfalls. Part o f his activity on behalf of the Church and the voters was his call to 
the laity to help keep a watchful eye on Marcos’s political machine in order to stave off 
election fraud. Part o f his plan included a request to send in accounts of electoral 
cheating, which he would then turn over to former United States Vice President Walter 
Mondale. His call was answered in large numbers.65 Sin, along with other priests and 
ministers, also directed his flocks through sermons and pastoral letters to take part in the 
voting. Voting became part o f one’s Christian duty in 1986. The people answered this 
call in record numbers. Once at the polls, they voted for the Church’s hand-picked 
candidate, Cory Aquino.
As stated earlier, Cardinal Sin and the Church convinced her to run, but the 
process of completing the opposition ticket and selecting Cory’s running mate was not as 
easy. Cory may not have been the most politically astute person, but she knew what she 
did not want in her campaign. She did not want Salvador Laurel as her vice president, 
even though he was clearly the best choice given the fact that he had an organized 
political machine behind his campaign—something she lacked and desperately needed to 
win.
Cory’s reasoning for keeping Laurel off the ticket was that she felt Laurel did not 
meet the moral standards to run on a leadership platform.66 Throughout the early primary, 
both jostled for political position and each side criticized the other. Laurel had not 
decided to give up his own presidential aspirations in deference to the Church’s choice in 
Cory. But division meant a possible Marcos victory and the choice in candidates could 
not have been more clear. The primary came down to an immoral candidate versus an 
inexperienced one. The fragmentation that it produced in the opposition might have
65Casper, Fragile Democracies, 74.
66Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 69.
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never healed and it may have doomed their chances against Marcos had the Church not 
intervened.
Not having the party machine that Laurel possessed or his political instincts, Cory 
knew she would need the Catholic Church. It was the only force in the Philippines that 
by giving its blessing and support legitimized her candidacy to millions. She needed the 
Church’s help, and during the indecision about Laurel she needed its advice. Her first 
step was to formally announce to the Church her decision to seek the presidency. On 
December 6, 1985, Cory went to see Cardinal Sin in his sprawling white villa in Manila 
and said, “Your Eminence, I have prayed over this. And I have made up my mind. I will 
run.”67
Sin’s response to Cory’s simple statement was direct and pointed, for he knew 
Cory did not possess the political machinery or acumen needed to win against Marcos, 
who was certain to pull out all stops in his corruption machine. “With whom are you 
going to run?” Cardinal Sin asked. Cory answered that she could not run with Laurel. 
After hearing her explain her concerns, Sin took on the role o f the trusted advisor. His 
tone shifted to one that was more appropriate for the representative of the truly legitimate 
force behind any decision for her to run, any hope she had of future political success, and 
any legitimacy her presidency could hope to possess. He said to her, “Cory, you cannot 
do it alone . . .  It is foolish to rim if you are going to lose.”
In these a few words, the cardinal cautioned Cory not to dismiss the political 
machinery that backed Laurel. Cory knew what Sin was implying without saying it 
directly. She knew that Sin wanted her to consider Laurel, and she also knew that he 
would talk to Laurel himself, evaluate his fitness, and help him accept a secondary role in 
the future government. Feeling the pressure of the Catholic Church on her shoulders
67Ibid„ 75.
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Cory humbly replied, “Your Eminence, before I came here, I made up my mind.
Whatever you tell me to do. I will do.”68
On December 11, 1985, Cory again visited Cardinal Sin, and he blessed her and 
prophesized that she would indeed be the next president of the Philippines. He called her 
the Philippine “Joan of Arc.”69 Although neither Aquino nor Sin could have known it, in 
that single act of submission the future of the Philippine government’s character was set. 
It would be the government of Cory Aquino that would be awarded the mantle of 
legitimacy from the Catholic Church. It would also be her government that would oversee 
the full restoration o f the Catholic Church’s power and political influence to the levels it 
had enjoyed almost a century before.
The Church’s mission, especially Cardinal Sin’s, was to convince Laurel to accept 
the secondary spot on the presidential ticket. Sin paid a personal visit to Laurel to discuss 
the matter. Cardinal Sin spoke to Laurel in his typical diplomatic fashion as 
powerbroker, intermediary, and adviser, “You are wise in the way of politicians . . .  (but) 
the sympathy of the people will go to her. Join with her, and you will win.” 70 It is said 
that a tear rolled down Laurel’s cheek as he fought with his pride. “Now go and decide,” 
Sin told him. He did, choosing to be Cory’s vice president.
Even unbiased observers within the Marcos circle now state unequivocally that it 
was Jaime Cardinal Sin who brought Laurel and Aquino together and convinced Laurel 
to shelve his presidential ambitions in favor of Cory.71 It was this action by Jaime Sin 
that prevented the split in opposition votes that most likely would have doomed any 
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had saved Aquino’s candidacy and more than a decade of preparation by the Church was 
also salvaged. Cory had only two months to prepare for the election, but now she had a 
united ticket and she had the Church on her side.
Initially, Cory’s campaign was strong on generalities and short on specifics, but 
this did not matter. There was no need for her to be strong on both. She was leading a 
moral crusade, and this kind o f campaign was much more than a campaign o f policy 
wonks and issue-specific details. Her political message was both simple and appealing,
77“Sobra na—Tama na—Palitan na!” (“Too much—Enough Already— Change him!”). "
This moral crusade pitted Cory and her backers in a constant fight to combat what 
they felt would be inevitable cheating by Marcos. Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter 
warning of a “sinister plot” to frustrate the people’s will, including bribes to teachers, 
district campaign managers, and others to buy their votes. Sin took the unprecedented 
step o f offering absolution before the sin, telling people that they could take the money 
but that “money offered to you in no way obliges you to vote for a particular 
candidate.”73
Alongside the usual vote-buying schemes and violence, Marcos made a conscious 
decision to counter the Church’s influence at the polls. The Church had NAMFREL, but 
Marcos had his own weapon at the precincts and they were the ones who would officially 
tally the votes. Marcos’s government Commission 011 Elections (COMELEC) issued an 
order prohibiting priests and nuns from engaging in partisan election activities, with 
threats of fines and long imprisonment. It was a blatant and atrocious double standard 
meant to target the Catholic Church, for no order was forthcoming when anti-Catholic
72Ibid., 217.
73Ibid„ 88.
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charismatic religious group Iglesia Ni Kristo and its three million members publicly 
backed Marcos.74
There was no limit to the lengths to which Marcos would go to discredit the 
Church. During the actual voting, Marcos ordered his state-run television networks to 
broadcast images of nuns carrying ballot boxes, with the announcers absurdly telling the 
audience that what they were seeing was evidence that the Church was trying to cheat.75 
It was not convincing. Nonetheless, his efforts at cheating bore fruit. At the height of the 
vote count it appeared as if Marcos would successfully steal the election. His cronies 
successfully rigged the results at some o f the ballot boxes and at official vote-counting 
establishments.
One thing remained to be done. NAMFREL planned a quick count o f all the 
votes and the results would be broadcasted over Veritas. If this happened, Marcos knew 
his fraudulent election could be in jeopardy. To counter this possibility, Marcos sent 
Imelda to Brother Raymundo L. Dizon, then president o f De La Salle University, to 
demand that he stop the NAMFREL count. The Marcos administration knew 
NAMFREL results would not match those of the Marcos controlled COMELEC.76 Dizon 
refused.
COMELEC was expected to cheat, and early returns only verified the inevitable. 
The cheating brought down the mood at NAMFREL headquarters. Before their eyes, 
Marcos was successfully stealing the election from the Church, from the people, and 
from Cory. Workers at NAMFREL, burdened with the reality that despite their ardent 
efforts they might come up short, were melancholy as the results came in. But the 
Church did not give up and did not shirk its responsibility and role as the force of
74Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 51.
75Ibid., 48.
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legitimacy in the Philippines. It had thrown down the gauntlet in the election and it was 
the time for it to put everything it had in resources, people, and leadership on the line. If 
political change was to happen—and no change could be more absolute than deposing 
Marcos—then it had to take a stand now.
Keeping the spirits up at NAMFREL was an important task, and taking part in 
this effort was again Cardinal Sin. Word spread quickly through the NAMFREL 
headquarters that Sin would be coming to visit, to lift their spirits, and to reinvigorate 
their efforts. “The Cardinal is coming. He will defend us against Marcos,” was the 
rumor spreading through the workers.77 Through the force o f personality, Cardinal Sin 
kept the fight alive at NAMFREL. And come he did.
Cardinal Sin entered NAMFREL headquarters that night like a film star 
surrounded by a phalanx of security men, being jostled by throngs of women trying to 
touch him and kiss his ring and eager autograph-seekers thrusting papers and pens in his
70
path. Sin pushed his way through the crowds, offering his ring with one hand and 
signing autographs with the other. Sin’s presence in NAMFREL that night was more than 
just a visit to rally the troops. It was a real manifestation of the Church’s willingness to 
fight Marcos.
Sin’s visit and his work on behalf of NAMFREL and others made people believe. 
He gave them hope when most felt that they did not have a chance against Marcos’s 
corrupt political machine. In the showdown of Church versus State, Cardinal Sin led the 
charge. His visit to NAMFREL completed the circle because NAMFREL itself was 
founded at the urging of the cardinal, who gave its first president, Jose Concepcion, his 
full blessing. Sin also provided him with an elite corps o f priests and nuns to act as 
recruiters and organizers, and this was merely the first step. NAMFREL’s work was
77Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 46.
78Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179
thought o f as a Christian apostolate, using bishops to verify possible members and weed
out the saboteurs and infiltrators.79 So on the night of Sin’s visit, it was just another in a
long line o f proactive measures he took on behalf o f the Church. And that night, Cardinal
Sin and the Church asked the faithful not to give up hope, telling all the foreign press in
80attendance to stick around because something big was going to happen soon.
It did not take long for something big to happen. One o f the most important 
events from the election period of February 1986 happened on the evening of February 9, 
when thirty government COMELEC computer operators charged with counting the votes 
quit their jobs and walked out. They did so out o f conscience, accusing the Marcos 
government o f electoral fraud and cheating. They were given protection by the Church 
and moved to a Church safe house to prevent Marcos from exacting revenge.
The Church was doing all it could to bring Marcos down. It hand-picked the 
opposition candidates, fielded a half-million people to oversee the elections, set up an 
anti-Marcos radio station and weekly journal, castigated the government from the pulpit, 
ardently prayed for its downfall, and now sheltered its enemies.
Even the skeptical nonpartisan foreign press started to believe in the Church’s 
power to challenge the Marcos machine. Bryan Johnson, who was among the journalists 
in the foreign press corps covering the events, wrote:
To a Protestant skeptic such as myself, such profound faith was nearly 
incomprehensible. Until then, I had thought of the Philippine Catholic 
church as a wealthy and dogmatic bureaucracy; its opposition to Marcos 
had seemed mostly symbolic. All that talk of Good vs. Evil and “God On 
Our Side” was the standard rhetoric o f battle, the same absurd claim made 
by everyone from Hitler to the Ayatollah Khomeini. But Jaime Sin had put 
a large dent in my cynicism. Who knows? Maybe God did care about the 
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As a skilled observer of events, Johnson noticed how Marcos had for years 
criticized the Catholic bishops for their unwarranted intrusions into politics, and had even 
accused them of harboring Communist sympathizers in their ranks. But he had always 
been careful to couch the attacks in oblique language, avoiding any direct assault on the 
Church itself. In a country that is 90 percent Catholic , where half o f the female 
population seems to be named Maria, Lourdes, or Evangeline and no home is complete 
without a wall shrine to the Christ-child Santo Nino, it is political suicide to declare open 
war on the Roman Church.83
Political suicide perhaps, yet some politicians did not believe it was a risk, and 
certainly Marcos had no choice. He did not realize that the Catholic Church did more 
than just encourage participation in secular politics and that it made voting a symbolic act 
of the Christian faith. Along those lines, the Church also carried out voter mobilization 
campaigns. Voting in the 1986 election was for the parishioner as much a Catholic duty 
as taking Mass, confession, and the Hail Mary.
Even before the election was completed, the Church hierarchy in the Philippines 
and even the Papacy in Rome let it be known that they did not intend to extend the 
trappings o f moral and political legitimacy to Marcos. The Church also took an active 
role in opening up the long-controlled Manila press by starting publication o f a new 
tabloid, Sign, and the Catholic magazine Veritas. Radio Veritas, the Catholic station that 
survived the Marcos crackdown on freedom of speech, continued to prove itself as a 
useful and influential tool in spreading the Catholic Church’s call to action during the 
election.
After the COMELEC defections, it was clear that Marcos was going to steal the 
election as expected. What was also equally expected was the Church-backed 
NAMFREL’s announcement that its quick tallying of the vote results gave the election to
83Ibid.
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Mrs. Corazon Aquino.84 The Church was invested at every level of Cory’s election that 
night. The NAMFREL vote counters, the vast majority o f them Catholics, declared her 
the winner of the vote, and the Catholic radio station Veritas was the first place Cory
o;
went to claim victory.
When COMELEC declared Marcos the winner, there was little surprise. This 
election was by all accounts one of the most corrupt elections in Philippine history. Just 
as the COMELEC defectors had warned and just as the NAMFREL workers feared, 
Marcos had stolen the election. What was different this time was that the Church and its 
flock were prepared to do something about it. In 1969 and 1972 they did nothing, but in 
1986 things were different. The Church moved quickly to declare the new Marcos 
presidency null and void.86
On Sunday February 9,1986, Sin made an address after the Mass at Santo 
Domingo and Baclaran churches. He was dressed in yellow and green, the symbolic 
colors o f Cory and Laurel, and in his speech he praised the voters’ courage, NAMFREL, 
and Aquino. Moreover, he warned that God would not forgive Marcos if he was 
responsible for fraud. God may not have been on Marcos’s mind, as he did indeed try to 
steal the election. Cory waited for the Church to act.
In the days following the fraudulent claims by the ruling regime, the Catholic 
bishops deliberated on the appropriate response. On February 13, the CBCP discussed 
and reflected on their positions well into the early morning hours. Members argued 
amongst each other about whether to take a strong position.88 Imelda Marcos tried to 
intervene and break up the meeting. She hoped her actions would prevent the bishops
84Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 101.
85Reid and Guerrero, Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire Revolution, 24-25.
o/
Komisar, Corazon Aquino., 119.
88Ibid„ 100.
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from issuing a statement. Her action was yet another example of how much those in 
power feared the Church’s voice. She even went so far as to try to bribe Cardinal Sin 
with extravagant gifts.
In her pleas for the cardinal to influence the CBCP not to act against her husband, 
Imelda Marcos threw a temper tantrum in what was called “one o f the most delicious 
scenes in Church-State relations.”89 It was to no avail. Cardinal Sin had no intentions of 
stopping the CBCP, and he himself wanted the statement to be one that would define the 
Church’s position against Marcos. When complete, the CBCP’s statement was both blunt 
and scathing in its language against the Marcos presidency. It left little doubt in the 
minds of the public and the international community about the official Church position.
The CBCP statement declared in unambiguous terms and with moral certainty 
that Cory Aquino had won the presidency. It was one of the most explicit political 
statements the Church had ever issued, not simply during the Marcos era but also during 
post-Vatican II Church history. The bishops called the election “unparalleled in the 
fraudulence o f their conduct.”90 Moreover, they condemned the disenfranchisement of 
voters and declared that the government had no moral basis on which to govern.
The statement was read around the country in all parishes and churches, and it did 
not take long for Marcos to respond. His cronies blasted the bishops’ statement, calling it 
“inflammatory” and “rash” and insisting that it posed “an imminent threat to the peace 
and tranquility o f [the Philippines].”91
Coupled with the CBCP’s statement was the first of what would become a series 
of massive anti-Marcos rallies organized by the Church. In the past rallies were held, but 
rarely did they number more than a few thousand participants. This new rally was
89Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 56.
90 Reid and Guerrero, Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire Revolution, 26.
91Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 57-62.
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trumpeted as a “Triumph of the People” prayer rally and held on February 16, 1986, in 
Manila’s sprawling Luneta Park. Two million people attended, led in prayer and protest 
by three bishops and thirty-five priests. The Church worked on all fronts.
As an amusing aside to the growing size and power of the rallies, Cardinal Sin’s 
political power caught the attention o f other would-be plotters for Marcos’s presidency.
In more than one instance Cardinal Sin was included, without his knowledge, in the 
planning of political intrigues such as the coup plot being hatched by Marcos Defense 
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile planned to overthrow Marcos and establish a new 
“National Reconciliation Council” that was to include Cory, General Fidel Ramos, and 
Cardinal Sin.92
Marcos learned of Enrile’s plan and set in motion another chain of events that led 
to Cardinal Sin and the Church being involved with Enrile and Ramos, but not in the way 
the two military men expected. Remember that Enrile was a major player in the events 
that brought about martial law and persecution of the Church, as well as being a 
mouthpiece for various threats and warnings hurled at the Church throughout martial law. 
The events set in motion after Marcos’s own intelligence reports showed that Enrile was 
planning a coup would lead to an ironic twist of fate in which Enrile would beg the 
Church to save his life.
After learning of the plot, Marcos ordered the arrest o f Enrile and Ramos. Tipped 
off to the coming trouble, both men sought safety in their respective camps and among 
their loyal followers. But none could offer them complete security. They had to call 
upon the Church to protect them in their hour of need. Their defections from the Marcos 
administration, combined with events already set in motion by the Church, culminated in 
the massive protests in the streets that have since come to be known as the People Power 
Revolution.
92Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 110.
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Enrile joined forces with General Fidel Ramos at Camp Aquinaldo with a handful 
of soldiers who supported their cause. They knew that an attack could come at any time, 
and that their actions, while bold, were doomed without the support of the Church and the 
people. To be successful against Marcos meant more than guns and ammunition, it took 
faith in the Church’s ability to rally the people around their cause. Marcos was far from 
politically impotent. He still controlled the presidency, and he still had the loyalty o f the 
armed forces and the firepower to crush the infant revolt by two o f his top military 
officials. He did not, however, control the Church.
Enrile’s wife was the first to appeal to the Catholic Church for help on the day her 
husband defected. She called Cardinal Sin directly and appealed to him to help her 
husband. Cardinal Sin responded favorably and contacted the leadership of many of the 
religious orders o f nuns and priests in Manila and told them to “go to the chapel and 
stretch out your arms and pray and fast. . .  We are in battle, and you are the powerhouses
QT. . . ” Prayer was needed first, and action followed next.
Enrile also telephoned Sin. He said to the cardinal, “I will be dead within one 
hour . . .  I don’t want to die . . .  if  possible do something.”94 Even Fidel Ramos, a 
Protestant, told the cardinal that he embraced an image of the Virgin Mary and pleaded 
with Sin to “help us by calling the people to support us.”95 The cardinal replied that he 
would indeed help them both, comforting Ramos and Enrile by saying, “In fifteen 
minutes, your place will be filled with people.”96
On February 22, Cardinal Sin took to the airwaves on Radio Veritas. As he spoke 
to the people, the Church’s candidate, Cory, slept in the Carmelite Monastery protected
93Ibid„ 111.
94Mercado, An Eyewitness History, 105.
95Ibid.
96Ibid.
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by a battalion o f nuns who vowed to die if necessary to protect her. Cory was resting and 
waiting patiently for her opportunity to assume the presidency. Hearing the cardinal on 
the air, Marcos sought to silence Radio Veritas, but fortunately for the Church the 
military commander he told to destroy the facility ignored his order.97 As such, the 
opposition was able to hear Sin and other officials broadcast messages of inspiration and 
urgency in these critical hours.
The Church did not take the requests from Ramos and Enrile lightly. Cardinal Sin 
knew that calling upon the six million Catholics in metro Manila would be dangerous.
He knew what Marcos was capable of and once People Power began, Marcos had 
options. General Fabian Ver, an ardent loyalist o f the Marcos regime, came up with one 
plan that called for the government to instigate a bombing and arson campaign and then 
crack down on this supposed criminal activity by calling for martial law. The plan was 
called Operation Everlasting, and it included the arrest o f many officials, including Cory 
Aquino and Cardinal Sin.98 It was outrageous to say the least, but it was an action the 
Marcos government considered.
If Marcos decided to open fire, thousands would be killed and the blood would be 
on his hands 99 So when Sin went to broadcast again, he knew the full weight and 
magnitude o f his request. He announced on Veritas that day that he was “deeply 
concerned about the situation o f General Ramos and Minister Enrile,” and he made a call 
for the “people to support [Enrile and Ramos]” and to “go to Camp Aguinaldo and show 
your solidarity with them in this crucial period.”100
97Ibid., 116.
QO
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Pushed by the Church and the exhortations of Cardinal Sin, hundreds of 
thousands took to the streets. They answered the call to defend those in the Marcos 
administration who had defected from his camp. When Marcos’s troops closed on the 
camp, they did not meet armed resistance but instead human barricades as nuns knelt in 
front o f the tanks and recited the rosary.101 It was an unprecedented scene in world 
history, and from February 22-25, 1986, the events that would become known as People 
Power unfolded.
With People Power in full swing, the Church now protected the same officials 
who during martial law were responsible for the arrest, torture, and execution o f many of 
the faithful. Nonetheless, Radio Veritas broadcasted repeated calls for the people to take 
to the streets to protect those who had defied Marcos, and come they did. Veritas 
increasingly became a thorn in Marcos’s side, and eventually he was able to have some of 
his loyal forces bomb the transmitter and knock the station off the air. However, the 
destruction o f their tower was too little too late for Marcos’s position. By then, hundreds 
of thousands had come to the streets in and around EDSA Avenue, forming a human 
barricade against the tanks and armed forces loyal to Marcos.
The Church-sponsored nature of the People Power revolution is unmistakable. 
Even one of the most popular and well-known books dealing with the events o f People 
Power, entitled An Eyewitness to History People Power The Philippine Revolution o f  
1986, is dedicated not to Enrile, Ramos, or even to Cory but to the Virgin Mary. The 
events o f February 1986 are called a “Marian revolution” by no less than Francisco S. 
Tatad, Marcos’s former press secretary, a member of Opus Dei, and a current member of 
the Philippine Senate. Senator Tatad and other influential and politically powerful 
Filipinos wrote that the revolution’s strength and sustenance was drawn from the masses
101Ibid., 118.
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• • 102held and conducted by men like Cardinal Sin and prayers offered to the Virgin Mary.
It was a case o f rosary beads against M-16s.
At first, rosary beads and prayers were not enough to convince Marcos to budge. 
He was not going to leave without a fight, no matter how many people took to the streets. 
In a late night press conference following the Enrile and Ramos defections, Marcos 
blasted his former defense minister as being “out to grab power and rule the country 
through a junta.” His rage also extended to Cardinal Sin, whom he called “an inciter to 
rebellion” and “a mouther o f subversion statements!”103 He tried to move forward with 
his own inauguration, but his broadcast was interrupted after supporters o f the People 
Power revolution took control o f the major broadcasting relay stations.
The United States watched the events with interest, and even President Reagan’s 
administration recognized the Church’s importance in the political developments within 
the Philippines. The Reagan administration requested that Cardinal Sin go to 
Malacanang to negotiate a peaceful end to the standoff in a face-to-face meeting with 
Marcos. Sin responded: “It should be the president o f the United States who insists that 
he should leave the country.”104
The United States also hastily arranged a phone call to Cardinal Sin from Jose 
Azcona, the president of Honduras, where it was hoped Marcos could go into exile. 
President Azcona told the cardinal, “We have decided not to accept him, but if  you ask, 
we will do it.”105 Both instances are further evidence o f the Church’s powerful political
1 A A
Mercado, An Eyewitness History, 8.
1 (f l Romulo, Inside the Palace, 231.
104Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 120.
105Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
188
position. Here was the world’s most powerful nation turning to a priest to resolve a 
crisis, bring peace to a nation, and ensure American interests in the region.
Having lost all ability to communicate with the country and seeing his military 
routed by hundreds of thousands o f citizens, Marcos finally realized his situation was 
hopeless. Indeed, while he may have held nominal political power and influence in the 
military, he could not rule a country where the citizenry was in active revolt. He had lost 
the mandate of legitimacy long ago, and martial law and his penchant for corruption 
allowed it to remain only as a facade. The Church brought reality home to Marcos. His 
time was up. At 9:00 P.M. on February 25,1986, American helicopters airlifted Marcos 
and his family to Clark Air Base. He was then flown to Guam, and after Cory rejected 
his appeals to return to the Philippines, he was exiled to Hawaii.
The family’s departure from the Philippines only embittered Marcos against those 
who deposed him. He and Imelda were particularly ungracious in their comments 
towards the Catholic Church. Marcos himself continued to call Cardinal Sin “an 
Ayatollah Khomeini,” while Imelda referred to him simply as “a son of a bitch.”106 They 
were furious at the People Power movement organized by the Church and outraged at 
what they felt was illegal assistance given by the Church to Cory’s campaign. They 
charged that the Catholic Church contributed more than $30 million to Aquino’s 
campaign, a charge that Church officials scoffed at and denied. The Church had room to 
scoff, because Marcos himself had stolen billions from the Philippine people to remain in 
power.
The anger was understandable. The Church forced Ferdinand Marcos, president 
and dictator of the Philippines for more than twenty years, to flee the country o f his birth. 
He died in exile. He had lost international support for his government, but domestic 
support had long since dried up. Thanks to the brave souls in the streets, the military
106Romulo, Inside the Palace, 262.
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defectors, and the Catholic Church’s leadership, Cory Aquino became the new president 
of the Philippines.
Cory was in power because o f the Church, and as she faced the task of ruling the 
country she needed its support, assistance, and legitimacy then more than ever. The 
Church’s actions during the election of 1986 were unprecedented in modem political 
history, yet when viewed through the lens of this study one can see how the Church was 
merely reclaiming its lost legacy. Its power as the force o f legitimacy had come full 
circle. With the election complete, Cory legitimized, and the Philippines reclaimed, the 
Church’s next task was to pick up the pieces o f a tattered nation left by years o f Marcos 
corruption and rebuild Philippine pride in the government and in the nation-state as a 
whole.
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CHAPTER V 
THE PARTNERSHIP OF POWER
The Philippine Catholic Church’s work in the post-Vatican II era made the events 
leading up to People Power possible. Organized peasant and dissident movements aided 
the process, but the Philippines’ fragmented political nature made any large-scale 
resistance by these groups unlikely. The Church was the only institution with the 
resources and organizational capability to oppose Ferdinand Marcos. With its vast 
network o f priests, nuns, and laymen working in the Basic Christian Communities, the 
parishes, and at the national level, an anti-Marcos coalition became a reality. In the end, 
Marcos had not given the Philippines a total solution but instead a total problem, and it 
was the Church that provided the ultimate answer.
Ninoy Aquino’s assassination was the watershed in the Church’s resistance 
movement. It culminated more than a decade o f work that had grown increasingly bolder 
with each year. Ninoy’s martyrdom enabled the Church to make a final social and 
political push that included pastoral letters, protests by clergy, mass rallies, and the 
mandate o f legitimacy being passed to Cory Aquino. When Cory was finally recognized 
domestically and internationally as the Philippines’ new president, her recitation o f the 
oath was the symbolic culmination o f martyrs’ sacrifices both in the Church and in the 
streets. People who had given all for love o f their country made those sacrifices.
Cory Aquino took the oath with her hand placed firmly on a Bible held by Dona 
Aurora, the mother of her slain husband Ninoy. Together, she and her supporters sang 
the Lord’s Prayer. At that moment in history, the Philippine Catholic Church had come
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
full circle. It had risen like a phoenix from the ashes of martial law to once again claim 
the preeminent position o f power (see figure 14). The Church was now both a mediating 
variable and a partner in power. No other group or organization possessed the same 
influence and credibility as the Church. It was again the kingmaker and the force of 
legitimacy in the Philippines. From the time Cory took office until the day she left no 
other organization wielded as much influence or control over the government’s 
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Fig. 14. The Church and Aquino’s Administration - Aquino’s ascension to the 
presidency was coupled with the rise o f the Church as both a partner and a mediating 
variable in her legitimacy. Unlike Marcos, Aquino also addressed utilitarian concerns 
of her constituency. At no time since the 1898 revolution had the Church enjoyed 
such preeminent influence in Philippine politics, and that is why it is illustrated as 
rising above and as coequal with the government.
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The oath of office was just the beginning. During the next few months and years, 
the fledgling Aquino administration was challenged and tested. These challenges 
included writing a new constitution, restoring morality to the presidential office, and 
lifting the Philippine people out o f poverty. The years of Marcos’s administration had 
done little to alleviate the poverty of the masses, and millions still struggled to survive. 
Marcos had cared only about guns and neglected the butter of his nation. Rebuilding all 
that was tom down during martial law was a daunting task requiring sacrifice from every 
sector, including the politicians who had grown fat on the plunder o f the Philippines.
Aquino’s stiffest test came from politicians who wanted to maintain the status 
quo, not from the people who were eager to see a new life and hope for their children. 
Tests also came in the form of military coups. There were seven in total, and it is likely 
that many more were planned but never brought to fruition. The coup attempts against 
Aquino were led by disgruntled members o f the military who saw Aquino as soft on 
Communism, weak on the military, and unworthy to hold the position o f president. 
Undoubtedly, a level o f Philippine machismo played into the various plots that were 
hatched. Cory was, after all, a soft-spoken Catholic woman, hardly fit in the eyes of 
some in the military to run a country being tom apart by Communist insurgency, Islamic 
separatism, and banditry.
These disgruntled military elements wanted to seize power. However, even 
during the military coup attempts the Church emerged as the Aquino administration’s 
protector. Indeed, through it all Cory had but one strong and faithful ally on which she 
always leaned—the Catholic Church. During her administration, the Church’s full 
political and social power was used to stave off the coup plotters, keep her in power, and 
mold and shape the character o f Philippine politics.
The Aquino administration represented many things for the Church and the 
Philippines. The Church and its apostle, Cory Aquino, led their flock, which was 
symbolized by the Philippine masses, into the light o f a new era. Marcos’s vanquishing
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was a fitting end to the “miracle” that was People Power. The Church’s role in affecting 
the lives o f so many millions within the country, providing solace and a solid foundation 
against Marcos, and crowning a new president were just the first steps in its reemergence 
as the force of legitimacy.
Cory understood, as did the world, that she was president not simply because of 
the people’s votes and the actions of Enrile and Ramos. She was president for two main 
reasons. The first reason was the sacrifice o f her husband Ninoy, who had paid the 
ultimate price for his country. The second reason was because she had the Catholic 
Church’s full faith and support. The Church gave her a platform from which to speak, 
infrastructure to build upon, and a voter base on which she could rely. But winning the 
election was merely the first major hurdle to be cleared. Having accomplished that, she 
needed to turn her attention to rebuilding her government. Just as the Church had helped 
her construct one of the most amazing political victories in history, it was also prepared 
to build her government.
The situation that existed during the Aquino administration was one not seen 
since the days of the friar-run Spanish government. After more than a decade o f study, 
however, scholars o f the Aquino administration are confident in writing that the official 
political support and activities of the Catholic Church during her administration were 
significant factors in shaping the Aquino government’s character.1 “It is impossible to 
separate the two . . . ” commented one Western diplomat. “The one unquestionable winner 
. . .  has been the Church. It is now stronger than ever with the enhanced moral authority 
of having rid the country o f Marcos, with a very direct and effective line into the 
presidency.”2
'Battung et al., Religion and Society, 31.
2Matthews, “Speaking Voice of the Church.”
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This partnership manifested itself in a variety of ways. Among them was the 
Church’s role in hand-picking a number o f Aquino’s government officials, both at the 
cabinet and sub-cabinet level. The Church also served as an oversight body on other 
appointments in the bureaucracy. Indeed, it was common knowledge during the Aquino 
administration that those who wished to serve in the civil service and who sought 
powerful and influential positions knew that the “church [was] a sure channel for 
acquiring posts . .  .”3
The process o f putting together a cabinet for the Aquino administration was 
extremely important. It had to be done correctly and with the right people. Mistakes 
made in selecting personnel could hamper the entire administration. Aquino’s 
government was a fresh start, and with the Church’s help she intended to make a clean 
break with the Marcos past. Besides Cardinal Sin, other Aquino advisors included her 
brother Peping, close friend Jimmy Ongpin, Joker Arroyo, and the President o f Ateneo de 
Manila, Father Joaquin Bemas.4
Aquino’s economic advisor was Bernardo Villegas, a Catholic with ties to Opus 
Dei. There were other Opus Dei representatives in her government as well, and they 
filled many of the top positions. Among the most notable included Jesus Estanislao, the 
minister o f finance, who was responsible for reigning in the out o f control inflation, 
stabilizing the Philippine peso, and laying the ground work for the growth that would 
characterize the latter half o f her administration and that o f her successor, Fidel Ramos.5
Casper, Fragile Democracies, 124-25.
4Mercado, An Eyewitness History, 127.
5Jesus Estanislao received few accolades during his term as Philippine finance 
secretary. The Harvard-trained economist became President Corazon Aquino's third 
finance chief. Estanislao's most lasting legacy is the restructuring o f the Philippines' 
foreign debt. Estanislao negotiated with commercial creditors and multilateral lenders 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, and the result was a complex arrangement that 
retired some national debt while lowering interest rates and spreading out payments.
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Jose Concepcion, the Catholic layman Sin hand-picked to head NAMFREL, was 
made minister o f trade and industry. Concepcion was also president o f the Council o f the 
Laity and had a vision to meld his own ministerial functions with business leaders. 
Concepcion stated, “I see the church, the military and the private sector working together 
to eradicate the country’s problems.”6 Joint efforts by the Church, the laity, and business 
interests were seen as one avenue to address the difficulties facing the Aquino 
administration.
This Church’s heavy involvement in the Aquino administration overshadowed the 
military’s role. During the proceeding decades the Philippine military had played a major 
role in legitimizing the government, shoving aside the Church as the major player. Now  
the roles were reversed. The Church reclaimed the top spot with the People Power 
revolution and soon after, strains between the Church and the military became apparent.
On many occasions, Aquino did not consult the military about her political 
appointments. Whether this maneuvering helped foster the coups is a matter o f debate, 
but ignoring the military resulted in tension between their camp and the Church. If the 
military was angry that its advice was not sought, the Church basked in the attention.
Cory consulted the Church about almost every decision. In fact, her cabinet’s religiosity
t n
was so well known by the media that it was dubbed the “Council o f Trent.”
This “Council o f Trent” helped her form policy and administer the complex job of 
rebuilding the Philippines. On the domestic front, the Church was particularly influential 
in matters such as family planning and education. To help shape her education policy, 
Aquino chose one of the Church’s hand-picked candidates, Lourdes Quisumbing, to be 
her minister of education. At the time of her appointment, Quisumbing was the president
6National Catholic Reporter, June 14, 1986 no 20, page 1.
7Eduardo Lachica, “Corazon Aquino's Strategy Calls For a Campaign That Never 
Ends,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Wall Street Journal (February 2, 
1986; accessed 1 September 2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
of Maryknoll College, a Catholic girls’ school. Quisumbing had no experience in 
government and no experience running a nationwide education network. She did not 
have a background in politics at all, so why did Cory Aquino choose her? What were her 
qualifications? Most importantly, she had the support of the Church and Cardinal Sin 
and according to their sources, she led an exemplary family life, was an able
o
administrator at Maryknoll, and was a good Catholic.
With her cabinet taking shape, Cory moved in concert with the Church to abolish 
the Marcos constitution of 1973. This constitution was the basis of Marcos’s exceptional 
power and allowed him and his government to become more corrupt than any in the 
modem era of the Philippines. With the Church’s help, Cory sought to dismantle the 
legal trappings o f the Marcos administration piece by piece in a fast and efficient manner. 
A mere month after taking office, she abolished the Batasan (national assembly) and with 
it the constitution.
The Philippines were now without a governing document. To fill this void, 
Aquino turned to Father Bemas, who drew up what was called the “Freedom 
Constitution.” This provisional document penned by an influential member of the 
Church provided Aquino with enough executive power to govern the Philippines until a 
new constitution was written and ratified.
To help write a new Philippine Constitution, Aquino turned again to her Catholic 
advisors. This led to a Constitutional Convention in 1987 that included an unprecedented 
number of clergy filling its ranks and committees. Not since the days of the 
Commonwealth Constitution had the makeup of the drafters almost guaranteed a 
document that would be favorable to the Church’s aims and goals.
Among the well-known clergy and laity that served on the Constitutional 
Commission were Bishop Teodoro Bacani, the former Jesuit president o f Ateneo de
o
Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 128.
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Manila and a theological and secular law specialist, Father Joaquin Bemas, who has 
already been mentioned as president o f Ateneo and author o f the provisional constitution, 
and Sister Christine Tan, one of the most popular and charismatic nuns in all o f the 
Philippines.
The commission was charged with more than creating a new document outlining a 
legislative and executive structure. Real human needs had to be addressed, the kind of 
needs the Church had committed itself to championing during the Marcos years. As 
such, committees dealing with civil liberties, abortion, divorce, identity, social justice, 
and human rights were formed. Almost every committee had at least two members from 
religious organizations. In all, two-thirds of the constitutional committees had 
representatives from the Catholic Church. With that level o f representation and input into 
the formulation of the Philippine legal code, it was inevitable that the constitution would 
reflect Church opinion.
The Constitutional Convention proved more than ever the length and depth of the 
Church’s role in legitimating the new government. It was a fundamental example o f the 
kind of power the Church enjoyed as a result o f Aquino’s victory. No organization in the 
Philippines has played such a powerful and influential political role before or since.
Completing the constitution was merely the first step. The Church wanted to 
ensure that the document was ratified after its completion. Aquino relied upon the 
Church’s power and political pressure to make sure that happened. The Church did not 
disappoint her. Cardinal Sin himself was quoted as saying that ratification o f the 1987 
Constitution was the moral duty of every elected official. It was equally important that 
the people support it, adding pressure on their elected officials to not drag their feet 
during the ratification process.
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Ratification was achieved quickly and the new constitution was considered a 
significant victory for the Aquino administration and for the Church.9 The fact that 
scholars recognize the Church’s victory parallel with that of Aquino’s secular 
government is another telling reminder of the close partnership between Church and State 
that reemerged during the Aquino era. Moreover, it is evidence o f the impressive 
mediating role the Church played in influencing all sectors o f governmental legitimacy, 
including the establishment o f laws and legal norms.
The Philippine Constitution shares many similarities with the United States 
Constitution. For example, the 1987 Constitution established a presidential system with a 
bicameral legislature, restoring the political structure the United States had implemented 
in the Philippines at the time of independence. But in other ways it is quite different. The 
constitution’s intricate details do not need to be outlined in this study, but a few important 
aspects o f the document are worth noting because they illustrate how the Church was able 
to inject its own agenda into the law.
The form of government the committee agreed upon was a restorative move of 
sorts. As mentioned earlier, Marcos abolished the legislature in favor o f a parliamentary 
system in 1973. He insisted on these changes to ensure his reelection. Marcos also had 
Amendment VI, which gave him the power to rule by legislative fiat, also abolished in 
1987. Besides setting mild restrictions on foreign investment and requiring two-thirds of 
the Philippine Senate to approve treaties, the constitution also granted women equal 
treatment before the law. In response to martial law it prohibited secret detention, 
violence, and torture.10
While it never mentioned the Church specifically, the document’s tone was 
clearly inspired by Church doctrine. As a “Catholic” document, it banned abortion from
9Youngblood, “The Corazon Aquino Miracle and the Philippine Churches,”
1,240.
10Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 137-38.
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the time o f conception. Moreover, it outlined in Article XIII the government’s 
responsibility to enact measures that “protect and enhance” the right of all people to 
human dignity and the reduction o f social, economic, and political inequalities. These 
goals are precisely the same ones the Church sought in its quest for social justice under 
liberation theology. It is ironic that something Marcos fought so hard to prevent would 
eventually become part of a new constitution.
There were also explicit references to freedoms of speech, assembly, and the 
press, all rights Marcos violated during the martial law period. Along with these basic 
rights were the establishment o f an official language, Filipino, and a weakening of capital 
punishment, which the Catholic Church had hoped to abolish. While it did not make 
capital punishment completely illegal, the constitution made it very difficult to pass a 
death sentence for criminals, a clear victory for the death penalty opponents within the 
Church. Also in the area of criminal law, the writ o f habeas corpus was strengthened and 
could no longer be suspended indefinitely.
Even before the ink was dry on the constitution, the Church was pressuring the 
Aquino administration on several fronts. Among them was the issue o f land reform.
Many in the Church felt that her administration was in danger o f falling behind on its 
promise o f land reform, a much-needed policy to appease the more violent elements of 
the peasantry. But more than anything, land reform was seen as a first step in alleviating 
poverty in the Philippines, a condition that saturated the vast majority of its citizens. 
Cardinal Sin joined the chorus of those within the Church attempting to reach Aquino on 
this issue.
In a strongly worded pastoral letter read at Manila's cathedral, Cardinal Sin 
reiterated his pressure on the government: "We ask our government. . .  to turn its
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attention to the issues o f land reform and the concerns most closely related with it.”11 
Aquino had raised “genuine hope” among the poorest segments o f society on the issue o f  
land reform. Archbishop Sin applied a bit o f public pressure on Aquino when he said the 
government's "credibility" depended upon "its sincerity and readiness to act in this 
area."12
Cardinal Sin and the Church were not expecting miracles, but they were expecting 
action. Blood was being shed over the matter, and its inclusion in the new Philippine 
legal code was essential. Sin stated, "We realize that what has been beyond the capacities 
of past government for so many decades—and perhaps centuries—cannot be adequately 
resolved in a few months . . .  But realistic implementation of programs must begin, with 
all deliberate speed."
The Church’s efforts were rewarded with the inclusion of Article XIII in the 
constitution. Article XIII deals with the issue o f social justice and human rights. More 
specifically, sections four through ten address the issue of agrarian and natural resources 
reform and land reform. The problems tackled in the national governing document were 
meant to address and emphasize the importance to future governments o f taking care of 
the elements o f both rural and urban poor. These elements were of particular importance 
to the Church as its traditional constituency, and they were also the same societal 
elements that the Communist insurgents targeted for recruitment.
A healthy nation required uplifting all citizens. Tackling the large hacienda 
owners was the first task the Church felt was necessary, and the state itself was one o f the 
largest landowners in the Philippines. Prying the land away from elite families was 
certainly politically risky, but redistributing the state’s lands was less so. Indeed, Aquino
nKeith B. Richburg, “Filipinos Criticize Aquino Over Shooting: Church Stresses 
Absence o f Land Reform,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Washington 
Post (January 26,1987; accessed 13 September 2001).
12Ibid.
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enjoyed the wealth produced by her family’s hacienda, and she showed little sign of 
moving to redistribute her own land or pressuring the other large landowners to do the 
same.
The state, with its immense holdings, was a different story. Targeting large tracts 
of government land was not as politically risky as targeting elites and not nearly as 
hypocritical. It was to be the first step in giving something to the poor, landless farmers. 
Section six reads, “The State may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own 
agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.”
In urban areas such as Manila where thousands lived literally on mountains of 
garbage, the need was urgent. The Church pressed the Aquino regime and the 
constitutional committee to address this need. It was successful, and section nine of the 
1987 Constitution put into law the general principle that it is the state’s duty to help 
alleviate the problem of urban poverty and provide the basic needs o f life. It reads:
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with 
the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which 
will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under­
privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall 
also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the 
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights o f small 
property owners.
The constitution also addressed the abuses o f public trust, the sort o f abuses the 
Church decried that were rampant during the Marcos era. Article XI, section one 
declared that employees “must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with 
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, 
and lead modest lives.” It also took steps to curb the military’s power, barring any 
member o f the military from engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities. 
It prohibited the imprisonment of individuals based on their political beliefs and 
aspirations.
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Some of the most outrageous past abuses by the government and the military were 
violations o f basic human rights. Curbing government and military influence also meant 
curbing the possibility of repeated abuses. The constitution went further in specifically 
addressing human rights issues, and there are several striking and clearly Church- 
influenced aspects, including the establishment o f a h uman rights commission in Article 
XIII.
Family issues were also addressed, and this was clearly the fruit o f the Church’s 
labor on the various committees. The unique focus the Philippine Constitution has on the 
Filipino family is remarkable in that it explicitly addresses issues of marriage and 
children along the lines of the Catholic Church. In Article II, section twelve it reads that 
the state "shall equally protect the life o f the mother and the unborn from conception," 
effectively ending abortion. The anti-abortion clause was the work of the Catholic 
representatives on the committees, but the Church was also successful in two other major 
constitutional provisions.
The first was Article XV, entitled simply “The Family.” In a few amazing 
sentences the Philippine Constitution, and thus the government itself, takes a direct 
interest in the welfare o f not just individuals but the traditional, Church-sanctioned 
heterosexual family unit. Sections one and two read:
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. 
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total 
development. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of 
the family and shall be protected by the state.
In those few sentences, the Philippine Constitution strengthens and supports the 
family unit with the fall backing o f the government itself, and makes divorce, for all 
intents and purposes, illegal.
Finally, the Church’s influence is found in yet another major part o f the 
constitution. Remembering the role o f the BCCs, NASSA, NAMFREL, the CBCP, and
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even earlier efforts by Catholic-sponsored social organizations to fight social injustice 
and how Marcos tried to crush them all, the new constitution addressed the issue of 
“People’s Organizations.” Indeed, it was the Church’s work through these “People’s 
Organizations” that facilitated the first People Power revolution. Therefore, the basic 
idea of such organizations’ value and usefulness was realized in 1986. One year later as 
the constitution was being penned, the importance of these groups was not lost on the 
drafters.
In Article XIII, sections fifteen and sixteen it states:
The State shall respect the role o f independent people's organizations to 
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, 
their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful 
and lawful means. People's organizations are bona fide associations of 
citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and 
with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure . . .  The right of 
the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation 
at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be 
abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment o f adequate 
consultation mechanisms.
The 1987 Constitution is a remarkable document in so many ways and a testament 
to the revitalization o f the democratic ideals and the spirit o f freedom. Even today, 
reading the words is a refreshing experience to those who appreciate a government built 
upon egalitarian principles that uplift and protect less fortunate elements of society. One 
can feel within each paragraph the hard work of the committee members who poured 
every ounce o f commitment they had into creating a set of laws and principles based on 
the ideas they felt God had endowed naturally to humankind. The document was so 
loved by the people and the Church that it found easy ratification, and future efforts to 
alter these words met with stiff opposition.
With the new constitution being handled and overseen by trusted officials, 
including clergy, Aquino turned her attention to local government matters. Marcos had
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stocked the various mayoralties with his cronies and the city councils with an equally bad 
lot. Aquino believed that dealing with this problem required drastic measures, so she 
began the wholesale firing of more than seventy provincial governors, 1,600 mayors, and 
more than 10,000 council members.
The firing o f so many elected officials was an unexpected and a politically daring 
move by Aquino. The officials’ dismissal was justified as necessary to purge the 
polluting elements o f the Marcos administration. Firing them was the easy part. The 
difficult task was replacing them, because Aquino had no intention of allowing elections 
to replace these individuals. She was smarter than that, knowing that elections might 
only bring back the sort of riff-raff she had just purged. She chose instead to appoint 
officials to fill the offices.
Appointment instead of elections may have violated the type of democratic 
principles that Aquino and her new government stood for, but it was a necessary step. 
There was a danger that if  elections were held, the result would be widespread corruption 
and voter fraud at the local level, resulting in the reinstallation o f the very Marcos cronies 
she had just fired. Rather than allow any o f the Marcos corruption to taint her 
administration, she chose instead to follow her own conscience and sought the Church’s 
advice before making any appointments.
To illustrate how involved the Catholic Church was in this appointment process, 
one need only note that before making an appointment, the administration held 
consultations with local bishops and priests.1 The consultations with the Church at this 
level illustrate the political power the Church enjoyed throughout the Aquino 
administration. Church involvement in choices of a few cabinet-level offices is amazing 
in itself, but to have a hand in choosing hundreds of local officials is another level of 
influence altogether. It demonstrates the political penneation that was thorough by this 
time.
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Aquino rightly believed that besides being worthy o f her trust, these local-level 
Catholic officials were in the best place to judge office holders’ suitability.13 These 
priests, like the friars before them, were in the trenches doing the dirty work while others, 
such as Cardinal Sin, were more nationally recognized. Sin could never have given an 
informed opinion on each of the vast number of council seats to be filled. However, these 
local-level priests did so with authority and the kind of expertise that came from living 
their entire lives in the communities. They knew the families better than anyone, being 
present at community marriages, baptisms, and funerals. The type o f information that 
comes from knowing a community and its members from cradle to grave could only be 
gleaned from local-level priests.
Aquino’s cabinet, local appointments, and constitution were all issues tackled 
during her first year in office. Through it all, the Church and its leadership were there to 
offer assistance when needed. Each o f these and other actions helped the Aquino 
government become thoroughly ensconced in power and provided a little breathing room 
for one man who needed it—Cardinal Sin. Feeling that he had made his contribution to 
Philippine politics, Sin thought it wise to step back and evaluate his position. In March 
of 1987, the Archbishop made a decision and surprised everyone with a statement 
regarding his political future.
He announced that he was withdrawing from the political arena. To some this was 
no doubt a welcome sign o f a return to normalcy in politics, especially to those who 
feared the Church as a political rival. To others, it was a shock and a sad day knowing 
that the Philippines were losing one o f the most effective and charismatic political figures 
in history. Cardinal Sin did not simply announce his retirement from politics, he went a 
step further and recommended that other clergy do likewise. “From here on in I shall
13Keith Dalton, “Cardinal Sin Steps Down from Political Stage,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Sydney Morning Herald (March 6, 1987; accessed 10 
September 2001).
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stay in the background," he said, "I shall not talk too much. I shall be avoiding the 
limelight."
Sin denied that his decision was due to pressure from the Vatican or the Pope. No 
matter what side o f the issue one was on, one did not have time to savor Sin’s retirement 
very long. In a matter of weeks, he was back injecting himself into political matters. Sin’s 
retirement was brief, maybe one of the shortest political retirements in history. It was not 
long before he was pulled back into the strife-torn world of Philippine national politics. 
There was really no other choice. Aquino needed his support and that o f the Church if  her 
administration was to survive the turbulent times ahead.
Part of the reason Aquino needed the Church was to counterbalance the military’s 
influence and power. The military was constantly shifting, trying to gain as much power 
for itself as possible. This often meant that during the Aquino government the military 
and the Church clashed. Indeed, they were not on the best o f terms to begin with, having 
been at odds throughout martial law. The bad relations between the Church and the 
military had started more than a decade before when the Marcos administration chose the 
path of martial law and the Church dedicated itself to the "liberation" o f the poor. The 
army, at the behest o f Marcos, was used to fight the left-wing Communist insurgency that 
thrived in impoverished areas.13
On more than a few occasions, the battle against the Communists led to the 
persecution of Church members. Many in the military seemed to find it difficult to 
distinguish their left-wing enemies from the priests and nuns. Thus, they were equally 
harassed. This left bad blood between the Church and the military, differences healed 
only temporarily by the Church-military alliance to bring down Marcos and install 
Aquino as president. Even this alliance was partial, and many elements remained loyal to
13 •Gustav Niebuhr, “Friction Between Philippine Armed Forces, Catholic Church 
Sparks Growing Violence,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 29 November 1987, sec.
A, p. 1.
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Marcos or stayed on the sidelines awaiting the final outcome of the 1986 special elections 
and the People Power movement.
The Church did not fear the military and sought to counterbalance it at all levels 
through its own power and influence. The military had to respect the Church, both 
during the Marcos era and the Aquino administration, because the Church remained the 
only institution in the Philippines with both a nationwide communications network and 
the legitimacy to use that network for political purposes. This network proved invaluable 
in pressuring Marcos to leave and in protecting those elements of the military that needed 
shielding during the Enrile-Ramos defection.
Until his final days in Malacanang palace, Marcos fought a bitter war o f words 
with the Philippine bishops, particularly Cardinal Sin. Just before fleeing into exile, 
Marcos uttered words that evidenced the Church’s important actions. He made no 
mention o f the military, but he accused "priests and nuns" o f working hand-in-glove with 
Communists to bring him down.14 To the military’s chagrin, the Church’s authority 
continued to increase in Philippine society.
In spite o f or because o f its own actions, the Church became the only independent 
institution outside of government control. Citizens no longer turned to independent 
mayors and congressmen to try to get grievances redressed. The average person had but 
one place to go for a reliable solution, and that was the priest. All o f this meant that the 
military remained suspicious of the Church even after Aquino’s victory, and the feeling 
was mutual.
The suspicions about the Church were well grounded. Aquino’s administration 
rested on shaky ground more than a few times during her tenure. She was caught 
between the generals and the bishops, but it was the military that threatened her 
government’s stability, and it was the Church that helped bring her through each coup
14Ibid.
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attempt. The Church held more of the cards, having brought People Power to the 
forefront and using its high-profile position to effectively support Aquino through the 
various nefarious plots.
The military-sponsored coups proved the most serious challenges to Aquino’s 
government. Some o f the coups the Church faced do wn were not severe, such as the 
Manila Hotel incident, in which the conspirators were punished with thirty push-ups and 
allowed to go back to duty. But others were serious grabs at power.15 For example, in 
1989 elements o f the right-wing Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM) seized 
portions o f Makati and threatened destruction of the presidential palace. The military 
never wholly supported Aquino and their its failed, but not without a cost in political 
capital and human life.
Aquino did not have the military’s complete loyalty, but she did have General 
Ramos and the Catholic Church on her side. At the height of the coup plotting, Cory 
turned to the Church and Cardinal Sin to join her in a meeting with top military officials 
at the Malacanang palace. It so happened that one of the plotters was none other than 
Juan Ponce Enrile, one o f the aforementioned plotters of the Marcos era. It was not 
enough that Enrile had been given the defense portfolio during the Aquino 
administration. He had his eyes on the president’s seat and ruling the country. Instead of 
helping Aquino build the country, he was determined to overthrow her government. 
Although he was never labeled a traitor, Enrile’s actions can be seen in a treasonous light. 
It is peculiar to Philippine politics that he was allowed to go free and even later was 
elected a senator, as was former coup plotter and RAM leader Gregorio Honasan.16
15Ibid.
16Carlito Pablo and Fe Zamora, “No Link with Estrada Loyalists: Young Officers 
Head Held for Questioning,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Manila Times 
(October 25, 2001; accessed 23 August 2002).
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During the tense days against Marcos, it was Cardinal Sin and the Church who 
rallied around Enrile, protecting the defense minister from Marcos’s guns with the 
Church faithful. Yet after the People Power victory, Enrile began plotting to overthrow 
the very government his earlier actions had helped establish, and he made an enemy out 
of the very Church that had saved his life.
The particular plot in question was a serious power-grabbing attempt dubbed 
“God Save the Queen.” Enrile’s plotting included a plan to depose Aquino and place 
himself as head of a military junta. The particulars o f the coup are not important, but 
what is important is that it failed to succeed, in large part because o f the actions and 
pressure brought by the Catholic Church. Aquino needed the Church’s support and the 
cardinal’s advice, and she asked Sin to postpone his trip to Rome and to see what he 
could do to help the situation.17
With some forces still loyal to Aquino and headed by the stem and dependable 
Fidel Ramos, Cory had some breathing room. The Church gave her more. Cardinal Sin 
placed a call to Enrile just as Aquino had wanted, and he attempted to persuade him not 
to go through with his attempts to seize power.18 Sin focused on Enrile’s own 
responsibility as a cabinet member who was not supposed to be talking o f coups but 
coordinating and supporting Aquino’s administration. He emphasized the magnitude and 
futility o f the coup, and Cardinal Sin laid the responsibility for any bloodshed on Enrile.
Still fearing plotters, Cory asked again that Sin stay and not go to Rome, and he 
agreed.19 She herself stated publicly that any coup attempts by “misguided elements” 
would be met with People Power.20 In the end, the coups were aborted and Enrile was
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forced to resign. He is lucky he was not jailed or worse. Attempts to topple Aquino 
failed repeatedly, largely because of her continued appeal as the embodiment o f the 
pasyon and the Catholic Church’s support. Both o f these things acted as buffers to her 
popularity and her political control and helped secure the administration by 
characterizing any attempts to topple her via a coup or legislation as a rebellion against 
God.21
The Philippine Catholic Church staked its very prestige and reputation on 
Aquino’s success. It was a political marriage. She was the Church’s darling until the 
very end. She was the bride, the Church’s personal selection as president, legitimized by 
the Catholic vote and by the Catholic Church. Cardinal Sin and the rest were not about to 
abandon her fortunes to those military elements that sought to illegally seize power. Not 
content at merely supporting the president herself, the Church shored up her 
administration by campaigning for, supporting, and endorsing Aquino’s own slate of 
candidates for the congress during midterm legislative elections. In response, Aquino 
was thankful and always devout, even at times praying her rosary on national television.
As if  dealing with disgruntled elements of her own military were not enough, 
Aquino inherited several active rebellions and separatist movements from Marcos.
Among these were various Islamic separatist groups located in the southern archipelago 
on the islands o f Mindanao, Sulu, and Jolo. There was also a Communist insurgency that 
still held on to the antiquated idea of overthrowing the democratic government and 
establishing a Marxist regime. The National Democratic Front (NDF), the Communist 
Party of the Philippines’ (CPP) political front organization, led the charge during the 
Marcos era along with its armed element, the New People’s Army (NPA). Both the 
Communists and the Muslim separatists threatened the life and property o f thousands of 
Filipinos and the stability of Aquino’s government.
21Casper, Fragile Democracies, 152.
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Marcos’s method of dealing with the Muslims and Communists was to crack 
down on them. He launched military attacks against them throughout his administration. 
Attacks instead of reconciliation created deep wounds of mistrust between the 
government and the rebels. The level o f mistrust on both sides seemed almost 
insurmountable. Moreover, during this period Marcos often lumped the Church’s 
socialist activity in with the Communists, justifying his attacks on both the NPA and on 
the Catholic Church. Yet the Church was never an ally to the NPA, nor was it an enemy. 
As mentioned earlier, there were some leftist elements o f the Church that were not far in 
their ideological views o f social reform from many of the leftists in groups like the NPA, 
and there were a few priests who officially joined the Communists. Where they differed 
was in the use o f violence and removing God from the center of their ideology . It may 
seem ironic that a priest would join and fight for an ideology that at its core was anti- 
God. It is just another example of the strange alliances that distaste for Marcos created in 
the Philippines.
In dealing with the Communist insurgency after the 1986 election, the Church 
was again aligned with Aquino. Or it may be better stated that Aquino was more in line 
with the Church’s position. The Philippine Catholic Church’s hierarchy continually 
rebuffed efforts by some Communist leaders to be included in a power-sharing role after
99Marcos’s downfall. This was a change in posture after Aquino’s assumption o f power, 
as the Church had been in careful collaboration with leftist groups throughout martial 
law. With Marcos deposed, the Church could afford to take a stronger stance against 
leftist elements both in the New People’s Army (NPA) and in the Church itself.
More decisively, the bishops decided to assert their own authority over the 
Church’s National Secretariat for Social Action, a body that proved successful in
9 9  • •“Philippine Rebels Jar Conservatives, Church,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Chicago Sun-Times (December 12, 1986; accessed 23 August 2001).
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countering some o f the negative aspects o f martial law but had for a decade been widely 
suspected of being under the control of NPA sympathizers who were siphoning off funds 
to support various guerrilla organizations.23 With Aquino installed and made legitimate, 
the Church was not about to share its power with leftist insurgents. The military had to be 
dealt with on relatively equal footing, but Communist rebels could be overshadowed.
The Communists made it easier given their ridiculous demands for power sharing. 
The National Democratic Front’s own proposals for “nationalistic foreign policy” 
included the immediate closing of United States military bases on the islands and 
removal o f Catholic-based education from the islands’ school systems. Both o f these 
requests were inconsistent with the Church’s goals.24 The Church could tolerate the 
United States bases in 1986 and preferred to wait for negotiations to resolve the base 
issue once the lease expired. Indeed, the Americans were a potential military force to be 
tapped if Aquino needed extra firepower to ward off coup attempts. This is precisely 
what happened in 1989. Little mention need be made of the demand for Marxist-based 
education, because that was something completely intolerable to the Church.
Denying the Communists’ demands on the American base issue and on the 
education system did not mean that Cory opposed a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
And with the Church on her side, it seemed that such a resolution was feasible. One step 
briefly discussed earlier in the chapter was her creation of a Commission on Human 
Rights. The Commission was headed by Pepe Diokno and included Church 
representation at all levels. Sister Marianni Dimaranan was the former head of Task 
Force Detainees, which during martial law was the largest national Church-backed 
human rights organization. She was the Church’s chief representative on the Commission
23“Philippine Rebels Said to Get Funds From Bishops,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Washington Post (February 5, 1988; accessed 3 November
2001).
24“Philippine Rebels Jar Conservatives, Church,” Chicago Sun-Times.
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on Human Rights. She had spent much of her life documenting abuses committed by the 
military and paramilitary groups during the Marcos administration and was the perfect 
choice to sit on the Commission.
The 1987 Constitution included Article X, which allowed for establishment o f an 
autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao. The region’s organization was to be based on 
religion, cultural heritage, and the economic and social structures of the people living in 
those areas. It was hoped that by giving concessions to the separatists, peace could be 
achieved. Cory’s administration went a step further by taking police power out o f the 
constabulary’s hands and placing the responsibility of peace and order with local Muslim 
police.26 As chapter 3 mentioned, the Philippine constabulary was notorious for its abuse 
of peasants and minorities. It was corrupt and often used private armies controlled by 
wealthy landowners and corrupt politicians. Just as the Huks had banded together to 
police their own areas, Cory’s deal allowed the Muslims to provide a police force to take 
care of their own.
Aquino’s attempts at making peace with the rebels had both high and low points 
during her six-year term, but even in her presidency’s waning years she did not give up 
on the peace efforts or fail to include the Church as part o f the solution. As late as 1990, 
Aquino was quoted as saying she intended to "invite the leaders o f the private and Church 
sectors to join the government in convening a national peace conference so that we can 
work out, resolve and act to attack the deep sources o f our divisions, our conflicts, our 
injustices and inequities in society which are obstacles to peace."27 Until the end she was 
searching for peace for her fellow Filipinos, no matter their creed or religion.
25Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 141.
Philippine Constitution, art. 10, sec. 21.
27Robert H. Reid, “Aquino Calls for Decade of Peace in Philippines,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (January 1,1990; accessed 12 
November 2001).
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While Aquino’s efforts ended with her leaving office in 1992, the Church’s 
activities as a peace broker spilled over into the administration of Fidel Ramos. Ramos, a 
Protestant and former general under Marcos, had helped bring Aquino to power during 
the People Power revolution. Under Aquino, he served as defense minister and won a 
narrow plurality to become president o f the Philippines. One of the first questions posed 
to Ramos was how, as the first Protestant leader o f a predominantly Roman Catholic 
country, he could forge a working and lasting relationship with the Catholic Church.
Ramos had to appease the Church because he was not its ideal man for the job. He 
was not Catholic and did not initially cater to Cardinal Sin or other bishops, so 
hisrelationship with the Catholic Church was precarious. At times he clashed with the 
Church head on, and at other times they worked in unison. His strength lay in his ability 
to get things done without worry of coup attempts. Secure in his position as president, he 
could deal directly with both the economic and political troubles that had plagued 
Aquino. Chief among these troubles were the insurgency movements and dissident 
groups, both areas where the Church proved useful to Ramos’s efforts.
The problem of insurgency was not going away. On February 15,1992, the NPA 
ambushed government soldiers on the island o f Mindanao, killing forty-one people and 
highlighting the real danger that still existed from the groups. Early in his administration, 
Ramos declared "national reconciliation" the highest national priority. He legalized the 
Communist Party and created the National Unification Commission (NUC) to lay the 
groundwork for talks with Communist insurgents.29
28  •  •Sandra Burton, “Stepping Into Cory’s Shoes: Fidel Ramos Succeeds President
Corazon Aquino of the Philippines,” Time, 15 June 1992, 41.
29John McBeth, “Attritional Politics: Ramos Looks for Ways to End Communist 
Rebellion,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Far Eastern Economic Review, 
(March 18, 1993; accessed 3 December 2001).
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In September 1992, Bishop Fernando Capalla of the CBCP and Feliciano Carino, 
secretary general o f the National Council of Churches o f the Philippines (NCCP), joined 
the nine-member NUC, which was entrusted with formulating a national reconciliation 
program to resolve problems with dissident groups. Government efforts under Aquino 
and Ramos had come up short alone, and Ramos realized that true peace needed to 
incorporate the religious, including the Catholic Church. It was time to give the Church 
and its leadership a real try to end the conflicts that directly affected domestic stability 
and international relations with nation-states such as Malaysia and Indonesia. These 
nation-states had a direct interest in seeing the separatist movements in the Philippines 
quelled, lest they encourage their own dissidents.
The CBCP and the NCCP also formed the Joint Committee for Peace. Philippine 
churches, along with other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), initiated peace 
consultations at the local level.30 In June 1994, Ramos signed into law a general 
conditional amnesty covering all rebel groups, as well as Philippine military and police 
personnel accused of crimes committed while fighting the insurgents. In October 1995, 
the government signed an agreement bringing the military insurgency to an end.
Although outstanding differences remained and many o f the underlying social problems 
were not addressed, the actions Ramos and the Church took removed the threat to 
government stability posed by the Communists and Muslim insurgencies.
The Ramos government also worked with Catholic and Protestant church 
organizations on projects and programs to protect the environment, improve the 
socioeconomic wellbeing o f the poor, and address a growing Vietnamese refugee 
problem.31 It did so because the government itself remained staffed with a large
->/-V
Robert L. Youngblood, "President Ramos, the Church, and Population Policy in 
the Philippines," Asian Affairs: An American Review 25, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 3.
31 Ibid.
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contingency of men and women who were educated in the most prestigious Catholic 
universities in the Philippines. These universities continue today to act as feeders for 
personnel in the Philippine government. Through the education process, the Catholic 
Church ensured its survival and guaranteed that those sympathetic to its agenda remained 
in power.32
Cooperation to alleviate the problem of insurgencies and social welfare projects 
did not mean that Ramos’s relationship with the Church was always smooth. Quite the 
contrary, he would raise the Church’s ire on numerous occasions, including his move 
towards “family planning” and changing the 1987 Constitution, a move that would come 
to be known as “Cha Cha,” short for Charter Change. His first clash with the Church was 
over the issue of family planning. Ramos addressed the Philippine Congress about the 
country's population growth rate and endorsed a family planning program that met with 
stiff Church opposition.
Remembering that the Church itself had made sure abortion was outlawed in the 
1987 Constitution, Ramos took his appeal directly to the people. Passing out condoms, 
something Cardinal Sin once called only fit “for animals,” angered conservatives within 
the Church. Whether Ramos liked it or not, he was president o f a Catholic nation, and he 
was president in large part because the Church had supported his candidacy. He 
remained president in large part because the Church thought him adequate for the task. 
Indeed, he owed his life to the actions o f Cardinal Sin and others who put their own lives 
on the line to protect Ramos at Camp Crame when he defected from the Marcos camp 
during the People Power revolution. But the past was the past, and during his tenure as
Esteban A. De Ocampo, The First Filipino Diplomat (Manila, Philippines: 
National Historical Institute, 1978), 94.
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president his actions earned him the moniker “Infidel” Ramos from his Catholic 
opponents.33
Being labeled an infidel by the Church was in stark contrast to how Ramos was 
initially embraced. Early in his administration, Ramos was invited to speak at Catholic 
gatherings, including crowds o f hundreds of thousands in Luneta Park where he and 
Cardinal Sin appeared onstage at a rally against poverty. But the honeymoon period 
between Ramos and the Church did not last.
Besides the abortion issue that resulted in him being labeled an infidel, the pivotal 
event in the Ramos-Church relationship was his consistent desire to change the provision 
of the 1987 Constitution that would allow him to run for a second six-year term. This 
became known as “charter change,” or “cha cha” for short. As evidence has shown 
earlier, the 1987 document was no ordinary constitution. It was a Catholic document, 
penned and ratified through the hard work of the Church and the martyrs o f Marcos’s 
state violence. It was written to fit their needs and peppered with protective mechanisms, 
such as the six-year term limit, to keep the Church and the Philippine population from 
experiencing a repeat o f the Marcos era. The drafters were not about to let Ramos or any 
government official run roughshod over their hard-fought victory. Tampering with the 
words of the constitution was akin to editing the Bible itself for many in the Church.
Cardinal Sin again led the political fight that ensued between Ramos and the 
Church. It was man of the cloth versus man with the gun and Catholic versus Protestant, 
and the prize was either the salvation o f the 1987 Constitution or another six years of 
Ramos. The Church did not hold back on its rhetoric against Ramos. It accused him of 
attempting to stay in power at any cost, even being willing to throw the Philippines back 
in the dark ages. To add to the rhetoric’s impact, the Church made many o f its statements
33Greg Jones, “Optimism Growing in Philippines Elections Indicate Democracy 
Finally Taking Root, Analysts Believe,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Dallas Morning News (June 10, 1995; accessed 13 October 2001).
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on carefully timed days. For example, on the fourteenth anniversary of Ninoy Aquio’s 
assassination, Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter reminding the Philippine nation o f the 
trouble that would befall them should Ramos insist on staying in power. Sin’s alluding to 
Marcos’s murderous actions and comparing them to Ramos’s desires to stay in power 
was a bit overdone, but it was effective.
The two opposing camps could not have presented a starker contrast. One camp 
had the president and the other had the Church of People Power and Cardinal Sin, the 
man who had led the Mass at Ninoy’s funeral, guided his widow to the presidency, and 
called upon the flock to protect Ramos from the bullets of Marcos’s assassin. Now this 
same Cardinal Sin told the faithful that Ramos wished to throw progress away in a blind 
pursuit of power. Sin blasted Ramos for not leading the Philippines with “enlightened 
political responsibility, social stability and prosperity . . . ” but instead leading the country 
“back into the dark ages of pre-martial law political dynasties, warlordism, corruption, 
sham democracy and debilitating poverty.”34 It was am impressive use of the Church’s 
power to persuade.
In other statements, the Church accused Ramos of endangering the future o f the 
Philippines with his charter change ideas. As if endangering the future and 
impoverishing the nation were not enough, Sin even went so far as to warn that the 
Philippines might become "another Cambodia," with civil war, murders, and executions 
if  Ramos got his way.35 Comparing what Ramos wanted to do with the evil inflicted upon 
the Cambodian people by Pol Pot was certainly excessive hyperbole, but in a country
34“Filipino Cardinal Fights Re-Election o f President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Seattle Times (August 24, 1997; accessed 23 October 2001).
35Jonathan Mirsky, “Manila Faces Civil War Under Ramos,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Times o f London (September 12, 1997; accessed 27 
October 2001).
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where Cardinal Sin led a politically powerful political body, Ramos had to take it 
seriously.
Ramos did not give up or back down easily. He and his allies struck back with 
their own attempts to scare the public with predictions of religious fundamentalism. One 
pro-Ramos observer wrote, "It is a shuddering thought. This country could be the 
Catholic equivalent of Iran. We will have a mullahtocracy, except that we address them 
as monsignors."36 Such charges met with little public support. The Philippine population 
did not believe or even fear a mullahtocracy o f Catholic monsignors, and there was no 
danger of religious fundamentalism washing over the Philippines unless one considers 80 
percent o f the population adhering to one faith and enjoying the Catholic Church’s 
leadership to be a brand o f fundamentalism.
Ramos and his supporters should have known that their appeals to the fear of 
fundamentalism would come up short. They were in a position of power with the help of 
the Church, and the Church was a part o f the fabric o f Philippine society and would be 
there long after Ramos had turned to dust and his administration had faded from memory. 
Had it not been for the Catholic Church, Fidel Ramos would probably not have had the 
chance to become president at all.
This fact did not deter Ramos from trying to push through his charter change 
ideas. His continued efforts to do so meant a head-on confrontation with the Church.
The Church and its allies, including former President Cory Aquino, threatened another 
People Power-like demonstration should Ramos start a fight. Sensing that a showdown 
was imminent, Sin called on the Catholic faithful to prepare for a rally against Ramos and 
against charter change. In a prepared statement read just days before the proposed 
September 21 rally, Sin said, "If you are against military rule and authoritarianism, if you
■jz:
Uday Khandeparker, “Pulpits Again Political Platform in Manila Battle,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business Daily (September 16, 1997; accessed 14 
September 2001).
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are for freedom, go to Luneta on September 21. If you are afraid, do not go to Luneta. 
Luneta is only for the brave."37
Ramos’s allies countered the Church’s call for a rally and other efforts to 
influence the legitimacy o f his administration. One group, calling itself the Philippine 
Constitution Association (PCA), went so far as to formally request an intercession by 
Pope John Paul II to stop Cardinal Sin’s “aggressive interference” in political matters, 
arguing that he was sowing dissension in the country. In the letter, the PCA said Sin 
"has been fomenting hatred and conflict" with his anti-charter change pastoral letters, 
leading many Catholics to break away from the Church and join other religious 
groups.”38
The letter further stated, “Many Catholics have stopped attending masses because 
they don't want to hear political sermons . . .  Some have even changed religion.” The 
PCA did not say how many Catholics had broken away from the Church to join 
opposition movements, but the number must have been miniscule because public opinion 
data since Ramos’s era show no sign of Catholic affiliation weakening among the 
population.
Sin shrugged off the complaint, justifying his actions as being in line with the 
spirit of Vatican II. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) backed 
Cardinal Sin. Pro-Ramos lawyers, with the full faith and support o f Ramos himself, filed 
petitions against Cardinal Sin and his activities. In effect, it was an attempt to put a 
national-level restraining order on the Archbishop o f Manila. The Philippine Supreme
77 “Church Warns Against Ramos 'dictatorship' Filipinos Urged to Turn Out for 
Protest Rally,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Toronto Star (September 
17,1997; accessed 12 August 2001).
38“Philippine Groups Complains to Pope about Church Interference,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (September 11, 1997; 
accessed 12 October 2001).
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Court, however, sensibly ruled that lawyers Vincente Millora and Ricardo Valmonte
I Q
“failed to establish sufficient justification” and denied their request.
Seeing that the “stick” approach was not working, Ramos then tried the “carrot.” 
Setting aside his rhetoric and his cronies’ attempts to silence the Church, he decided to 
broach the matter with Sin face-to-face. Despite calls from within his administration to 
keep the Church out o f political decisions, Ramos dined with Cardinal Sin at the 
Malacanang palace and met with seven officials o f the Church’s governing body, the 
Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines, led by Monsignor Pedro Quitorio. Both 
occasions appeared to acknowledge the strong link between the Church and the business 
o f government in the Philippines.40
Yet these meetings did not stop Ramos from continuing his efforts to counter the 
mainstream Catholic Church by courting opposition and breakaway movements, such as 
the charismatic Catholic offshoot group El Shaddai. With more than ten million 
members, El Shaddai made a powerful ally for Ramos. Speaking at the thirteenth 
anniversary of El Shaddai’s founding, Ramos tried to circumvent the Catholic Church’s 
negative reaction to his charter change ideas. Mike Verlade, the leader of El Shaddai, 
warmed to Ramos, foreshadowing his own slow move away from the mainstream Church 
and out from under the shadow of Cardinal Sin.41
39Carlos B. M. Santos, Norman P. Aquino, and Miguel C. Gil, “SC Affirms 
Church Right to Hold Anti-Charter Change Rally on Sunday,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Business World ( September 17, 1997; accessed 2 February
2002).
40Raissa Robles, “President Invites Cardinal Sin and Aquino to Dinner After 
Month of Mudslinging Ramos Defuses Tension with Church,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (October 3, 1997; accessed 12 
October 2001).
41Leotes Marie T. Lugo, “Ramos Scorns Sin, Runs to El Shaddai,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (August 25, 1997; accessed 12 October 
2001).
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The Ramos-El Shaddai partnership did not deter the Church from its opposition to 
charter change. Ramos had to admit and recognize the Church’s power and even met 
several times privately with Cardinal Sin to try to politically negotiate himself out o f a 
potential political mess. The mere fact that the president o f the Philippines was taking 
time out o f his schedule to meet with religious leadership to discuss his political strategy 
is more evidence of the Church’s role as an important variable in governmental 
legitimacy.
As a constitutionally elected president, it was Ramos’ prerogative to push any 
agenda he wished within the scope of the law. His attempts to chang the charter were not 
illegal. They were, however, unpopular with the Catholic Church. It is for this reason 
Ramos and his proposals were doomed to fail. Sometimes even as meetings took place 
between Ramos and Sin, more than 3,000 priests and nuns rallied in front o f the 
building.42
On other occasions, President Ramos showed up unexpectedly at Cardinal Sin’s 
residence to reassure the Church that he had no plans to become a dictator and that the 
constitutional changes were safe, and to ask the Church to call off rallies against his 
administration 43 When reporters caught Ramos emerging one night from Sin’s villa, 
they questioned him about the visit. Ramos simply responded, "I asked him to please 
reconsider the planned rally on Sept. 21 because that would be counterproductive toward 
our wish to heal the wounds of the nation." He added that the mass demonstration would 
just exacerbate differences. It is more likely that he was worried about being deposed or 
wished to safeguard his legacy and not have it lumped together with Marcos’s.
42“Sin Ignores Ramos’s Plea to Call Off Protest,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Asian Political New (September 8, 1997; accessed 12 October 2001).
43Miguel C. Gil, Cecille M Santillan, and Carlo B. M. Santos, “Ramos Fails to 
Stave Off Rally vs Charter Change,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Business World (September 11, 1997; accessed 3 December 2001).
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The Church would not be silenced on this issue. It made noise over the charter 
change proposal, both figuratively and literally. Churches nationwide rang their bells, 
and Catholics blew their car horns in a noise barrage encouraged by the Church.44 This 
noise barrage was the beginning of the countdown to a September 21 demonstration. 
Cardinal Sin, never one to miss the symbolism of an event, organized the rally to 
coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary o f the imposition of martial law in the 
Philippines. The symbolism was there, and it was time for the substance.
Ramos and the Philippine Congress knew they had no chance and, fearing a 
showdown with the Roman Catholic Church, eventually abandoned the idea of charter 
change. The call came after Ramos and his allies heard the announcement by Sin and 
former president Aquino that they were going to mobilize more than one million people 
at the September 21 rally. The rally went ahead as scheduled.
September 21, 1997, would prove once again how powerful the Catholic Church 
remained. Before the event, questions swirled as to whether or not the Church would 
produce the numbers they had promised in Manila and the rest o f the Philippines. Could 
they convince enough people to turn out in a show of peaceful protest against Ramos’s 
charter change? These questions were answered with a definitive “yes.” An estimated 
600,000 protesters poured into the streets in Manila, and more than 100,000 
demonstrators gathered in Bacolod. Tens o f thousands turned out elsewhere in the 
Philippines to send Ramos and his allies a strong message. That message was that the 
powerful and influential Church was there and it was watching, and no one was going to 
be allowed to tamper with its blessed constitution.
The rally o f 1997 was the exclamation point on the Ramos-Church rift. After 
that, Ramos and the Church did not face off again on any large-scale issues. Ramos
44“Cardinal Sin Calls for Church Bell Protest Against Philippine Leader,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Toronto Star (September 5, 1997; accessed 12 
October 2001).
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served out his term as president, which ended in 1998, and made no further attempts to 
remain in power. However, Ramos never left public life completely. He still resurfaces 
from time to time alongside Church officials at various national rallies, lending his 
support to their continued political fights. Ironically, he is usually seen at these rallies 
standing on stage, arm-in-arm, shoulder-to-shoulder with Cardinal Sin. In the 
Philippines, old foes can be new friends again. The Church remains there with open arms 
to welcome those who may have “lost their way.”
Ramos may have “lost” his way politically, but he was forgiven. This was so 
because in the past he had been instrumental in helping bring Aquino to power and won 
early favor with the Catholic Church. His missteps and mistakes in the eyes o f the 
Church were his insistence on family planning and charter change. He was not, however, 
an immoral man, at least in the eyes o f the Church hierarchy. Once out o f office, he was 
redeemed to become a Church ally. The same cannot be said for Ramos’s vice president 
and the man who would become the third president in the post-Marcos era, Joseph “Erap” 
Estrada.
Joseph Estrada and the Catholic Church started off as uneasy allies because of 
Ramos’s charter change actions. The Church objected to the charter change on 
constitutional grounds and out o f fears o f renewed dictatorship. Estrada objected because 
had designs on the presidency, and a second Ramos term meant an end to those 
aspirations. But their mutual dislike o f Ramos’s initiative was not enough to endear 
Estrada to the Church. Estrada himself had the kind of personal life that put him in the 
same tabloidesque league with Bill Clinton and Ted Kennedy. Needless to say, he was 
not a favorite o f the Catholic Church’s moral majority.
Before entering politics, Estrada was a movie actor. He was the star o f more than 
100 films, and in real life he was fond of playing Robin Hood-type roles and fancied 
himself a champion of the poor. He often compared himself to Ronald Reagan, although 
that comparison is neither fair nor warranted and does a great disservice to Reagan.
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Estrada the politician was not much different from Estrada the movie star. Outside of the 
cinema and the legislature he was an admitted drinker, gambler, and philanderer. He was 
never shy about his activities.
His movie career and his role as Ramos’s vice president had won him popular 
support from the nation’s poor, but his lifestyle did not endear him to the Church. Once 
its temporary solidarity had eroded with Ramos’s constitutional term, the Church ended 
its moral cease-fire with Estrada. Subsequently, his declaration o f desire to run for the 
presidency prompted Cardinal Sin to call for “morality” in the opposition. This call for 
morality in an election where Estrada was sure to be the frontrunner was clear evidence 
of the Catholic Church’s early opposition against an Estrada presidency. It was in a way 
a preemptive strike, one that was needed if  the Church was to dampen Estrada’s 
substantial support among the poor.
During the 1998 election, the Church’s support was important to all o f the 
candidates. The election came down to who could gamer a plurality of the vote, and the 
Church’s support was considered crucial. At that time, the Church’s key figure was still 
Archbishop Cardinal Sin. His vow to leave politics back in 1987 was never realized. He 
never really left and reemerged repeatedly during the Aquino and Ramos administrations 
or whenever “infidel” Ramos needed a good nudging in the “right” direction.
By 1998, public opinion polls showed that nine out of ten adult Filipinos knew 
who Cardinal Sin was, and among those surveyed, 69 percent trusted him.45 This level of 
tmst was unmatched by any official in or out of the Philippine government. Cardinal’s 
Sin’s tmst rating was built by the activities he had engaged in during the previous decade, 
from People Power to preventing charter change. Any candidate in the 1998 election had 
to take him seriously and take his public and private support of their campaign into
451998 Social Weather Survey, done nationwide on 1,200 respondents o f voting 
age, for a 3 percent error margin. SWS media releases may be verified on the webpage at 
http://www.sws.org.ph.
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consideration. Even candidates like Estrada, who had little chance o f winning the 
Church’s favor, were careful in their public criticisms of Sin or the Church.
Estrada did not, however, pay the Church the deference that other candidates 
showed. For example, during the 1998 campaign it was commonplace for candidates to 
meet with Church officials. In fact, eight o f the eleven presidential candidates showed up 
at forums organized by the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines. 
Conspicuously absent from these forums was Joseph Estrada. He chose to avoid such 
Church-sponsored forums, relying instead on the solid lead he had in the polls.
The situation vexed the Church. Although its official position and that of 
Cardinal Sin was “neutral,” it was clear to all observers that the Church did not want 
Estrada to win the election. Coming to this conclusion was not difficult. Statements 
from Church officials made it clear that Estrada was not the favored choice. Indeed, he 
was a political pariah in their opinion. Keeping him out o f office was difficult because of 
the support he enjoyed with the masses. It was not that the Church did not control a 
strong Catholic vote. The problem the Church faced was the sheer number o f candidates, 
which split the Church vote. If the Church wanted to keep Estrada out, it needed to unify 
the opposition.
Issues o f insurgency, abortion, and foreign policy became less important to the 
Church as the election of May 11, 1998, got closer. The Church realized that a split in 
the vote would allow Estrada to win. In an unprecedented display o f political 
partisanship and with the Church’s blessing, Sin made a desperate attempt to ward off the 
vote split. Throwing away any pretense o f impartiality, Cardinal Sin, acting on behalf of 
, the Philippine Catholic Church, urged the less popular candidates to withdraw from the 
presidential race in order to keep an “unqualified” candidate from winning.46
4601iver Teves, “The Outspoken Archbishop o f Manila,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (April 23, 1998; accessed 12 October 2001).
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Sin did this so that the Catholic vote would not be split and divided among 
candidates who may have been fine individuals but did not stand a chance at winning the 
election. It was hoped that by having some o f the less popular candidates withdraw, a 
strong and unified anti-Estrada vote could be mobilized. This sort of influence, or some 
may say “meddling,” in politics by the Church is astonishing to observers who have no 
idea about the historical role the Church played in Philippine politics and legitimacy. 
Though unparalleled in a place like the United States, the Church’s attempt to directly 
affect the outcome o f a presidential election in the Philippines and install the sort of 
regime it wanted was and remains the norm.
Asking candidates to withdraw from presidential contention was not a foolproof 
plan, for there was no guarantee that the candidates would do as the Church asked. If the 
plan failed, the Church had other measures. The pastoral letter was again used to issue 
political opinions from the Church. Sin issued a series of letters to the Catholic dioceses 
to be read in parishes throughout the Philippines. The sentiments expressed were simple, 
to the point, and clearly anti-Estrada. The Church wanted parishioners to ignore the 
various public opinion polls that showed Estrada in the lead.
The letters not only encouraged the voters to ignore the polls but also hinted that 
the election of the next president was a moral referendum on the Philippines itself.
Voters had more to consider than just personal interest, because their vote was to 
illustrate the kind of people they were by the kind of leaders they elected. One letter 
stated, “Our future depends most of all on our choices, and especially on our choice of 
leaders. . .  Listen to the voice o f conscience and do not be intimidated by survey results. 
Our choice for president will show what kind o f people we want to become."47
4701iver Teves, “Cardinal Sin Tells Voters Not to be Intimidated by Surveys,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (March 25, 1998; 
accessed 1 November 2001).
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In a pastoral letter issued on May 3,1998, just eight days before the election, the 
Church stated in a matter-of-fact manner that the most probable winner, Estrada, would 
be disastrous for the Philippines. Any pretense of impartiality was purged. Such bold 
political statements, particularly aimed at bringing down a presidential candidate who 
was merely exercising his political right to seek office, drew considerable fire from the 
opposition. Sin’s reply to the criticism was in his usual affable fashion: “I am guiding 
my people because if I do not guide, what kind of shepherd am I?"
Sin was indeed a shepherd for the Church, and he wanted the flock to choose a 
candidate that the Philippines could be proud of and a person worthy o f imitation. This 
meant a good Catholic and someone who would seek out the Church for counsel. In the 
Church’s view, the Philippines must be united around a common positive moral vision 
for the Philippines. These ideas were summarized in the Church’s pastoral letters, which 
were direct attacks against candidates with links to the Marcos administration, and 
particularly a womanizer like Estrada.
Other religious organizations entered the fray against the Church and in favor of 
Estrada. He may not have had the backing of Cardinal Sin or the Catholic Church, but he 
did have the backing o f the Iglesia ni Cristo, which declared its support for Estrada 
during the campaign. The Inglesia was not as large, but its members were committed and 
wealthy and its endorsement helped to further solidify Estrada’s wide margin in the polls.
Estrada was not above exploiting religion. A Catholic himself, Estrada used 
elements o f the Church and its trappings to further his image as a “friend” of the Church. 
For example, when it came time to receive Mass and blessings from priests, Estrada 
usually surrounded himself with the poor, who he claimed to be the champion o f during
48Marcus Gee, “Vote Pits Church Against State: A Philippine Archbishop Takes a 
Tough Stand in Campaign for President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Globe and Mail (April 27, 1998; accessed 1 November 2001.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
229
his campaign.49 These and other blatantly political actions that exploited religion 
appalled many, but it never stopped Estrada from joking about it during the campaign. 
Buoyed by his lead in the polls, Estrada could afford to make statements that left the 
Church’s collective jaws on the floor, particularly in matters of sexual indiscretions. In a 
country where speaking of sexual matters is taboo between adults even in private, 
Estrada’s comments about then United States President Bill Clinton were outrageous. He 
said, "Both President Clinton and I have sex scandals. But Clinton has the scandals, and I 
have the sex."50 Such statements galled the Church.
Estrada also had allies in the public and private sector. Although it is unclear if 
Estrada was behind any moves to shut the Church out o f its role as overseer of elections, 
there was a decision by the government-controlled Commission on Elections 
(COMELEC) to ban priests and nuns from helping monitor the May 11 election. The 
timing seemed odd at best. COMELEC further ordered that in order for NAMFREL to 
be accredited, Archbishop Sin and eight o f his religious associations must be dismissed. 
This was further evidence o f the government’s desire to remove the Church from being a 
factor in an Estrada candidacy.
Estrada’s allies were not against legal action to lessen the Church’s influence in 
the 1998 election. As Ramos’s allies had done before, groups tried litigation to tie the 
Church’s hands. One such group, the pro-Estrada Muslim Reform Party, filed a petition 
calling for an investigation of Sin for possible violations o f the Omnibus Election Code. 
Party Chairman Alim Farouk Kali criticized Sin for his remarks that Vice President
49Ramoncito De la Cruz, “Ex-Actor in Lead for Filipino President, Markets Stay 
Calm, but Church Concerned about Man Known as Champion o f Poor, A Hard Drinker,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Rocky Mountain News (March 9, 1998; 
accessed 3 November 2001).
S0David Thurber, “Estrada Claims He'll Prove Critics Wrong,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (May 12, 1998; accessed 13 November 
2001).
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Joseph Estrada was certain to win but unfit to govern the country because of his 
questionable character, saying the statements indicated his favoritism toward another 
candidate. The Church and Cardinal Sin accepted the criticism in stride.
Unfounded and irresponsible litigation was one thing, but the Church had to be 
careful o f its long time nemesis, the military. Whether it liked Estrada or not, it did not 
want the military involved in the electoral process The Church wanted to make it clear 
that any undue government influence in general or military involvement in particular 
would be met with a powerful Church response. The Church did not want Estrada to win, 
but it did not countenance cheating to affect the election’s outcome. Given the military’s 
record, the Church’s caution was warranted.
Flexing its political muscle, the Church warned the military to stay out o f the 
election. The Church declared May 10 as “the Lord’s Day,” and also stated that 
Christians must oppose any form of cheating. But if cheating did take place or the 
military intervened in the free and fair elections, it would be opposed with "People 
Power."51 Sin stated, "In case of electoral fraud, people power, the people empowered 
by the Lord, will not fail to prove anew God's special Providence and its democratic 
institutions."
In the end the Church both won and lost, for the elections of May 11, 1998, were 
not fraught with cheating, but Joseph Estrada won. Estrada did not gamer a majority of 
the vote, but he did win the election based on a plurality o f the vote. It was not the 
stunning victory reported in the worldwide press, for he received 34.6 percent o f the total 
vote. The rest was split amongst a plethora of less popular presidential candidates. The 
Church was successful in keeping the majority from voting for Estrada, but it could not 
keep one-third o f the voters from choosing a man o f questionable character.
51“Philippine Cardinal Warns Army to Stay Out o f Elections,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Press (May 4,1998; accessed 13 
November 2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
231
The 1998 elections proved to be peaceful, and this was also a testament to the 
Church’s enduring influence. While the Church may have not had a direct role in
52electing Estrada, it was one of the primary reasons the polls were safer than in the past. 
Due to the rise o f the Church, civilians no longer dominated politics as they once had, 
and factional poll violence declined. Church participation is o f particular importance for 
democratic consolidation because it institutionalizes nonviolent participation. The 
subculture of violence and corruption was in some ways tamed by the Church’s activities.
The Church opposed condemning the national security state and economic 
policies that emphasized efficiency and export at the expense of the poor. It accelerated 
political education and aid to nongovernmental and human rights organizations, 
mobilized followers to monitor elections, staged rallies, and confronted regimes through 
its Church-owned media. Its opposition to Estrada aside, the Church made sure that it 
kept up its role o f the insurer o f free and fair elections, even if it meant the election of a 
man it did not want in office.
Estrada’s plurality victory was hardly a stunning rebuke of the Catholic Church, 
but it was evidence of the Church’s weakening electoral influence. There was little 
chance that Estrada could have received that high of a percentage without a sizable 
number of Catholics who had ignored the Church’s advisory and voted for Estrada. The 
first round of the political fight between the Church and Estrada went to Estrada. 
However, this fight was going the full twelve rounds, and as was illustrated earlier, the 
Church would not wilt and go away. It would regroup to fight another day.
Estrada’s inauguration met with the usual pomp and celebration, but not the 
exuberance the Church had offered to his predecessors. The Church had no intention of 
cutting Estrada any political slack, as evidenced by the lack of a honeymoon period.
52John L. Linantud, “Whither Guns, Goons, and Gold? The Decline o f Factional 
Election Violence in the Philippines,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, no. 20 (December 
1988): 298.
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Political tradition usually allows a new administration a honeymoon period. This period 
is a time when the new president enjoys the well wishes o f even his defeated foes.
Estrada did not enjoy a honeymoon period. Cardinal Sin did not show up for Estrada’s 
inauguration and no sooner had he won the election than the Catholic Bishops 
Conference o f the Philippines (CBCP) began forming a committee to review 
constitutional amendments Estrada intended to propose. Estrada, like Ramos, planned to 
offer up a few minor constitutional changes during his administration.
The Church did not take its defeat at the polls lightly. It may have failed get the 
desired results in the presidential election, but legitimacy in the Philippines comes from 
more than the ballot box. To be legitimate in part means to be effective, delivering on the 
utilitarianism discussed earlier. Estrada’s ability to maintain his popularity, to push 
through his agenda, and to maintain his office had yet to be seen.
It was well known that Estrada had designs on the 1987 Constitution, the Catholic 
Church’s baby. If his designs were real, then Estrada needed to prepare for a political 
fight with the Church and a serious test for his administration. To the Church, the 1987 
Constitution meant “the destiny of the people . . . ” Any changes, even any talk of 
changes, had to include a dialogue with the Church.53
Cardinal Sin also shot a preemptive volley across the Estrada administration’s 
bow. The political volley was not meant to sink the new government, but merely to warn 
Estrada against embracing corrupt elements o f the past. The Church and Sin feared a 
return of "former plunderers," referring to close associates o f the late Ferdinand Marcos. 
One such “plunderer” was the business tycoon Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., one of the most 
powerful figures during the Marcos regime and a man who was cozy with Estrada.54 "I
53“Church to Join Cha-cha Effort,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Business World (June 4, 1998; accessed 13 November 2001).
54“Cardinal Sin Blasts Return of ‘Plunderers,’” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Associated Press (July 7,1998; accessed 13 November 2001).
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am worried about the ease that accompanies our dealing with the former plunderers of 
our nation. Money is not the end of everything. Friendship and utang na loob cannot be 
the sole criteria for our decisions and actions," Sin stated.
Estrada gave little attention to the Church’s warnings, although at times he sought 
the Church’s help for domestic initiatives. One such initiative was his much-vaunted war 
on poverty. The Church and Estrada joined forces, at least rhetorically, in their efforts to 
alleviate the persistent problem of poverty. However, taking credit for the initiatives was 
another story. Not wanting to give the president credit for the initiative, Cardinal Sin 
made sure in public statements that it was the Church that thanked Estrada for joining it 
in the war on poverty, instead of the government thanking social organizations like the 
Church for helping governmental efforts.55
Ramos’s family planning initiatives also continued during the Estrada 
administration, drawing direct fire from the Church. Taking its cues from the Vatican, 
the Philippine Catholic Church continued to be the most active opponent o f population 
control in the Philippines. Politicians, wishing to balance the real need for population 
control within the poverty stricken country with their own political needs, walked a fine 
line between family planning and support of Estrada and the Catholic Church’s very 
conservative policy towards birth control.
Adding to the fire was the Church’s insistence that abortion o f all types remain 
illegal in the Philippines, something Estrada was open to changing. Abortion was seen 
by some of the more liberal elements in Estrada’s government as one form of population 
control. Moreover, in a country where a baby is more likely than not to be bom in abject 
poverty and a burgeoning sex industry fuels the rapid spread of HIV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases, the Catholic stance showed its inflexibility. But this position did not 
change.
55“Estrada, Sin Join Forces In Fight vs. Poverty,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Business Daily (September 22, 1998; accessed 3 December 2001).
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Other aspects o f the Church’s activities and influence during the Estrada years 
were less conspicuous. For example, The Church injected itself into the Estrada 
administration’s domestic policy, including the “conscience committee” that Estrada 
appointed to review death penalty cases. The death penalty had always been a 
contentious issue for the Church, and it tried during the writing o f the 1987 Constitution 
to have it outlawed. However, it was unsuccessful and Estrada had every intention of 
reinstating the use o f the death penalty in certain instances. His inclusion of the Church in 
the matter demonstrated his own need to appease it as much as possible.
Estrada was also sensitive to the Church’s role in the use of People Power, 
although at the time he could not have imagined that People Power would be used to end 
his presidency. He did know that its use helped secure the new era in Philippine politics, 
an era he enjoyed and that led to his presidency. Trying to capture the spirit o f EDSA, 
and some may say hijack it, Estrada created a commission to ensure the annual 
commemoration of the EDSA revolution. He even gave Cardinal Sin an honorary 
membership on the commission.56
The smiles and handshakes went both ways between the Estrada camp and the 
Church. Working with Estrada was a necessity if  the Church wanted to accomplish 
objectives such as staffing the bureaucracy. Filling political positions was important to 
the Church, and it was wise to focus on those organizations that were beneficial to the 
Church’s goals in the next election. The Church already controlled NAMFREL, but 
COMELEC was another story. To help rectify this situation, the Catholic Church 
strongly pushed for the appointment o f one of its allies, Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, to the 
highest post in the organization. Cardinal Sin, teamed with influential Archbishop
56“Erap: Keep People Power Alive,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Manila Standard (February 9, 2000; accessed 3 December 2001).
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Ricardo Cardinal Vidal o f Cebu and other religious leaders, successfully pushed for the 
appointment.57
The issue of United States military bases was another area in which the Church 
remained involved. In 1986, the Church was in favor of keeping the bases open, but 1998 
was a different year. Back in 1991, Cory Aquino and the Church had rallied to extend 
the lease o f bases but failed to win support in the government, and as a result, the bases 
were closed. Seven years later, the Church had removed all pretense of support for 
United States military activities in the Philippines. On the issue o f the United States 
military, it seemed the Church took on the characteristics o f a political party. It had the 
ability to shift and change its position. It was unlike other moral or religious issues, such 
as abortion, on which the Church and its leadership never wavered.
Whereas in the late 1980s it had supported keeping the United States military in 
the Philippines, the late 1990s saw the Church adopt a more nationalistic agenda, urging 
the Philippine Senate to reject an accord that would allow United States troops to train in 
the Philippines. Although the substance of its claim is questionable, the Church believed 
that a new pact with the United States would threaten the Philippines’ security.58 In a 
Church homily, Cardinal Sin said the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was too vague 
and opened the door to American placement of nuclear weapons on Philippine soil. 
Senate leaders recognized that Sin’s opposition “cannot be ignored.”59
57Cecille M. Santillan and Cathy Rose A. Garcia, “Church Leaders Name 
Preference for Top Comelec Post, Palace Choice Known Soon,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (October 9,1998; accessed 3 December 2001).
58Jim Gomez, “Influential Church Leader Urges Philippine Senators to Reject 
U.S. Pact,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (May 17, 
1999; accessed 3 December 2001).
59“Philippine-US Defense Pact to Push Through Despite Objections: Officials,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 18,1999; 
accessed 3 December 2001).
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The Church remained relevant because it remained important. In areas other than 
politics, for example, the Church was often called upon to counsel and support the 
government. Estrada, who during the campaign promised to bring a settled peace to the 
trouble regions of the Philippines, backed away from his initial proposals. He 
unilaterally suspended talks with Muslim separatists and Communist rebels on the 
southern island of Mindanao. Senate Defense Committee Chairman Rodolfo Biazon 
feared a resumed war and appealed to the Church and Cardinal Sin to pressure Estrada to 
resolve differences through negotiation.60
Since the late 1980s, the Catholic Church in the Philippines had been actively 
involved with peace efforts in the archipelago. Some of these efforts were discussed 
previously, as was the Church’s role as primary mediator between the insurgencies and 
the State. The Church was also proactive in peace talks between the government and the 
leftist New People’s Army. Estrada sought a role for the Church in helping his 
government deal with both new and old threats to domestic peace.
Estrada’s administration called upon the Church to conduct talks with various 
factions of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayaff, a more recent 
insurgent threat that acted as a terrorist-kidnapping gang in the Mindanao-Sulu area and 
purportedly had ties to Osama bin Laden. Church officials had in the past successfully 
negotiated cease-fires between the government and these militants. The Church even 
actively pursued a joint dialogue between priests and Muslim clerics in an effort to unite 
the Filipino people from Luzon to Mindanao under a common cultural banner, all 
evidence of the Church’s continued role in shaping and forming the Philippine identity.
Its work with the government did not stop the Church from criticizing Estrada’s 
approach to peace. Whether it was a real attack on his failure to lead on the issue or just
60Raissa Robles, “Civil War Fears Amid Estrada Peace Tour,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (February 26, 1999; accessed 
3 December 2001).
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another chance to weaken the legitimacy of the Estrada presidency is a matter o f debate. 
But the attacks were anything but mild. Cardinal Sin accused Estrada's government of 
failing to provide leadership amid the crises o f the Muslim insurgency, kidnappings and 
bombings:
There is a growing perception that there exists a vacuum of leadership. Even 
government personnel, especially those with decision-making powers, cannot get 
their act together . . .  This situation will not leave us unless the government gives 
us clear directions and a common course of action . . .  the people are clamoring 
for a clearer, more analytical and more unified leadership.
President Estrada was willing to meet with the Catholic bishops about the way his 
administration was handling the insurgency issues, even desiring an open dialogue on the 
Church’s proposals to end the armed conflict. Meetings such as these with Church 
officials helped Estrada maintain a balance in his own policy in the region. It also gave 
him the opportunity to explain to the bishops in a fonnal setting his administration’s 
policy.
Domestic policy was not the only area in which the Church was utilized during 
the early Estrada administration. In the late 1980s and 1990s Church officials, including 
Cardinal Sin, served as de facto ambassadors to China, probing the Chinese government 
in matters o f religious freedom and reestablishing relations with the Republic o f the 
Philippines. Sin, himself of Chinese decent, visited China on several occasions serving 
as an unofficial but extremely influential representative o f the Philippine nation.
The Church also pressured the government successfully on other foreign policy 
issues. The most noticeable example was the situation in East Timor. East Timor had 
recently voted for independence when Estrada took office. He had to balance his need 
for good relations with Indonesia, from which East Timor was trying to break away,
61“Senior Philippines Church Leader Assails ‘Vacuum of Leadership’ During
Crisis,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 20, 
2000; accessed 3 December 2001).
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while being sensitive to the fact the East Timor was a predominately Catholic nation with 
tremendous sympathy from his country’s population and the Church.
The Church admitted that the Philippines were too far from East Timor to be 
directly affected by the turmoil there, but it drew parallels based on the commonality of 
their religion. The Catholic Church and its leadership, including Cardinal Sin, 
consistently urged the Philippine government to exert pressure to stop the bloodshed in 
East Timor, where anti-independence militias were murdering Catholics.62 Up to twenty 
Filipino nuns and priests were in East Timor during the height of the violence. "This 
should stop . . .  I am appealing to the [Philippine] Secretary of Foreign Affairs and to the 
ambassador of Indonesia to the Philippines to exert moral pressure to stop further 
bloodshed," Cardinal Sin stated.63
The pressure the Church exerted worked. Estrada agreed to commit 1,000 troops 
to the peacekeeping effort and said the final number of Philippine peacekeepers would 
depend on a decision by the United Nations. He was also willing to offer $200,000 in 
government funds to help the situation.64 The Philippine Catholic bishops also attempted 
to pressure the United States to put American troops into East Timor and halt what they 
described as Indonesian "genocide" in the mainly Catholic territory. Indonesia was also 
targeted. More than 2,000 priests, nuns, Catholic schoolchildren, and activists and a 
small group of East Timorese added to the political pressure with demonstrations. These 
protests were staged in front of the Indonesian embassy.
f t y  •“Bishops Call for Action in E. Timor,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Gulf News (September 16,1999; accessed 3 December 2001).
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“Philippine Church Leader Urges Pressure to Stop East Timor Bloodshed,” 
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accessed 3 December 2001).
64“Philippines Gives Dlrs 200,000 for East Timor, Offers Troops,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (September 15, 1999; accessed 3 
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“The Philippines should help promote democracy in East Timor," said Cardinal 
Sin, who led the nuns and priests at one of these demonstrations. “We have been vigilant 
about our democracy. We also want democracy to reign in East Timor." Estrada 
welcomed the decision made by Catholic bishops and business leaders in Manila to send 
humanitarian assistance to East Timor. Church groups also launched a campaign o f their 
own to raise funds for humanitarian aid to East Timor. The National Secretariat for Social 
Action, Justice and Peace and Caritas Philippines began a "Save East Timor" campaign. 
NASSA hoped to solicit more from corporations, prominent personalities, politicians, and 
major Catholic universities.
The cooperation between the Church and State regarding East Timor may 
represent the best o f times for the Catholic Church an d the Estrada administration.
Having come to power in spite of Church opposition, Estrada did not feel any particular 
allegiance or affinity towards the Church or its leadership, but he had to be wary. Estrada 
understood that because of his lifestyle as much as his politics, he was a political target 
for the Church. He needed to be careful in his dealings both domestically and 
internationally to stave off the ever-present Church and its willingness to release pastoral 
letters condemning Estrada for his missteps.
Estrada had at one time been aligned with the Church against Ramos in the debate 
over charter change. As a witness to history, one would think that he would avoid such a 
fight for his own administration. Yet he did not. Perhaps it was his own feeling of 
invulnerability based on his electoral success. Whatever the case, he chose to make 
charter change an issue in his administration, and just as it had during the Ramos years, 
the Church was there to meet the president in political battle. The new clash over 
changing the 1987 Constitution would spark a series o f events that would make Estrada a 
frequent target o f Church criticism and scrutiny. In a matter of months he would be 
embroiled in repeated scandals, all culminating in the call for People Power II and the 
sudden and dramatic collapse of the Estrada administration.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE POLLS, THE PULPIT, AND THE STREET
Joseph “Erap” Estrada was elevated to the office o f president through a large 
plurality o f the vote in 1998. His popularity among the masses superseded any 
politician’s at that time, and this popularity would prove to be a formidable hurdle for the 
Church to overcome in its own efforts to influence policy and Estrada’s presidency. He 
posed new challenges for the Church, because while it did not want him in office, Estrada 
proved that without the Church he could still be elected and legitimized.
Estrada was the epitome of the populous politician who attempted to use other 
methods to maintain his legitimacy. He challenged the Church’s role as the mediating “z” 
variable. Attempting to maintain the Church’s position as the “z” variable meant 
inevitable confrontations between the Church and Estrada. Indeed, during the Estrada 
administration it seemed the penchant for the Church to criticize his government and for 
Estrada to blast the Church was matched only by the seemingly endless number o f calls 
from both sides for “reconciliation.” The pattern seemed to be: assault-^ reconcile-^ 
assault again-> reconcile once more, all the while preparing for the inevitable final 
political battle. This future battle could take many forms. It could happen at the next 
election if Estrada survived, or it could happen in the streets should the Church come 
across an issue that necessitated a People Power-type revolution to depose the president.
This chapter is therefore important in illustrating how the Church adapted its 
strategy to fit the problem, and in the process emerged more politically powerful and 
invigorated. Challenging Estrada’s legitimacy would require an adjustment in strategy, 
and it was an adjustment that the Church was able to make. Through the use o f specific 
instances from the Estrada administration, the reader will come to understand just how 
the Church was able to manipulate events in its favor and eventually succeed in bringing 
Estrada down.
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The previous chapter mentioned briefly how the Church and Estrada began his 
administration with a hint o f cooperation. However, this cooperation had its limits, and as 
Estrada pushed forward with his domestic political reforms in the second year o f his 
administration, he had the backing o f the business community but not the Church. 
Estrada’s main domestic project for the year 1999 was his Constitutional Correction for 
Development (Concord), a fancy name for what had in the past commonly been called 
“Charter Change.” As Estrada floated trial balloons for his own version o f “Charter 
Change,” the Catholic Church hardened its stance against him. In time, the Church called 
for a rally to denounce Estrada and what Cardinal Sin called the “cronies” of the late 
dictator Ferdinand Marcos who were influencing the Estrada administration.1 It was also 
a very public way for the Church to express its displeasure with Estrada’s attempts to 
change the constitution.
Estrada insisted that his changes were different from Ramos’s because he would 
limit his changes to economic provisions, such as the ban on foreign entities owning land. 
Any political changes he wanted to make would take affect after he was out o f office.
The Church did not support this argument. Cardinal Sin called Estrada’s plan a 
“dangerous exercise,” fearing that opening the constitution to change would allow the 
involvement o f what Sin termed “crazy people.”2 By opposing Estrada’s ideas for the 
constitution, the Church and Cardinal Sin believed that they were doing their “duty” as 
Philippine citizens by remaining “vigilant” so that the gains of EDSA would not be lost.
The Church feared opening up the constitution to any change that might lead to an 
extension o f term limits. This would allow a political enemy like Estrada to serve up to
1 Cecil Morelia, “Aquino, Church Leaders Gang Up on Philippine Leader,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (July 30, 1999; accessed 8 
August 2002).
2Ibid.
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twelve years in office, an unpalatable situation for the Church.3 It believed such a move 
would endanger the fragile Philippine democracy, and it felt that general legislation could 
address any economic problems and a constitutional assembly was unnecessary.
Estrada expected Church opposition and took his case for Concord to the press.
He argued that provisions in the 1987 Constitution hurt the nation’s economy because 
they limited foreign investment. But words were not enough to convince the press or the 
people. Estrada needed the support o f popular figures. If the mainstream Church was not 
going support him, then Estrada had to find someone else. He did, and he soon trotted 
out Brother Mike Velarde, the leader of the Philippines' largest charismatic movement, El 
Shaddai, and Estrada's spiritual adviser.
By having Brother Mike at his side Estrada hoped to illustrate that he had 
“religious” support for his proposed changes. Velarde, who went against the Church and 
Cardinal Sin by backing Estrada's presidential campaign, organized a birthday celebration 
to coincide with a rally of support for Estrada. It was no accident that this celebration 
corresponded with the Catholic Church’s own planned rally against Concord.4 The rally 
organized by Verlade and Estrada was expected to draw a larger audience, because while 
the Church offered patriotism and rhetoric, Verlade and Estrada offered a festival 
atmosphere and a chance for families to come and enjoy a free meal.5
3“Sin Taps Church Network vs Constitutional Change (Pastoral Letter’s Targets: 
Cronyism, Threat to Press Freedom,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
BusinessWorld (August 1, 1999; accessed 22 November 2002).
Verlade’s actions drew heat from the mainstream Church, even to the point of 
generating talk o f an official censure from the Church. The censure, had it proceeded, 
would have been based on the “official” position that Verlade was transgressing Church 
doctrine while preaching the gospel to his followers. The unspecified and unclear nature 
of the charge mattered little, for Verlade’s real crime was his unqualified support for 
Estrada.
5Raissa Robles, “Free Food at Rally Expected to Draw Millions,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (August 18, 1999, accessed 8 
August 2002).
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To counter Verlade’s and Estrada’s moves, the Church mobilized its power base. 
Indeed, it had all it needed to counter Estrada’s moves, for it could work within 
democracy and appeal to nationalism and Catholicism to counter his actions. Cardinal Sin 
urged through a pastoral letter for the faithful to join the Church’s rally against Concord. 
The letter was read during Mass in Catholic churches nationwide. In his letter, Sin 
stressed past Church successes and exhorted parishioners to join if  they “still believe in 
freedom and you want our children to remain free, join me . . .  for our rally for freedom. 
Let us not wait until it is too late. Vigilance is the price of freedom."6 In the letter, he 
also linked Estrada with Marcos and called for "morality," "transparency," and "truth" in 
Estrada’s government. Sin also said that the rally was a show of “patriotism," and 
patriotism was an expression of the love o f God and the Church.
Estrada did not let the issuance o f the pastoral letter pass without a reaction. He 
branded Cardinal Sin's statements as "lies" and "baseless accusations."7 Moreover, 
Estrada believed that his actions would benefit the people and as such, he had God’s 
support. "Despite all the insults [the Church] will make, similar to those o f Cardinal Sin's, 
they cannot change my mind because I believe the voice o f the people is the voice of 
God," Estrada said.8 However, Estrada was careful not to push the Church too far. Just a 
day after he issued his statement, he expressed hope that he and Cardinal Sin could sit 
down to a nice lunch and patch up their differences.9
6“ Sin Taps Church Network vs Constitutional Change.”
7Donna S. Cueto and Blanche S. Rivera, “Palace Tells Critics: Erap no Marcos,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (September 22, 
2000; accessed 8 August 2002).
8“Sin Taps Church Network vs Constitutional Change.”
9“Erap Turns Conciliatory,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Manila 
Standard (August 17, 1999; accessed 17 November 2002).
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Estrada’s sober and conciliatory tone contrasted sharply with the angry rhetoric he 
often directed towards the Church. But he was not alone in his criticism. Top 
government officials also urged the Church leadership to refrain from preaching a 
"gospel o f hate" against the Estrada administration.
Batangas Representative Ralph Recto, a member of the administration’s Laban ng 
Masang Filipino, called on Sin and other Church leaders to stop using the pulpit to raise 
"alarmist statements" regarding Estrada and Concord.10 When August 20,1999, arrived, 
the Church’s anti-Concord rally drew an estimated crowd of more than 150,000 people. 
The Church’s efforts from the pulpit paid huge dividends. People took to the streets in 
several major cities to oppose Estrada’s efforts. In Manila alone, the number was 
estimated to be 75,000. These rallies were the first large-scale public opposition 
organized by the Church against Estrada’s administration. The Church framed itself in 
the role o f valiant warrior opposing the oppressor. Those who came heard a litany of 
anti-Estrada propaganda, much of it comparing his administration to Marcos’s. "We 
fought a dictatorship then," said Josefina Fernando, a Franciscan nun who spoke to the 
protestors. “We are here to prevent this government from ending up like that one.”11
The Church’s success at turning out tens o f thousands was a point of pride, but 
surprisingly it could not match the success of the Verlade-Estrada rally held the same 
weekend. That rally drew more than 600,000 people in metro-Manila. It was certainly 
impressive, but neither Estrada nor Verlade could have believed the masses were there 
simply to celebrate a birthday or support Estrada’s Concord. Indeed, they were there for 
the festive atmosphere and the free food, and the politics o f the event were secondary. In 
the end, the numbers at the Church rally might have not matched Estrada’s, but those in
ÎbidL
11 Jim Gomez, “Filipinos Protest Proposed Change to Constitution,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Seattle Times (August 20, 1999, accessed 8 August 
2002).
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attendance at the Church’s rally were there with purpose, were politically astute, and 
were active and did not show up simply for free food.
The Church claimed a moral victory that overshadowed Estrada’s numbers. "The 
rally last Friday achieved its purpose. We said what we wanted to say. We manifested 
openly, peacefully and emphatically our concerns, more specifically regarding the 
proposal to change the Constitution. Now the ball is in the President's court," said
10Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines President Archbishop Oscar Cruz. With 
both rallies considered successes, each side waited for the other to react.
Estrada’s reaction was quick and reconciliatory. He agreed to meet with Cardinal 
Sin to discuss Concord. However, those plans were put on hold almost immediately. No 
real excuse was given as to why Estrada changed his mind. Perhaps he believed the 
numbers at his own rally provided him with the necessary political clout to demean the 
Church’s role in the Concord issue. After his rally, Estrada belittled Cardinal Sin and the 
Church’s political role, saying the Church and the cardinal should concentrate on 
preaching spiritual and moral values and stay out o f his politics. "Maybe he [Cardinal 
Sin] should leave the matter of running the government to the duly-elected leaders—past 
and present. We are the ones accountable to the people.”13
Estrada may have overlooked the Church’s role in his own legitimacy, but 
advisors close to him did not. It seems that behind the scenes pressure was exerted after 
his comments, and Estrada made a counter-announcement a few days later. He recanted 
his earlier statements and vowed to “consult” the Church before making any changes to 
the country's constitution. It was an astonishing about face. Estrada abruptly visited Sin’s
12 •  •“Church Waits for Signals from State,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (August 21, 1999; accessed 1 September 2002).
13“Erap: With Cory, FVR, Yes: With Sin, No,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (August 23, 1999; accessed 1 September 2002).
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residence for a late afternoon meeting. Although Estrada believed there were no 
specifics to discuss, he said he felt the meeting was necessary to mend fences.14
Estrada also preempted speculation about whether or not the Church would play a 
role in legitimizing possible changes to the constitution. After the meeting, he outlined 
for the press his plans to appoint a preparatory commission whose sole purpose would be 
to look over all proposed changes and come up with a specific plan to address the 
constitutional amendments. Furthermore, he agreed to let the Church help select 
members o f the committee. Lastly, Estrada promised that once the committee had 
completed its work he would submit it to “his eminence."15
In a matter o f days, Estrada went from telling the Church to “stay out” of politics 
to including it in every level o f his decision-making process regarding the Concord.
Either he or one of his advisors realized that fighting the Church over changes to the 1987 
Constitution was a losing battle. It was better to make the Church a participant in the 
process itself and ensure its full support for any changes that might be made.
The Church accepted the president’s offer, but it never really felt comfortable 
with Concord. Moreover, it continued to encourage street protests against “Charter 
Change.” In September 1999, thousands marched in Manila's streets to mark the 
anniversary of Marcos’s declaration of martial law. The rallies were not a mere 
remembrance of the past but were also tied to Estrada’s efforts with Concord. Rallies 
were held simultaneously in thirty-two cities and provinces. Each gathering was a potent 
mix of Church theology and political activism, with people waving anti-Estrada banners 
and carrying images of the Virgin Mary.
I4“Erap Meets Cory, Jaime at Palace o f Archbishop,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] BusinessWorld (August 31, 1999; accessed 23 November 2002).
15Barbara Mae Dacanay, “Estrada Bows to Cardinal's Will,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Gulf News (August 31, 1999; accessed 12 June 2002).
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Estrada’s pledge to include the Church was never fulfilled to the Church’s 
satisfaction. There was really no way for Estrada to placate the Church, for it never 
called off its vocal opposition against the administration’s plan for Concord. One Church 
organizer, Father Robert Reyes, said that the Church-sponsored outpourings would “. . .  
not stop until the President listens to the voice o f the people and stops pushing for 
[Concord]."
Reyes said that the Church was committed to bringing more people to the streets 
if  necessary.16 Cardinal Sin added, "The moves to amend the charter now is a threat to 
our democracy. The reasons for changing the charter are not clear. The character of the
• • • 17people who will be tasked with amending the charter gives me a nightmare.”
Estrada was unwilling or unable to concede his policies to the Church’s influence. 
He did not want the Church to dictate the policy or the makeup of any “Charter Change.” 
It was better to strategically retreat from Concord at this point and regroup to fight 
another day. In essence, the Church’s pressure worked and in January 2000, Estrada 
announced that he would back off his plan to change the constitution.
The Church welcomed the move, sending out the figurative olive branches of 
peace. Cardinal Sin released a favorable public message via the Philippine press stating 
that the Church was not Estrada’s enemy over Concord but was merely engaged in an 
honest disagreement about policy. Sin offered a change in the tone of political rhetoric, 
saying, “I believe in the goodwill and good heart of the President. Our criticisms o f his
16“Thousands March Against Cha-Cha,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] BusinessWorld (September 22, 1999; accessed 21 November 2002).
^Thousands Join Philippine Protest Rally,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Japan Economic Newswire (September 21,1999; accessed 17 November 
2002).
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administration do not make us his enemies or oppositionists. We really want to make him 
succeed."18
It is unlikely that Estrada was moved by the Church’s kind words, because he and 
the Church knew it was matter of time before they clashed again. Dropping Concord 
from his domestic agenda earned Estrada some breathing room, at least publicly. He 
made other favorable moves in his governmental appointments. The Church was 
particularly pleased by the appointment of Alfredo Lim as interior secretary. Lim's 
appointment was seen as a “peace offering” to Cardinal Sin and ex-President Aquino.
In 1998, Lim had been Sin’s choice and the Church worked to get him elected. However, 
like the other candidates, Estrada soundly defeated him.19 His inclusion in the Estrada 
administration was a roundabout victory for the Church.
Estrada may have told the Church and the public that he was dropping the idea of 
Concord, but he was never through with his Concord propaganda. Estrada continued to 
celebrate “Charter Change” as a personal and national priority. Although he had agreed 
not to push for it in 2000, Concord was his pet project and ten days after publicly 
shelving it, he claimed the press had misunderstood his true intentions. Far from 
disposing o f the plans for Concord, Estrada said that he would “never backtrack” because 
he fervently believed that change was necessary.20
Estrada’s behavior was not schizophrenic. Perhaps he believed that if  he paused, 
regrouped, and rethought his strategy he could take up the issue again in the future. At
1 ft“Sin Happy with Concord Deferment,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (January 11, 2000; accessed 12 June 2002).
19Jonathan Sprague and Antonio Lopez, “Act II for Estrada,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Asia Week (January 21, 2000; accessed 8 August 2002).
90 •  • •“Philippine President Says Moves to Amend Constitution Continue,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Manila Times (January 13, 2000; accessed 12 
November 2001).
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the time, Estrada still had four years left in his term, plenty of time to push through 
constitutional change. Perhaps it was the result of a leader’s inability to accept a political 
defeat at the hands o f the Church, or maybe it was simply that he could not stomach the 
patronizing statements in the press coming from Cardinal Sin and other Church officials.
Estrada continued to enjoy support from a large segment of the population. He 
believed, and rightly so, that close to half o f the population supported some form of 
constitutional change. In the first four months o f 2000, the numbers only grew stronger. 
Pulse Asia, in its March 2000 survey, found that 45 percent of the population agreed that 
the country's constitution needed to be amended. That was up from 39 percent during 
September 1999. The ranks of those who disapproved of the move, on the other hand, 
dwindled from 57 percent to 44 percent during the same period.21 So why was it that 
Estrada needed to bow to the Church’s wishes and its criticism of his administration? Did 
he not have a mandate from the people? Indeed he did, both from the 1998 election and 
from the polls on Concord. Yet as this study has consistently illustrated numerous times, 
without the Church’s support it is difficult to maintain the people’s support.
Estrada did not deal well with criticisms and patronizing statements from the 
Church. When attacked, he often struck back. He even promoted a boycott against the 
widely read Philippine Daily Inquirer, which had been particularly critical of him and his 
policies and seemed to favored the Church in much o f its coverage. Estrada publicly 
accused the Inquirer o f maligning him and filed a libel suit against the publication. The 
suit was dropped after the owners wrote a front-page apology.
Seizing this controversy, the Church attacked Estrada on many levels. The issue 
provided yet another way for the Church to chip away at his credibility and his 
legitimacy. The Church pointed out that it was not the fault of the Inquirer that Estrada
21 Luz Baguioro, “Filipinos Warm Up to Idea o f Charter Change,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Strait Times, (April 19, 2000; accessed 11 September 
2002).
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suffered from what Cardinal Sin called a "crisis of credibility." Sin also bashed Estrada’s 
suit as an attempt to censor the press and prevent free political commentary. Sin noted, 
"When we see clear attempts to silence the opposition and to harass free expression how
• • 99can the citizens not worry about a return to authoritarianism?"
In addition, Cardinal Sin urged Estrada to behave more like a president, and "to 
look at criticism with openness, humility and even with gratitude."23 He publicly 
questioned Estrada’s fitness to govern. “When government officials make statements in 
public with no reflection, decorum and finesse, how can the citizens' respect be won? 
When government deals are done under dark clouds of suspicions, how can trust in public 
office be sustained? When the cronies o f the dictatorship are perceived to be close allies 
of government, how can we believe that justice will indeed be served?" Sin asked.24
Estrada bit back in a published interview. In it, he pointed his own finger of 
shame at the Catholic Church. He brashly lumped Cardinal Sin in with openly 
subversive and violent groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New
9 ̂People’s Army. Such charges went above the usual rhetoric exchanged between the 
Church and State. In the same interview, he oddly expressed an admiration for the unity 
of Vietnam and said he was disturbed by the Philippines’ disunity. He went further, 
making vague references to a plot to destabilize his own government. There is little doubt 
that he meant to include the Church among those groups that wished to overthrow him.
99 “Church Accuses Philippine Leader of Muzzling Press, Opposition,’’[Wire 




“'I Am In control': The President Defends His Reworked Agenda,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Asia Week (February 2, 2000; accessed 8 
September 2002).
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Expressing an admiration for a brutal Communist dictatorship was certainly no 
way to win the Catholic Church’s support, particularly when there was an ongoing 
political fight over the future o f the Church-crafted constitution. Estrada had a few high- 
profile allies to keep the pressure on, including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who in the 
past had benefited from the Church’s power during the 1986 revolution. Forgetting what 
the Church had done for his political career, Enrile publicly charged that it was now a 
destabilizing force at work against the Estrada administration.26 To have raised the ire of 
so many Estrada allies meant that the Church was effective in its criticism.
The Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines (CBCP) vehemently denied 
Enrile’s claims. “Our business is to point out the corruption and moral ills in the 
government," said Monsignor Hernando Coronel, CBCP spokesman. Coronel also stated 
that it was not the Church’s business to topple governments and the criticisms 
surrounding Concord and other issues were merely part o f the “prophetic” role that the 
CBCP and Cardinal Sin had a right to exercise.27 When asked to characterize his own 
role in relation to the government, Cardinal Sin said, "When necessary, I am an 
accelerator and people accuse me of being a radical. When the situation calls for it, I am 
the brakes.”28
In a few words, Cardinal Sin had summarized the Church’s role and his position 
as its leader. Neither could keep silent, for their roles were ones of oversight. They did 
not seek to create policy, but they were determined to help shape it and oppose it if  it 
conflicted with Church goals. They were the mediating force, giving voice to a 
population who might otherwise be bulldozed by the political machine o f the Estrada
“Bishops Deny Plot vs. Erap,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 9, 2000; accessed 5 August 2002).
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
252
government. When the single voice o f a voter was not enough and when something or 
someone needed to mobilize thousands to be heard, Cardinal Sin felt that the Church had 
a right and a duty to do it. The people may not have always agreed with the Church’s 
stance, but there had never been mass opposition to its policies and positions.
Despite the political bickering, by early 2000 the Church and the president were 
sure of their respective roles in the political drama of Philippine politics. Never far from 
the surface were the Church’s desire to depose Estrada and Estrada’s desire to circumvent 
the Church’s influence and push his agenda through Congress. Yet all was not political 
warfare between Estrada and the Church. Often in the public arena the proverbial 
“hatchet” could be buried long enough for a political truce to take affect.
An example o f this reconciliation came in February 2000, during the fourteenth 
anniversary o f the first People Power Revolution that had toppled Marcos in 1986.
Estrada portrayed himself as its champion. In actuality, he had been a minor victim of 
the People Power Revolution. After the first EDSA revolution when Corey Aquinio took 
office, one of her first principle acts at the Church’s behest was to fire hundreds of local 
officials believed to be connected to Marcos. Estrada was then serving as mayor of San 
Juan in Metro Manila and was summarily dismissed.
Putting a spin on his past victimization at the hands of the Church, Estrada said he 
accepted his removal because he believed that at the time it was the only way for true 
reform to be implemented by the Aquino administration.29 He went further in his mea 
culpa by claiming that his dismissal in the wake of EDSA I, as People Power has come to 
be called, prompted him to seek higher positions. He became a senator, vice president, 
and eventually president. It was a blessing in disguise and after winning the presidency, 
Estrada continually identified himself as a champion of the events at EDSA.
29“Erap: Keep People Power Alive.”
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The anniversary proved to be a political Christmas of sorts when bad feelings 
were put aside in celebration of a wondrous birth, in this case the birth of a new 
Philippine democracy. The tone carried over into March 2000. Perhaps both sides were 
weary and in need of a respite, for since 1998 the Philippines had experienced almost two 
years of political fighting between the Church and Estrada.
Publicly at least, both sides continued the time of reconciliation and good feelings 
for the next few weeks. For his part, Estrada urged Filipinos to forgive him for past 
transgressions and broken campaign promises. The Church urged the people to pay less 
attention to the president’s failings and focus instead on unifying and working together 
towards solving society’s problems.30 However, like a bad marriage, it was inevitable 
that the respite would end and the bickering between the two sides would resume.
A mere month after the “reconciliation,” Cardinal Sin opened up a new political 
assault on Estrada. He blasted the administration and accused the highest levels of 
government o f having what he termed a “vacuum o f leadership.”31 What prompted his 
outrage was a spate o f bombings in Manila and the Estrada administration’s failure to 
arrest those responsible. Estrada had also failed to address the issue o f poverty to the 
Cardinal’s satisfaction. Finally, the Church had offered in good faith to mediate the talks 
between Muslim separatists and the government, but had been snubbed by Estrada.
Estrada did more than rebuff the Church’s offer to negotiate with the separatists. 
He also ignored pleas for a temporary cease-fire from a Church-led coalition that 
included groups such as the Coalition for Peace, the Makati Business Club, the National
TO > • • •“Estrada Wants to Rectify Past Mistakes,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Gulf News (April 22, 2000; accessed 4 June 2002).
o 1
Norman Bordadora, Carlito Pablo, and Juliet L. Javellana, “Sin Slams 'Vacuum 
of Leadership' in Gov't,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (May 25, 2000; accessed 8 July 2002).
32Ibid.
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Peace Conference, Abanse Pinay, the Akbayan Citizens' Party, and the Association of 
Major Religious Superiors o f the Philippines.33 Estrada’s administration also blasted the 
Papal envoy, Archbishop Antonia Franco, for suggesting in a speech that Estrada did not 
want peace in the Philippines.34 The cardinal defended the envoy as a “man of peace.”
He turned the tables on the critics, charging that anyone who was “offended by a man o f  
peace cannot be men of peace themselves."
Attacking a “man of peace” was construed as further evidence that the Estrada 
government lacked something substantial in leadership. However, the Estrada 
administration immediately attempted to rebuff any claims of a “vacuum of leadership” at 
the top. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora blasted the Church’s insinuation and 
implied that the Church had no clue about the president’s real nature. Press Secretary and 
Presidential Spokesman Ricardo Puno Jr. said much the same thing. In denying any 
vacuum of power, he said, “It is clear the President is not just in control. He and his 
Cabinet are also working hard to address the problems o f the country, including those 
concerning our economy . . .  with all due respect to our Cardinal, [I don’t know] what he 
based his statement on the supposed leadership vacuum in the government."36
During the Papal envoy scandal and the argument over leadership, there were the 
first hints of something bigger brewing in the way of scandals. The rumors o f this new
33Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Erap Rebuffs Sin, Cory on Ceasefire,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 1, 2000: accessed 8 
August 2002).
34Armand Nocum and Norman Bordadora, “Erap Men Mad at Papal Envoy,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 14, 2001; 
accessed 8 August 2002).
35Norman Bordadora, “Sin Defends Papal Nuncio, Lambastes President's Men,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 15, 2000; 
accessed 7 September 2002).
36Gilbert Felongco, “Manila Denies Sin's Charges,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Gulf News (May, 26, 2000; accessed 7 September 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255
scandal revealed an affiliation between Estrada and large gambling cartels in the 
Philippines. The Church had always found the Estrada administration’s lackadaisical 
attitude towards gambling offensive, and as early as January 2000 it seemed the Church 
had some insight into possible connections between gambling illegalities and the Estrada 
administration. One thing was certain, if  a scandal could be created, Cardinal Sin and the 
Church would go out of their way to link it with the Estrada administration. Indeed, 
gambling was choice material for the Church. It was often linked with “poverty” and a
"5*7
“lack of direction” within Estrada’s government.
The scandal that would develop out o f these rumors is pivotal to this study, for it 
is the final fight between Estrada and the Church. It is the final showdown between two 
powerful political forces, and one that sees the Church and Estrada come face to face in a 
political showdown for his legitimacy as president. The scandal itself and how the 
Church used it to take legitimacy away from Estrada is fascinating on many levels. Not 
only is it the story of a president’s downfall, but it illustrates the Church’s power to make 
news, create controversy, and energize enough o f the people’s authority to topple a 
government.
Being two years removed from the scandal, this study has many luxuries of 
hindsight. However, one question that cannot be answered fully is whether or not the 
Church had advance knowledge of the impending scandal. But whether it knew or not, 
the Church behaved in a particularly unsavory manner towards the Estrada administration 
in the weeks leading up to the story breaking. There were no olive branches passed 
between the two camps, and the Church did not offer any reconciliatory rhetoric. In fact, 
it publicly turned up the pressure on Estrada. But these attacks were merely a prelude to 
the bigger scandal, one that would see the Church launch its final assault on the
- 5 7  t
“Philippine Church Leader Slams Arrival o f Floating Casino,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (January 3, 2000; accessed 12 
November 2002).
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presidency and bring to fulfillment its long-expressed desire to remove Estrada from 
office.
The irony and symmetry of what was about to unfold could not fail to be 
appreciated. The Church had a hand in driving Estrada from his mayoral office in 1986, 
yet it had been unsuccessful in keeping him from winning the presidency. Since 1998, it 
had never failed to publicize every major and minor fault of Estrada and his 
administration. Those were nitpicking political attacks and did not damage the 
president’s overall popularity among the masses. What the Church needed was 
something big, something that the majority could not overlook.
The Church needed an issue to serve as the foundation for a new “People Power” 
revolt to rip legitimacy away from Estrada. In late summer 2000, when Estrada remained 
as popular as any elected president during the same time, the Church found that issue. It 
was the political ammunition it needed to topple Estrada. This new scandal would prove 
to be the missing link required to energize the Church and the public and take away 
Estrada’s mantle of legitimacy.
The story began when one of Estrada’s closest friends sought the Church’s 
assistance and guidance in a matter o f great importance. This “friend” had information 
that the president was involved in high-level illegalities, and he felt that the Church 
would be interested in knowing the specifics. Estrada’s “Judas” in this political passion 
play was a man by the name o f Luis “Chavit” Singson. Singson had been both Estrada’s 
friend and political confidant for much of their political lives. Singon, the governor of 
Ilocos Sur, bolted from his friendship with Estrada after the President seized tax revenue 
from the treasury o f Ilocos Sur. At the time he sought out the Church’s help, he was 
serving as the provincial governor of Illocos Sur. Singson’s relationship to Estrada meant 
he was privy to important personal information. It also meant he had powerful allies, and 
turning on them meant making powerful enemies.
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To protect his life and ensure his credibility, Singson sought out the Catholic 
Church’s assistance, support, and protection before going public with his story of
on
Estrada’s massive corruption. Cardinal Sin eagerly listened to the story. Singson’s 
story was not filled with the typical allegations hurled against Estrada. His story was 
something quite different. As Governor o f Illocos Sur, Singson claimed he was forced to 
collect payoffs and kickbacks for President Estrada, including PI30 million from the 
province's tax proceeds and P414 million from a gambling jueteng.39
Allegations o f illegal gambling fit in well with the picture the Church wanted to 
paint of Estrada as being incompetent, irresponsible, a liar, a thief, and immoral.
Singson’s allegations had in effect spilled Estrada’s proverbial blood, and the sharks o f  
the Church began to circle. Singson asked for the Church’s help and he got it. But it 
came at a price. The Church would make sure that Singson brought his “crusade” against 
Estrada to a successful completion.
When the story of Singson’s revelations hit the Philippine press, it had an 
immediate impact on the economy and the value of the Philippine peso. The peso 
plunged to a low of 47.35 per dollar and stocks hit a two-year low. Singson now feared 
for his life, and he said as much in his statements to the press: "I had wanted to come out 
with this for a long time but I could not because the president was my friend . . .  It is hard 
to go against a powerful man—they will file cases against you, they will even try to kill
-5 0
“Cardinal Sin Supports Singson Efforts on Gambling Allegations Against 
Estrada,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] AFX News (October 9, 2000; 
accessed 8 September 2002).
“T Was Desperate, I Gave P544m,'” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 8, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
40“Archbishop Urges Estrada to Step Down,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Deseret News (October 11, 2000; accessed 7 September, 2002).
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The way in which Singson made his allegations public by working through the 
Church appears to build a strong circumstantial case that the Church applied the 
necessary pressure on the otherwise loyal Singson to turn on Estrada publicly. The 
behind-the-scenes machinations o f Cardinal Sin, other Church officials, and Singson are 
not fully known, but a deal was certainly struck in which the Church would offer moral 
support and a modicum of protection for Singson if he was willing to tell his story in full 
and serve as the chief witness in the moral crusade and Estrada’s eventual impeachment.
Singson was certainly not the Church’s poster boy for ethics. He had admitted to 
illegalities o f his own, but he was a useful tool in helping turn the public against Estrada. 
The Church offered support and Singson offered evidence. The partnership, such as it 
was, seemed to work well. Singson, Cardinal Sin, and the Church were pleased with the 
results of their initial meetings. Singson himself said, "I left my meeting with Cardinal 
Sin with a stronger resolve and an inner peace, as he assured me of his prayers and 
counseled me not to be afraid o f telling the truth."41 In other words, Cardinal Sin had 
praised Singson for his courage to come forth and give the Church the much-needed 
evidence to finally eliminate Estrada. In so doing, Singson was offered forgiveness for 
his own crimes and the protection afforded by the Church to someone who can be o f use 
in its political aims. Singson had given the Church the long-awaited key to bring down 
Estrada, and it was a chance that the Church could not and would not miss. It was a 
convergence of luck for both sides. Estrada had long dodged the Church’s fire, but this 
time it would be more difficult.
Some may doubt that the Church had a concerted plan to oust Estrada. But after 
he was merely implicated in an alleged illegal jeuteng by the admitted criminal Singson, 
the Church went straight to the press and the people to call for Estrada’s resignation.
41Ceres P. Doyo and Norman Bordadora, “Singson Dubbed ‘Enrile o f Erap’” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (October 10, 
2000; accessed 20 November 2002).
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Indeed, a mere day after Singsong’s press conference Cardinal Sin, speaking on behalf 
the Church, called for Estrada’s resignation, saying he had lost "the moral ascendancy to 
govern.” He also called for Estrada to “relinquish his office and turn it over to the 
constitutional successor."42
The Church circumvented the courts and the constitutional process to get a jump 
on influencing public opinion. Given the tradition of being innocent until proven guilty 
and the Catholic Church’s forgiving nature, it seemed at least a bit hasty to call for the 
resignation o f the nation’s highest elected official before a complete hearing o f the facts. 
The media did not fail to notice the early signs o f the Church’s planned strategy. They 
said Singson’s press conference looked like the early beginning o f a “People Power” type 
uprising. As in 1986, the Church was there and Singson appeared to play a role similar to 
the one played by Marcos’s defense minister, Juan Ponce Enrile.43
It is also likely the Church had preliminary contact with Estrada’s “successor.”
She was none other than Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the daughter o f former President 
Diosdado Macapagal, who was defeated in 1985 by Ferdinand Marcos. Arroyo was 
Estrada’s vice president, but she understood the importance of the Church as an ally.
And if the time came and the Church called her to power, whether through another 
“People Power” or other means, she would be ready to serve.
It was not accidental that the same day the Church called for Estrada’s resignation 
Arroyo resigned her cabinet post as secretary of social welfare.44 She had been advised 
to do so by Cardinal Sin. Arroyo’s action sent a very public message to Estrada that she
42 • •“Philippine Church Leader Calls on President to Step Down,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (October 11, 2000; accessed 7 
September 2002).
43Doyo and Bordadora, “Singson Dubbed 'Emile o f Erap.’”
44Jim Gomez, “Philippine VP Leaves Cabinet Post,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] AP Online (October 12,2000; accessed 7 September 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
260
supported the Church’s call for his resignation, and that Estrada would not have her 
support in the months ahead. It is not mere speculation whether or not the Church’s 
actions and those o f the vice president were concerted. She admitted as much a few 
months later.45 Her admission was not surprising given the close relationship between the 
Church and Arroyo during the scandal and the continued role the Church had in advising 
in her administration. It is unlikely that she would have made such bold moves had 
Cardinal Sin and the Church not assured her full political and moral support in the 
coming months.
The CBCP on October 13 2001, also called for Estrada’s resignation. In the 
CBCP’s statement, it said that Estrada had lost the right to serve as president. CBCP 
President, Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, upped the ante when he officially endorsed 
Cardinal Sin’s earlier call for the people to unite in the expression of their outrage about 
the president's alleged illegalities 46 The Church, acting in its role as the mediating 
variable in the Philippines, had launched an effort to influence public opinion and 
organize the faithful around the cause of withdrawing legitimacy from Estrada and 
banishing him from public office.
Other Church members involved in anti-Estrada activities immediately backed the 
CBCP and the Cardinal’s call. "President Estrada has turned the national leadership into a 
national disaster. He has lost the moral and political basis to run the country and must 
therefore heed the growing calls for his resignation," said Father Joe Dizon, the 
spokesman for the September 21 Committee, a Catholic group that gained prominence
45James Hookway, “Arroyo Makes Preparations For Possible Life After Estrada — 
- Acceding to Presidency, She Would Confront Conflicts Among Supporters — 'We Will 
Go Straight to the International Capital Market,'” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] The Asian Wall Street Journal (January 19, 2001; accessed 8 September 
2002).
46“Catholic Bishops Support Cardinal Sin's Call On Estrada To Resign,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] World News Connection (October 13, 2000; 
accessed 8 September 2002).
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for leading nationwide protest actions against corruption, martial law, and the Estrada 
administration.47
The Church moved quickly to solidify its political support. Part o f this effort was 
the unification of disparate factions that acted independently against Estrada. This 
required the Church to form alliances that normally would not have been considered. For 
example, it bucked its traditional wariness o f the military and joined with the 2,000- 
strong Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM), a group o f ex-military rebels 
who backed Corazon Aquino's rise to power. They also joined with the Guardians, a 
group composed o f 800,000 reserve and active military soldiers, as well as the Young 
Officers Union and other legitimate groups in the Armed Forces to call for Estrada’s
48resignation.
As special-interest support was growing and uniting with the Church’s effort, the 
public response was expected to follow. But the public did not immediately respond 
favorably to the Church’s call for Estrada’s resignation. Perhaps it was scandal fatigue or 
the belief that this was another in a long line o f accusations hurled by the Church at 
Estrada. Whatever the reason, in the early days of the scandal public opinion polls 
revealed that the masses were unmoved by the situation. Pulse Asia found in its poll 
taken on October 16 that 53 percent of Manila residents wanted Estrada to hold on and 
stay in office 49 It was a solid majority unmoved by Cardinal Sin’s call.
47Jennee Grace, U. Rubrico, and Jacquelin P. Conclara, “Cardinal Sin Airs Call 
for Estrada to Resign,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World 
(October 12, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
48“Sin, RAM, NGOs Join 30 Lawmakers,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 11, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
49“Survey favoring Erap Shows Nation's Pulse,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 16, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
But the Church was not alone in this fight, and it was confident that enough o f the 
population would come around to its way o f thinking when needed to bring down 
Estrada. The Church’s call for resignation was meant to move events on several fronts, 
not simply to cause an instant and measurable affect in the polls. Public opinion was 
certainly important, but the Church’s action aimed to pressure political leaders as well. 
The public was known to respond sluggishly, but the politicians who feared and respected 
the Church’s voice responded more quickly. Just days after Sin’s announcement, thirty 
members o f the Philippine House o f Representatives signed a resolution "endorsing the 
verified complaint for impeachment."50 Along with Arroyo’s resignation, it was the first 
real step towards pulling legitimacy from Estrada.
Estrada was clearly perturbed by the Church’s unusual quickness to judge him 
and his administration. He immediately issued statements calling the Church’s stance 
“unfair” and rejected any call for resignation or “snap elections” meant to unseat him.51 
In a televised statement, Estrada said, "It is my conviction that the call for my 
impeachment or resignation is unfair as it is hasty."52 In other television interviews, he 
added that he could not understand why the cardinal prejudged him when he had not 
heard his side.53 In private, Estrada surely knew what was at stake. He had been targeted 
by the Church before and survived, but this time things were different.
50Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines' Estrada Rejects Quit calls Over Bribe Scandal,” 
Agence France-Presse (October 11, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
51 “Philippines Estrada Rejects Church Call For Resignation,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Dow Jones International News (October 11 ,2000; 
accessed 8 September 2002).
52 “I'm innocent and I'll Survive This Crisis -  Erap,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Manila Standard (October 12, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
53Armand N. Nocum and Juliet L. Javellan, “Estrada says Declaring State of 
Emergency 'Farthest Thing from his Mind',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] World News Connection (October 14, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
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At the outset, Estrada rejected the Church’s calls and vowed he would never 
resign. He then tried to divert attention away from his scandal by privatizing gambling 
activities once overseen by the government. The hope was that this move would show 
that no one in government would ever gain from gambling. It also reaffirmed his 
commitment to the masses that had so strongly supported him during his movie career 
and political life. He also tried to contrast the argument for his impeachment with what 
he called his continued fight for the oppressed and the poor. Like America’s Bill Clinton, 
Estrada and his advisors sought to turn the people’s attention away from scandal and back 
to a domestic agenda. A Social Weather Station poll on November 6, 2001, reported that 
44 percent o f Filipinos did not want Estrada to resign and only 29 percent did.54
Estrada categorically denied Singson’s charges and lashed out at the Church and 
Cardinal Sin. Estrada said he would not “accommodate” Cardinal Sin’s wishes because 
his pact was with “the masses” and not with the Catholic Church.55 He was willing to 
fight for his job and for his legitimate mandate. Indeed, the battle ahead was one that 
would test the strength of the legitimacy model on every level. The question was, how 
strong would Estrada’s mandate be when the authority gained from the law, his 
charismatic appeal, and his utility to the people was filtered through the Catholic Church, 
which now expanded its role and authority as the mediating force to determine Estrada’s 
fitness as president? This battle was fought using the constitution, in the legislature, and 
over the support o f the masa.56
The Church began where its power base was the strongest and most effective, and 
soon the “parliament o f the streets” began to assemble at mass rallies across Manila and
54Rigoberto Tiglao, “Fool’s Polls,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Philippine Daily Inquirer (December 8, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
55“T'm sorry it had to come to this',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Manila Standard (October 14, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
56Masa is the colloquial term used by Estrada to describe the masses.
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the Philippines. The Church realized, as it had since the early days of Marco’s martial 
law, that in order to push its agenda it needed the people’s support. The first call to 
action came on October 17, 2000. In attendance at this small rally were Cardinal Sin, 
former President Aquino, Vice President Arroyo, and close to 2,000 supporters. It was a 
small rally, but it was a beginning. At this first rally, Sin openly prayed that Estrada 
would do the “heroic” thing and resign, while Arroyo spoke to the crowd about her recent 
resignation from the cabinet. She appealed to the masses in her way by saying that her 
own resignation from Estrada’s cabinet allowed her to join Cardinal Sin, Aquino, and the 
“cabinet of the people” to oppose Estrada’s presidency.57
When she was asked by a reporter about the possibility o f an another EDSA 
revolution along the lines of the first People Power, she replied, “We do not know yet 
where all these will lead to because only God can decide where we should go. What is 
important is that we are following His orders. We are praying to know what He wants us 
to do.”58 In matters of politics, Cardinal Sin and his bishops were often the only ones who 
were given credit for knowing God’s orders. Realizing as much, Arroyo verified in this 
same interview that her actions had the authorization of Cardinal Sin and the Church.
A day later, 6,000 clergy, business leaders, and members o f various political 
groups held a rally in Makati, Manila’s financial district, to demand the president's 
resignation.59 The rally came hours after forty-one members o f the House of 
Representatives filed an impeachment motion against Estrada. At a rally a few days later,
57“Anti-Estrada Forces Hold Mass Rally in Manila,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Xinhua (October 17, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
CO t <
“Philippine VP Arroyo Discusses Role in Unifying Opposition,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] World News Connection (October 17, 2000; accessed 8 
September 2002).
59Arturo Bariuad, “Thousands Protest Against Estrada,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (October 18, 2000; accessed 8 September 
2002).
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the number was 10,000.6° Things were moving rapidly in the Church’s favor. Even the 
nation's Muslim minority weighed in, branding Estrada as an "evildoer" unfit to govern.61 
These street protests were all leading up to a larger rally planned and organized by the 
Church for November 4, 2000.
The rally being planned was significant on many fronts. It was scheduled to take 
place on Church property, but not just any property. It was to take place at the EDSA 
shrine. Holding a rally at a shrine that had been declared holy ground and was official 
Church property brought with it political and spiritual connotations. Any anti-Estrada 
rally held at EDSA was sure to send a powerful message to Estrada and his allies that the 
Church meant business and was not going to let this issue die without seeing his 
resignation.
In order to gather the number o f supporters required to make this happen, the 
Church had to use its tried and true public relations methods. Calls went out from their 
print and broadcast media as well as in pastoral letters from the pulpit. The letters were 
issued to all parishes, Catholic schools, religious communities, and institutions and called 
each member to mobilize in full force for the rally.62 Father Joe Dizon of the Estrada 
Resign Movement (Resign), urged the public to heed Cardinal Sin's pastoral letters and
63the Church’s call to rally, saying this was "both a moral obligation and a patriotic duty."
60“Pressure Rising on Philippine Chief,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Deseret News (October 10, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
61Dirk Beveridge, “Filipinos Blast Estrada; Vice President Says Resignation Only 
Way Out,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press Newswires 
(October 25,2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
Normal Bordadora and Yolanda Fuertes, “Cardinal Sin Justifies Acceptance of 
Donation From Manila's Gambling Firm,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
World News Connection (October 25, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
63Christine Avendano and Norman Bordadora, “Velarde Challenged: Church, or 
Erap?,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer 
(November 3, 2000; accessed 8 September, 2002).
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Dizon went further to vent his frustration over Estrada, stating, “Each day that he clings 
to power, Estrada gives the people more reasons for his resignation or ouster. What is 
worse is that he and his henchmen are shamelessly pointing at the people's protests as the 
cause o f the economic and political crisis when he is the problem."64
Estrada described the proposed rally and the Church’s other actions as “assaults” 
against the republic. Fearing that he would lose support from key segments o f the 
government the Estrada administration pressured the military not to support the Church 
or any other group that might try to oust him. Defense Chief Orlando Mercado, who was 
Estrada's campaign manager during the 1998 elections, was dispatched to meet with the 
head of the armed forces, General Angelo Reyes, and new Philippine Army commander 
Brigadier-General Diomedio Villanueva to caution both men to remain neutral and not 
engage in “partisan politics."65 Estrada’s fears were real, because he knew the Church’s 
power, especially if  it could gain the momentum of past EDSA rallies.
Some of Estrada’s supporters were more vocal and less gracious in their anger at 
the Church’s call for his resignation. Just a few days before the Church’s rally, a group 
of several hundred rallied outside Villa San Miguel, the home of Cardinal Sin, and pelted 
his residence with dead fish and tomatoes.66 The group was quickly arrested and charged 
with defacing the cardinal’s property, and Estrada distanced himself from the attack. He 
also called for no further harassment o f Cardinal Sin. However, it is unlikely that such 
actions would have happened without at least tacit approval from Estrada.
64Ibid.
65Raissa Robles and Frank Longid, “Estrada Seeks Military Backing,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (October 23, 2000; 
accessed 9 September 2002).
66“House of Sin Pelted With Tomatoes, Fish,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 28, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
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Through it all, Singson continued to meet with Cardinal Sin and Church officials. 
Each time it seemed he had new revelations for the priests. Speaking at Sin’s Villa, 
Singson opened up new public accusations o f philandering against Estrada. He accused 
the president o f spending the people’s money on “beautiful ladies.”67 Estrada’s 
philandering was no secret, but the possibility that he had used the poor’s hard-earned 
money to finance his liaisons was something altogether different. To have a mistress was 
one thing, but to keep her on the backs of the poor was quite another.
The Church used this and the previous accusations of gambling illegalities to call 
for the activation of Article VII, Section eleven of the 1987 Constitution to remove 
Estrada from office.68 It was yet another avenue the Church could use to apply pressure 
on Estrada. Leading law professionals agreed with the Church’s use of the law. The 
College o f Law Student Council and the Legal Advocacy Group of the University of 
Saint La Salle were leading the charge when they issued a joint statement calling for 
Estrada's resignation or impeachment for allegedly violating the constitution and 
betraying the public trust.69 They had attacked his character and his utility and every day 
they were rallying popular opinion to their cause, but Estrada remained unmoved.
With the Church’s help, Vice-President Arroyo joined and led a newly formed 
United Opposition, which was an alliance of opposition parties committed to 
participation in mass actions held by other anti-Estrada forces. Other high-profile 
politicians, such as Opus D ei’s own Senator Francisco Tatad, continued to pressure
f\1 “Estrada ‘Paid Millions for Services o f Women',” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (October 28, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
68Section 11 reads, "Whenever the President transmits to the President o f the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties o f his office, and until he transmits to them a 
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the 
Vice President as Acting.”
69Avendano and Bordadora, “Velarde Challenged: Church, or Erap?”
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Estrada. Tatad asked Estrada to resign and came up with a power-sharing scheme that
70would include Arroyo and a coalition cabinet to rule the country in the interim. Estrada 
refused to consider it.
The rallies, the defections of Arroyo and Tatad, and the dozens o f legislators 
calling for Estrada’s impeachment led political analyst Alex Magno to describe Estrada 
as "damaged goods" and write in the Christian Science Monitor that Estrada’s attempts to
71stay in power could lead to the destruction o f the Philippine economy. Former 
President Cory Aquino agreed with this analysis. Speaking at the Catholic Ateneo de 
Manila University before a thousand delegates from the Kongreso ng Mamamayang 
Filipino (Kompil), one of the largest anti-Estrada coalition groups in the Philippines, 
Aquino said, “For every day that he holds on to office, the peso drops in value, more 
investments retreat, more factories and businesses shut down, more workers lose their 
jobs, and more families go hungry."72 Estrada had lost the people's confidence, she 
claimed, "because [he] seems to have lost any sense of accountability." It appeared that 
Estrada was willing to take the chance and he was unmoved by criticisms from all 
sectors. He still believed he had a mandate from the people to stay in office, to fight the 
charges, and to finish his term.
The Church’s rally went on as planned on November 4, 2000. Amazingly, some 
in the mainstream Philippine press seemed to support and endorse it. In particular, the
70  • • •“Philippines: Estrada Rejects Proposal to Share Power with Opposition,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] BBC Monitoring Source: GMA 7 television, 
Quezon City, in Tagalog 1000 gmt (October 27, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
71Abby Tan,“Heat's on Philippine President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Christian Science Monitor (October 29, 2.000; accessed 8 September 2002).
77 •Dona Pazzibugan and Alcuin Papa, “Fight Between Good, Evil,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (October 30, 2000; accessed 20 
November 2002).
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Philippine Daily Inquirer printed an exhaustive list o f the assembly points. Anyone 
wishing to attend the rally in Manila or elsewhere in the Philippines could have found out 
just when, where, why, and how to do it by simply reading this supposedly unbiased 
newspaper.
The four-hour rally was dubbed Ipagdasal ang bayan, bantayan ang katotohanan 
(Pray for the country, safeguard the truth) and was described in the papers as being 
marked both by both religious activities and political speeches.74 Most o f the speeches 
focused on getting rid o f Estrada. More than 100 thousand people gathered at EDS A that 
day and Cardinal Sin used the podium to launch another verbal jibe at Estrada: “We are 
here to pray for the President. Resignation from the presidency will be good for his sou l. 
. .  The presidency is not good for you because you are not capable to run this country."75 
He went further, telling Estrada to "shake the dust from your feet and leave . . .  Mr. 
President, the poor elected you because you said you were for the poor. Can you now tell 
them that you lived a simple life as a sign of your concern for them?”76
Sin claimed that Estrada’s resignation was both “constitutional and biblical."77 At 
EDS A, the Church covered all bases in its attack on Estrada. Having locked up “God’s” 
opinion, it now proclaimed to have a legal standard as well. After the cardinal finished 
speaking, Cory Aquino took the stage and voiced her unity with the Church. In her
73Norman Bordadora,“ 100,000 Expected at EDS A Rally today,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (November 4, 2000; accessed 9 
September 2002).
74Norman Bordadora, Rocky Nazareno, and Juliet Javellana, “'Take Final Bow 
Now',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer 
(November 5, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
75Frank Longid, “80,000 tell Estrada to Quit,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] South China Morning Post (November 5. 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
76Bordadora, Nazareno, and Javellana, “'Take Final Bow Now'.”
77Ibid.
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speech, she praised the Church and Cardinal Sin, recognizing the Church’s role as the 
voice of conscience in Philippine politics and change when necessary.
Cardinal Sin was the gatekeeper and the key master, and the Church was the 
arbiter of legitimacy and authority in Philippine politics. Thos were powers vested to 
them by the people themselves. Aquino said, "In a nation o f many voices, [Sin’s] has 
stood out because he has always been able to galvanize the flock to action. Without him, 
the democracy born out o f the EDSA People Power Revolution would not have been 
possible. And because o f him, we are proudly united today."78 Aquino’s words were not 
lost on the thousands gathered, nor were they lost on the woman who the Church wanted 
to be Estrada’s replacement, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Arroyo looked upon Cardinal Sin and the Church with great deference. If she 
were to be president it would be the Church, working through the people, that would give 
her that opportunity. It would be the Church that would ensure she had a legitimate 
mandate to rule the country. Could there be any doubt that she would also defer to the 
Church once she was president? That question was partially answered when reporters 
covering the EDSA rally asked Arroyo about how she would handle a possible 
resignation deal with Estrada. Arroyo’s answer intimated that she did not have the power 
or authority to handle such things.
It was an astonishing admission, for if  the duly elected vice president did not have 
the power to handle the president’s resignation, then just who did? Arroyo’s answer 
revealed the solution. Arroyo’s answer to this question was stark. She said that anyone 
who wanted to negotiate for Estrada's exit should go to Cardinal Sin. "I think [Sin and 
Aquino] are the best persons who can reflect a consensus . . . [Interested parties] should
78“The Cardinal,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (November 16, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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approach them."79 In some ways, her short answer was a brief window into the soul of 
Philippine politics and into the future o f her administration.
Estrada’s initial reaction to the November 4 rally was simple: “No amount of
SOrallies can make me resign." He was prepared for a political battle that would work to 
his favor if the impeachment proceedings made their way to the Philippine Senate, where 
his allies were sure to help him. Cardinal Sin’s response was equally blunt: “If he will 
not step down, the situation could worsen and he may have to step down with great
o 1
embarrassment, humiliation and ignominy." It appeared that neither side was going to 
budge. Both camps continued their preparations for a political clash.
The same day as the Church’s rally, Estrada had to deal with more bad news. 
Manuel Villar, the speaker of the Philippine House o f Representatives and one of 
Estrada’s strongest allies, left the Estrada camp and took more congressmen with him. 
Villar’s move effectively destroyed Estrada’s majority in the House of Representatives.82 
Senate President Franklin Drilon also resigned from Estrada's ruling Lapian ng Masang 
Pilipino (LAMP) Party and threw his support behind efforts to remove Estrada from 
office.83
79Donna S. Cueto and Christine Avendano,“Estrada: Why Will I Agree to 
Graceful Exit?” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer 
(November 11,2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
oa t
Jim Gomez,“Filipinos Rally Against Estrada,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] AP Online (November 4, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
81 Ibid.
82Richard Lloyd Parry, “Estrada Hanging on to Power After Allies Jump Ship,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Independent (November 4, 2000; 
accessed 8 September 2002).
83Rajiv Handrasekaran, “Impeachment Seems Likely in Philippines,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Washington Post (November 4, 2000; 
accessed 8 September 2002).
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Opposition was mounting against Estrada day by day, and his choices were 
becoming limited. If he hoped to counter the Church’s efforts successfully, he would 
need to prove to the Church and to the public that he still enjoyed a popular mandate 
from the masses. Estrada had more than rhetoric to back up his claims of legitimacy, 
because not only had he won a free and fair election, but public opinion still favored his 
staying in office. Moreover, he claimed he had the support of the United States, which he 
said advised him to "stick it out" through the constitutional process amid the calls for his 
resignation. His last claim is subject to scrutiny since the official United States position 
was to stay out o f Philippine domestic affairs.
Estrada was also willing and able to do something, and other politicians could not 
use his charismatic appeal to call for the people’s support. He still enjoyed the support o f  
the Inglisia ni Cristo and El Shaddai, each with millions o f their own very loyal flocks 
ready in support. He also had legions o f poor Filipinos who viewed him as a folk hero. 
He had used his own rally to counter the Church’s attempts at “People Power” over the 
Concord issue.
So while he lashed out at business interests and the Church for what he called a 
"destabilization campaign" against his administration, Estrada was making his own plans
oc
for a counter-rally to show the world the support he enjoyed among the masses.
Estrada’s rally took place a mere seven days after the November 4 rally organized 
by the Church. His call for support from the masses resulted in more than a million 
people gathering in Manila for a government-organized "prayer rally.” How ironic that in 
his darkest hour, when he was criticizing the Church for its prayer rallies, he allowed his
84Leotes Marie Lugo, and Manolette C. Payumo, “Estrada on the Attack, Blames 
Business and Other Groups for Crisis,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
BusinessWorld (November 10, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
85Ibid.
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government to officially sponsor one of its own. To ensure massive numbers, Estrada 
declared that November 11,2000, was a non-working holiday and reports said that some 
government agencies “asked” or pressured their employees to attend.
At the rally, Estrada sounded more like a parish priest than a beleaguered 
president. In front o f the multitude that had gathered, he pleaded to God for his 
administration’s salvation: "Almighty God, we offer you everything, my presidency, my 
whole being, our identity as people, our hearts and minds because all o f these came from 
you. We also pray for everyone to be enlightened so all our actions will be for the good 
of all, especially our economy." Estrada further asked God to "help us move forward our 
economy for the good of our poor and small countrymen."87
Estrada’s rally caused a bit o f concern inside the anti-Estrada coalition. Senator 
Ramon Magsaysay Jr. admitted that the opposition and the Catholic Church appeared to 
be losing, at least temporarily, to Estrada in the battle to win the hearts and minds o f the 
poor in supporting calls for his resignation. Magsaysay and others met with Mosignor 
Socrates Villegas, rector o f the ESDSA Shrine and Cardinal Sin’s spokesman, and other 
Catholic priests to find ways to reach out to the common people.88 They certainly needed 
a plan to counter Estrada’s rally, and they needed to do something quickly or they risked 
losing their early momentum.
oz
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It did not take long for the Church to counter Estrada’s moves. On November 14, 
2000, the Church called for a nationwide “people’s strike.” This strike was, according to 
the Church, a way for the average Filipino to “express their outrage at the immorality in 
public office."89 It was also a chance to take the spotlight and media coverage off of 
Estrada’s success. Indeed, the success o f Estrada’s rally led many political observers to 
conclude that the Church would not have enough support or political will to stage a 
second People Power revolt to remove him from office.
The experts were wrong. The Church had every intention of pushing forward 
with efforts to de-legitimize Estrada through the power emanating from the masses. And 
anyone who doubted its political will needed only to refer to the words of Father Reyes, 
who summed up the Church’s plan of action: "Congress will impeach him, the united 
opposition will press for his resignation, and if these fail, the Filipino people will be 
forced to oust him."90 People Power was definitely in the works.
Estrada’s rally would be the high point of his counter-offensive. He would never 
again be able to mount the kind of public support necessary to counter the Church’s 
opposition. After November 11, his allies were left throwing mere political spears at an 
ironclad Church. Among the petty things his allies attempted was filing sedition 
complaints against Cardinal Sin, Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, and even Vice President 
Arroyo. Ironically, lawyers hired by the Marcos family filed the complaints, which were 
soon dismissed by the Quezon City prosecutor’s office.91 Arroyo scoffed at the charges
89“Sin Supports Nationwide People's Strike Today,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (November 14, 2000; accessed 9 September 
2002).
90 Arturo Bariuad, “Estrada Ousted By People Power II,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (November 14, 2000; accessed 8 September 
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Service (November 17, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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and believed they were merely attempts to "undermine" her credibility. They were also 
meant to distract and harass Church leadership.
Earlier, Estrada had distanced himself from just these sort of personal attacks on 
Cardinal Sin. He then said that “being the Archbishop of Manila and a prince o f the 
Catholic Church, o f which I am a member, he deserves honor and respect from everyone, 
including those who do not agree with him on some things."93 But now all bets were off, 
and this was a fight for his political life. He would try any legal means he could muster to 
oppose the Church.
Events were rapidly deteriorating in the Philippines as Estrada’s impeachment 
moved forward. By early December, the peso had continued its slide against the dollar 
and tensions had mounted. Any hope that Estrada had to repair the economy by keeping 
protests off the streets would be ineffective. The Church had no intentions o f calling off 
its protests. Indeed, other rallies were already in the works, including a Pananalangin ng 
Bayan Para sa Katotohanan (Nation's Prayer for Truth) followed by a “Jericho March."
Cardinal Sin and other Church officials planned to lead thousands of anti-Estrada 
protestors around the Philippine Senate building on December 7, 2000, the first day of 
Estrada’s impeachment trial.94 The walls were not going to “come crumbling down,” but 
it was hoped that those inside would feel the pressure to convict Estrada. The circling of 
the Senate was also meant to draw media attention to the impeachment and apply 
pressure to those senators who remained loyal to Estrada. During the march, a "torch for
92Christine O. Avendano and Cathy C. Yamsuan, “Gloria Blames Palace for 
Move to Impeach Her,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (November 16,2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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September 2002).
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truth" was to be passed Olympic-style by opposition leaders, including former presidents 
Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos and Vice President Gloria Arroyo.95 The “Jericho 
March” was part of a larger nationwide Church effort that included as many as seventy- 
seven rallies held at all the dioceses throughout the Philippines.
In each of these efforts, the Church acted more like an opposition political party 
than a religious institution, broadcasting its calls for the faithful to attend on its own radio 
stations, through pastoral letters, and even placing fill 1-page advertisements in the 
nation’s newspapers. The ads mixed a dose o f prayer with a repeated call for Estrada to 
step down. In one advertisement Cardinal Sin wrote, "We must pray very hard for the 
president. It is only in the light of the spirit o f love for God and country that he will be 
able to see the value of resignation."96 The Church even made alternative plans for those 
Filipinos who may not have been able to attend the rallies. This included those who had 
to stay at home, in offices, factories, or schools. The Church urged them to switch off 
their lights to observe five minutes o f darkness as a symbolic act that would mean a 
demand for Estrada’s resignation.97
At the start o f the impeachment trial the big question was not “i f ’ the Church 
would inject itself in the process but “how” it would do so. The answers would come 
quickly. The day the impeachment trial began, Church officials held a special Mass for 
senators and their staff and while this special mass was labeled “impartial,” the faithful
95“Thousands Gather Ahead o f Philippine Leader's Corruption Trial,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (December 7, 2000; 
accessed 9 September 2002).
96P. Parameswaran, “Philippine Church's Hatchet Man Sin Keeps Crossing 
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were nonetheless urged to attend an anti-Estrada prayer rally being convened by Cardinal 
Sin.98
After they prayer the prosecutors wasted little time in opening their attack on 
Estrada. They labeled him a “thief’ and accused his administration of being tainted by 
money, mansions and mistresses. One of the eleven prosecutors, Congressman Joker 
Arroyo, compared Estrada to the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, saying, “I wonder 
[which one] is the bigger crook?” Arroyo would later produce a check for $3 million 
with a signature that he said was a mirror copy of the presidential signature on Philippine 
bank notes. He accused Estrada of having hidden assets in numerous bank accounts under 
a false name.99
Upon hearing the allegations coming out o f the impeachment trial, Church 
officials repeated their demand that Estrada quit immediately. Sin believed that only a 
quick resignation would spare the Philippines from a long, divisive trial.100 So fervent 
was the belief in Estrada’s guilt and unfitness as president that protesters who were part 
of the “Jericho March” and other rallies throughout the nation vowed that they would 
continue to protest regardless of the verdict.101 It was only the first day, and things 
certainly did not bode well for Estrada.
The “Jericho March” itself ran into a bit of trouble, because Estrada still had the 
loyalty of Manila’s police force. He had them block the estimated 80,000 participants 
from reaching the Senate building. Police installed barricades roughly one kilometer from 
the building. “Jericho” marchers, a diverse group organized by the Church, included
98Craig Skehan, “Estrada Foes And Allies Seek God's Help,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Age (December 7, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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members o f the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (Kompil) II, the Makati Business 
Club, Trade Union Congress o f the Philippines, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bagong Alyansang 
Makabayan and the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines. The marchers were 
only able to push up to the front gate o f the Senate. This was not what they had planned, 
but it was close enough for their voices to be heard.102
The loudest voice at the rally was Cardinal Sin’s. He urged Estrada to be true to 
his bravado and personally answer "one by one" all of the charges lodged against him.
Sin demanded that Estrada "be brave and face the truth.” He said, “I hope that you 
personally answer the questions o f our senators, not through your lawyers. We want the 
truth from your lips personally, not by proxy . . .  Mr. President, do not be afraid to 
resign."103
Cardinal Sin went further, emphasizing the president’s need to realize the truth of 
his situation, at least the truth as seen through the eyes o f the Church, and compared 
Estrada unfavorably to another whom the Church had helped depose. He said, “I say to 
the President, do not be afraid o f the truth . . .  the truth is, you have lost your moral 
ascendancy to govern us. Face the truth and be courageous . . .  We were there to face 
Marcos. But Mr. Estrada is worse than Marcos because he does not understand 
history."104
102 • *Christine Herrera, “Cops Block Jericho Marchers on Pimentel Order,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (December 8, 2000; 
accessed 9 September 2002).
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The events o f December 7, 2000, like those of previous months, foreshadowed a 
larger problem for Estrada and his allies. They worried, and rightly so, that each passing 
day as the people took to the streets the politicians themselves would be placed under 
tremendous pressure to produce an outcome that the Church would favor. And the 
Church favored only one outcome— conviction.105
The protests in the streets were also indicative of another problem that politicians, 
the police, and the military had to consider. Even if Estrada survived the trial, his 
position might be made untenable by mass opposition.106 Just as it had done to Marcos, 
Ramos, and Estrada himself over the Concord fiasco, the Church was slowly chipping 
away at his legitimacy by marshalling its political clout and focusing it on a single point 
in the future—a People Power revolution with Estrada as the target.
At the height of the trial, Estrada seemed in a hopeless position. Just a few weeks 
earlier Estrada had the masses behind him, yet the masses were not taking to the streets 
every day begging him to stay. Indeed, it was the Church that was fielding thousands in 
the streets demanding he resign. Estrada might have wondered what good was it to have a 
million supporters if  none were willing to stand by his side when he needed them most.
As the impeachment trial adjourned for the Christmas holiday, both sides had 
time to regroup and strategize. The Church continued to push its agenda every Sunday 
during Mass. But what started out as peaceful combativeness between the Church and 
State erupted into violence on December 30, 2000. Just a few days before the trial was to 
resume, five synchronized bomb attacks killed twenty-two people and injured more than 
120 people in Manila. Police accused Muslim rebels in the attacks, yet many in Manila
105Craig Skehan, “Police And Priests On Impeachment Duty.”
106John Aglionby, “Philippines President Tried for Corruption: Senate 
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feared the bombs were linked to the trial. There was the possibility that Estrada 
supporters were trying to instill fear in the hearts o f would-be protestors.
Whatever the case was in reality, the escalation o f violence during the height of 
the impeachment trial concerned many, including Cardinal Sin, who confessed in the 
wake o f the bombings to feelings o f “hopelessness” over the national situation. He used 
this opportunity to accuse the Estrada government o f not only failing to set a high moral 
standard for the country, but also failing to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and 
heinous crimes.107
Cardinal Sin, working within the Church’s framework, used this opportunity to 
question the veracity of any actions the Estrada administration might take to calm fears. 
He said in a public statement that, “If the President cannot give us an example o f moral 
leadership, if  the police and the military cannot protect innocent citizens from terrorist 
attacks in the middle of the city, if  our Cabinet secretaries cannot appreciate 
overwhelming evidence that the President is corrupt and they continue to support him, 
where else can we turn? This government has not only lost its moral ascendancy to 
govern. It seems like this government cannot even give us private citizens the peace and 
order that public servants owe the citizenry."108
The bombings did not deter the Church. Indeed, work never stopped and it never 
took its eye off o f the impeachment proceedings. The bombings may have caused fear, 
but there was a greater concern for the safety of Church protestors. Many felt that real 
danger lay in the possibility o f Church-sponsored demonstrations being counter-attacked 
by pro-Estrada forces, triggering an "Indonesia scenario" o f street fighting, violence, and 
killings. The media wrote that such an orgy of civil violence could only be prevented by
107Norman Bordadora, “Sin Admits to Feeling 'hopeless' Over Crises,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 6, 2002; 
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the Church. They argued that the Church was the only organization with the power to 
stabilize the volatile situation and calm fears of a doomsday post-acquittal scenario.109
The potential for violence was certainly there. The Church realized this and so 
did the military. Both also recognized that by working together, they could mitigate the 
possibility o f violence. The Manila Standard reported that a group o f ex-generals, 
including National Security Council Adviser Joe Almonte and former ambassador and 
ex-General Fortunato Abat, met with Cardinal Sin at his home to discuss the prospects 
after an acquittal or conviction. The Standard claimed that this group of ex-generals had 
support from active members of the armed forces, and that during their visit they assured 
Sin that in case of a Senate acquittal, elements o f the military were ready to ensure that 
Church protests were not victimized by reactionary pro-Estrada violence.
The report seemed to coincide with ongoing rumors that the same group had 
promised "military intervention" on the Church’s side in case o f acquittal.110 This is an 
important point, because here the Church was given what amounts to official assurance 
that the military would not intervene in its activities. It would not crack down on an 
EDSA II should it happen, and what is more, it would protect the Church’s flock if  
Estrada attempted to crush the new revolution against him. It was a win-win situation for 
the Church.
The military’s backing o f the Church further emboldened Cardinal Sin. Early in 
January 2001, he publicly implied that something larger than the previous street protests 
was in the works, and he hinted that a People Power-style revolt could take place if  there 
was an acquittal. One o f the cardinal's spokesmen, Father Joselito Jopson, said the 
Church would first study any verdict, and if there were indications that the acquittal was
109“Post-acquittal Scenario: What's Church Role?” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Manila Standard (January 4, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
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“premised on deceit and manipulations, there would be no acceptance on [the Church’s] 
part."111
The “no acceptance” clause found in the Church’s public statements was chilling. 
Sin and his Church were ready to call upon parishioners to join "non-violent" mass 
actions "to express . . .  indignation" over Estrada’s continued refusal to step down. The 
cardinal assured the faithful that their actions were legal and moral, and furthermore it 
was their "Christian duty to stand up for what is right and moral," which meant joining 
the Church’s effort to oust Estrada.112
Cardinal Sin sent solidarity messages urging other anti-Estrada groups, such as 
those that made up Kompil, to maintain the pressure, saying in his message that now was 
“not time to be passive and indifferent, not the time to just simply wait."113 The need to 
apply pressure on the impeachment court was also o f prime importance for the Church, 
because like Vice President Arroyo and members of KOMPIL, it feared that if  left on its 
own conscience the Senate could be easily bribed or otherwise swayed by the 
presidency’s power and influence. Father Reyes stated that the Catholic Church was 
prepared to “march in thousands and even in millions” should the impeachment court not 
rule as the Church hoped.114 The Church felt confident that it could mobilize the public 
and be protected against counter-rebellions led by Estrada’s backers.
Arroyo took a leading role in urging the anti-Estrada groups to continue the fight 
and warned that they all had "cause for concern" because those who "seek to preserve the
m “In Case o f Acquittal, What Next?” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
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spoils o f power" were moving to "prevent the truth from coming out."115 The leadership 
of KOMPIL agreed, saying it would be no less than “treason” for the Senate to clear 
Estrada of all the charges amid what they called the overwhelming evidence against 
him.116 "We overthrew a ruthless dictator. We will oust a criminal President," KOMPIL
117declared in a statement.
Estrada’s allies scoffed at the Church’s action. In a telephone interview with 
Business World, acting Press Secretary Michael F. Toledo spoke of Estrada’s belief that 
the public was well aware that the situation in 1986 was much different than the current 
case against the president. He said, therefore, that any “People Power” phenomenon 
could not be replicated and would “not get the support of the Filipino people.”118
The confidence Estrada’s team expressed was founded on a shaky premise. They 
either could not or wished not to see the power and influence the Church still wielded. 
And why they ignored the reality of the situation is very puzzling. With the exception of 
his election in 1998, the Church had prevented Estrada from changing the constitution 
and forced his hand in East Timor and in other issues. Estrada’s camp should have 
realized that the impeachment process had become the most important political issue for 
the Church. Only the performance of the sacraments took precedence over getting rid of 
Joseph Estrada in the year 2001.
The statements about the unlikelihood o f an EDSA II were made by the 
administration on January 15, and a day later the validity o f these statements was put to
115Lacuarta, Contreras, and Avendano, “Sin: Keep Up Good Fight.”
i ̂ “Philippines Warns Against Protest if  Estrada Acquitted,” [Wire Service 
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118Leotes Marie T. Lugo and Jennee Grace U. Rubrico, “1986 EDSA Revolt 
Cannot be Replicated, Says Palace,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
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the test. On January16, 2001, events transpired that the Church, Arroyo, and KOMPIL 
feared but expected. The impeachment trial was effectively halted when the Senate voted 
by a margin o f one to keep sealed a “second envelope” o f vital evidence. With that one 
vote, the opposition was dealt a major defeat. The Church was now sure that the trial was 
as sham, because without all of the evidence Estrada would never be convicted. Inside 
this “second envelope” was the most damaging of all evidence against the president. The 
envelope contained bank records that purportedly proved Estrada had amassed 3.3 billion 
pesos ($63.5 million) in unaccounted wealth in illegal bank accounts using four aliases.
Chief Prosecutor Feliciano Belmonte Jr. threatened to resign if  the envelope was 
not opened. Nonetheless, the senators judging Estrada voted 11-10 not to open the 
documents, underscoring how the highly politicized trial had divided the impeachment 
court. Congressman Joker Arroyo called the move “shameless” and said, "This means 
there are eleven senators who are in the pocket of the president."119 It did not take long 
for the Church to react to the news.
The eleven senators, all allies o f Estrada, became instant targets o f Church anger. 
The next few hours would see a flurry o f activity by the Church as it blasted the Senate 
and Estrada and immediately called the “people” into action. Within an hour o f the 
ruling, several protests erupted in Manila. Cardinal Sin urged people to gather at the 
EDSA shrine. On Radio Veritas, Cardinal Sin stated solemnly, "That which we are afraid 
of has happened . . .  Truth has become a victim of immoral people."120 In his lament for 
justice, there was the call to action and a new “People Power” had begun.
119James Hookway, “A Twist in Manila's Impeachment Trial — Senate Could 
Acquit Philippine President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Wall 
Street Journal (January 17, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
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The Philippine Senate failed to fulfill its constitutional duty impartially, so it was 
time for the Church to do its duty and rip legitimacy away from Estrada the best way it 
knew how—through a People Power Revolution, or an EDSA II. By midnight, Cardinal 
Jaime Sin had spoken before an angry crowd of more than 10,000 people who gathered at 
the EDSA memorial. He spoke not only o f the Philippine Senate’s failure, but also 
warned of bloodshed because o f their irresponsible actions.
The protesters gathered included nuns, office workers, and laborers. Many 
carried anti-Estrada signs with the words "Guilty" and "Justice died last night" printed on 
them. They chanted such slogans as "Enough is enough. You're exposed, Get out." This 
was the beginning of EDSA II, and from underneath the statue of the Virgin Mary, 
Cardinal Sin warned Estrada and the eleven senators who had betrayed the Church about 
God’s wrath: “God is awake and God knows the evil they have done . . .  We will not 
sleep and rest. We must keep watch, keep our candles lighted and overcome this 
darkness."121
The rally at EDSA extended into the next day, with the Church leadership calling 
for a “political cleansing” of Philippine politics and Malacanang.122 The Church stepped 
up pressure on Estrada by marshaling thousands more angry protesters and demanding he 
pack up and leave office along with his cabinet. "Only the foolish and crazy will say that 
he is as innocent as a dove and as pure as a baby," Sin told those assembled. "We do not 
say resign only to the president, we also say to the cabinet—resign." The Church vowed 
to lead intense, nonstop "forms of public protests including even civil disobedience,"
121 “Church Leader Warns Suppression of Evidence Could Lead to Bloodshed,” 
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because continuing to leave the fate o f Estrada in the hands of the Congress was in their 
words an "exercise in futility."
Support poured in from all over the country. The potential for violence was there 
and Cardinal Sin was forced to address the issue. "The Church will not allow violence," 
he said, but he noted that it could not "discount the possibility or even the validity of 
extralegal peaceful means, in terms of civil disobedience."124 And groups participating in 
these “extralegal” means were voicing their support from as far away as Mindanao. 
"Cardinal Sin has already warned about this and we are ready to mobilize enough people 
to show Metro Manilans we are with them in this struggle," said Alvin Luque, head o f the 
Estrada Resign Movement (ERM) for Southern Mindanao.125
There were some efforts to dampen EDSA II. Estrada’s allies tried in the media 
to discount the Church’s call, even branding Cardinal Sin and the Church as a group of
1 96“lawless clerics.” Moreover, they wondered out loud if the Church would respect the 
constitutional process of removing a president from office or if it would simply act 
unilaterally and attempt to instigate riots to bring down the government and destabilize 
the nation. Members of the media accused the Church of supporting mob rule and called
121 . ,
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Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (January 17, 2001; accessed 9
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the Church’s idea of ousting Estrada through “People Power” uncivilized and part o f the 
“law of the jungle.”127
Countering these charges, the CBCP said it was the Church’s duty, morally and 
religiously, to seek Estrada’s resignation. The relationship between the Church and State 
was not as clearly defined as Estrada’s supporters wished. Indeed, the level o f interaction 
between the Church and Estrada’s state was determined not by the constitution but by 
how the government was doing its job and whether the Church was being true to the 
mission it had expressed for itself.128
Senate President Aquilino Pimentel also quit in protest after the vote and left the 
Philippine Congress, along with the entire prosecution team. Estrada appealed for calm. 
But there was little for the anti-Estrada crowd to be calm about. Former President Fidel 
Ramos, himself a target of Church rallies in the past, joined Cardinal Sin at the EDSA 
memorial and called on the army and police to withdraw their support for Estrada. 
Echoing the Church’s call, Ramos told the crowd that the nation's fate "is now in the 
people's court."129 Vice President Arroyo was also with Cardinal Sin and warned 
Estrada’s backers against encouraging a military takeover to cling to power: "You will 
not succeed because the people will not allow it."130
127Ibid.
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129James Hookway, “Manila's Power Struggle Shifts From Courtroom to the 
Streets — Massive Anti-Estrada Protests and Trial's Halt Roil Already Fragile Markets — 
- A Bittersweet Victory for an Embattled Leader,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] The Asian Wall Street Journal (January 18, 2001; accessed 9 September 
2002).
130Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
288
Cardinal Sin also requested that the poor, part o f Estrada’s core constituency, join 
the Church in its efforts. He compared Estrada’s corruption to an attack on the poor, 
claiming, "The poor trusted you and you betrayed them. . .  The businessmen trusted you 
and you lied to them. The First Lady married you and you used many women . . .  We
111
know in our hearts that the President is guilty."
Throughout the day protesters continued to pour into the streets and parking lots 
around EDSA, shutting down traffic in the area. Cardinal Sin exhorted them to stay 
"until evil is conquered by good."132 The political turmoil caused the Philippine currency 
to tumble further.133 Yet the people kept coming. EDSA II was growing and gaining 
support. Cory Aquino, also present at EDSA, called for more: "Our prayer is that there 
will be more people who will gather at EDSA in the coming days."134 Arroyo’s prayer 
was soon answered as the crowd swelled to an estimated 200,000 people in a very short 
time, bolstered by the arrival o f delegations from all over the Philippines.
The Church’s plan was working, but it was a long time in coming. Since 1998 it 
had tried to depose Estrada, yet he had always remained in power. Now at the EDSA 
shrine it was 1986 all over again. The people were there in the tens of thousands, as were 
Cardinal Sin and the Catholic hierarchy, all surrounding their political allies and leading 
those who answered the call to action. Cardinal Sin understood that without the masses
13’Richard Lloyd Parry, “Rumours of a Military Coup Sweep Philippines,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Independent (January 18,2001; accessed 9 
September 2002).
Norman Bordadora, Andrea Trinidad-Echavez, and Christine Herrera, “'Stay on 
Edsa Until Evil is Conquered by Good,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 18, 2001; 9 September 2002).
Hookway, “Manila's Power Struggle Shifts From Courtroom to the Streets.”
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little could be accomplished in opposing Estrada. He realized the Church was powerful 
because at that moment it led the people, and the people acted through it.
At no other time or place was the Church fulfilling its duty as the mediating force 
in Philippine politics and in the legitimacy equation more clearly or more completely 
than that day at EDSA. Cardinal Sin now spoke for the people, and through the Church 
they expressed their outrage. To the Church and the people, the truth had “been 
subverted” and the “fire o f the people’s indignation and outrage” had been ignited. In 
one of his defining moments as the Archbishop o f Manila, Cardinal Sin turned to address 
the crowd and told them just how important they were to the Church’s cause: “I have 
hope because you are here. You are the hope o f this nation. So long as you are here, I can 
keep on hoping. There is only one immoral President and eleven shameless senators. 
There are millions and millions o f people who will safeguard the truth and, if  necessary, 
die for the truth"135
In other remarks, Sin had as much praise for the ten Senators who voted for the 
envelope’s opening as he had anger for those who refused. In fact, he broke off from his 
homily to lead the crowd in cheers for Senators Raul Roco, Rene Cayetano and Franklin 
Drilon, who joined Sin on stage along with other members of the Philippine Congress. 
Rain or shine, Cardinal Sin and Church officials vowed that in the name of the people 
they would all stay at EDSA until they could "reclaim power" from Estrada.136
The indignant but peaceful protests on January 17, 2001, which Defense Secretary 
Orlando Mercado referred to as "political dynamics,” were proof of the people's distrust 
of Estrada and a demonstration of the Church’s power to call upon the “parliament o f the 
streets” to enforce its will. Other actions, such as a mass march to the presidential palace 
planned by opponents of the embattled president, were called off because protestors said
135Ibkf
136Ibid.
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they did not recognize the occupants o f the palace anymore.137 There were also fears of 
violence should the group march on the president’s residence, and Cardinal Sin forbade 
it, calling the potential for violence too risky.138 There were also some people who 
simply wanted to remain at EDSA, feeling it was the center o f hope and power for the 
movement. The march would eventually take place, but only after Estrada’s plight was 
certain.
The economy continued to nosedive during EDSA II. The Philippine peso 
plunged 5.3 percent during a twenty-four hour period to a low o f 55.75 pesos against the 
dollar.139 EDSA II was now a test o f wills. There were to be no negotiations between the 
Church and Estrada. The Church had only one requirement, and only one mantra—  
resign.140 Indeed, Cardinal Sin reminded everyone within the sound o f his voice that he 
had warned o f an Estrada presidency. He had “tried” to educate the electorate and the 
elite about the dangers of Estrada as far back as 1997, and now the proverbial chickens 
were coming home to roost and the nation was suffering because of it. Sin said, “I said 
this during the campaign . . .  If he is elected, it will be a disaster. And (now), you see."141
There were few options remaining for Estrada under Philippine law, and the 
Church preferred they not be exercised. They included a provision that allowed the
137“Mass March to Estrada's Palace called Off: Organizers,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (January 18, 2001; accessed 9 
September 2002).
138Ibid.
1 TO“Return o f People Power?” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Jakarta Post (January 18, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
140“Philippine Senate Adjourns Amid Swelling Protests,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Los Angeles Times (January 18, 2001; accessed 9 September 
2002).
141Bordadora, Trinidad-Echavez, and Herrera, “'Stay on Edsa Until Evil is 
Conquered by Good.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
291
Philippine House o f Representatives to form a new group of prosecutors, a move that 
could further delay the trial but at least see it to that a lawful conclusion was reached.
But the Church wanted no more delays. Estrada’s tightly knit group o f core supporters 
began to unravel. Soon, Defense Chief General Angelo Reyes appeared at EDSA, and at 
his side was Estrada’s defense secretary, Orlando Mercado. Hours earlier they had urged 
Philippine soldiers to stay out o f the political fray. Moreover, a newspaper advertisement 
signed by sixty members o f the Philippine Military Academy’s class o f 1962 urged 
Estrada's departure and said Philippine soldiers "know what to do during the critical days 
ahead as they have done in the past for the good of their country and their people."142 
Other top military officials quickly joined them at EDSA.
A desperate Estrada appeared on television, pleading with lawmakers to restart his 
impeachment trial. It was an interesting sight to see the embattled president practically 
begging to be prosecuted. He was now more than willing to let prosecutors open bank 
records that had previously been sealed. Estrada was willing to face any trial or court 
except the court o f public opinion or the “parliament of the streets,” for it was there that 
the Church was the prosecutor, and it had already selected the jury, stood as judge, and 
had signed an order o f political execution.143
Estrada believed that restarting the impeachment trial would buy him the time he 
needed to counter the Church’s moves to rally the people against him. It was also a way 
to further his public relations campaign and to discredit anyone who would take his place. 
Estrada felt that no one other than him could be legitimate because it was he who had 
won an electoral mandate from the people. "Since I still have the support o f a significant 
segment o f our people, I don't think that the present polarization can be healed by a new
142Dirk Beveridge, “General Defects in Philippines as Estrada Struggles to Stay in 
Office,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (January 19, 
2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
143Ibid.
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leader who will take over without an electoral mandate from our people," Estrada said in 
a statement clearly directed at Arroyo.144 His appeals for a restart o f the trial were 
ignored, and thousands of people continued to swarm at EDSA and tens of thousands of 
protestors marched on the palace.
Estrada could fight no longer. Until then, Arroyo had been pensive about EDSA 
II and had expressed a concern to do the right thing morally and legally about Estrada. 
She often met with her advisors to discuss the issue and on the morning of January 20, 
she had breakfast with Cardinal Sin and Cory Aquino to discuss how to handle Estrada’s 
exit. According to Arroyo, Estrada had asked for five days to get his affairs in order. 
However, Cardinal Sin was emphatic that this was unacceptable. Witnesses at the 
meeting said the cardinal began to pound on the table and spoke sternly to Arroyo: 
"Gloria, you owe the presidency to the people. And it is the people who want a new 
president."145 There would be no five-day wait. On January 20, 2001, Estrada stepped 
down as president o f the Republic o f the Philippines.
Vice President Arroyo immediately took the oath of office on the platform that 
had been erected in front of the EDSA shrine. Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. 
administered the oath. She took the oath in front of tens of thousands of Filipinos 
gathered at EDSA, and she shared the stage with her political allies, members o f the 
military, and the Church leadership.146 As she swore her solemn oath, she did so under 
the ever-watchful gaze o f the Virgin Mary statue that stood so prominently at EDSA. "I
144 Paul Alexander, “Stripped o f Support, President Reportedly Negotiating 
Resignation,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press Newswires 
(January 19, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
145 Amando Doronila, “SC Justices Finally OK Gloria Oath,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (February 24, 2001; accessed 9 
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accept the privilege and responsibility to act as president of the republic. I do so with a 
sense of trepidation and o f awe . . .  It is now, as the good book says, a time to heal and a 
time to build," Arroyo told the masses at EDSA.147 Word from Estrada via his executive 
secretary, Edgardo Angara, was that he had accepted the decision rendered by the people 
at EDSA, the court, and the Church.148
The entire event o f Arroyo’s swearing in offered striking imagery, illustrating 
the Church’s power not only to influence but to shape the secular State. One spectator 
had words o f praise for all EDSA II had accomplished: "This was a parliament on the 
streets and the people have expressed themselves."149 Indeed, they had expressed 
themselves, and while the future can never be known with absolute certainty, one thing 
about the new Arroyo government was certain. The Church would play an influential role 
in its foundation and any future actions it might take.
Arroyo was under no illusions as to why she was now the president. She was 
president because o f Estrada’s resignation, but she was in power because o f the Church’s 
actions. The Philippine Constitution might have mandated the terms o f succession, but 
she was not made legitimate by simple rule of law. She had not received a mandate at the 
ballot box, yet she had the people’s support. She attained the legitimacy of the Filipino 
population through the Church’s efforts.
A day after Arroyo took her oath, Cardinal Sin celebrated a special Thanksgiving 
Mass at EDSA. It was a celebration of the country’s “liberation,” a victory of the people
147Calvin Sims, “Estrada Forced Out of Office,” New York Times 21 January 
2001, sec. A, p. 21.
148 Peter Goodspeed, “Estrada Steps Down After Cabinet Resigns: VP Sworn in 
as President: Filipinos Take to the Streets in Near Replay of 1986 Revolution,” National 
Post, 20 January 2001, sec. A, p. 14.
149Alex Spillius, “'People Power' Topples Estrada: Deputy Takes the Helm as 
Disgraced Philippine President is Forced Out,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] The Sunday Telegraph (January 21, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
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and of the Church. Speaking at the Mass, Sin said that the Philippines now needed to 
remain vigilant and not allow a leader like Estrada or a government like that elected in 
1998 to beset the nation again. He spoke of those who in the past warned that the 
Church’s struggle would be long, but he said he believed otherwise, saying that God had 
always planned to give the Philippines a “special gift.”150 He also noted the role o f the 
people, taking special effort to credit their response to the Church’s call as the key to 
bringing down Estrada. ”We walked in darkness but now have become people o f the 
light. . .  Your presence and prayers wrote history. Your love for God and country made 
the big difference . .  ."151
The Mass was also the perfect opportunity for Cardinal Sin to publicly inject the 
Church into the fledgling Arroyo administration. "We will help you for the good of the 
nation. We will also criticize you for the good o f the nation," stated Cardinal Sin. Arroyo 
now had unofficial advisors whether she wanted them or not. Cardinal Sin further 
assured the assembled masses that the Church would and in fact must be involved in 
future politics: “Among all the aspects o f Filipino life, it is politics that needs most the 
redemption o f Christ. Politics in the Philippines must be baptized, evangelized and 
become a tool not for corruption but for sanctification."153
These words, meant to reassure the public, sent chills through the spines o f those 
who advocated a strict separation o f Church and State in the Philippines, most notably 
Estrada’s allies. It was ironic that someone so opposed to the Church’s role in
150“Answered Prayers,” [Wire Service Online -Dow Jones Interactive] Manila 
Standard (January 20, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
15‘ibid.
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government had lost his job not at the ballot box, but by a revolt of the people led by that 
same Catholic institution. Indeed, the Estrada administration posed several paradoxes. 
While Estrada attempted to keep the Church marginalized, his actions and his policies 
resulted in the Church becoming more powerful.
At no time during the modem era did the Church assume as much influence and 
power as it did during the final year o f the Estrada administration. Not even during the 
Aquino years, when it acted as a partner in her administration, did it have as much say in 
the political future o f the Philippines as it did after EDSA II. Because o f Estrada’s 
scandals and because he chose to fight it, the Philippine Catholic Church briefly 
superseded even the president in power, forcing his resignation and installing its own 
anointed choice into the office. In the wake o f EDSA II, it was a time to sit in awe and 
reflect on all the Church had accomplished and ponder future possibilities.




Nearly five centuries have passed since the Philippine Catholic Church’s 
establishment. The previous chapters have detailed Church involvement in the 
legitimacy process and its evolution from governmental control during the Spanish 
colonial era to overt power-sharing schemes that materialized during the post-1945 era of 
independence. Throughout history the Church has played both lead and supporting roles 
in the political pasyon that is Philippine politics, and it has evolved from an arcane body 
of bishops seeking a theocracy to a modem, politically active, and flexible social 
organization that adjusts to fit the changing landscape of Philippine politics. The 
Church’s survivability has proven that no matter what kind of regime mled the 
Philippines, it invariably sought the loyalty of the Church and the Filipino people—rarely 
mutually exclusive things. Indeed, whether a particular ruling regime continued often 
hinged on whether or not it enjoyed the Church’s support.
The roots o f the Church’s influence run deeper than some social scientists and 
politicians like to admit. The Church maintains considerable influence, even as the 
average Filipino may wish for it to stay out of politics. For example, 66 percent o f the 
population polled in 1998 felt that religious leaders should not try to influence how 
people vote in elections, and 63 percent said they should not try to influence government 
decisions.1 Yet when the Church intervenes in secular politics as it did in EDSA I and II, 
the public rarely objects and indeed follows the Church’s political lead. For example, as 
late as January 6, 2001, 53 percent o f those polled did not want Joseph Estrada to resign,
l4‘Attendance at Religious Services- Survey for October 28-November 14, 1998,” 
Social Weather Report Survey (Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Station, 1998), 
186.
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but in a matter o f weeks nearly 71 percent felt that the Church-sponsored EDSA II, which 
forced Estrada’s resignation, “expressed the sentiment of the majority.”
Polls conducted in the Philippines can be used to show the rise and fall o f the 
Church’s trust rating and those of its leadership, yet it is to the Church that the nation 
turns in times o f political chaos.3 Both EDSA revolutions vividly illustrated to the world 
the power o f the Church to affect change in governmental legitimacy, and at the same 
time showed the weakness o f polls in gauging true public opinion towards the Church.
In the absence o f reliable statistical data, the kind that has only become available 
in the last two decades, the researcher is left with qualitative analysis o f Philippine 
history and politics to determine the Church’s true nature in government legitimacy. The 
totality o f this study has attempted to do just that, and this chapter is the final reservoir of 
ideas and analysis of the Church within the legitimacy paradigm. It begins with a brief 
review of legitimacy theory and a discussion of the Church’s place within the model.
The ideas of Weber and Easton are recounted to refresh the reader on the general 
concepts discussed, debated, and challenged in this study. Coupled with this review is a 
look at how the Church has performed within the democratic milieu now predominant in 
Philippine politics. Democratic politics poses its own unique rules and constraints on 
legitimacy, for the people must be accounted for in any legitimacy model. One purpose 
of the concluding chapter is to explain this issue and demonstrate how the people were 
and remain a part o f the Church’s actions throughout the twentieth century, especially in 
the EDSA revolutions of 1986 and 2001.
2
Maha Mangahas, “From Juentenggate to People Power 2: The SWS Surveys of 
Public Opinion,” Social Weather Report Survey (Quezon City, Philippines: SWS, Inc. 
2002), 18, 52.
“The Cardinal,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (November 16, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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The review of legitimacy theory and the discussion of the role of the Church 
within the democratic realities o f the Philippines is followed by a discussion o f the events 
in the wake o f EDSA II. It is beneficial for this study to include a few examples o f how 
Estrada, and later Arroyo, dealt with the Church’s political influence and authority in 
their own quests for legitimacy. In a similar vein, the last half of the chapter examines at 
the Church’s current role in the Arroyo administration and its possible future in 
Philippine politics. This includes an examination of specific policies of the Arroyo 
administration where the Church’s influence is obvious, as well as lesser issues where the 
pressure is not so noticeable.
Finally, no look at legitimacy and the Church can be complete without some 
discussion o f the future, and discussion about the future of the Philippine Church must 
inexorably revolve around what will be a “post-Sin” Church. Jaime Cardinal Sin’s own 
political involvement has decreased and continues to do so since the events o f 2001. The 
Church may face its own leadership crisis in a few years. Will the Church suffer from a 
“vacuum of leadership” o f its own in his absence, or will it survive and even flourish with 
a new generation of leaders? A few pages are dedicated to answering these and other 
questions.
Any study dealing with legitimacy and the role o f a social institution like the 
Church tends to focus on pursuit and acquisition of power within political relationships. 
This is not surprising considering that reduced to its most basic element and stripped o f  
all its social trappings, legitimacy is simply a government’s ability to coerce consent out 
of a population. The word coerce may seem harsh, but this coercion can take many 
forms. The Weberian model o f legitimacy outlined three possible ways, or the three arch­
types or classifications that function as independent variables providing authority to the 
dependent variable o f “legitimacy.” There are Rational-Legal, Traditional and 
Charismatic, and each are considered “ideal” types oflegitimacy found in Weber’s 
paradigm.
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Rational-Legal legitimacy rests on the belief that there is a legality found in 
patterns of normative rules and behaviors, and the right of those elevated to authority 
under such rules is to issue commands. The government’s ability to coerce legitimacy 
from the population stems from its acceptance of the rules and laws found in a governing 
document or contract. Whether it is a Rousseau-like uncomplicated social contract or a 
more Lockean document such as the United States Constitution, the people concede that 
both they and the government are responsible for keeping the tenets o f the law. One side 
yields authority and a degree o f personal sovereignty to the other.
Traditional legitimacy is based on the belief in the sacredness o f ancient traditions 
and the status o f those exercising authority. People respond to the government and its 
command because that is what the previous generations did. New thought is discouraged, 
new ways are not welcome, and new blood is not appreciated within the ruling circle. 
Kings, queens, sultans, and chiefs predominate this form oflegitimacy. The power o f the 
potentate is unquestioned. Populations are coerced by history, culture, respect, and 
custom.
The final Weberian legitimacy type, Charismatic legitimacy, may be the most 
intriguing. In this ideal type oflegitimacy the government or regime, which is often 
personified in a single individual, coerces its authority out of the population by appearing 
to embody exceptional or exemplary characteristics. People want to follow this type of 
individual or regime because they are so enamored with that person’s qualities that they 
are willing to sacrifice a bit o f their own personal sovereignty. Moreover, the ruler or 
regime that is legitimized by charisma is ordained with the authority to set out the rules of 
how things ought to be.
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Outside the Weberian model is the Utilitarian type of legitimacy. Utilitarianism 
features coercion equally applied by both the ruler and the ruled. The ruler seeks the 
power and authority to govern the nation-state and the ruled seeks as many concessions 
from the government as it can get. Nowhere is this concept more readily observed than 
in the United States, where candidates are often elected to government office based on 
how much money or goods and services they can bring back to their district or state. A 
presidential campaign is much the same way. In exchange for a vote, a presidential 
candidate may promise more money for national defense, roads, reducing crime, or even 
something as mundane as a guaranteed prescription drug program for senior citizens.
As with every independent variable, whether it is Rational-Legal, Traditional, 
Charismatic, or Utilitarian, it does not affect governmental legitimacy directly. Indeed, 
the cornerstone of this entire study is based on the existence o f mediating variables that 
serve as lenses through which authority is focused. Each of these mediating variables 
filters consent to the government, and consent is based on a belief in norms and values 
shared by rulers and the ruled. Mediating variables tend to shape the norms and values. 
Thus, any consensus on a norm or value used to legitimate a government is the result of 
actions taken by the mediating variable. These mediating variables may include the 
military, business groups, and religious institutions. This study has argued that in the 
Philippines, the Catholic Church has become the epitome of the mediating variable, 
influencing legitimacy of any and every type.
Discerning the Church’s role in the Rational-Legal type oflegitimacy proved to 
be the least problematic. As was discussed in previous chapters, the Church has at times 
been more than simply a mediating force in Philippine governmental legitimacy. It has 
actually been the government. Extensive resources exist documenting the Church’s role 
during the Spanish colonial era, when it helped write the laws, staffed the bureaucracy
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with its candidates, and at times even had its Archbishop serve as chief executive of the 
colony.4
The Church also organized cities, built infrastructure, and protected the 
population against pirates, heretics, and other Europeans who sought dominion over 
Filipino territory. Later, the death o f three priests was the catalyst for the Filipino 
revolution o f the late nineteenth century. During the revolution, Spanish friars were the 
object o f scorn and Filipino priests were part of the revolutionary leadership. Parishes 
served as weapons stores and rallying points for colonial defense, and later for the 
revolutionary cause against Spain and the United States.
The Church also brought 1,000 years o f Catholic tradition with it to the 
Philippines. The success it had in baptizing and converting the indigenous population to 
the Catholic faith meant that in a few years, large segments o f the Filipino populace 
accepted the catechism and the authority o f the Church and all it represented during this 
time. Part of this acceptance was the political leadership role of the pontiff, archbishops, 
bishops, and the parish priest.
Filipinos were subjects o f Spain and the Catholic Church, and as such leaders in 
both realms were to be respected and obeyed. The priest, regardless o f his rank, 
represented the historical Church, its customs, and inevitably God himself. Therefore, 
when the bishops favored one set o f laws over another, or one ruler over another, the 
people abided by their decisions. The Filipino gave consent to the Church and the 
Spanish secular authority based not on the Spanish reputation, but because the Spanish 
were allied with the Catholic Church. Such a close relationship allowed Spain to control 
a numerically superior population with few soldiers and even fewer priests.
The Church’s traditional authority meant that it possessed considerable political 
gravitas that it could parlay into real political influence even after the passing o f Spanish
4Nicholas Tracy, Manila Ransomed: The British Assault on Manila in the Seven 
Years War (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 33-34.
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hegemony. The Spanish Church became the Filipino Church, and its mantle of 
traditional legitimacy passed from one to the other. The monarchy may have left the 
archipelago to be replaced by Uncle Sam in 1898, but the Church remained active in 
“crowning” local leadership and in a feudalistic position as head of its barangays. 
Traditional authority invested in the Church by custom and legacy continues to support 
government officials and actions.
Characterizing the Charismatic element of legitimacy requires a more specific 
look at personalities within the Church that directly impacted Philippine politics. There 
have been several leaders in the past and the present who, through the Church’s 
leadership and their own personal charisma, have sought and achieved an important role 
in Philippine politics. These individuals include Bishop Fray Domingo de Salazar, the 
first bishop of Manila who in 1581 led the Christianization of the Philippines;
Archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Rio y Vieyra, who was Governor General for a 
time and led the defense o f Manila when the British lay siege in 1762; and Fathers Jose 
Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora, who bravely fought to end Spanish control 
of the Church and their country and were executed for their actions. Their deaths sparked 
a revolution.
In the twentieth century there has been one charismatic priest who has stood out 
among the rest for his involvement in politics and the legitimacy o f Philippine 
governments. Indeed, some may argue that Jaime Cardinal Sin, the archbishop of 
Manila, has become a mediating variable himself. His charismatic appeal can certainly 
not be denied, for no ordinary man can command the allegiance o f the Philippine 
Catholic Church, have a million people pour into the streets when he asks, and unseat two 
constitutionally elected presidents. Indeed, he is much more than the archbishop of 
Manila, he may be the seminal political and social force in twentieth-century Philippine 
politics.
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The very powerful and influential Jaime Sin came from very humble beginnings. 
He was bom on August 21, 1928, the fourteenth o f sixteen children bom to Juan Sin and 
Maxima Lachica. Like many large Filipino families, the Sins expected one o f their 
children to enter Church service. Young Jaime did, and he was ordained a priest at the 
age o f twenty-six and went on to become a domestic prelate at thirty-one. He became a 
bishop at thirty-eight, an archbishop at forty-four, and a cardinal at forty-eight. His rapid 
rise to the heights o f Church power placed him in the position of great importance in the 
Philippine Catholic Church. As bishop o f Manila, he was the Church’s de facto leader. 
He attained this post at the height o f Marcos’s marshal law, and chose to thrust himself 
into the heart o f the political turmoil.
The Church had always been active in politics, but prior to Cardinal Sin’s 
takeover o f Manila’s bishopric it had not fully confronted Marcos. Cardinal Sin rallied 
his forces to change this situation and served as the uniting influence and the voice of 
opposition against Marco’s regime. He successfully drew upon his own charismatic 
appeal and political acumen to position the Church’s immense popular support and 
resources to render Marcos illegitimate.
After Marcos’s downfall in 1986, Cardinal Sin helped prop up the presidency of 
Corey Aquino, stabilizing the fragile Philippine democracy in the process. He was also 
instrumental in the ratification o f the 1987 Constitution and subsequent efforts to keep 
President Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada from tampering with the document. His role 
in the EDSA II uprising against Estrada in 2001 was recounted in the last chapter. The 
showdown between two charismatic leaders, Estrada and Sin, proved to be a titanic 
political battle that would last for four months, from October 2000 to January 2001. 
Unofficially, it can be traced back to the 1998 presidential elections and did not end until 
the events that transpired in May 2001, which are discussed later in this chapter. In the 
end, EDSA II might prove to be Sin’s last great political battle, but at least he went out on 
top.
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Sin’s importance to Philippine politics cannot be understated. President Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo has lauded Cardinal Sin as a “prophet of our times,” a “pillar o f the 
Catholic Church,” and “one o f the greatest Filipinos” of the last two centuries. Yet 
Arroyo’s praise does not end there. During a special Thanksgiving Mass held at the 
Manila Cathedral, Arroyo spoke at length about the work and legacy o f this charismatic 
Catholic leader. Her speech appears in part below, and it deserves a place in this study for 
its ability to highlight the importance of Cardinal Sin to the president in particular and the 
Philippines in general. Before a crowd of political and theological dignitaries, Arroyo 
affirmed:
His eminence has guided us to discern the right path through various moral and 
ethical issues. He has strengthened our faith in miracles, in prayer, and in the 
blessings that the Lord Almighty showers upon our country. . .  He has been a true 
example of courage, facing up to the authoritarianisms and immorality in days 
when very few dared to dream of free speech or go against the tide o f mob 
popularity. He has shown catholic and non-catholic Filipinos alike . . .  we can 
stand in the way o f armored tanks and propaganda machines and still prevail. . .
. . .  Who can forget that it was His Eminence [who] called us to gather at 
EDSA and make a stand for democracy? It as His Eminence . . .  soothing 
assurances that one’s presence at EDSA was a moral act and a free person’s right 
that brought a million people to EDSA . . .
. . .  Who can forget, too, that it was also His Eminence who invoked the 
requirement o f moral ascendancy in government just a few months ago that 
culminated in a peaceful change o f leadership by constitutional succession? His 
Eminence’s wisdom has guided us . . .  more than 25 years . . .  proving over and 
over again that, as in Proverbs, Chapter 24, Verse 5, “A wise man is more 
powerful than a strong man, and a man o f knowledge is more powerful than a 
man of might.” Your Eminence, I speak for a grateful Filipino people, grateful to 
you for leading us through years o f struggle for democracy, through long months 
of searching for moral ascendancy, and through many moments o f individual 
moral and religious decisions that Filipinos have to make in their daily lives.”5
5 Speech of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, given during the Thanksgiving 
Mass on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Anniversary of Cardinal Sin as Cardinal o f the 
Catholic Church (May 31, 2001) Manila Cathedral, Manila.
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It does not stretch the imagination to think that Cardinal Sin may one day be 
given sainthood for the “miracles” that he and his Church performed in 1986 and 2001. 
Still, he will not live forever and there are others within the Church waiting to assume the 
role o f archbishop of Manila and the leadership o f the Church. The responsibilities they 
will inherit are more than spiritual. Any future leader must realize that the Church, as the 
premier mediating variable, may determine the very legitimacy of the government and 
the presidency itself. Politicians may understand this better than anyone. Many were in 
attendance at the Thanksgiving Mass, and others appreciate the significance o f the 
Church’s support, both real and symbolic, to any search for power they may entertain.
Outside of Weber’s paradigm in the area of Utilitarian legitimacy the Church 
played an equally important role. For many centuries while the Philippines were under 
Spanish control the Church facilitated the outlay of goods and services, meager though 
they were, to the population. The Church ensured not simply community defense or the 
common good, but as was discussed in Chapter 2, the local parish organized every aspect 
of community life. So engrained was the relationship between the parish priest and the 
community that when the Filipinos had the chance to throw off Spanish rule during the 
British occupation of Manila in 1762, they did not.6 The British found it impossible to 
win the Filipinos’ hearts and minds. The Americans were able to do it only by re-staffing 
parishes with friendly priests, doing away with the Catholic monopoly on education, and 
building on simmering discontent within the Spanish Church. Yet the Church was never 
fully removed from politics and reemerged in the wake o f World War II to reassert itself.
6Tracy, Manila Ransomed, 40.
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Finding a utility for the organization in the post-war Philippines challenged the 
Church’s resourcefulness in many ways, and it responded accordingly. No longer 
responsible for providing basic goods and services or even governmental services to the 
population, the Church focused instead on helping the new independent republic and the 
peasant population through the organization of trade unions, peasant advocacy groups, 
and anti-Communist cadres that sought to counter the ongoing Huk rebellion.
After the Vatican II liberalization and revitalization o f the Church in the early 
1960s, Church elements became more active as advocates for the poor and the politically 
disenfranchised. This advocacy role provided a utility for large segments of the 
population that could not hope to resist the repressive laws o f the authoritarian Marcos 
regime, which was in full force by the end o f the decade. After Marcos declared martial 
law in 1972, the Church provided one of the strongest anti-Marcos and anti-martial law 
voices in the Philippines. This led to the events o f the early 1980s and the first People 
Power Revolution, the culmination of the Church’s efforts and the epitome o f its political 
utility for the masses. Since Marcos, the Church has continued its utilitarian function for 
both the poor and the politically disenfranchised, taking an active role in elections and 
caring for the needs of the less fortunate.
Though discounted by Weber and others in legitimacy theory, the Philippine 
Catholic Church has proven its merit and worth in all four types o f legitimacy. It has 
provided the government with a social order seen as validated by God and embedded 
within a political culture that was itself shaped and often controlled by the Church. 
Legitimacy in the Philippines has proven to be a phenomenon of social order, and the
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type of social order found in a Philippine society has not affected the Church’s ability to 
manipulate it to its advantage.
The Church has thrived and dominated in a colonial government, matched wits 
with an emerging superpower during a commonwealth period, and survived a Cold War.
It has fought off challenges from left-wing humanist movements, Protestant schisms, 
Communist infiltration, and Muslim insurgency. It has survived martial law and the 
imprisonment, abuse, torture, and murder o f its leaders and laity. It has endured and 
outlived fascism and authoritarian regimes, and it has flourished in democracy. The 
Philippine Catholic Church has been the great political and social survivor for almost 
500 years and most likely will remain politically active.
In Weber’s theory oflegitimacy acceptance of the Church’s role is found in the 
three ideal types, along with utilitarianism. In David Easton’s theory the Church’s role 
takes a different shape. Unlike Weber, Easton does not give a theory oflegitimacy, but 
his ideas on the political system require one to already exist. In that sense, his ideas fit 
well with helping expand the Weberian design oflegitimacy and the role o f the Church in 
the state. For example, Easton tells us that in a political system, something needs to
n
“intervene in the name o f society... to decide how valued things are to be allocated."
This study has illustrated that in the Philippines, no other organization has intervened 
more in political matters than the Catholic Church. The very nature o f its raison d ’etre 
meant that it decided the value of policies and politicians, and still does this today.
The Church is also inherently intertwined with the idea o f diffuse support. 
Throughout Philippine history support for the Church has been based on traditional, legal,
n
David Easton., ed. Varieties o f  Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1966), 136.
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charismatic, and utilitarian authority. Along with this has been the diffuse support 
engendered in the population by the catholic institutions that make up the Church and the 
Church itself. No organization or government has the impact on the young mind, the 
family unit, and the adult population, as does the Church. Its support has been 
institutionalized. Its specific support is found in the policies it promotes and the solid 
backing it gets from the citizenry. The Church has realized what Easton wrote, that 
governments, regimes, and individual politicians find it difficult to remain effective 
without diffuse and specific support.
The Church has been successful in maintaining specific and diffuse support and 
this can be proven by public opinion polls that confirm the Church’s trust rating and the 
public’s concurrence on key issues. For example, in a country where overpopulation is a 
problem and the Church frowns upon birth control, abortion is a hot issue. Politicians 
have from time to time brought up the issue, and the Church has reacted vehemently 
against it. The citizenry seem to agree with the Church. A full 70 percent believe 
abortion is always wrong, making no exceptions for the life of the mother or rape and 
incest. Only 7 percent say that abortion is acceptable.8
Public opinion in the Philippines also illustrates that the Church has more trust 
and confidence from the population than do the courts and the educational system. 
Moreover, one finds a strong majority o f 55 percent believe the Church possesses and 
utilizes the correct amount o f power, illustrating for the researcher that the Church among
8 Religion Module - Social Weather Station Report Survey, October 28 -  
November 14, 1998, (Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Station, 1998), 181.
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all organizations has the institutional diffuse support needed as well as the specific 
support to push forward their agenda in the Philippine democracy.9
The Eastonian idea of diffuse and specific support is real and lasting for the 
Church in the Philippines in part because it has utilized so well the tools o f politics, even 
as the political currents have changed in Philippine history. The restoration of 
democratic rule in the Philippines and the election of President Aquino allowed the 
Church a new position of power. At the same time, it also created new challenges. A 
democracy restored meant that the Church was now unable to simply impose its will as it 
did during the Spanish era, or resort to open violence as it did against the British and 
Americans. Unable to work through peasant groups as it did in the post-World War II 
decade, the Church has had to adapt to and deal with this democracy. It has worked 
successfully through the people because its very foundation is with the people.
As it had in the past, the Church utilized all aspects, including its gravitas, to 
ensure that the politicians of their choice--Aquino and now Arroyo—survived and those 
they objected to did not. The Aquino presidency and subsequent administrations each 
provide ideal material to observe the Church within a democratic milieu. Dictating 
policies was much easier in a time when concern for parishioners was secondary to 
Church policy, but parishioners were now the well from which the Church’s power was 
drawn. Through the use of People Power the Church has left an indelible mark on the 
Philippine body politic. With the people’s help during the past twenty years, the Church 
brought down one dictator and one morally corrupt president and helped install two 
governments sympathetic to the Church’s cause.
9 Ibid., 190.
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It has been able to do this not by force o f arms or theological coup, but by 
working through the democratic processes now existent and revitalized in the Philippines. 
No matter how powerful or convincing the Church may be, without the people there 
would have been no EDSA I or EDSA II. It was, after all, People Power. At lower levels 
of politics the Church continued to stump for candidates, openly expressing preferences 
for or attempting to prematurely end the terms o f officials with which they did not agree. 
In a way, the Church’s power has remained interwoven with the fortunes o f politicians 
allied to its cause.
These questions remain: Where does the people’s authority expressed through the 
power of the vote and through the Church’s agenda fit into the legitimacy model outlined 
in chapter 1? Should the people share paradigmatic space with other independent “x” 
variables and, if  so, does this preclude any action by the population in the other sectors of 
“x”? Do the “x” variables have a chance to interact with one another or are they mutually 
exclusive? And where does the Church fit in the model with the inclusion o f people 
expressed graphically? Is it still as important? How does the theories o f Weber or Easton 
help explain this situation?
The answers are not complicated, because any study that examines the importance 
of mediating variables in legitimacy and uses for its case study a democratically elected 
government cannot take the people out o f the equation. The population’s role has always 
been assumed in each of Weber’s categories and in utilitarianism, and in Easton’s ideas 
of diffuse and specific support. For example, a leader needs a population with which to 
have a social contract under the Rational-Legal ideal oflegitimacy. Without a population, 
the ruler’s contract would be null and void because he would be the only party to the 
agreement. A ruler also needs the population of his state to acknowledge his charismatic 
appeal. Looking in the mirror at one’s reflection and admiring one’s own charisma is not
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going to keep one in office. Therefore, any ruler who survives on charismatic appeal 
needs a population to recognize and reinforce it.
The people are o f lesser importance in the traditional style oflegitimacy, but they 
are nonetheless needed because they accept and reinforce this norm. And should they 
cease to accept it, it opens the way for an illegitimate ruler and an unstable nation-state. 
The overthrow of monarchies is certainly something that is part o f human history. The 
utilitarian ideal oflegitimacy presupposes the presence o f a population that gives 
authority to a government or individual in return for what that government or individual 
can do for it. Indeed, without a population there can be no exchange o f goods and 
services for authority.
Support o f any type, whether it is diffuse or specific, needs actors involved to give 
such support. Measuring diffuse or specific support is mainly done through public 
opinion polling. Without a public there could be no polls, without polls there can be no 
effective measurement of support. There would be no need for either diffuse or specific 
support in totalitarian regimes, for they would exist in spite o f an Eastonian ideal. But 
Easton’s ideas require a democracy to work, a democracy like the Philippines, and thus 
the people a priori to the political system.
The bulk of this study has dealt with the Church’s role as the champion, caretaker, 
spokesman, and representative for the political will of the Philippine population. 
Therefore, in the legitimacy model the people cannot and should not be illustrated as a 
separate variable acting independently. Instead, the people are an equal and integral part 
of each and every one of the independent variables. In democracies like the Philippines, 
the population is the foundation on which all independent variables o f legitimacy exist.
The inclusion and acknowledgment o f an important role for the people does not 
pose any particular problems for the Church’s role. In fact, the last few chapters have 
shown that these roles are necessary when one attempts to understand the Church’s 
influence in Philippine politics. The Church has acted and continues to act as a political
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lens that focuses the people’s power and authority through the independent variables onto 
the Philippine government. Democratization of the Philippines has had consequences for 
the Church’s role in legitimating governments, but it has adjusted.
Realization that nothing of the magnitude of deposing presidents can be 
accomplished without the people, this study has shown how the Church and its leadership 
have become masterful in manipulating the population to that end. Cardinal Sin and 
others continue to fight their battles with politicians in the court o f public opinion, and 
they do not fight fair. Mobilizing the Church’s immense resources, they can launch 
propaganda barrages that very few single politicians can counter. They have their own 
television, radio, and print media to transmit their ideas, opinions, and attacks. But even 
this is not needed, for the Church gets ample coverage in the private media as was 
illustrated in earlier chapters. What the Church does not get in free coverage it buys with 
paid advertisements.
What the Church cannot accomplish in the media it can attempt to achieve in the 
parishes. One thing that raises the ire o f Church critics on the op-ed pages o f Philippine 
newspapers is the Church’s continued use of pastoral letters and homilies extolling the 
“virtuous” will of the Church, while scandalizing and condemning the politicians it 
opposes. Since 1986, going to a Catholic Church in the Philippines has often meant more 
than simply hearing a sermon, receiving Mass, and confessing sins. It has come to 
include important political messages written by Cardinal Sin or the CBCP and read by the 
local parish priest. These messages simultaneously reaffirm God’s love, condemn 
political foes, and seek to motivate the people to answer the Church’s call to action. Any 
political enemy of the Church can be assured that if  they do not bow to the Church’s will, 
they too will find their names and activities as part o f the sermon.
Becoming an enemy of the Church has meant political destruction for many— 
destruction brought about by the people. The previous chapters are full o f examples.
Once the Church’s resources are mobilized behind a cause and it has motivated the
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people, it is almost impossible to stop. Estrada had the best chance to fight and beat the 
Church. He was not an ordinary politician or a cruel dictator. He was a former movie star 
who appealed to the masses as both a cult hero and as a politician who championed the 
poor’s cause.
Estrada was able to translate his charisma into political clout. As an actor and a 
politician, he was able to convince the poorest o f society that he cared about their plight. 
The poor, or the masa as they were known, were the source o f his political power and his 
legitimacy. In Estrada’s eyes, the Church could be circumvented. He would accept its 
endorsement if  offered but he believed he did not need it to survive politically. It was a 
calculated risk on Estrada’s part. The Church publicly opposed his candidacy, propped 
up his opponents, and questioned his morality. The Church wanted anyone but Estrada to 
win.
Not only was Estrada’s victory a defeat for the Church, but it also indicated that 
the people mattered in the new Philippine democracy. If the Church wanted to affect 
political change in the post-1998 world, it needed to mobilize the people. In the Estrada 
case, enough people chose to ignore the Church’s mediating influence and elect Estrada. 
As such, he had a right to feel invincible. As he relaxed into his new role as the most 
powerful politician in the Philippines, the Church never stopped working against him.
Had this been pre-1898, it would have simply had him removed and sent him back to the 
province from which he came, relegated to obscurity either in the Philippines or on the 
Iberian peninsula. But this was 1998 and the Philippines is a democracy. To get rid of 
Estrada, the Church needed the people. It needed the masses, and it needed to find 
something to turn sufficient numbers against Estrada to end the mandate that he had won 
in a free and fair constitutional election. That is exactly what the Church did.
The events that led to Estrada’s downfall have already been chronicled, but o f  
interest is how the Church worked through the people. As with all “z” variables in a 
democracy, the people’s energies are usually focused on the government. Their will,
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anger, desires, authority, and voices are magnified by mediating variables to levels 
unachievable without them. The political decibel level was deafening to Marcos in 1986, 
loud enough for Ramos to stop his attempts to tamper with the constitution in 1997, and 
boisterous enough in January 2001 to force the resignation o f the once very popular 
Estrada.
Estrada believed that the masses could protect him. Unlike Marcos, his approval 
ratings had remained high and he remained a hero to the poorest in the Philippines. In its 
initial struggle against Estrada, the Church fielded fewer numbers than Estrada so his 
confidence was warranted, at least on the surface. But as this study has shown, one must 
look much deeper than the surface. The Church realized its place in modem democratic 
politics and embraced it.
If one lesson is learned, it is that the Church articulates and protects norms and 
legitimacy. Moreover, as Fleet and Smith point out, the Church has made a gradual, 
though no less radical, transformation to become an ally to democracy. The Philippines 
are an ideal place to witness this transformation. There the Church has become a kind of 
social loudspeaker, ensuring that the political will and desire of the masses cannot be 
discounted or overlooked by any politician seeking to remain legitimate and relevant.
Polls in the wake of EDSA II confirm this position. If the Church had not 
instigated a People Power movement against Estrada, 64 percent of the population 
believed Estrada’s government would not have listened to their complaints.10 In 1986, 
after the first EDSA revolution, 66 percent believed that a popular struggle was necessary 
to have their grievances heard.11 Furthermore, the triumph of EDSA II was seen as the
10 Maha Mangahas, “From Juentenggate to People Power 2: The SWS Surveys o f  
Public Opinion,” 76.
1 ■ibid.
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will o f God by 59 percent o f the population, and 61 percent believed that EDSA II was 
necessary and just.12
Estrada tried but failed to marginalize the Church. During the early stages o f his 
impeachment trial, he was able to organize upwards of a million people to attend a rally 
in support of his administration. In the end he was able to get nearly 1 million supporters 
at his rally, and the Church managed only 100,000 at their counter demonstration, yet the 
Church prevailed. Why? The only answer lies in the Church’s ability to magnify the 
individual’s voice and power, energizing tens o f thousands from the electorate and 
channeling their power into a mandate for the Church to call for the removal of a duly 
elected president who still maintained tremendous mass support. There has really been 
nothing like it in all o f Southeast Asia, and perhaps the world.
Doubters need only look at the events o f EDSA II. Nowhere else in 
contemporary politics is there so vivid an example o f the Church working unilaterally 
through the people to accomplish its political agenda. Public opinion data now shows 
that the Church’s actions were justified since the Filipino people have embraced the 
results. The numbers at EDSA were in the hundreds o f thousands, but that still only 
represented a small fraction o f the electorate. With the Church’s support, however, 
EDSA II forced Estrada to resign. EDSA II was an expression and an illustration of how 
the Church serves as the mediating variable in legitimacy.
Public opinion data collected by the Social Weather Station (SWS) after the 
events o f EDSA II reaffirmed the Church’s actions and its position o f power and 
influence. Polls taken shortly after EDSA II revealed that 56 percent believed that the 
“strength o f People Power” legitimized Arroyo’s presidency.13 The second and third 
factors in her legitimacy were “the decision of the Supreme Court” and “the support o f
12Ibid., 59-60.
13Ibid„ 87.
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the Catholic Church.” It should not be forgotten that although the Church is third on the 
list of factors, it played a leading role in helping organize the People Power and 
pressuring the Supreme Court. The Church gave weight to both Estrada’s resignation and 
Arroyo’s swearing in as the new president, and the people accepted it.
Another poll showed that nearly 70 percent o f the population believed EDSA II 
represented the majority’s opinion. This reinforces the idea that the Church was in the 
unique position to act on the behalf o f millions o f Filipinos.14 Yet another public opinion 
poll showed that a full 64 percent of the people believed that if  the Church-led People 
Power had not taken place, Estrada’s government would not have responded to the 
people’s grievances. This is more evidence of the Church’s continued role as the one 
organization that can force a corrupt government to heed the people’s wishes. By its 
actions, the Church ensured that there would be no mass disenfranchisement of the 
electorate by the actions o f Estrada and his eleven allies in the Philippine Senate.15
The Church’s overall effectiveness in the public’s eyes was boosted considerably 
after its EDSA II success. When the SWS measured the “trust ratings” of popular 
personalities in February 2001, just two weeks after ESDAII, Cardinal Sin enjoyed a net 
trust rating several points higher than former President Aquino, and more than fifteen 
points higher than the popular Fidel Ramos. The only non-Church figure with 
considerably more popularity was the new president.
Arroyo was and remains a popular figure, and like Cardinal Sin and others in the 
Church, she had a strong sense of her political destiny.16 She still portrays herself as a
14Mangahas,“From Juetenggate to People Power 2: The SWS Surveys of Public 
Opinion,”3 6.
15Ibid„ 40.
16Hookway, “Arroyo Makes Preparations For Possible Life After Estrada.
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woman of the masses and her support may reflect that reality.17 Yet never far away from 
Arroyo’s political life is the influence of the Catholic Church and Cardinal Sin. Even 
before Estrada’s troubles, Cardinal Sin was considered Arroyo’s close confidant. It was 
Cardinal Sin who advised her to quit her cabinet job the same day the Church launched 
its anti-Estrada campaign. Later, Arroyo relayed part o f their conversations, which 
reflected a powerful cardinal guiding a very malleable Arroyo. She said Sin told her,
1 ft"We don't have to plan every detail. God will take care o f it." Of course, in the opinion 
of millions and maybe Arroyo herself, God worked through Cardinal Sin and the 
Church.19
Arroyo’s story and the way the Church has influenced her administration follows 
next in the discussion. Up to this point, the story o f the Church’s influence has been told 
largely through historical narrative with analysis weaved into it. The events o f the 
Spanish era, the American period, and the administrations of Marcos, Aquino, Ramos, 
and Estrada have all been discussed in varying degrees of detail to ensure a proper 
understanding o f the Church’s role in the legitimacy process. The Church’s existence 
within the democratic political milieu has also been covered in this chapter. What 
remains is a discussion o f how the Church is performing in the Arroyo administration.
President Arroyo’s administration, now twenty-one months old, provides an 
archetype final case study to understand how the Church remains a force of legitimacy. 
Having installed her into power, the Church has still not removed itself from its advisory 
and support role in her administration.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Raissa Robles, “Just the Woman for the Job,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] South China Morning Post (January 20, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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In fact, it may be argued that since Arroyo has taken power the Church has acted 
in a very public manner, becoming bolder and more powerful than it ever has been. The 
Church’s importance to Arroyo has only become larger since her inauguration. Its role in 
her presidency is easily measurable by simply looking at the Church’s actions since she 
took her oath of office under the statue o f the Virgin Mary at EDSA. Her first year in 
office illustrates the Church’s key role in solidifying her legitimacy, which has been 
questioned by some in the Philippines, especially Estrada’s supporters. The first months 
of the Arroyo administration are full o f political drama and Church involvement. Indeed, 
the Church continued to remain active throughout her administration in its role as the 
most influential mediating variable. What follows is a discussion of a few of the key 
issues in which the Church injected itself into matters of legitimacy and policy in the new 
administration.
The first test for Arroyo and for the Church in its advisory role to the new 
president was the question of legitimacy itself. Although the polls clearly showed that the 
people supported the results o f EDSA II, there were those in Estrada’s camp who tried to 
create doubt in the people’s minds about the legality o f Arroyo’s legitimacy. The 
criticisms were based on the Rational-Legal foundation found in the Weberian model. 
Arroyo had not been elected to the presidency and in the pro-Estrada group’s eyes, 
therefore, she should be seen only as an “acting” president until something legally 
binding, such as a snap election, could be created.20
The argument had some weight, but it ignored Arroyo’s popularity and the 
majority’s acceptance o f EDSA II as a form of snap election. Moreover, the Church- 
sponsored protests had forced President Estrada to accept a Philippine Supreme Court 
decree that stripped him of his office. The court may have been creating law, but
90“GMA Government Facing Constitutional Crisis,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Manila Standard (February 2, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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nonetheless, his acceptance o f it and Arroyo’s swearing in by the chief justice made her 
the new president of the Philippines. It was, therefore, constitutional.
The efforts to discredit her via a legal argument were fruitless. Furthermore, 
Arroyo had followed the constitutional procedures in selecting a new vice president, 
Teofisto Guingona, and both chambers o f the Philippine Congress had confirmed her 
selection. The constitutional hurdles that needed clearing were so minor that they did not 
even register in most people’s minds. Whether Estrada’s allies liked it or not, the fact 
was that Estrada had resigned, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had sworn in 
Arroyo, and she had the full faith and support o f the Catholic Church, which “spoke” for 
the people at EDSA II and had the public opinion polls backing up its claims.
In spite o f everything, it was still not enough for loyal Estrada cliques, and 
Estrada still had legions o f supporters among the poor. A plan was hatched three months 
after EDSA II to force Arroyo’s resignation. Throngs of Estrada supporters began to 
gather at the EDSA shrine. They were angry about their idol’s arrest, and they declared 
that they would not disperse until Arroyo resigned and Estrada was returned to 
Malacanang. It was a tense time in Manila, and the Church knew it had to react to this 
counter-action or risk losing its president and its influence over Philippine politics.
The press dubbed the event the “poor People Power" because it was largely made 
up of Manila’s poor and unemployed, who had voted for and sympathized with Estrada. 
There was also a very large contingent from the Inglesia ni Cristo, a powerful anti- 
Catholic religious group that still supported the ousted president.22 The numbers soon
21David W. Hendon and Donald E. Greco, “Notes on Church-state Affairs,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Journal o f  Church & State (April 1, 2001; 
accessed 5 October 2002).
22Ramon Tulfo, “Catholic vs. INC at EDSA,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 28, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
320
swelled to tens o f thousands, but they discovered that numbers were not the key to 
success. Even before EDSA II, Estrada had amassed more than a million supporters to 
his cause in Manila to no avail. As those at this “EDSA III,” as it became to be called, 
were about to learn, a People Power without the Church’s support had no power at all.
The Catholic Church not only did not support the efforts o f an EDSA III, but also 
fought against them. The protestors gathered at the EDSA shrine had done so without the 
Church’s permission. Once there, they began to deface what was officially Church 
property. EDSA was more than simply Church property. It was officially “holy ground,” 
a place where Christian pilgrims were granted plenary indulgences by the Roman 
Catholic Church. It had been declared holy ground shortly after EDSA II by a decree 
from Pope John Paul II. A church had existed on the site since 1987.23
Defacing holy ground and the parish did not sit well with Cardinal Sin. He took to 
the airwaves and urged people to defend democracy and the new president. "As 
Catholics, we must fully support, defend, and stand behind the present government and 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo," Sin said in a radio and television address. "Keep 
watch, stay alert. [EDSA III] is immoral to grab power. It is immoral to support those 
plotting against duly constituted authorities." The armed forces were also put on the 
highest alert.24 Arroyo’s feelings on the issue were summed up by her husband, who said 
she was ready to deal with any attempt to grab power. He quoted the president as saying 
to Estrada’s supporters, "Come and take your best shot and I will crush you."
23Norman Bordadora and Andrea T. Echavez, “EDSA Shrine: Where man is Fully 
Alive,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (February 
23,2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
24Paul Alexander, “Philippines Cardinal Urges Protest,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (April 29, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
“Estrada Followers Cancel March To Philippine Pres Palace,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Dow Jones International (April 29, 2001; accessed 5 
October 2002).
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The pro-Estrada mob did nothing to endear themselves to the millions o f Arroyo’s 
Catholic supporters. Their actions desecrated the EDSA shrine and left many dismayed. 
Trash littered the site, and Estrada partisans even plastered pictures of their hero on the 
hem of the Virgin Mary’s dress. They also positioned loudspeakers at the doors o f the 
shrine’s church. The loudspeakers blasted “foul language” and “obscene songs” while 
those inside were trying to hear the liturgy.26 "So many of us are on the brink o f tears," 
Sin said over the situation. "We are grieving for the EDSA shrine, church o f the people, 
temple of God, monument to peace."27
The influential Catholic Bishops' Conference o f the Philippines also decried the 
protestors as "immoral" and accused Estrada’s "rich and powerful" allies o f "exploiting 
the poor" for their own interests.28 The CBCP’s Bishop Quevedo called the EDSA III 
rally an "effectively planned and amply funded sinister destabilization scheme" staged by 
Estrada's supporters. Both sides were poised for a new confrontation.
Estrada supporters threatened to storm the presidential palace. The police and the 
military rolled out armored vehicles to secure the palace and several thousand people 
responded to Cardinal Sin’s radio broadcast. President Arroyo visited and shook hands 
with those who responded to the Church’s call and thanked them profusely.29 She also 
made a special effort to meet with Cardinal Sin, military, and police officials to discuss
Blanche S. Rivera, Donna Pazzibugan, and Gerald G. Lacuarta, “Sin Urges 
Flock: Wear Blue Today,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (April 29, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29“Strike Thwarts Power Grab by Estrada Supporters, says Arroyo,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Bangkok Post (May 1, 2001; accessed 3 October 
2002).
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strategy on how to deal with the potential for deadly riots. Sadly, violence was 
inevitable.
On May 1,2001, elements of the pro-Estrada rally attempted to storm the 
Malacanang. President Arroyo declared a "state of rebellion," sending heavily armed 
police to arrest key opposition politicians and quell the protests. It was the worst wave of 
political violence in fifteen years, and Philippine democracy suffered because o f it.
Within hours, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who served as defense minister under dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos, was arrested on sedition charges. He was one of eleven politicians, 
military officers, and policemen arrested that same day. Others included Senator 
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, the same man who led two coup attempts in the late 1980s 
against President Corazon Aquino. When the smoke cleared, one policeman and two 
rioters were dead. About 113 protestors were wounded and more than 100 rioters were 
also arrested.
In the end Arroyo made good on her promise "to crush" the protests and end 
Estrada’s hopes for a return to power. The blame for the violence lay not with Arroyo 
but with Estrada, and the Church placed it on his shoulders. Cardinal Sin condemned 
allies o f the jailed Estrada for instigating the riot as he spoke before thousands of pro- 
government supporters who had gathered at the defaced EDSA shrine to reclaim it for the 
Church and clean up the filth left by Estrada’s mob. The fact that the pro-Estrada mob 
chose EDSA as the place of the protest also indicated that they opposed the Church’s 
actions as well. However, the Church did not blame the poor, but instead laid the blame
30Ibid.
31Marc Lemer, “President calls 'state of rebellion' in Manila Police Arrest 
Opposition Politicians,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Washington 
Times (May 2, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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at the feet o f Estrada’s political allies for abusing and manipulating the poor and 
capitalizing on their weakness.
Nearly 25,000 people attended the Mass held at the end of the “poor people” 
power uprising. It was a day of “reclamation” and reaffirmation o f the Arroyo 
presidency. Standing before the trash-strewn shrine, Sin declared, "The people have 
desecrated Holy ground, disrespected the image o f our Lady and offended Catholic 
sensibilities. Obscene songs and contemptuous remarks were hurled even at the Church . .  
. [but] we do not sow revenge, hatred, and rancor. We are saddened but not vengeful. We 
are appalled by the desecration but we do not want to retaliate . . .  We do not hold these 
sins against the poor.”33 Cardinal Sin also used the mass to reiterate his support for 
President Arroyo. He said, “She blended well justice and love, force and tolerance, law 
and freedom.”34 Moreover, he vowed that the Church would "never again allow the 
desecration" of the EDSA shrine.35
Estrada’s hopes o f using People Power to regain his office were dashed, but 
EDSA III opened the Church’s and the new administration’s eyes. It illustrated to both 
the government and the Church that significant numbers of the poor still supported 
Estrada. The reasons were simple. He was their matinee idle and, at least in his rhetoric,
32“Philippine Catholic Church Leader Condemns Street Riots,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 1, 2001; accessed 4 March 
2002).
-5-3
Cathy Rose A. Garcia, “Politicians Who Manipulated Poor Face God's Wrath -  
Sin,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (May 2, 2001; 
accessed 3 March 2002).
34Arturo Bariud, “Arroyo Blossoms Under Pressure,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (May 5, 2001; accessed 5 March 2002).
35“Choose Wisely, Voters Told (GMA Says Polls Not a Test o f Her Legitimacy),” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (May 14, 2001; accessed 5 
October 2002).
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he attempted to identify with their issues. Regardless of his own alleged embezzlement of 
funds, he still made them feel important.
Arroyo had not used her first few months in office to cater to the poor as Estrada 
had. Concrete actions by the Church were slow, and the poorest segments o f society 
continued to feel abandoned and overlooked by the new government. Certain segments 
even called upon Arroyo and Cardinal Sin to end their social, economic, and political 
"calvaries," daring them to “stand for the right of the peasantry . . .  above the interests of 
the landed families who continue to amass wealth and property at the expense o f the 
already impoverished peasants."36 Unfortunately, many felt that action was too slow, and 
this is part o f the reason an EDSA III erupted.
When the author was in Manila during the summer of 2001, the talk on the streets 
was much the same. “Where is Arroyo? Where is Cardinal Sin? Erap was our guy, our 
president and they took him from us,” said one gentleman in a Makati shopping mall. 
“The Church should not have intervened. Let the trial go. Estrada is the one who should 
be president,” said another in Manila.37 Indeed, many were still angry about the events of 
EDSA II well into the summer o f 2001, feeling that the Church had snatched away their 
legitimate president in order to install one of its own. Moreover, they felt that the Church 
was an institution o f elite and middle class that cared little about the plight o f Manila’s 
poor.
The editorial boards of Manila’s newspapers concurred. They often criticized the 
Church for not taking the plight o f the poor seriously. One criticism was that the Church 
did not apply enough pressure on its rich and middle class parishioners, who seemed to
36“Farmers Seek Sin, GMA Help to End 'Calvary',” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 12, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
37Filipinos’ Opinion. Interview by author, 20 July 2001, Philippines. Transcribed. 
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.
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forget the gospel after Sunday sermons and failed to take care o f the “least” o f society. In 
fact, these same “rich” parishioners often failed to pay their poor workers a “living” 
wage. In one scathing editorial, the Philippine Daily Inquirer called upon the Church to 
do “something significant to show for more than 400 years o f work in this ‘only Christian 
country’ in Asia.”38 It was a dramatic indictment of the Church’s performance in helping 
the nation’s poorest.
Understanding this perspective, Cardinal Sin took the opportunity in the wake of 
EDSA III to publicly ask for forgiveness from the poor for both himself and the Church. 
Sin apologized and acknowledged that the Church had neglected the poor and that this 
had made them easy prey for “selfish” and “powerful” people. “We would like to ask the 
poor for forgiveness," Sin said. "We should listen to the poor's complaints. We should not 
wait for another crisis before we open our eyes.”39 The Church needed to reopen a dialog 
with the poor, and the aftermath of EDSA III was the perfect time.
The crisis o f the “poor people power” forced the Church to act as Arroyo’s 
protector. It would soon have to meet another challenge to her legitimacy from a 
different and much smaller segment of society. In the summer o f 2002, a new threat to 
her legitimacy came in the guise of a political pressure group known as the Council for 
Philippine Affairs (COPA). Ironically, COPA was launched at Cardinal Sin’s villa in 
1999. It started out as a gathering of political hacks interested in injecting themselves 
into national politics. They morphed into a group eager to depose what they felt was a 
weak Arroyo administration.
38Ramon T. Jimenez, “'EDSA III' Should Jolt Gov't, Labor, Church to Act Now,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 2, 2001; 
accessed 3 April 2002).
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The COPA slogan had been "Be informed. Be concerned. Be involved,” and as 
long as the group’s criticism was not directed towards Arroyo, the Church did not watch 
COPA particularly closely.40 But when Arroyo became a target o f COPA, the Church 
took notice and took action. Although COPA’s attacks were minor and hardly registered 
in the Philippine press initially, they had to be met head on. Allowing them to fester in 
the body politic was something the Church was not comfortable with.
Most o f COPA’s charges centered on the fact that Arroyo had abandoned the 
“spirit” of EDSA II in favor of status quo politics. It was a baseless charge, and Arroyo 
initially dismissed it, saying she was not bothered by COPA, nor did she owe her position 
to anyone but “God.” To some God may have been a code word for Cardinal Sin, and 
according to at least one incredulous reporter, Sin was “as close to God as anyone can get 
in this country.”41 While not divine, Cardinal Sin was politically astute and wanted to 
head off any COPA rallies that might use Church property as a rallying point. The 
Cardinal banned political demonstrations on the premises of the EDSA shrine and refused 
to give permission to allow COPA to use it for any actions against Arroyo.
The Church did not want anything to jeopardize the Arroyo administration.42 
Consequently, the cardinal commanded the presidential advisor on media and 
ecclesiastical affairs, Conrado "Dodi" Limcaoco, to release information to the press about
40Donna S. Cueto and Norman Bordadora, “Who's Afraid of Copa?” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 27, 2002; 
accessed 5 October 2002).
41Conrado De Quiros, “Theology 101,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 15, 2002; accessed 5 October 2002).
42Amando Doronila, “GMA - EDSA II Beneficiary Not Its Reincarnation,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 14, 2002; 
accessed 5 October 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
327
COPA’s activities.43 The strategy was simple. He wanted to expose the plotters to the 
conservative press and to Arroyo’s supporters, and this preemptive move would force 
COPA back into the shadows. He also had another reason. Members o f COPA had been 
intentionally feeding erroneous information to the press that fostered the false assumption 
that Cardinal Sin supported their efforts against Arroyo.
COPA Secretary General Pastor Saycon told one paper about a meeting with 
Cardinal Sin. He said he went to see the cardinal to present COPA’s manifesto. "The 
manifesto would be all about democracy and freedom from poverty. That's why we 
wanted the Cardinal's blessing," Saycon said.44 The manifesto also contained a provision 
by which COPA members would take over the government and form a ruling junta 
should rumors of a coup or an EDSA IV materialize. COPA’s manifesto was absurd on 
many levels, because the group never had the support of Cardinal Sin or the Church.45 
Moreover COPA never had support from the masses. It was, in the words o f one 
observer, a “small group” with media savvy 46
COPA was easily defeated without the Church’s support and after a meeting with 
the Reverend Socrates Villegas, COPA’s Saycon offered a public apology to the nation, 
the Church, and the president47 The entire COPA affair was small but indicative o f how
43Carlito Pablo and Dona Pazzibugan, “Palace Admits News Leak,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 25, 2002; accessed 5 
October 2002).
44“'Freedom Force' not Anti-Gloria,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 23, 2002; accessed 4 October 2002).
45Christian V. Esquerra and Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “Copa to Seek Ceasefire,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 26, 2002; 
accessed 5 October 2002).
46Armand N. Nocum and Normal Bordadora, “Saycon Says Sorry for Those He 
Offended,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 
15,2002; accessed 4 October 2002).
47Ibid.
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political opposition sometimes worked. The Church helped keep it small, and that was a 
good thing for Arroyo. In Philippine politics the most minor o f charges or the smallest 
ripples o f discord can lead to severe consequences. Former Presidents Ramos and 
Estrada can attest to that.
In less public and identifiable ways than COPA, the Church served Arroyo as less 
of a watchdog and more of a cheering section and unofficial publicity machine. Its 
message for all the discontented was simple—have patience. Patience was a theme 
echoed over and over by the Church during the early months o f Arroyo’s administration. 
Everyone must have patience with the new president, the Church believed, including the 
masses and the Philippine Congress.
The Church was not above chiding the Philippine public and members o f  
Congress for having what they deemed "unrealistic" expectations of Arroyo. The Church 
also criticized the "inane behavior" o f senators stifling her domestic agenda. Moreover, 
it was the Philippine Congress, the Church believed, which kept Arroyo’s war on poverty 
from making progress. In a roundabout way, Congress’s inaction could be used to take 
some of the heat off o f Arroyo and the Church.
Poverty and how to deal with it is always a pressing issue in the Philippines, and 
sometimes the Church is even harsh on the president when it feels she is not acting in the 
best manner and being proactive enough in responding to the needs of the poor. In fact, 
Cardinal Sin chastised Arroyo early in 2002 when he believed she cared more about 
photo opportunities with the poor than actually helping them. Sin told the president that 
the poor were “not for decoration and for romantic charity photographs," and exhorted
48“Philippines: Catholic Bishops Ask for Arroyo Government to be Given More 
Time,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 
18, 2002; accessed 5 October, 2002).
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Arroyo to serve them "away from the flashing lights of photographers." 49 Arroyo soon 
got the message and stated publicly that she would “heed” Cardinal Sin’s advice.50
Over the past twenty-one months, these are issues that the Church has helped 
Arroyo address when it is not defending itself against attacks from the press, such as on 
the issue o f the poor, or actively buttressing Arroyo’s legitimacy. Less popular issues 
were not less important to the Church. Indeed, it injected itself into many of Arroyo’s 
policies and the Philippines have also witnessed a convergence of Arroyo’s policy 
platform and the Church’s political agenda over other issues. Arroyo accepted virtually 
the Church’s entire policy platform as the template for her own government's policies, 
including the areas of reproductive health, divorce, the death penalty, and censorship of 
the media. The press even reported that Arroyo herself vowed with “lamb-like 
meekness” to follow the Catholic Church’s dictates in matters of policy, and would pay 
particular deference to the advice o f Cardinal Sin and the Catholic Bishops Conference of 
the Philippines in certain policy matters.51
One area where the Church belonged was in the spiritual needs of the 
administration. For example, the president summoned the "prayer power" of Cardinal 
Sin to help her and her administration put an end to the hostage crises that afflicted the 
Philippines in June 2001. The Abu Syaff, a terrorist group with ties to A1 Queda, was 
kidnapping Filipinos and western tourists with impunity and causing her administration 
considerable public relations problems. The cardinal arrived at the palace and set about
49“Philippines Leader Says She is in Charge After Turbulent Year,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agertce France-Presse (January 20, 2002; accessed 5 
October 2002).
50Ibid.
51Norman Bordadora, “Gloria Toes Church Line,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (February 16, 2001; accessed 18 November 
2002).
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leading a "prayer for the Cabinet."52 The fact that his visit was detailed in the press hints 
at its importance. Whether the prayers worked or not is something debated by believers 
and theologians, but no doubt the Church’s public presence added a sense of authority 
and punctuated the crisis’s importance to the Arroyo administration.
In a more mundane role, the Church injected itself into the nomination process of 
some of Arroyo’s cabinet members. A prime example is the selection o f the health 
secretary. Since this position was directly responsible for policies dealing with 
reproduction and abortion-issues the Church had a keen interest in—it was interested in 
who would take the seat. Arroyo recognized the Church’s interest in her administration’s 
issues. She said she would “gladly listen” to the counsel of the Church and “the good
• STCardinal.” It came as no surprise that the Church approved the appointment o f Dr. 
Manuel Dayrit, who favored its positions.54
Media reports also indicated that the Church was heavily involved in the 
nomination and endorsements o f candidates to the Commission on Elections (COMLEC), 
which is the governmental body in charge o f overseeing elections. Overseeing elections 
was one way for the Church to solidify a powerful position in the government. Having 
allies on COMLEC could ensure an election that it believed would favor its candidates.
The Church was also involved in more ominous endeavors, such as censorship of 
the media. The Arroyo administration did little to counter its actions. The Church had 
always been the unofficial moral conscious of the Filipino people, but under the new
Juliet L. Javellana and Carlio Pablo, “Gloria: Nani Can't Serve as Negotiator,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 20, 2001; 
accessed 5 October 2002).
Arturo Bariuad, “Ban Shows Church's Influence on Arroyo,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (March 23, 2001; accessed 5 October 
2002).
54Ibid.
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Arroyo administration it became more active, taking an “official” role as arbiter of what 
could and could not be seen in Philippine cinema. A prime example o f the Church’s new 
empowered moral authority came after the release o f the motion picture Live Show.
The film, which won wide acclaim across the entertainment world, including the 
Cannes Film Festival, was targeted by the Catholic Church and its leadership for its 
graphic depictions o f the seedier side o f Manila’s nightclub life, including its depiction of 
live “sex shows.” The Church did not approve, and it pressured the president to remove 
the film from theaters. When Arroyo acquiesced, it became the first instance o f open 
censorship in her administration.
In another graphic representation o f the Church’s authority and influence on the 
State, the chairman o f the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board 
(MTRCB) was summoned to a meeting with Cardinal Sin. Interestingly, he had to 
answer to the cardinal and not to the president for his actions. After the meeting 
Chairman Nicanor Tiongson, who had previously approved the film Live Show, stated to 
the press that he had been “traumatized” by his meeting with Sin, who he said was 
“reeking with arrogance.”55 Moreover, Tiongson said the cardinal had acted more like a 
“political tactician” than a priest.
Regardless o f the criticism, Cardinal Sin proved politically effective in pressuring 
President Arroyo to suppress the film. Did she have a choice? How could she say “no” to 
the Church or Cardinal Sin in this matter? Arroyo recognized that she owed her position 
as president in large part to the actions o f the Catholic Church and to Cardinal Sin. 
Without EDSA II there would be no President Arroyo. Consequently, Arroyo forced 
Tiongson to resign.
55Leah Salterio, Donna S. Cueto, and Norman Bordadora, “Chief Censor Quits; 
Church Meddling Hit,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (March 22, 2001; accessed 18 November 2002).
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The media was wary of the Church’s actions in this particular case. By giving in 
to the Church’s pressure, they believed that Arroyo had committed “a culpable violation 
of the constitutional principle separating Church and State.” The Philippine Daily 
Inquirer called the Church a “moral posse of pharisaic ayatollahs,” claiming that none of 
the Church leadership had even seen the film.56 Asked if this was a violation of the 
separation of the Church and State, President Arroyo confidently replied that it was not.
cn
She said, “Anybody can recommend, and it's up to the President to make a decision."
So it seems the Church merely “recommended” that she do what it advised.
The Church also had Arroyo’s support regarding the death penalty. Catholic 
doctrine from the Vatican on down opposes the death penalty in all cases. This often 
contradicts with Catholic societies at large, including the Philippine public, which tends 
to favor the death penalty for murder and other heinous crimes. Public opinion polls 
show that the death penalty is favored by as much as 82 percent o f the Philippine 
population. On this issue, the Church is out o f step with the majority.58
Arroyo’s own actions in dealing with the issue of capital punishment show how 
she is tom between doing the Church’s bidding and her own desire to follow the people’s 
wishes. She has personally expressed displeasure for the death penalty, and she 
continues to support the Church’s push for the repeal of the death penalty law.59 She has
56Dean Jorge Bocob, “Joker, Say, Oh say It Ain't So,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 2,6, 2001; accessed 4 May 2002).
57Donna S. Cueto and Jerome Aning, “GMA: It’s Not Sin but His Spokesperson,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 31, 2001; 
accessed 4 October 2002).
c o
Mahar Mangahas, “Omnibus Social Survey-October 30, 1998,” [Online 
database at http://www.sws.org.ph/] Social Weather Report Survey (October 30, 1998; 
accessed 22 November 2002).
59Raissa Robles, “Arroyo 'Rules Out Executions on Her Watch',” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (April 5, 2001; accessed 5 
October 2002).
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also commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment.60 However, a few months later 
she altered her stance and said that death sentences should be carried out as long as the 
law existed. It seems that she is playing politics on this issue.
Most recently, she granted a reprieve to three convicted rapists who were 
coincidently scheduled to die on Cardinal Sin’s birthday.61 Arroyo would not allow the 
executions on the birthday of her most important benefactor. As the year 2002 
progressed, the issue o f the death penalty was still unresolved, but if  she followed public 
opinion then capital punishment would continue unfettered. If she followed the Church, 
she would continue to push for a law that prohibits the death penalty in all cases. The 
outcome of the death penalty issue remains uncertain.
The legality o f divorce is another issue confronting the president. But unlike the 
death penalty, Arroyo and Cardinal Sin’s closeness on the issue is described as “solid” 
and in “total agreement.”62 Both have attacked a measure before Congress that would 
have made divorce legal, calling it "un-Filipino," "immoral," and “unconstitutional.”
Not one to mince words, Cardinal Sin said such a measure was “absurd” and “insane” 
and said that no sensible or intelligent legislator would pursue it.63
Both Arroyo and Sin have consistently favored keeping the constitutional 
provisions o f 1987 that “guarantee” the sanctity o f the family. Divorce violates these
60Leotes Marie T. Lugo, “GMA Commutes All in Death Row List to Life Terms,” 
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (April 4, 2001; accessed 4 
March 2002).
61“Legal Effort To Halt 30 Philippine Executions Fails,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Dow Jones International News (September 23, 2002; accessed 5 
October 2002).
62Gerald G. Lacuarta and Juliet L. Javellan, “GMA, Sin call Divorce Bill 
Immoral, Un-Filipino,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (July 7, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
63Ibid.
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provisions, in their opinion. Arroyo has been quoted as saying that the government 
should not alter any section of the constitution that would harm the “basic source of our 
national bond and fraternity."64 Arroyo also said measures to amend the constitution and 
legalize divorce only served to distract from economic priorities and cause further 
divisions within the government and society.65 For the foreseeable future, it seems that 
divorce will remain illegal since the Church is unlikely to yield on this issue.
EDSA III, the Live Show debate, the death penalty, and divorce are just a few 
examples o f how the Church has been integrally involved in the new administration. 
Sometimes its activities have drawn criticism both domestically and internationally.
Even the Vatican was displeased with the Philippine Catholic Church’s overt political 
activities. A case in point is found in a “leak” of a Holy See edict soon after Arroyo took 
office. In the edict, the Pope was critical of Cardinal Sin and the Church’s continued 
involvement in politics after EDSA II. The Church’s leadership did not like the criticism. 
Cardinal Sin reportedly had the Philippine Ambassador to the Vatican, Tita De Villa, 
recalled immediately.
It was an astonishing demonstration o f power, for here was a prelate forcing the 
newly installed president o f the Philippines to recall am ambassador. It was yet another bit 
of evidence o f the Church’s lofty position in the Arroyo government. As the Manila 
Standard later pointed out, the important lesson from this episode was not the “leak” 
itself but that President Arroyo was so eager to accommodate the Church without giving 
Ambassador De Villa a chance to explain her actions. The appointment of ambassadors
64Ibid.
65Camela Cruz, “President Opposes Proposal to Allow Amendments,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press Newswires (July 6, 2001; 
accessed 5 October 2002).
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is legally the sole prerogative of the president, but she gave in to the cardinal’s demands. 
This caused the Manila Standard to ask if  Arroyo had own “Richelieu.”66
Having a “Richelieu” was not all bad, and it had positive affects for Arroyo. Not 
only did Cardinal Sin lead the Church that helped install her as president and legitimize 
her administration, but he also helped her gain a congressional voting block in the interim 
elections o f May 2001. The Church made it its duty to campaign for candidates that 
favored its agenda in the May elections.67 Together with Arroyo, it campaigned to get the 
country's estimated thirty-six million eligible voters to choose a slate of candidates that 
would help Arroyo, and do so in an atmosphere not tainted by guns, goons, or gold as 
Philippine elections often are.
The Church and Arroyo had high hopes for their slate o f candidates, thirteen in 
all. They were all part o f the administration’s “People Power Coalition,” which was a 
group of candidates that the Church felt would support the president’s policy decisions. 
As it had in the past, the Church watched the May balloting carefully. It wanted to 
prevent cheating and hoped to calm any potential violence the election could engender. 
Not only did COMELEC officiate, but the National Citizens Movement for Free 
Elections (NAMFREL) was also present, as was the Parish Pastoral Council for 
Responsible Voting (PPCRV), which had an impressive 462,000 volunteers covering 
fifty-eight dioceses nationwide.68
66“Sin Had Ambassador to Vatican Recalled,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Manila Standard (February 4,2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
f t  7 . • .“Philippine Church Leader Appeals for Calm Ahead of Elections,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 13, 2001, accessed 4 
October 2002).
68Gerald G. Lacuarta, “Polls 'Generally Peaceful,' Turnout 85%,’’[Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 15, 2001; accessed 5 
October 2002).
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When the election was over and the dust had settled, the Church was pleased. Its 
presence had ensured relatively peaceful elections and eight o f its thirteen candidates had 
won election. Politically, the Church had pulled off another victory for the Arroyo 
government. She now had validation from the Church, from the EDSA II “parliament of 
the streets,” and from the ballot box. Challenges from pro-Estrada forces would now face 
an impossible task in unseating Arroyo.
By the year 2002 Arroyo had, with the Church’s help, fought off challenges to her 
legitimacy and secured her place as president. She made significant progress on her 
policy agenda, and certain segments o f the international press took notice of her efforts.
In their “report card” on her administration, she received high marks. They credited her 
for having accomplished a great deal in her first year in office, despite the political and 
economic turmoil that engulfed the Philippines at the time she took over for Estrada.
They gave her credit for restoring fiscal control, stabilizing the peso, and presiding over 
the fastest growing economy in Southeast Asia for the fiscal year.69
Domestically, she enjoyed the solid backing of the military, and public opinion 
polls showed that her popularity remained steady. The Church continued to stand 
squarely behind the president, and throughout her term it has been her most ardent 
supporter.70 Sometimes it offered concrete policy advice and at other times spiritual 
guidance and comfort, and it sometimes served as her protector. On rare occasions, the 
Church could even be Arroyo’s toughest critic. The key point is that it was there in some 
capacity through her first volatile months, keeping her focused on her message and the 
reasons she was made the president to begin with.
69“Thrilla in Manila -  II,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] 
Institutional Investor -  International (June 1, 2002; accessed 5 October 2002).
70 Luz Baguioro, “Arroyo Feels the Heat from Ramos and Estrada Camps,” [Wire 
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (January 11, 2002; accessed 5 
October 2002).
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Cardinal Sin and the Church have remained powerful in Philippine politics, both 
in an advisory role when necessary and a very vocal and public role when required. But 
what about the future of the Church in Philippine politics? Will it remain the mediating 
variable in matters of legitimacy? Cardinal Sin’s leadership certainly cannot last forever, 
and with his passing the Church will have to fill a large “power vacuum.”
The author believes that Cardinal Sin’s absence in no way means the end of 
Church activism or influence. The model found in figure 17 does not contain the names 
of any one person, but instead features an institution in the role o f the mediating variable 
“z.” Yet history teaches one that the presence of a charismatic and politically astute 
leader helps assure the Church a preeminent position in matters of secular politics and not 
simply a marginal role as a mediating variable. Cardinal Sin’s own exploits have 
illustrated that the Church is most powerful when it has a strong leader at the helm. As a 
result, observers have wondered if anyone can and will fill Sin’s shoes and lead the 
Church in the new millennium.
Whoever it may be, he will need to possess a combination of empathy for the 
oppressed, a dynamic personality, and a keen political instinct. Only a leader with keen 
political instincts could navigate the immense social weight o f the Church through the 
potentially troubling waters of the Philippine political scene. He will need to practice 
political moderation as well, so as not to involve the Church in petty political disputes but 
save its power for battles that truly matter. Given all o f this, the question becomes: If not 
Cardinal Sin, then who will it be? Is there any one man who will rise to take the 
Church’s helm?
Until recently it was unclear if such an individual existed. But one man has risen 
above the rest in the unofficial competition to be Sin’s spiritual successor. He has been
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• • • • •  • •  * 7 1previously mentioned briefly in this study. His name is Socrates “Soc” Villegas. 
Although not a stranger to those who have visited the EDSA shrine in the past eleven 
years, he has remained largely below the political radar screen of most casual observers 
of Philippine politics. But Villegas is far from a new face to Philippine social and 
political circles. Everyone from Philippine politicians to priests knows exactly who he is, 
his history, and his potential.
Since being ordained by Cardinal Sin sixteen years ago, Villegas has been Sin’s 
personal secretary and spokesman and has been in the forefront of many o f the Church’s 
political battles. In fact, Villegas was just months into the priesthood when he stood by 
Cardinal Sin’s side during the four days o f the first People Power Revolution of 1986.
For eleven years, he was the rector o f the EDSA shrine, and in January 2001, it was 
Villegas who turned on the lights at EDSA to welcome the first wave o f protesters 
against President Joseph Estrada.72
The faithful who have attended Mass at the shrine during the past decade know 
Father “Soc” very well, having been “entranced by the homilies o f the baby-faced
• 7T •priest.” Villegas has been called a “gifted sermon writer and orator, a charismatic, 
principled leader who guides his faithful with steadfast, moral courage.” 74 In Manila’s 
political circles, he is known for being a simple, well-spoken advocate o f conservative 
Catholicism, making the Church’s doctrines palatable to all.
71Andrea Trinidad-Echavez, “Msgr. 'Soc' Now a Bishop,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 27,2001; accessed 5 October 
2002).
72“Barbed-wire Crest for New Bishop,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (September 1, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
73Kris Aquino, “A Modem Man o f the Church,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones 
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (September 3, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
74Ibid.
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Villegas has also accumulated some accolades. In the year 2000, he received the 
Ten Outstanding Young Men (TOYM) award for community development given by the 
Philippine Jaycees. He is also the author o f five books on homilies, prayers, and 
reflections. Moreover, he was given the Catholic Authors Awards by the Asian Catholic 
Publishers Inc. in 1994. He also serves as member o f the College of Consultors, vicar 
general o f the Archdiocese o f Manila, and the district head o f the Ecclesiastical District 
of Quezon City-South. He was also executive coordinator of the Commission for the 
World Youth Day 1995 in Manila.
But those offices and honors were mere baby steps to his ordination as a bishop of 
the Church on August 31,2001. The coronation was held in the historical Manila 
Cathedral and performed by none other than Cardinal Sin. In fact, Sin chose his own 
birthday as the perfect day to affirm the Church’s newest bishop. If the Cardinal’s 
personal blessing was not enough, President Arroyo, former President Aquino, and Chief 
Justice Hilario Davide were also there. They shared the audience with members of the 
Philippine Congress and some of the most politically powerful Filipinos in the world. It 
was no accident that they were in attendance. Their presence was a very real 
acknowledgment o f the event’s significance. Perhaps it was also a tacit “nod” to the 
future of the Church itself.
Even before the ceremony, Villegas had the president’s ear. Arroyo publicly 
stated during the COPA crisis that she received advice and counsel from Villegas. He had 
also offered to mediate between the Arroyo administration and COPA during the mini­
crisis discussed earlier.75 Moreover, he was also the one who pressured COPA’s 
leadership to drop their anti-Arroyo rhetoric, convincing Pastor Saycon to publicly 
apologize.
Armand N. Nocum, T. J. Burgonio, and Christine Avendano, “Bishop Offers to 
Mediate in 'Civil' Unrest,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (July 12, 2002; accessed 4 October 2002).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
340
The political elite’s attendance illustrated that in years to come, young Bishop 
Villegas would most likely be leader o f the Church, and those who wished to secure and 
legitimize their political power should become acquainted with the new bishop. On the 
day o f his coronation, Villegas’s life and Cardinal Sin’s, and perhaps even the Church’s 
role in the Arroyo administration, had come full circle. The Church of today had 
Cardinal Sin, its future lay in Villegas, and its political power rested with Arroyo.
In a way, the torch o f leadership was passed to Bishop Villegas on the day o f his 
coronation. Cardinal Sin has since receded more into the background. The rest o f the 
Church leadership has also vowed to disengage from the political scene. In a statement 
issued by 119 bishops o f the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines, they vowed 
to stay out of the country's politics and leave secular matters to ordinary Filipino 
Catholics and lay organizations.76
However, the Church has vowed to do so in the past and has failed each time. It 
is unlikely that the bishops will withdraw completely from politics. There remain too 
many important issues to deal with in the Philippines, and the Church has something to 
contribute to them all. As an essential power broker in the Philippines and the bedrock 
on which the legitimacy of the Arroyo government rests, do not expect the Church to fade 
from the public spotlight.
The Church helped situate Arroyo in the unique position where she may have 
been able to serve eight years as the president and bring real fundamental changes to the 
Philippines. Yet Arroyo’s own waffling on political matters near and dear to the Church 
produced rifts in their once close relationship. On one side was the powerful Church that 
was looking for a strong and even subservient political ally as president to help push 
through their social and political agenda, and on the other a politician being torn between
76Arturo Bariuad, “Manila Bishops Vow to Keep Out o f Politics,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (July 17, 2001; accessed 5 October 
2002).
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the need to satisfy the Church as well as political opposition in the Philippine Congress. 
The result was stagnation, and nothing was being done.
Perhaps sensing the hopelessness o f the situation and realizing she was losing 
support from all sectors Arroyo made a surprising decision. On December 30, 2002 
President Arroyo announced to the nation that she would not seek reelection in 2004.
This sent shockwaves throughout Philippine political circles and even shocked the author 
this study. On the surface there were no real indications that her situation was so 
hopeless as to warrant pulling out of politics. However, it did not take long before facts 
emerged that gave a context to her decision.
Rumors soon surfaced that Arroyo lost the support of the Church.77 These rumors 
were not hard to believe. Her popularity has been falling in recent surveys and she
78ranked a distant fourth in preferences for the 2004 presidential election. Some urged 
the President to “cast aside” the wishes of the Catholic Church in order to tackle issues 
such as population control that she has been less than assertive in dealing with while 
under the Church’s thumb.79 The Church pushed her to be more in line with their wishes. 
She could do neither. She decided to bow out.
Reaction to her decision was swift, for just a few days after her announcement the 
Church praised Arroyo during a special Thanksgiving Mass. In front of a crowd of about 
a thousand the heir-apparent o f Cardinal Sin, Bishop Socrates Villegas said that Arroyo 
had set a “fine example o f pursuing peace and unity for the world and the nation.” He
77 “Philippines Risk: Economic, Political Worries Increase,” [Wire Service 
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Economist Intelligence Unit (January 9,2003; accessed 
10 February 2003).
78 “Analysis-The Philippine Presidency: Jury Still Out on Wisdom of Arroyo’s 
Withdrawal,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Bangkok Post (January 7, 
2003: accessed 2 February 2003).
79Ramon Tulfo, “There’s a Lack o f Presidential Timber,” [Wire Service Online- 
Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 6, 2003: accessed 5 February 
2003).
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went further to declare that the President “sought the guidance of God and not politicians 
in declaring her decision not to run in 2004."80 Such a quick and glowing response leads 
this author to suspect that the Church knew and had a hand in her decision all along.
After her announcement candidates began lining up for the presidency and the 
Church is already preparing their tactics for 2004. Who are the contenders and what do 
the people think o f them? In a recent Social Weather Station poll Senator Raul Roco was 
chosen by 24 percent o f those polled, followed by actor Fernando Poe Jr. at 21 percent, 
Noli de Castro with 19 percent, and coming fourth was President Gloria Macapagal-
Q 1
Arroyo with 13 percent.
Out of this list, Femado Poe Jr. worries the Church the most. He not only is a 
popular actor but also a friend and ally to deposed President Estrada. The Church does 
not wish to see another Estrada debacle. Their reservoir of “People Power” is not so deep 
as to be able to call another in just a few years should Poe be elected and it become 
necessary. Hoping to preempt Poe’s candidacy Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, president 
of the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines, praised Arroyo while at the same 
time indirectly commenting on Poe when he said, "We must expect other political leaders 
to follow her example o f self-sacrifice when it is for the common good of all. We must 
expect possible candidates for electoral office to examine themselves in the light of the
R')needs o f the country... winnability must not be taken as a criterion for candidacy.” It 
would seem that the Church is gearing up for an offensive should Poe take on the mantle 
of Estrada and wish to challenge their authority. There are no current indications from
80 “GMA Admired, Applauded at Mass for Unity,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 2, 2003: accessed 5 February 
2003).
81 “Roco and De Castro Lead the 2004 Race, According to SWS December 7-15 
Survey,” Special Media Release [http://www.sws.org.ph] (20 December 2002: accessed 
3 January 2003).
82 Ibid.
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Poe’s side that he wishes such a political fight, and he may end up embracing the 
Catholic Church, as 2004 grows closer.
Outside electoral politics the Church is also relevant to the Philippine 
government. The recent spate of terrorist attacks in Mindanao and in Manila also 
highlights the dangers posed by Communist insurgencies and Muslim separatist 
movements. The Church may be needed now more than ever as both an intelligence 
gathering arm of the government and for its ability to negotiate peace with enemies o f the 
State. Many questions will certainly be posed and answered in the 2004 elections. Can 
the Church ensure an election of a candidate favorable to their agenda? Will the new 
president embrace the Church as a political ally? And what role will the Church play 
with the State in the next few years?
If one thing is certain about Philippine politics, it is that nothing is certain. The 
Church will certainly have a major presence, but at times the relationship between the 
Church and State—even between Cardinal Sin and Arroyo—can be a tumultuous union 
with the electorate taking the part o f the suffering children. At other times the “marriage” 
between the two is one of the most beautiful political and social relationships found in the 
family o f nation-states.
The closeness o f the relationship may trouble the hardened observer, but the sight 
of Arroyo surrounded by cardinals and bishops of the Philippine Catholic Church is 
anything but an ominous vision. In many ways, it is the continuation of a tradition 
spanning over 400 years, when the first political communities were organized around the 
Catholic parish and the local leadership was hand-picked and advised by the parish priest. 
Seeing Arroyo embraced by the Church both literally and figuratively may be just the 
way it ought to be, and it is certainly nothing unusual or any reason to feel a sense of 
foreboding. Indeed, the fact that the new president shared the stage with the Philippine 
Church may offer a bit of inner peace, if  only for a moment, for it is better to see a head 
of State surrounded by men of peace instead of the objects of war.
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In the end, the future o f the Arroyo presidency beyond 2004 and Philippine 
politics in general can be seen by examining a scene from the recent past. In fact, this 
scene may be one of the most telling and striking visuals to come out o f the Church-State 
relationship in years. It happened on January 21, 2001, as members o f the Philippine 
government joined with newly appointed President Arroyo on stage at the EDS A shrine 
along with the Church’s leadership. The following account o f the event is from the 
January 28, 2001, edition of the San Francisco Chronicle:
Philippine President Gloria Macapaga- Arroyo walked solemnly toward the 
serene-faced old man in a gold-colored vestment seated near the altar o f the 
Manila Cathedral. Bowing before Cardinal Jaime Sin, she kissed the hand o f one 
of the world's most politically influential Roman Catholic leaders, who—for the 
second time in 15 years—helped rally a million people in a popular revolt that 
brought down a tainted government. . .
Bowing in respect and acknowledgment for what the Church had just done for her 
and the Philippine nation, Arroyo recognized where her government’s legitimacy came 
from. After she bowed, the cardinal spoke to her and to the nation: “Politics in the 
Philippines must be baptized, evangelized and become a tool not for corruption but for 
sanctification . . .  we will help you for the good o f the nation. We will also criticize you 
for the good o f the nation."83
Many may pray, wish, and even plead with the Church not to “meddle in the 
affairs o f government,” but their prayers and pleas will most likely fall on deaf ears and 
their wishes will come to no avail.84 The Church is now an integral part o f Philippine
Benjamin Pimentel, “Prelate of the People / Cardinal Jaime Sin Seeks Justice in 
the Philippines,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The San Francisco 
Chronicle (January 28,2001; accessed 7 October 2002).
84Ramon Tulfo, “Lucio Tan's Unsolicited Advice,” [Wire Service Online-Dow 
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (August 30, 2002; accessed 5 October 
2002).
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democracy and performs an indispensable role. It remains active when necessary and 
vigilant when required.85
If God does exist, he may very well be working through the Church to stabilize 
Philippine democracy, marginalize its enemies, and legitimize those who will best serve 
the nation. Who is to say? It could be so. In the grand scheme o f things, whether the 
Church performs exactly as a “z” variable should function or whether it outperforms any 
social science model is o f less significance than the greater lesson found in more than 480 
years o f Philippine Church history.
The lesson is clear. The Church matters, and it matters a great deal. Take it out 
of Philippine democracy and the democracy will be weakened. Take it out of the society 
and watch governmental corruption envelope it. Take it out of the lives of those who 
believe and their moral compass goes astray. Take the Church out o f its oversight and 
advisory role and the leadership may falter. Finally, take it out o f the legitimacy process 
and the right to rule will be diminished. Like an old friend, father, mother, teacher, 
comforter, defender, and ruler, the Church has played every role for the Philippine 
people. No institution can claim a perfect track record, but given its dominance over the 
Philippine nation-state, one can hope the Church will continue to guide administrations 
and individuals for the betterment o f all under its care.
Of
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